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Executive Summary
The first chapter of the dissertation removes Singapore's saving performance from 
its pedestal as an outlier in economic history, with the reputation of being hardly 
transferable and possibly not even desirable. Instead, the results of the 
benchmarking exercise clearly show the transferability of at least the saving aspects 
of Singapore's economic history. Moreover, the particular econometric approach 
applied highlights those circumstances, which are not directly related to saving 
policies but must be taken into consideration if transferability is assessed, 
particularly the demographic structure and external position.
The exercise shows that Singapore's saving performance between 1965-99 was far 
from extraordinary once the country's circumstances are controlled for, even though 
a mere comparison of averages of saving rates across countries would have us 
believe differently. Given Singapore's purely non-policy environment, it could have 
been expected of the country to achieve at least world average saving levels, 
substantially higher than its savings at time of independence. Above world average 
levels could have been expected if we also take into consideration the country's very 
successful external situation. Finally, if we also allow for potential peer-group 
mechanisms by placing Singapore within a group of successful Asian countries, the 
average benchmark saving ratio comes very close to the country's actual saving rate.
What is indeed extraordinary about Singapore's saving performance, is not the high 
saving rates in the late 1980s and 1990s, which usually attract the most attention, but 
rather the speed of transformation of the country's saving behaviour in the first half 
of the period, when Singapore was able to overcome its initial low saving 
performance much faster and much more strongly than could have been expected 
given her circumstances. The key to understanding Singapore's saving behaviour 
must he in the turnaround achieved during the first decade of the country's 
independence. Therefore, looking merely at the country's more recent saving
m
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performance will not be able to answer how Singapore was able to achieve its 
world-record saving ratios.
Chapter Two investigates the country's saving ratios in a time-series regression 
analysis. It is able to show that strong income developments are the main force 
behind Singapore's saving behaviour, while the demographic transition seems to 
have been the initial catalyst and also the enabling factor for the important 
compulsory saving scheme. However, the exercise also shows that the different 
subaggregates of gross national saving have very different driving factors and that 
contrary to parts of the past literature all main influences, which theory generally 
suggests, can be shown to have had a significant impact on the country's savings. 
Income, particularly its dynamic, i.e. transitory, component is the single strongest 
factor followed by the CPF, whose dynamic effects were offset by lower voluntary 
and public savings but its long-term effects more than compensated. Falling 
dependency is shown to have had opposite effects, positively adding to voluntary 
savings particularly during the early years but reducing public savings for the 
whole period. The lowering of borrowing constraints over time has led to more 
consumption and thus lower savings among the private sector, which was however 
compensated by a positive impact on public savings. Full Ricardian Equivalence has 
not been present, so that public saving has had a positive net effect on the country's 
gross national savings.
Since voluntary savings was the driving force behind the early saving transition and 
voluntary saving in the early years was itself largely driven by the rising labour 
force ratio, the favourable demographic environment must be considered as having 
been central to Singapore's saving 'take-off'. Moreover, the fact that the positive 
effect of the CPF was largely due to positive net-contributions to the fund, shows 
how important this demographic change was even outside of voluntary savings. 
Singapore used the chance to exploit this demographic dividend very well, by both 
kick-starting a changed voluntary saving pattern and by using the demographic 
window for the creation of a CPF 'hump-saving'.
IV
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The accounting exercise in the Third Chapter is able to offer quantitative evidence 
for a number of general speculations about Singapore's economic history. It is able 
to show that Singapore's government was in control of the equivalent of eighty 
percent of the country's gross national savings - as a lower bound limit. However, 
the analysis also shows that the government only made final investment decisions 
for two-thirds of the funds it controlled. Moreover, as a lower limit about one fifth of 
the total investment pool or fourteen percent of cumulative 1965-99 GNP was used 
as working capital, which would indicate that a more efficient use of the funds, i.e. 
less foregone consumption, could have still been possible without affecting the 
investment success. As a conservative estimate Singapore could have reduced its 
savings by at least three percent of cumulative GNP between 1965-99 without 
negatively affecting the economy's capital efficiency. The working capital appears to 
have been accumulated solely by the public sphere, which has surrendered some of 
it to compensate the financial limitations of the private sector.
The exercise finds that private investment was predominantly directed towards the 
service sector and public investment largely towards overseas. Based on their 
investment decisions Singaporeans did not see an exploitable comparative 
advantage in manufacturing. Even foreign investors, who dominated the 
comparatively little manufacturing investments made, primarily committed their 
funds to the tertiary sector. The analysis also shows that Singapore was not a flying 
goose in the strict sense. Singapore's development did not follow a flying geese 
pattern in which the country copied another country's earlier development success 
story and invested in a successive list of increasingly advanced industries. Instead 
Singaporeans decided to invest in the tertiary sector from the start. If at all, it was 
the foreigners who were the flying geese, using Singapore for their own industrial 
sequencing. Additionally, it becomes apparent that Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
captures only about half of total investments made, which shows the limitations and 
potentially misleading results of other analyses merely concerned with GFCF.
v
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Introduction
Singapore's real per capita GNP measured in 1990 constant Singapore dollars 
stood at S$4,224 in 1965, the year of the country's separation from the Federation 
of Malaysia, which marked its final step towards independence. By 1999 this 
figure had increased more than eight-fold to S$34,965. Converted at purchasing- 
power-parities, this ranks Singapore seventh in the world - one rank behind 
Switzerland.1 The country's economy managed an average compound growth 
rate of aggregate real GNP of 8.5 per cent annually for the 35 years since its 
independence.2
While there is still controversy over exactly how much of this spectacular growth 
performance can be attributed to productivity improvements and how much to 
capital accumulation, the discussion by now seems to be about which shade of 
grey is the most appropriate one. Both sides agree that the majority of 
Singapore's growth was due to capital accumulation. This brings Singapore's 
saving behaviour to the fore-front of the discussion. In 1965 Singapore saved 
11.2% of its GNP, which was already a big improvement from negative savings 
in the early 1960s. In 1961 and 1962 the Gross National Saving (GNS) Ratio stood 
at -2.4% and -2.3% respectively. By 1984 Singapore had further raised its GNS- 
ratio to 45.6%, among the highest in the world. After a short-term decline of the 
ratio in the second half of the 1980s, national saving increased again to a peerless
’ World Bank (2001), p. 275
2 During this time Singapore has transformed itself into, for example, the world's largest disk-drive 
producer, the fourth largest global foreign exchange centre after London, New York and Tokyo 
and fifth in derivatives trading. It is also one of the world’s largest offshore financial centres (IMF, 
2000, p.5 and p.26). It has also become the third largest oil refining centre after Rotterdam and 
Houston, the third largest oil trading centre after New York and London, and the largest fuel oil 
bunker market (Lee, 2000, p. 68). In 2001 its economy has been ranked the second most 
competitive in the world behind the USA by the Institute for Management Development, which 
ranked 49 countries on 286 criteria in four categories: economic performance, government 
efficiency, business efficiency and infrastructure (The Economist, May 5th 2001, p. 124).
IX
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54% of GNP in 1999.3 From 1988 onwards Singapore was able to finance gross 
capital formation solely through its national savings.4 Over the whole period 
1965 to 1999 Singaporeans saved 46.1% of their GNP.5
The nation's savings has always been considered central to the country's 
economic development. Dr. Goh Keng-Swee, the nation's first finance minister 
and a permanent member of the government cabinet until 1984, summarised the 
government's understanding of the importance of savings in a 1979 speech:
How was it possible for a small island state with no natural resources to achieve 
such an economic performance? A detailed answer would have to describe many 
complicated economic as well as political and social issues. Here I want to briefly 
discuss one crucial element in our recent economic progress to which inadequate 
attention was paid in the past. This is the role of domestic savings. There is no real 
secret about the way in which nations and individuals grow rich. They must save a 
good part of their incomes and invest their savings profitably. The more you save 
and the more wisely you invest, the faster you get rich.6
Since then quite a few studies have investigated the country's saving 
performance on the one hand and its resulting growth success on the other hand. 
The bridge between the two, namely investment allocation, has rarely been 
studied. Yet, even on the question concerning the country's savings behaviour a 
robust answer is still outstanding. This dissertation is trying to fill these gaps in 
the understanding of Singapore's economic history and therefore help its 
potential application to other country's development plans.
3 World Bank (2000, p. 299): Singapore’s Gross Domestic Saving in 1999 equalled 52% of its 
GDP. The average in East Asia stood at 37% and among the world’s high income countries at 
22%. The closest to Singapore was Angola with 48% and China with 42%.
4 Singapore Dept, of Statistics (1995), p. 31
5 Total savings 1965-99 / Total GNP 1965-99; The ratio gives thus higher weight to saving ratios 
in years with high GNP. The (unweighted) average of the annual GNS-ratios would equal 36.1% 
over the same time period.
x
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The most developed string of the literature about Singapore's economic 
development is clearly the discussion about the relative importance of the 
country's sources of growth, though even here controversy still exists about 
exactly how small the contribution of productivity gains has been to Singapore's 
growth and how respective industries and time periods have performed 
differently.6 7 The general conclusion of low productivity gains has cast some 
doubt over Singapore's economic success story. Paul Krugmann (1994) has 
probably driven home this aspect the furthest by comparing Singapore's growth 
with that of the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s, thus arguing that 
Singapore's development strategy is at least not sustainable and through the 
particular comparison indirectly hinting at even worse. The results of the TFP 
discussion have also found different interpretations. For instance, Singh (1997) 
explicitly putting himself into the tradition of the classical economists and with 
special reference in that of Kaldor (1965 and 1967) argues that, on the contrary, 
high rates of investment actually lead to greater turnover of machines and 
therefore to faster technical change, greater learning by doing, more and quicker 
product development, and hence greater international competitiveness. In 
Singh's view, this alternative non-neoclassical analysis gives no reason to assume 
that eventual decreasing returns should set in within a situation of high rates of 
investment.8 Miles and Scott (2002) interpret the TFP results on several analytical 
levels. On the one hand, they argue that the achieved increases in the standard of 
living cannot be denied. They are not a statistical mirage. Moreover, that 
Singapore did not achieve TFP growth in the past, does not mean that it will not
6 Goh (1995, p.78) in a speech given in 1979 to Singapore’s National Trade Union Congress. After 
his retirement from parliament, Dr. Goh also held the post of Deputy Chairman of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore from 1985-1992
7 The TFP literature on Singapore is not summarised in detail since a number of encompassing 
and comprehensive literature reviews have been published recently. See for example Owyong 
and Thangavelu (2002), Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp. 58-65), Miles and Scott (2002, pp.106- 
111) and IMF (2000, pp. 6-8).
8 Singh (1997, p. 232), referring as further support for this interpretation to Akyuz and Gore (1996) 
and Singh (1996)
xi
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do so in the future. On the other hand, they point out that the results of Young 
(1994) and others clearly reveal that the country's future development strategy 
will need to move away from just boosting factor inputs to focus on productivity 
improvements and that the past growth success has been far from miraculous 
since it was built on sacrifices. The current generation of Singaporeans are 
benefiting from these sacrifices, but their high standard of living has come at a 
cost.9
Casting doubt over Singapore's future growth success and removing the country 
from the pedestal of economic miracles of sustained development has thus in 
summary been the main outcome of the TFP controversy kick-started by Young's 
1992 and subsequent papers. But while Singapore's growth has come mainly 
from capital accumulation, the sheer scale of these increases in real per-capita 
income is still impressive. Moreover, the less than miracle status tells other 
countries that indeed here is a potentially simple success story waiting to be 
copied. Therefore, other developing economies could benefit from studying how 
Singapore realised such high saving rates and how it turned these into 
investments to achieve the country's capital accumulation and thus its 
tremendous increases in per-capita income and through these increases in living 
standards.10 As Collins and Bosworth (1996) have pointed out if the TFP growth 
story is correct then the main lessons from East Asian success come not from 
identifying which policies best promote TFP growth, but how economies can 
achieve and sustain high rates of saving and investment.11 Showing that 
Singapore is not a miracle, the TFP controversy has made the country's capital 
accumulation processes even more of a case study worth investigating.
9 Miles and Scott (2002, pp. 111-112)
10 Miles and Scott (2002, p. 111). They also point out that increases in labour inputs have also 
been important. Yet, there may be less to learn form this aspect, since similar increases in the 
working age population and a shift away from agriculture, which was the case not for Singapore 
but for other Asian NICs, are not easily reproduced in other nations nor politically feasible.
11 Collins and Bosworth (1996, p.139)
xu
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On a theoretical level processes of capital accumulation are far from miraculous 
because they can easily be explained and modelled. In practical terms, however, 
successfully implementing the theory is still a tremendous struggle full of 
unknowns and potential pitfalls. The relationship between saving and growth 
has been emphasised by early writers, such as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943), Singer 
(1952), Nurske (1953) and Lewis (1954, 1955). Yet only a handful of countries 
have so far succeeded down this path, Singapore being one of them. This 
dissertation intends to retract the country's steps along that path, so that other 
nations are able to see whether this path might be an option for their own 
development and possibly even how to improve upon it.
With that intention in mind, the first substantial part of the dissertation tries to 
establish how much Singapore's saving performance might have been 'sui 
generis' and therefore how much we can truly learn from the country's 
development success. Furthermore, it tries to quantify how much policy choices 
in Singapore mattered, by normalising for influences on the country's national 
saving rates other than (saving) policies so that it can be seen to what degree 
Singapore's saving performance was due to exogenous factors. In other words, 
the exercise tries to establish what saving rates could have been expected of 
Singapore given the country's circumstances. Determining these factors and 
quantifying their influence should allow other economies to weigh their relative 
position to Singapore's history more precisely and thus allow them to make a 
judgement on how likely a reproduction of Singapore's saving success might be 
in their own countries and what they might need to compensate for in their 
distinct situations in order to finance similar capital accumulation levels. The 
methodology employed uses cross-sectional regression analyses both on a 
pooled and annual basis across a world sample to derive models for 1965 to 1999 
with the Gross Domestic Saving Ratio as the dependent variable. The obtained 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are then used to calculate an expected,
xm
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benchmark GDS-Ratio for Singapore for each year given its actual data for the 
respective independent variables.
The second part of the thesis tries to remedy the fact that past attempts at 
explaining Singapore's saving behaviour have not been satisfactory - largely on 
methodological grounds. Therefore, no dear picture has yet emerged. A detailed 
time-series analysis for 1965-97 of all main saving aggregates, namely voluntary 
private, compulsory private and public national savings, will try to fill this gap, 
testing for all main influences argued for by the relevant theories, particularly 
income, demographics, borrowing constraints and the role of the government, 
including the role of Singapore's Central Provident Fund. The individual saving 
aggregates are then combined to form the country's Gross National Savings in a 
novel additive procedure, which is able to avoid a number of statistical pitfalls 
and offers a more differentiated insight into Singapore's spectacular saving 
transition since the country's independence. The final models are able to 
'explain' over ninety percent of Singapore's evolution from a low saving to one 
of the highest saving nations of the world, which in turn is fundamental to 
understanding the country's overall economic development.
Investment behaviour is the essential link running from saving to growth, but 
has rarely and if a t all only to a limited degree been investigated in Singapore's 
case. This has largely been due to the lack of a readily accessible data source. In 
an attem pt to close this gap, a large variety of government and private sources 
have been combined into a new database, which allows a much more revealing 
investigation into Singapore's investment pattern than hitherto possible and 
leads to a number of new insights about Singapore’s recent economic history. 
This third part of the thesis offers the yet largely unexplored link between the 
literature on the country's savings and the literature on its growth performance.
xiv
Chapter One
A Comparative View of Singapore's 
Gross Domestic Saving 1965-99
Chapter One
Page 1
Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1.1. INTRODUCTION
2
1
I.2. METHODOLOGY
1.2.1. The Benchmarking Process
1.2.1.1. The Gross-Domestic-Savings Ratio (GDSrat)
1.2.1.2. Non-Policy Factors
1.2.1.3. External Factors
1.2.1.4. Asian Peer Group Factor and other Regional Dummies
1.2.1.5. Variables for Sensitivity Analysis
1.2.2. The Model-Building Algorithm
1.2.3. Data Sources and Potential Problems
5
6
7
9
15
19
26
35
38
1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW
43
1.4. FINDINGS
51
51
1.4.1. Chenery-Syrquin Models
54
1.4.2. Non-Policy Models
. 621.4.3. Mixed Models
1.4.4. Non-Policy and Mixed Models without removal o f variables
1.4.5. Sensitivity Analysis
1.4.5.1. Additional Influences
1.4.5.2. Differing Variables
1.4.5.3. Probing of Asian Dummy
1.4.5.4. Potential Endogeneity o f  Net-Export-Ratio (Reverse Causation)
1.4.5.5. Other Potential Sources o f Sensitivity
67
71
72 
77 
81 
86 
88
1.4.6. Post Sensitivity Models
95
1.5. CONCLUSION
1.6. An Excurse: The Current Account Balance in Saving Regressions
1
Chapter One Page 2
1.1. Introduction
Singapore's average annual Gross Domestic Saving Ratio for the 35 years 
from 1965-99 stood at 36.13% of its GDP, which equals about double the 
world average.12 13 The country's saving performance becomes even more 
dramatic if we look at the latter half of the period only. Annual GDS-ratios 
for the vears 1981-99 average out at 45.6%, while the world's average was 
15.8%. From 1995 onwards Singapore's Gross Domestic Saving accounted for 
more than 50% of her Gross Domestic Pioduct.
Graph 1.1.a: Comparative View of Singapore’s Gross Saving Performance13
Such a sustained high-saving performance is easily seen as a mere outlier in 
econom ic history. However, no attem pt has been made to quantify the 
degree of extra-ordinarity. This part of the dissertation will try to fill this gap 
by establishing how much Singapore's saving m ight have been 'sui generis' 
indeed and therefore how much we can truly learn from  it. M oreover, it tries 
to quantify how much policy choices in Singapore mattered, by norm alising 
for influences on the country's national saving rates other than (saving)
12 The average given is an unweighted average of Singapore’s 35 annual GDS-ratios. If the 
ratios were weighted by the respective GDPs of each year the overall saving ratio would 
stand at 46.13% since more recent years with higher GDPs and higher saving ratios would 
attract a higher weight.
13 Sources- World Bank (2001) for all countries apart from Taiwan, whose data is taken from 
Council for Economic Planning and Development Republic of China: Taiwan Statistical Data 
Book (various issues); World Average refers to the average of all countries which reported 
GDS-ratios for each year of the period under investigation.
2
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policies so that it can be seen to what degree Singapore's saving performance 
was due to exogenous factors. In other words, the exercise tries to establish 
what saving rates could have been expected of Singapore given the country's 
circumstances.
The methodology employed uses regression analyses across a world sample 
to derive models for 1965 to 1999 with the Gross Domestic Saving Ratio as 
the dependent variable. The obtained coefficients of the explanatory 
variables are then used to calculate an expected, benchmark GDS-Ratio for 
Singapore for each year given its actual data for the respective independent 
variables. If the expected GDS-Ratio lies above Singapore's achieved saving 
ratio, the country 'should' have actually saved more given its circumstances. 
Singaporeans 'over-saved' if the predicted saving ratio lies below the actual 
value. Graph I.l.b. shows Singapore's actual saving ratio, the world and 
Asian averages as well as the country's over-/(under-)saving derived with 
the above methodology.14
Graph I.l.b: Singapore’s Expected Saving15
14 The Asian average comprises: China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand.
For sources see section I.2.3.. The Over-/(Under-) Saving shown in this graph is based on 
the models calculated in section 1.4.4. below. If all explanatory dimensions are controlled for 
and allowed to remain in the regression equation notwithstanding the possible loss of 
significance in some years, Singapore saved in average only 1.37% of GDP more than what 
could have been expected of the country given her circumstances.
3
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As it turns out, Singapore's saving performance was far from extraordinary if 
we control for the country's circumstances, even though a mere comparison 
of averages would have us believe differently. Given Singapore's purely non­
policy environment, it could have been expected of the country to achieve at 
least world average saving levels, substantially higher than its savings at 
time of independence. Above world average levels could have been expected 
if we also take into consideration the country's very successful external 
situation. And finally, if we also allow for potential peer-group mechanisms 
by placing Singapore within a group of successful Asian countries, the 
average benchmark saving ratio comes very close to the country's actual 
saving rate.
What is indeed extraordinary about Singapore's saving performance, is not 
the high saving rates in the late 1980s and 1990s, which usually attract the 
most attention, but rather the speed of transformation of the country's saving 
behaviour in the first half of the period, when Singapore was able to 
overcome its initial low saving performance much faster and much more 
strongly than could have been expected given her circumstances.
As a by-product of the exercise, it is also shown that export-promotion does 
not only allow a country to better exploit its comparative advantage but also 
allows the country to raise its saving levels and thus finance the further 
improvement and exploitation of this comparative advantage and possibly 
even to finance the creation of new comparative advantages. In turn this can 
potentially open up a virtuous circle of development. Additionally, the cross­
country regression analyses demonstrate that it is generally a lengthy process 
to alter a country's saving performance. Saving inertia in the world sample 
takes over twenty years to lose its significance.
The next section will describe the methodology in more detail, followed by a 
literature review of past cross-country studies of national savings. The fourth 
section will present the results of the individual statistical models, including 
a very detailed sensitivity analysis. Finally, a conclusion will summarise.
4
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1.2. Methodology
In a series of ten articles between 1956-67 Kuznets analysed inter-country 
variation in principal components of the gross national product and 
compared these results to historical changes in developed countries.16 This 
research gave rise to Chenery and Syrquin's investigation of over 100 
countries for the period 1950-75. Twenty-eight independent variables 
describing accumulation, allocation, demographic and distributional 
processes were independently regressed on semi-log functions with income, 
population and net capital inflows as explanatory variables.17 One of the 
dependent variables investigated was the countries' GDS-ratios. Chenery 
and Syrquin were trying to summarise the relationships of these processes 
along growth paths and thus establish certain 'Patterns of Development', 
particularly structural changes of the economy as the country increases its 
level of economic development defined as per capita income.18 Additionally, 
they also realised that the derivation of benchmarks can be one of the 
potential benefits of their approach, which is the route this article will take 
rather than investigating development patterns.19
16 Journal of Economic Development and Cultural Change, various issues 1956-67. As Lai 
and Myint (1996, p.3) point out already J.S. Mill set out the logic of comparative studies 
explicitly in his ‘A System of Logic’ (especially book III, ch. VIII) and this comparative method 
was applied by Alexis de Tocqueville in his ‘Democracy in America’ and by Marc Bloch in 
‘Feudal Society’.
17 Chenery and Syrquin (1975). In a later study, Syrquin and Chenery (1989), the period was 
extended to cover 1950 -  1983 and the sample size comprised 108 countries. For their exact 
regression formulas and an attempt to replicate their results see section 1.4.1. Crafts (1984) 
applies their approach to 19th century Europe and Learner (1987) extends the methodology 
to a three-factor, n-good General Equilibrium Model.
18 As Chenery (1986, p.13) explains, one of their motivations for their analysis was the critical 
assessment of neo-classical growth theory: “In the neoclassical tradition, GNP rises as the 
result of the long-term effects of capital formation, labor force expansion, and technological 
change, which are assumed to take place under conditions of competitive equilibrium. Shifts 
in demand and the movement of resources from one sector to another are considered 
relatively unimportant because labor and capital produce equal marginal returns in all uses.
19 Chenery and Syrquin (1975, p. 4): "By comparing countries that are following similar 
development patterns, it is possible to derive more valid performance standards and also 
compare the policies chosen by countries under similar conditions.
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1.2.1. The Benchmarking Process
By deriving best-fit regressions for the world sample and then inserting in 
this case Singapore's actual data for the explanatory variables, an 'expected 
value' for the dependent variable is obtained. The relationship of this 
expected value with the actual value can be investigated over time to 
highlight significant deviations in certain periods. In other words, this 
exercise aims to obtain benchmark values for Singapore's GDS-ratio 
controlling for those explanatory variables, which prove to be significant in 
modelling the variation in GDS-ratios across a world sample. Moreover, the 
pool of potential explanatory variables is being restricted to those which are 
not or only to a limited degree influenced by the countries' policies. As a 
result the statistical model determines how much of the variance between 
individual countries' savings performance can be explained by variables 
exogenous to the countries' respective policy choices.20 The modelling 
process works its way through three levels of control. The initial level 
controls only for the strictly non-policy environment. The second step adds 
the external situation and finally the peer-group factor is incorporated. 
Inserting Singapore's actual data into such a model will tell us how much the 
country should have been expected to save given her particular 
circumstances. What remain unmodelled are largely country-specific issues, 
which are open to policy choices and motivate the detailed time-series 
analysis in the next chapter.
It is important to emphasise that this article does not intend to explain 
Singapore's saving behaviour, even though the main technical tool used, 
namely regression analysis, is in its basic form identical to what would be 
used in an empirical attempt at 'explaining' behavioural statistics. Such an
Generally, poltcy can impact the regress on in a|sJ ¡mpact the observed level
respective variable’s effect on savings, ' e ^ s  coe . sample, i.e. Singapore
of the variable. The former effect is controlled for by the use or a ^  se(ection of the
is given the same impact the variable has in averag rohjbiting policy induced factors
variables tries to contain the impact of the latter effect by proniomny p 
from being modelled.
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intention, however, would necessitate a different model building process. 
Instead of explaining Singapore's saving behaviour, this exercise actually 
attempts to revise the country's saving performance by controlling for 
(largely) exogenous factors. In other words, rather than explaining the actual 
behaviour, the exercise tries to determine what behaviour could have been 
expected of Singapore.
The remainder of this section will discuss the individual variables used in the 
model, starting with the dependent variable, continuing with the non-policy, 
the external and the peer-group factors before closing with variables 
investigated in the sensitivity analyses.
I.2.1.1. The Gross-Domestic-Savings Ratio (GDSrat)
The GDS-ratio being in essence a plug in the national accounts is wide open 
to criticism. However, so far no clearly superior estimate of a country's 
saving has been established. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise the 
weakness of this variable, stemming from problems with the quality of the 
national income accounts, which are particularly detrimental to cross­
country studies.21
Hayashi (1989), for example, points out that much of the difference between 
the saving rates of the US and Japan is removed once common accounting 
practices are applied to the national accounts of both countries. Moreover, it 
can be argued that such items as education and private residential 
construction, which national accounting convention treats as consumption, 
should be considered as investments and thus added to Gross National 
Saving. The difference between developed countries with comparatively low 
saving rates but high educational spending and developing countries with
21
See Collins (1991, p. 349) for an assessment of this problem and also section II.4.3. which 
discusses alternative measures of saving, particularly from a time-series point-of-view.
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possibly higher saving rates but lower educational expenditures would then 
be less striking. Additionally, some authors also point to the fact that 
national income accounts do not account for capital gains. A study by Martin 
Barnes in the Bank Credit Analyst points out that customary saving ratios 
take into account taxes paid by individuals when they realise a capital gain 
from selling shares, but ignores the increase in income when the capital gain 
is banked.22 Adding back the tax would have raised the saving rate in the 
United States by 1.7 percent in 2000. Including the whole capital gain would 
have increased personal income by 6.7 percent. These two adjustments 
together would have pushed the saving rate into positive territory for that 
year.
Due to these notorious data problems in measuring savings, empirical 
findings -  particularly those stemming from cross-country comparisons -  
need to be interpreted with caution. Yet, lacking a superior estimate for 
international studies, no true alternative to saving estimates based on 
national accounts exists.
However, it is possible to avoid at least a number of data problems by 
selecting wisely among the different available saving aggregates derived 
from the national accounts. Particularly, the potential use of Gross National 
Savings is plagued by international differences in the measurement of 
remittances and other net-factor income from abroad. The compilation of this 
particular part of the Balance of Payments varies substantially from country 
to country, which is especially detrimental to the estimates of some 
developing countries. At times the respective transactions might simply 
appear in Errors and Omissions or potentially not appear at all. For this 
reason, this part of the thesis will use Gross-Domestic Savings although the 
time-series investigation about Singapore in the next chapter employs Gross 
National Savings. The potentially very revealing investigation of Net Saving 
rates is also prohibited by the very widely differing depreciation concepts
22 As reported in the Economist (June 23rd, 2001, p. 108)
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between countries, or within a country over time and even between different 
sources of the same country. Furthermore, many countries still lack estimates 
of capital consumption, which will make any cross-national comparison very 
sensitive to sampling errors.23
I.2.1.2. Non-Policy Factors
Factors which are not policy influenced include a country's demography, 
geography and its initial situation from just before the beginning of the 
period of observation.24
The Initial Situation
The initial situation is described by the country's average saving ratio and 
average per-capita income (in current US dollars) between 1962-64, i.e. the 
three years before the start of our regression analysis.25 The inherited saving 
ratio (IniGDS) is a measure of behavioural inertia, arguing that a country's 
saving performance is at least partly determined by its past saving 
behaviour.26 The initial level of GDP (IniGDP) allows for a classification of 
the individual countries into separate income groups, such as high, middle or
"  Also see Collins (1991, p. 349) who finds net-saving estimates even in their limited 
availability very unreliable.
24 A further, rather special type are regional dummies, which on first view clearly capture 
external factors because countries generally have a difficulty in choosing their regional 
neighbours. However, on a closer look the particular construction of the regional group can 
potentially capture other factors shared between the neighbours apart from their geographical 
proximity. Therefore, regional dummy variables are treated separately.
25 For Singapore these years include the unfortunate merger with Malaysia, which ended in 
September 1965. While this does not affect the regression outcomes, it will impact the 
benchmarking results. One can argue that the actual Singapore numbers plugged into the 
regression outcome to obtain the benchmark are too negatively affected by the unsuccessful 
merger period. However, it is also inappropriate to use pre-merger data, which would assume 
that the merger and any related or unrelated events during these years had never taken 
place. Therefore, this study still considers 1965 as the starting point of Singapore s 
development and thus the years just before as a description of its inherited situation.
26 For an example of another econometrical analysis of cross-country saving behaviour, 
which has used saving inertia variables, see Loayza et al. (2000).
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low-income, and thus into levels of economic development without the loss 
of variance in the sample. Furthermore, it can be argued, that the higher per- 
capita income the higher is the potential saving beyond a basic level of 
consumption.27
A very important aspect of a country's initial situation, which is however 
also very difficult to capture, is the quality of its institutions. As famously 
argued by Douglas North and other new-institutionalists, countries with 
better institutions, more secure property rights, and less distortionary 
policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and will use these 
factors more efficiently to achieve a greater level of income.28 This view has 
received some support from recent cross-country correlations between 
measures of property rights and economic development and from a few 
micro studies that investigate the relationship between property rights and 
investment or output.29 Efforts which try to quantify a country's institutional 
environment are largely recent investigations, which hardly offer 
observations going back further than the 1970s.30 This poses a problem in 
Singapore's case, because the country had already undergone a substantial 
institutional and social transformation by this time. Moreover, on a more 
general level, the recent ex-post studies are largely based on personal
27 This argument, however, has mixed theoretical and empirical support, largely because per- 
capita income is not the same as a person’s income. Furthermore, according to life-cycle and 
permanent income theory the change of income is actually the more important variable. See 
Section 11.1 for a discussion of determinants of saving behaviour.
28 See for example: North and Thomas (1973), Jones (1981) and North (1981)
29 For examples of cross-country investigations see e g. Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro 
(1995), Hall and Jones (1999), Rodrik (1999), and for micro-studies see for example Besley 
(1995), Mazingo (1999), and Johnson et al (1999)
30 The World Bank's governance dataset, for example, offers data only for 1997/8. The 
Heritage Foundation publishes political variables since 1995. The International Country Risk 
Group offers a dataset with observations starting in 1982. The related Gastil-index describes 
political rights and civil liberties from 1972 onwards, see Gastil (1978) and Freedom House 
(various years). The oldest direct observation on institutional quality can be obtained from 
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (Beri) and stem from 1972. These will be tested in 
the sensitivity analysis only, because the inclusion in the original investigation would bias the 
results of the benchmarking due to the fact that by 1972 Singapore has undergone 
substantial institutional change. In a recent study, as reported by The Economist, April 7th, 
2001, Asian Business Survey, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy rated Singapore 
best in corporate governance and transparency in Asia ahead of Hong Kong, Japan, and with 
South Korea at the tail end. It also ranked Singapore best in terms of quality of legal system, 
ahead of Japan and Hong Kong, with Indonesia the worst. This perception of high institutional 
quality, particularly the status of being ahead of Japan and Hong Kong, is not likely to have 
been the case at time of independence.
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assessments and are therefore very likely biased by the respective countries' 
subsequent economic development.
Fortunately, three datasets are available which offer at least proxy variables 
if not direct estimates of institutional quality for the required time period. 
However, the sample sizes are comparatively small and their coverage 
varies. A study by Adelmann and Morris (1967), which weights twenty-two 
socio-economic indicators into a single index, offers an ex-ante view of the 
social capability of seventy-four developing countries with data from the 
early 1960s and has performed well in recent tests, e.g. Temple and Johnson 
(1998).31 Unfortunately, it does not include an estimate for Singapore.32 The 
second dataset, constructed by Nehry, Swanson and Dubey (1993) and also 
used by Loayza et al. (1998a), offers an estimate of the human capital stock of 
a set of 85 countries with observations for 1965, including Singapore.33 The 
variable describes the mean years of schooling of the working age 
population. The third set is taken from Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), who try to explain how a number of ex-colonies have developed 
certain institutional arrangements and found that the difficulty of 
colonisation experienced by the former colonial powers is a very good proxy 
for the respective countries' institutional quality in their post-colonial 
economic history. They argue that the more difficult it was for a colonial 
power to reach and control a certain region, the more likely it is that the
31 Adelmann and Morris’ attempt at capturing the socio-economic development of a country 
has again taken centre-stage in development economics, particularly since Abramovitz 
(1986), but also more recently obtaining support from the work of Putnam (1993). Temple 
and Johnson (1998) find that the Adelman-Morris index can partly explain the respective 
countries’ subsequent growth performance. However, they also point out that the direction of 
causality is uncertain, with links running most likely in both directions. A higher level of 
development is likely to be reflected in higher investment and lower population growth, raising 
steady state income, while economic development is often felt to bring far-reaching social 
changes in its wake.
32 The value of Singapore's Social Capability is not needed for the regression itself, but for 
the calculation of the country's benchmark saving ratio. The Singapore value was therefore 
approximated by the average social capability of the top tier of developing countries 
according to Adelman and Morris’ (1967) own categorisation. That top-tier includes twenty- 
five of the total of 76 countries. The dataset offers an observation for South Vietnam, which 
this study uses as the best approximation for the initial institutional quality once observations 
of the other variables for the later re-united Vietnam become available in 1986.
33 The better known source, Barro and Lee (1993), unfortunately does not offer an 
observation for Singapore until 1975.
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colonists established institutions tailored to exploit the colony from afar. 
These sub-optimal institutional arrangements, they argue, persisted beyond 
the countries' eventual independence. The degree of difficulty faced by the 
colonial power was quantified by the mortality rate among the colonising 
pioneers, which they have researched for sixty-four ex-colonies including 
Singapore. The variable performs very well in their models. After they 
control for the institutional quality proxied by this variable countries in 
Africa or close to the Equator do not have lower incomes than the other 
countries in their sample.34 The Adelmann-Morris estimates (SocCap), the 
Nehry-Swanson-Dubey figures (HumCap) as well as the Acemoglu-Johnson- 
Robinson variable (Mortality) are therefore used as the best available proxies 
for the institutional quality at the beginning of our period of investigation.
Demography
The demographic development of a country -  especially as it affects its 
saving performance -  can be captured by the proportion of the population of 
working age (EcoAcRat), the degree of urbanisation (Urb) and the size of the 
total population (TotPop). EcoAcRat is defined as the number of people aged 
between 15 and 64 as a percentage of the total population. The higher the 
percent of people in working age, the lower will be the ratio of those 
dependent on the wage earners. Therefore, the wage earner in average 
should be able to save more of his/her income.35 The inclusion of the 
urbanisation ratio is based on the argument that more rural societies find it 
more difficult to save due to a potential lack of sufficient financial 
institutions in rural areas. Urban societies, on the other hand, find it easier to
M Acemoglu et al. (2001) accept that differences in mortality rates are not the only, or even 
the main, cause of variation in institutions. However, they maintain that they are a source of 
exogenous variation. Their analysis shows that mortality rates faced by the settlers more than 
100 years ago can explain over 25 percent of the variation in current institutional quality 
within their sample.
35 For a more detailed discussion of the underlying theory see section 11.1. about the theories 
behind saving behaviour.
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establish and benefit from such institutions.36 A more urbanised or more 
densely populated country is also more likely to benefit from agglomeration 
externalities.37 38The total population is a measure of the size of the economy. 
Its inclusion in the investigation stems from the Chenery-Syrquin exercise, 
although its theoretical backing in terms of its effect on a country's saving 
behaviour is ambiguous. Generally, the Chenery-Syrquin finding that size 
matters is not necessarily robust, see Balassa (1981) and Ellison and Gereffi 
(1990).3R Furthermore, a small population doesn't necessarily mean a small 
market. In terms of income, for example, the modern developed Singapore 
has a much larger market than many developing countries with much larger 
populations.
Some governments have tried to control the fertility of their people, so that it 
could be argued that in the long term EcoAcRat and TotPop are to a degree 
policy influenced. Singapore has also had a government led programme on 
fertility control until the mid 1980s. This program, however, was only able to 
reinforce an already existing trend, which had its origin in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. To what degree this re-enforcement potentially increased the 
magnitude and speed of the demographic transition in Singapore is arguable. 
The evidence appears to point to only a minor impact.39 For the purposes of 
this investigation, therefore, all demographic variables are considered to be 
exogenous to Singapore's policies.
36 Following the World Bank procedure, the required size of a town to be considered an urban 
environment is left to the respective country’s own definition. Therefore, Urb describes the 
share of the total population living in areas defined as urban in each country.
37 See for example Henderson et al. (2000) for an investigation into the role of cities in 
developing countries.
38 Balassa (1981, p. 377) argues that the East Asian NICs are not really small in market 
terms compared to many other developing countries. In particular the comparison with Latin 
America, shows that while, for example, “Brazil and Mexico possess much larger 
populations, their highly unequal pattern of income distribution, low wages, and slow growth 
rates in recent years have effectively reduced the size of the domestic markets to levels 
closer to that of their smaller East Asian counterparts than population figures alone would 
suggest."
39 See section 11.3.2. for a discussion of the existing evidence.
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Geography
The relationship between geography and economic development has seen an 
academic renaissance in form of the 'new geography' literature appearing in 
the later half of the 1990s by Jeffrey Sachs, Robert Barro, Paul Krugman, 
Anthony Venables and others. In general the literature assigns geography 
economic importance due to its effects on transportation costs and intrinsic 
productivity. The old real-estate mantra, it is argued, applies to development 
economics just as well: location, location, location. Gallup et al. (1999) extend 
this pure geography view somewhat by suggesting that climate just as much 
as location affect income levels and income growth, through its effect on 
transport costs, disease burdens, agricultural productivity, and even the 
choice of economic policy itself, among other channels.40 More directly 
related to savings, Ghosh and Wolf (2000) found that gross domestic product 
per capita is the only variable other than distance that helps explain capital 
flows. According to the authors, these results help explain why Africa has 
traditionally had limited access to capital markets. It appears opportune, 
therefore, to also include geographic variables in order to capture the effect 
they may have on a country's saving performance. Gallup et al. (1999) offer a 
comparatively large set of geographical variables for a sample of 150 
countries including Singapore.41 Tropicar describes the percentage of land 
per country which lies in the geographical tropics. PoplOOkm measures the 
proportion of the population within 100km of the coastline and AirDist the 
minimum distance to the closest of any of three main economic centres of the 
world: New York, Rotterdam, or Tokyo. The Landlock dummy variable, 
takes the value of one if nobody in a given country lives within 100km of a 
coastline, i.e. if PoplOOkm = 0. Due to the potential link between geography
40 The importance of climate has found early criticism stemming from the comparison of 
often very different developmental paths of pairs of countries in similar climatic 
circumstances, e.g. Meier (1995, p.62): “Neither Singapore nor Hong Kong -  among the 
superperformers in development -  has an ideal temperate climate. Nor are the climates of 
Ghana and the Ivory Coast different form each other, but the Ivory Coast was an ‘economic 
miracle’, while Ghana retrogressed.”
41 The data is available online at: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html. The latest 
version was downloaded May 2002.
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and disease burdens, Gallup et al. (1999) also offer a variable (Malaria) for a 
subset of 144 countries including Singapore, which measures the prevalence 
of malaria in a given country. The variable is defined as the product of the 
fraction of land area subject to malaria times the fraction of Falciparum cases, 
i.e. the malignant form of malaria. In respect to its effect on savings, it must 
be assumed that the higher the chances of malaria, the less likely individuals 
will save for old age.
1.2.1.3. External Factors
Next to strictly non-policy factors, the analysis will also try to control for 
Singapore's external situation, namely the country's Net-Export Ratio (or 
resource balance) and Net-FDI receipts. Due to Singapore's location, resource 
endowment and size these external influences can be considered to be 
predominantly (but not completely) non-policy in her case.
Net-Export Ratio / Resource Balance42
A country's current account situation is regularly included in saving analyses 
in order to capture the country's access to foreign savings and possible 
effects of external borrowing constraints. However, the argument that a 
current account surplus (deficit) is a sign that the country is (is not) 
experiencing external borrowing constraints is flawed as the excurse at the 
end of the chapter (Section 1.6.) shows in some detail. Instead an external 
surplus affects savings simply because it allows for higher saving without the 
need to reduce the absolute level of consumption. In turn, a deficit will put
Definition of Resource Balance = Exports of Goods and Services -  Imports of Goods and 
Services; Goods and Services defined as: “goods and services represent the value of all 
goods and other market services received from the rest of the world. They include the value 
of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other 
services, such as communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal,
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increasingly high pressures on national saving if domestic consumption is 
not relinquished to make up for the foreign imports. In other words, a net- 
exporting economy should always have higher savings.* 43 Policy choices with 
the intention to implement an open economy and any government action 
designed to make this decision a successful strategy have, so to say, a free 
windfall return of rising savings. From this angle already, the effect of the 
resource balance should be controlled for in order to better separate and 
evaluate saving policy impacts.44
In Singapore's case the requirement to control for the effect of net-exports is 
further necessitated by the fact that the openness of the country has not even 
been determined by choice but by necessity, on both the import and export 
side of her external balance.45 On the one hand, the country's resource 
endowments make it highly dependent on imports, while on the other hand 
its superior location on the main East-West trading routes and access to a 
massive but foreign hinterland make Singapore a natural (re-)export 
economy. In slightly over-stated form this means that if there ever was a 
policy decision for Singapore to be export-oriented, it was taken by Sir 
Raffles in 1819, when he founded the city as an entre-pot port. At the 
country's independence, this decision can certainly be considered 
exogenous.46
and government services. They exclude labor and property income (formerly called factor 
services) as well as transfer payments." (WDI CD-Rom, 2001 edition)
43 This relationship is even reflected in the basic accounting identity: Y = I + C + G + NX; 
which can be rearranged as: Saving = Y -  C -  G = I + NX.
44 Controlling for this effect can be either accomplished through the net-export-ratio or the 
current account balance which only differ in the exclusion of transfer payments by the former. 
Net-exports are more widely available, which is not surprising because net-transfers are 
generally more difficult to trace than imports and exports. If the Current Account was used 
then the appropriate national income figure should be GNP instead of GDP and thus 
correspondingly the dependent variable would need to be Gross-National-Saving instead of 
Gross-Domestic Saving, which for the same reasons is also less frequently available and as 
argued above more prone to issues of data quality. Using current-account balances to model 
Gross-Domestic-Saving thus introduces empirical inconsistency and limits the sample 
unnecessarily. Therefore, the net-export-ratio was used, although the literature largely 
employs the current-account balance.
45 See Urn, Chong-Yah (1991, p. 199) who concludes his assessment of Singapore’s 
outward-looking strategy as one “born of necessity”. Similarly, Kosai and Takeuchi (1998, p. 
314), argue that Singapore’s small domestic market forced it to be outward-oriented.
46 This view is even further extended by Muscatelli, Stevenson and Montagna s (1995) finding 
that the success of the Asian NIC’s manufacturing exports was largely due to the exploitation
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However, even in such a rigid policy environment a government is still not 
completely without tools to influence at least to a degree a country's resource 
balance, particularly by controlling the income-elasticities of demand for 
foreign consumption. In respect to Singapore, it must be noted that the 
government did indeed try to influence the composition of domestic 
consumption which in turn can leave its mark on imports and thus the 
resource balance. The most easily observable example of such interference in 
Singapore is the high cost of car ownership due to a number of fee and tax 
instruments. Therefore, while the export orientation and the general 
dependence on imports can be taken as given, the exact manifestation in 
form of the country's resource balance is still partly policy influenced. 
Consequently, the net-export-ratio must be considered a largely but not 
completely non-policy variable.47
Net-Foreign-Direct-Investment (Net-FDI)
The argument about Net-FDI-inflows follows that for the resource balance in 
that higher Net-FDI-inflows allow for a higher savings-ratio without the 
need to reduce the absolute level of consumption. Also similarly to the 
resource balance FDI receipts are potentially influenced by government 
policy. Huff (1995) points to the combined macro-economic stability and high 
infra-structural investments in Singapore as the main explanation for the 
country's high FDI receipts. This combination in turn, he argues, is due to the 
high degree of savings in Singapore, which would also point towards a
of price and income elasticities in the customer countries, pointing to the fact that not only the 
export-orientation but also the export success was predominantly driven by exogenous 
factors. Moreover, Kosai and Takeuchi (1993) and Felix (1994) point to East Asia’s low 
income elasticities of demand particularly for foreign goods, following similar developments in 
Japan. Felix (1994, pp. 128-133) argues persuasively that Asian consumers had more 
moderate income elasticities of demand for foreign-type consumables then for example Latin 
American consumers, who exhibited import-biased consumption preferences. In other words, 
the persistence of positive income elasticities for indigenously designed traditional 
consumables and thus low import-elasticities was culturally pre-determined.
47
Unfortunately, the interaction between consumption, imports and savings potentially also 
creates a statistical problem of simultaneity, which requires a slightly different statistical 
methodology. See the sensitivity analysis for an assessment of the potential effect of 
simultaneity on the main findings.
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potential simultaneity problem. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) argue that a 
country needs to offer substantial subsidies in order to overcome a 'lemon' 
problem in a world with a perfectly elastic supply of capital but imperfect 
information, which would also support the view that FDI is influenced by 
policy. Hughes and You (1969) in their early study of FDI in Singapore argue 
that it was not necessarily the tax incentives, but rather the efficient 
administration which attracted foreign investors to the city-state.48
However, while the recipient country can try to attract FDI with its policies, 
the high volatility of FDI across the world seems to be driven by many more 
aspects, such as the domestic situation of the sending country, cyclical world- 
economy developments and international financial shocks.49 Therefore, while 
the recipient countries might be able to influence at least to a degree where 
FDI is directed to, the amounts available and the time when they are made 
available seem to depend on factors not influençable by policies of the 
recipient country. Consequently, Net-FDI must be considered to a substantial 
degree a non-policy variable -  especially in a cross-sectional world sample.
The potential simultaneity between Net-FDI and savings is more difficult to 
resolve than the same problem between the resource balance and savings, 
because if the variables are jointly determined then only over a longer period 
of time due to the longer time-horizons underlying investment decisions.50 
This makes both finding instruments for a 2SLS model extremely difficult 
and also suggests that the simultaneity, while possibly existing on an 
analytical level, is not likely to impact the empirical analysis, because the 
error terms of the regression models are not likely to be correlated with the 
Net-FDI observation for the respective year(s).
48 Hughes and You (1969, p. 188)
49 For a summary of the FDI literature see Edwards (2000) and World Bank (1997). For a 
recent assessment of FDI from Singapore’s perspective see Ermish and Huff (1999).
50 Regressing Net-FDI on its lags for the last three years only yields an adjusted R-squared of 
o 36, in our sample (N=3057) for 1975-99, with all three lags significant at the ninety-five- 
percent confidence interval.
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I.2.1.4. Asian Peer Group Factor and other Regional Dummies
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The study works with three regional dummies, which intend to capture 
effects shared by the respective group of neighbouring countries beyond 
their individual non-policy and external situation. A dummy for Latin 
America (LA) comprises twenty countries from South Am erica.51 The Sub- 
Sahara (Sahara) dummy consists of forty-six African nations.5* The Asian 
dummy (Asia) combines Japan, the four East-Asian Tigers (Singapore, Hong 
Kong, South Korea and Taiwan), the second-tier Asian NICs, nam ely 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as the latest fast-track 
industrialising country, China.
These Asian countries are often investigated together in the sam e or sim ilar 
formation. Meier (1986) groups together the four Tigers, the second-tier NICs 
and the Philippines. De Brouwer (1999) also investigates the four Tigers and 
the second tier NICs plus the Philippines and Australia. Collins (1991) uses 
the same set of Asian countries as this study less China but adding Burma 
and Turkey. Kosai and Takeuchi (1998) investigating the influence of Japan's 
developm ent history have the exact same grouping as our Asian dummy. 
The W orld Bank's East Asian Miracle also works w ith a similar grouping, 
which they call HPAE (high-performing Asian econom ies). Page (1994) 
works on the same group of countries as our dummy except for China. The 
two m ain differences between the grouping used in this study and those just 
referred to are the inclusion of the Philippines and the exclusion of China. 
The Philippines are often included due to the fact that as early as the 1950s 
the country was picked to be the m ost likely candidate of an econom ic
"  The twenty Latin Arnericar■ ^ t n e ^ r e :  A*ens™.
S S n u a  Pan^nr'p^iraguayTenh Surin^ne'Uruguay and Venezueta.
Nic agua, Panama, 9 y nat:nns are- Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso,
The forty-six Sub-Saharan African African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Dem. 
Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central A can Ethjopjai Gabon The Gambia,
Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Cote dlvoire, Equ Lesotho,' Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, K V 1 Namibia Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mozambiqu , a ’ n 9 S th Africa Sudari) Swaziland, 
and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, some ,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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miracle.53 The exclusion of China is generally explained with the lack of data. 
However, the availability of data for China has improved and recently the 
country features more often in comparative analyses, e.g. Gamaut et al. 
(1995) and Kosai and Tackeuchi (1998). In order to evaluate the sensitivity of 
the Asian dummy in respect to these differences the Sensitivity Analysis will 
test the effects of a different Asian dummy which includes the Philippines 
and excludes China.
While the core configuration of the group of Asian countries is largely agreed 
upon in the literature, differences on what these countries actually share and 
thus what such a dummy measures are widespread. Geography, policy, 
culture, successful economic growth and demography are all referred to as 
important similarities. While the impact of geography, demography and 
growth can be investigated empirically, which the sensitivity analysis will 
undertake, the influence of the policy and cultural environment is more 
difficult to capture empirically.
Geography, Demography and Growth
The new-geography literature suggests that distance with its impact on 
trade, investment and income is the driving force behind the often found 
statistical significance of these regional variables.54 They appear to model the 
costs of being outside of existing economic centres. This study, however, will 
already model geography via the separate inclusion of the geographical 
variables described above. If the dummy is significant even if the 
geographical variables are included or themselves insignificant, then the 
dummy appears to capture at least more than geography. If the dummy 
proves not to be significant once the geographical variables are included,
For example see: World Bank (1993, p. 22): “In the 1950s, [the Philippines were] thought 
to have the best potential in the region, second only to Japan."
See for example Hendersen et al. (2000)
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then indeed geography seems to be the driving force. The effects of growth 
and demographic developments can be similarly investigated.
Policy
De Brouwer (1999) convincingly shows that the East Asian countries had 
very varied policies in respect to consumption, savings and their financial 
markets. Ito (1996) offers a comprehensive assessment of similarities and 
differences in the East Asian economies and finds that there is almost no 
generalisation that applies to every fast-growing country in East Asia, not 
even the fact of very high rates of investment and saving, where Hong Kong 
is the exception.55 Therefore, no clear set of policies emerges which could 
distinguish East Asian countries. However, statistical analysis works with 
averages and thus it must be said that even if some individual countries 
differed on certain aspects, the successful East Asian countries tended to be 
more export oriented and have a more economically active state.56
The Flying Geese hypothesis gives a potential explanation why these 
tendencies might have been shared across the region. Bruce Cumings (1984) 
argued in his often cited analogy with flying geese that countries in East Asia 
followed one another in a developmental trajectory in which the latecomers 
replicate the developmental experience of the countries ahead of them, 
starting with the Japanese.57 The simplicity of this view has attracted a fair 
share of criticism, e.g. Bernard and Ravenhill (1995). Yet, even Bernard and 
Ravenhill (1995) agree that a regional perspective is essential for
55 For a further comparison of many East Asian countries’ development policies particularly in 
respect to earlier Japanese policies see Yamada and Kuchiki (1997)
56 Kosai and Takeuchi, (1993, p. 312), see the similarity in the income-elasticities, i.e. the 
conservative spending habits of Japan, which have been shared to some extent by other 
East Asian countries. Felix (1994) comes to a similar conclusion. While this finding might be 
helpful in respect to an analysis of the shared growth success, it is not very useful in 
explaining the potentially shared savings performance, because in essence it would simply 
explain savings with savings.
57 As Bernard and Ravenhill (1995, pp.172-3) point out, the flying geese analogy goes back to 
an article by the Japanese economics Akamatsu Kaname published in 1937.
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understanding the pattern of industrialization in contemporary East Asia.58 
Meier (1986) argues explicitly that the East Asian NICs followed Japan and as 
the first-tier NICs moved up the ladder of comparative advantage into 
capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive products, the second tier 
countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, followed 
behind with exports from light industries such as food processing, textiles, 
clothing and simpler electronics.59 Kosai and Takeuchi (1993) also point out 
that in their view the East Asian economies have revealed a common pattern 
with growing intra-regional trade, investment and information exchange, all 
promoted by social, cultural and geographical proximity. In their view the 
flying geese model can even be understood as an external factor in East Asia, 
because latecomers simply use technologies and institutions of the other 
economies that took off first.60 But they also admit that within the geese there 
are different flying patterns depending on resource endowments, size of 
country etc. The geese decided to fly particularly differently in respect to 
their views adapted towards FDI, with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea all 
restricting FDI inflows.61 *
Culture
Cultural assessments of East Asian success point to the Confucian tradition 
which is said to promote frugality, hard work, family loyalty, respect for 
authority, a strong achievement orientation, a keen sense of personal 
obligation to group welfare, an enormous prestige of education with the 
concomitant motivation to provide the best education for one's children and 
severe meritocratic norms and institutions, which while egalitarian in design,
58 Bernard and Ravenhill (1995, p. 171)
59 Meier (1986, p. 14).
60 Kosai and Takeuchi (1993, p.313) f. • geese hypothesis. For a
61 See Section III.1.3. for a more detailed discussi g Singapore’s economic
more detailed exploration of the applicability ot tn w  investigate this hypothesis by 
history see Chapter Three, which among other aspects directly invesi y
analysing Singapore's investment pattern over time.
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serve to select out elites when they are at an early age.62 Beyond the resulting 
high working ethics, these characteristics are thought to have facilitated the 
national consensus around high-speed economic growth evident in Japan 
and the East Asian NICs since the 1950s and 1960s. This culturally derived 
capacity for cooperation is supposed to have led political elites, industrial 
leaders, workers, and other citizens to agree on the primacy of economic 
objectives for the society as a whole and on the means to achieve those 
objectives.63 Nevertheless, it is still controversial to which degree these 
cultural factors might actually be able to explain East Asia's economic 
success.64 Chan (1993) points out that East Asia's rich traditions embody a 
variety of values that can have both growth-promoting and growth- 
retarding effects. Which of these effects will prevail seems to depend not on 
culture per se but rather on its interaction with the environment. He 
concludes that in itself a cultural outlook cannot account for the East Asian 
transformation.65 Similarly, Gereffi (1994) argues that while generally 
containing valuable observations these generalizations based on cultural 
comparisons may be too sweeping:
They often fit one region or time period reasonably well but fa lter when their 
scope is expanded. (...) Simplistic cultural arguments run into a variety of 
problems. First, regions are not culturally homogeneous; this is particularly
See for example, Chan (1993, pp. 38-41), Berger (1988) or Kahn (1984)
“ Gereffi (1994, p.29-31). See also Johnson (1983, pp. 6-10), and chapters by Lucien Pye, 
Gordon Redding, and Siu-lun Wong in Berger and Hsiao (1988). By contrast, Latin America 
is argued to have been plagued by a divergent set of cultural norms based upon Ibero- 
Catholic heritage impeding the economic advancement of the region, see Valenzula and 
Valenzula (1978) for a review of this argument.
64 With regards to Singapore the origin of these potential values in the first place has also 
been taken into question. Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 35) disucss what later have been 
called 'Asian Values’ and have been associated with Lee Kuan-Yew's own views. They show 
that acutally these ‘Asian Values’ came most likely more from contact with Isreali 
development specialists and Singapore's Dutch economic adviser, Dr Winesmius, than from 
any Confucian heritage which, after all, was alien to the early PAP leaders. Another 
suggestion is found in Hill (2000), who proposes that Singapore did not adopt the general 
idea of ’Asian Values’ until later in the 1960s and 1970s from the works of Western social 
scientists, who had argued that neo-Confucianism was more conducive to industrialization 
that had been supposed. Lee Kuan Yew (2000, pp. 512-13) himself recalls how he learned of 
the nature of some Asian societies through his visits to American universities and talks with 
Western academics. Dr. Goh Keng Swee identified the values that Singapore upholds and 
which are often presented as Asian as those of the Victorian era in Britain (Peebles and 
Wilson, 2002, p. 35). Backman (1999, p. 21) offers a cyncial redefinition of what Asian 
Values actually are.
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true of East Asia. In Taiwan and South Korea, for example, Taoism and 
Buddhism as well as Confucianism have important followings, and there is a 
significant Christian minority in some East Asian countries like South Korea. 
More importantly in terms of the timing of high-speed growth, [Confucian as 
well as Christian] traditions have existed for centuries. But especially in East 
Asia ... the dynamic shifts in economic performance have occurred primarily 
in recent decades. A more sophisticated cultural interpretation would see 
culture as historically situated, emergent, and mediated through institutions. 
(...) The impact of cultural variables probably is most important in outlining an 
acceptable range of solutions to development problems, rather than in 
determining specific economic outcom es.65 6
Peer Group
In summary, hardly any factors have been shared across the whole region, 
with the exception -  as the sensitivity analysis will show - of a demographic 
transition, which however is not sufficiently strong to fully account for the 
Asian dummy's statistical behaviour. Neither culture, nor policy or shared 
economic success or geography is individually driving the Asian dummy. 
Nevertheless, they can also not be fully disregarded. How can such a 
controversial situation be reconciled?
Chan (1993) makes a case for the overall principle of "convergent goals, 
divergent conduct". Kosai and Takeuchi (1993) argue for a linked 
development among the East Asian countries, which -  they observe -  have 
all evolved along a shared but dynamic comparative advantage path.67 This 
notion of collectively but different, where individual countries have 
observed each other and yet still followed their own particular development, 
is what this study will refer to as peer-group effects. Singapore, it is argued
65 Chan (1993, p. 41)
66Gereffi (1994, p. 29-31), see also Swidler(1986)
24
Chapter One Page 25
by the inclusion of the Asian dummy, has 'played' within a league of fast- 
developing nations, using her similarly developing neighbours and regional 
competitors both as benchmarks and as sources for policy lessons, even 
though adaptation and implementation might have sufficiently differed. The 
Peer-Group notion is a somewhat less stringent variant on the flying geese 
hypothesis, able to incorporate other potentially shared factors beyond 
industrial sequencing.
Primary sources lend further support to this view. Goh (1995) for example 
refers to the useful lesson to be learnt from how Japan needed to change its 
institutional set-up before growth became feasible for the country.67 8 The 
second part of Lee Kuan Yew's biography also refers to Japan as a source for 
ideas rather than a model to be copied.69 With respect to Taiwan and Hong 
Kong Lee (2000) writes that he had "picked up useful pointers. If they could 
make it so could Singapore."70 Almost defining the essence of a peer group 
Lee (2000) writes further:
So I made a practice of finding out who else had met the problems we 
faced, how they had tackled it, and how successful they had been. 
W hether it was to build a new airport or to change our teaching 
methods, I would send a team of officers to visit and study those 
countries that had done it well. I preferred to climb on the shoulders of 
others who had gone before us.71
67 Kosai and Takeuchi (1993, p. 314). They further argue that Latin America, by contrast, was 
not able to create similar linkages, because trade and investment there was shaped primarily 
by the desire for a relatively complete market in each country.
68 Goh (1995, p. 144) in a speech delivered at the Royal Society in London in 1983 entitled 
'Public Administration and Economic Development in LDCs’: “Developing countries can learn 
much from the slow and painful way the Japanese adapted their social and political 
institutions before growth through industrialization became feasible."
69 Lee (2000, pp. 521-529) Chapter 32 entitled 'Lessons from Japan’
70 Lee (2000, p. 562)
71 Lee (2000, p. 686). Lee (2000, p. 614 and p. 645) also describes how China under Deng 
Xiaoping also studied the local group of NICs and particularly Singapore for potential lessons 
to be applied in China.
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I.2.1.5. Variables for Sensitivity Analysis
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A num ber of further variables are of potential interest but suffer either from  
weak theoretical support or limited data availability. Additionally, some of 
the variables tested in the standard analysis described above exist in slightly 
different formats, employing differing measurement techniques or com ing 
from  different sources. The sensitivity of the findings obtained by employing 
the above set of variables, therefore, needs to be tested in order to ascertain 
that the conclusions are robust even if additional or different variables are 
used in the models.
T able  I.2 .I.5 .: V ariables for Sensitivity  Analysis
Differing VariablesAdditional Variables
1 ■ Share of Agriculture in GDP (Agn)
2. Initial Income Distribution (Inilnc)
3. Net-Fuel Exports (NetFuel)
4. Terms of Trade (ToT)
5. Per Capita Income (GDPpc)
6. Growth of per capita income (Growth)
7. Interaction variables:
• EcoAcRat * growth
• EcoAcRat * GDPpc
• NetExRat * Asia
1. Institutional quality by Beri from 1972 
(Beri72)
2. Composite Living Standard Measure 
(IniHDI*)
3. Initial Literacy Rate (IniEdu)
4. Initial GDP in PPP estimates (IniPPP)
5. Share of Labour Force as percent of 
Total Population (LaborRat)
6. Total Trade as percent of GDP 
(Trade)
7. Different Asian Dummy: exclusion of 
China but addition of Philippines 
(Asia2)
8. Small Island Dummy (Island)
A dditional V ariables
It can be argued that the higher the country's exposure to the agricultural 
sector, m easured as the share of agricultural value added in total GDP (Agri), 
the m ore difficult it is for the respective country to create a saveable surplus. 
In reverse, this argum ent states that industry and services tend to create 
higher, saveable surpluses. This thesis was first proposed by Arthur Lewis' 
dual econom y theory (1954), which predicts that the share of saving in GNP 
will rise due to the more rapid growth of the modern, capitalistic sector with
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its higher saving potential.”  Additionally, an agricultural economy will also 
be less urbanised and it is argued that more rural societies find it more 
difficult to save due to a potential lack of sufficient financial institutions in 
rural areas. Moreover, the central government, it is argued, will find it easier 
to tax and collect taxes of an industrial rather than a peasant-based 
economy.”  However, these arguments are debateable, particularly once the 
agricultural sector moves beyond pure subsistence farming. The share of the 
agricultural sector in the economy might also simply capture income and 
growth of income, because as the economy develops the share of agricultural 
value added is likely to fall.74
Another hypothesis stemming from W.A. Lewis' work, is that higher savings 
requires growing inequality of income in favour of domestic capitalists. This 
argument motivates the inclusion of a measure of income distribution, 
particularly as it describes the countries' initial situation so that it can be 
regarded as non-policy induced. This is achieved by including Perotti's 
measurement of the income share of the second and third quintile, taken as 
Close as possible to 1960 (Inline). As Perotti (1996) points out, this measure 
has several advantages. It captures the notion of 'middle-class', whose size is 
often associated with the concept of equality. Additionally, the share of the 
middle-class is less sensitive to measurement errors.75
The obvious strong relationship between high saving ratios and oil-exporting 
countries, see graph I.l.a., poses the question whether the results of the
72 l, „  , .. ■ -mumpnt to the investment behaviour of Singapore,
Huff (1995, p. 750) applies t S• requires considerably more capital than one
arguing that an urban economy like Singapore regu..
with a rural economy. in a 1965 paper prepared for a
For example see Goh, Keng Minister of Singapore,
development conference when he was the Fin
74 . H . . . . .  »he Chenery and Syrquin argument about the
® matter of fact this is at as it moves through successive stages of
tructural transformation of an ec° n . ^  21-26) find that the share of value added in
evelopment. Chenery and Syrquin (19 . PP- g manufacturing and social overhead 
griculture declines sharply over the * ’ d t(ie Share of the services sector rises by
(construction plus utilities) double their share and trie sn<*
about 50 percent. yV.A. Lewis thesis, Perotti (1996, p. 182)
Perotti (1996, p. 154-55). Going beyond ferti|ity rates and higher rates of investment 
Iso argues that more equal societies have er J* ,itjca,ly and socially unstable.
,n education, and that very unequal societies tena io ^ h
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analysis are driven by a country's oil-exporting record. In order to model this 
effect, net-fuel-exports as a percent of GDP can be Included as an 
independent variable. Data availability unfortunately is somewhat restricted.
Another variable with limited data availability and somewhat questionable 
data quality is the development of the terms-of-trade. The study by Loayza e. 
al. (2000), for example, shows that a ten percent improvement in the terms of 
trade increases the private saving rate by 0.74 percentage points in the short 
term. Rodrik (1998) also finds that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between increases in the external terms of trade and saving. He 
too argues that it is primarily private saving that is affected by the terms of 
trade. Daval-Gulat and Thimann (1997) support this view as well, arguing 
that next to the access to foreign savings as measured by the current account 
balance terms of trade shocks are a second potential external factor. 
Reviewing the literature, they summarise that generally the Harberger- 
Laursen-Metzler effect, which states that positive terms of trade shocks
, cu effect o n  w e a lth  a n d  in c o m e , isin c re a s e  s a v in g  th ro u g h  the p o sitiv e  eirecx u
t  , nQq«\ o n  th e  o th e r  h a n d , q u alify  th e se  fin d in g s  s u p p o rte d .76 M a s s o n  e t  al (1 9 9 » ), o n  w k u
, • «.U« to rtu s o f  tra d e  h a v e  a  s ig n ifica n tly  p o s itiv ea n d  a r g u e  th a t  c h a n g e s  m  th e  te rm s  0 1 trau u
• t ,„ tr io c  hiit n o t  fo r d e v e lo p in g  c o u n tr ie s  o r  a  effect o n  s a v in g  fo r in d u stria l co u n trie s , but n o r y h
combined panel. The terms of trade deteriorated due to the oil price shocks
of 1973 and 1979, and the deterioration had large effects in reducing the
C o n v e rs e ly , th e  te rm s  of t ra d e
in d u stria l n a tio n s ' p r iv a te  sa v in g
and increased their saving, at least for a
im p ro v e d  in  o il-e x p o rtin g  co u n trie
. „ o ifo rv  M o re o v e r, b e ca u se  te rm s -o f -tra d e  
tim e. H o w e v e r , th e  effect w a s  tra n sito ry . M orec
, , i a Ip v p I th e re  is n o  p re s u m p tio n  th a t  th is
ch a n g e s  b a la n c e  o u t a t  th e  w o rld  le v e l, tn e re  f
* 77
v a ria b le  w ill d u ra b ly  affe ct w o rld  sa v in g .
^ceOstry and Reinhart(1992), F t , - o r
,han ,heir sub' sample ,or deve,opi" 9
countries.
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The relationship between per-capita income and the saving ratio is 
theoretically ambiguous and controversial. Additionally, it can be argued 
that policy choices matter substantially for the development of income over 
time. Yet, it is such a fundamental variable that it begs inclusion if only to 
investigate how it might affect the significance and coefficients of the other 
variables. Ideally, a large and reliable dataset on per-capita income adjusted 
for purchasing power parities should be used. Unfortunately, no such data 
set exists, even though recent efforts by Angus Maddison and by the Center 
for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania have 
brought us closer. Moreover, even purchasing-power-parity estimates have 
recently attracted criticism, not only in respect to the problems inherent in 
matching products between countries across different areas of the world and 
across different developmental stages, but also on theoretical grounds, see 
for example Ark (1996) or Dowrick and Quiggin (1997). Therefore, three 
different varieties of per-capita income measures are tested: per-capita 
income in current US dollars (GDPpc), in 1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollars (PPP) and adjusted according to the World Bank's Atlas method 
(GDPat).
The effect of growth on savings, on the other hand, has a much stronger 
theoretical backing.78 However, it is also largely policy induced and should 
thus not be part of a benchmarking exercise. Nevertheless, it is important to 
investigate whether the other variables included in the equation might 
actually capture growth effects. For example, Gallup et al. (1999) have shown 
that geography variables are correlated with income levels and growth of 
income. Therefore, it is important to show that growth does not enter the 
equation significantly and thus the other significant variables can not simply 
measure growth effects. Growth rates for the three per-capita income 
measures are therefore tested, in order to see how they might affect the other 
variables.
78
See section 11.1. for a detailed description.
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Finally, Collins (1991) makes a strong case for the inclusion of interaction 
variables, particularly between growth and (young) dependency. She argues 
that econom etric estimates of the determinants of savings are mis-specified if 
the interactive effects, which she terms the 'grow th-tilt' effects, are omitted.™ 
Her econom etric analysis shows that even though exclusion of these effects 
causes only a modest reduction in overall fit, it does severely bias the 
param eter estimates. Once the interaction variable is included, the 
dependency rate has a positive level effect on savings, i.e. an increase in 
dependency increases savings, but also a negative grow th tilt effect. The 
positive level effect is consistent with an increased population share of 
children which, Collins argues, leads to raising household bequests or 
increasing household precautionary savings. In combination, the positive 
level effect on savings is offset by the reduction in the mean age of 
consum ption in the economy relative to the mean age at which incom e is 
earned. The magnitude of this offset is tied to the econom ic grow th rate. For 
her sam ple and time-period the negative growth tilt effect dom inates for 
countries where the growth rate exceeds 6.8 percent. For those countries, the 
net effect of a rise in the dependency rate will be to reduce savings.««
For our analysis two further interaction variables m ight be of interest: 
EcoAcRat and per-capita income as well as the Asian Dum my and NetExRat. 
A high share of the economically active population but com bined w ith low 
incomes will not allow the many wage earners to save even though 
dem ographics might suggest it. Together w ith Collins' 'grow th-tilt- effect, 
this interaction might be able to explain the at times inconsistent findings of 
the savings literature in regards to dependency. An interactive variable 
between Asia and NetExRat will help to further investigate how im portant 
the export-success of the whole Asian peer-group was for the countries' 
saving performance, since the export orientation is one of the few shared 7980
79 Collins (1991. p. 362)
80 Collins (1991, pp. 364-5)
30
Chapter One Page 31
phenomena of this group of countries. The interaction variable will therefore 
allow us to probe further what indeed the Asian dummy captures.
Differing Variables
Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (Beri) has continuously tried to 
measure the institutional quality of countries around the world. Beri offer 
estimates on Bureaucratic Delays (as a proxy for the quality of the country's 
bureaucracy), Nationalisation Potential (as a proxy for the risk of 
expropriation), Contract enforceability and infrastructural quality. The 
earliest observations are available for 1972 for altogether forty-three 
countries, including Singapore. Notwithstanding the late date, Beri72 might 
still be useful as a means to test the robustness of the other variables 
describing the countries' initial institutional quality. Following Knack and 
Keefer (1995) the four dimensions are combined with equal weights into a 
composite figure (beri72), which ranges from 4 for low quality to 16 for high 
quality. Knack and Keefer (1995) find that this composite figure has a greater 
impact on investment and growth than has previously been found for 
proxies such as the Gastil indices of liberties, and frequencies of revolutions, 
coups and political assassinations. These results are robust to the inclusion of 
measures of factor accumulation and of economic policy.
The United Nations' HDI-index could also be used as a further description of 
the initial situation, in place of IniGDP, HumCap and even SocCap. This 
composite living standard measure has the potential advantage of combining 
into one figure three separate dimensions: life-expectancy, educational 
attainment and per-capita income. The individual observation for each 
dimension is capped at a certain maximum level. Educational attainment is 
proxied using literacy rates and the combined primary, secondary and
31
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tertiary enrolment rates.81 This measure, therefore, describes the access to 
consumption via the income figure and the quality of a country's institutions 
as they impact the capability of the people to enjoy their consumption. Thus, 
for the purposes of this study, it would be an ideal description of the
countries' respective situation at the beginning of our period of observation. 
Unfortunately, the United Nations does not publish HDI indices for the 
1960s. Therefore, the index as it would relate to 1965 needed to be calculated 
using the World Bank's World Development Indicators. Enrolment rates arc 
few to come by for this time period, consequently educational attainment 
was only modelled using literacy rates.«* The maximum levels for income 
and life-expectancy were set at the respective 1965 observations for the 
United States. Per-capita income was adjusted for differing price levels using 
the World Bank's Atlas method. This information was available for seventy- 
seven countries, including Singapore.
A regression analysis also allows for the individual inclusion of the three 
dimensions, so that the respective weights are determined separately. 
Therefore, the initial literacy rates (IniUtTO) and life-expectancies (IniLife) 
can also be included separately next to the initial per-capita income levels.
The initial income levels before 1965 have so far been modelled using per 
capita income measured in current US dollars. The Maddison dataset also
allows for purchasing-power-estimates with a sample not substantially
smaller, although somewhat different in coverage. Therefore, Maddison's 
1964 estimate of purchasing power parity adjusted per-capita income
(IniPpp) is ajso tested. *82
Da's?a,detai'ede*Plana,ion a?we»?sCraftsU997aand
1 9 8 7 $ a tool to investigate economic history, including that of
East Asia
821 inf are onlv available from 1970 onwards. In order
to J]fortunately, literacy rates for Singap ( HD( |eve| therefore combines life-
e ° w io r the benchmarking Pr0(?ef  ' rv  rates from 1970. The literacy rates are given expectancy and income from 1965 with literacy rates rrom
as a percent o f people aged 15 and above.
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A slight, but potentially important variation on the EcoAcRat variable, which 
measures the share of the population in working age, would be to instead 
measure the share of the labour force as a percent of total population 
(LaborRat). This alteration is motivated by the argument that it does not 
necessarily matter how many people are within working age. What matters 
is how many are actually employed and thus receive an income out of which 
a saving/consumption decision can be made. LaborRat captures 
participation and unemployment rates, which go unnoticed using the 'pure' 
dependency variable. On the other hand, the self-employed are excluded and 
furthermore the quality of the data can also be doubtful , particularly in 
countries with a large shadow economy. Furthermore, the use of LaborRat 
can lead to a reduction in sample size, due to its somewhat more limited
availability than EcoAcRat.
Levine and Renelt (1992) argue in their sensitivity analysis of cross-country 
growth regressions that findings using the share of exports in GDP could be 
obtained almost identically using total trade or import share. This points to 
the argument that trade statistics basically capture the degree of openness of 
the economy. In order to investigate whether the Net-Export-Ratio in our 
Standard set of independent variables does so as well, it would be helpful to 
substitute NetExRat with the sum of the export and import ratios, i.e. total
tra d e  as p e rc e n t  of GDP (T ra d e ).
Since it is rather difficult to determine what exactly regional dummies 
capture in a regression analysis, it is especially important to investigate the 
sensitivity of these variables. In terms of this study, the Asian Dummy 
requires a particular probing. Therefore, next to the regiona. dummies for
Latin America (LA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Sahara), two additional
. , arP tested . P o ssib ly  q u e stio n a b le  d a ta  fo r
v a r ia tio n s  o f  th e  A sia n  dummy a re  testeu . /  n
r-, . 1 i „ c5rin nf C h in a  fro m  th e  d u m m y  v a ria b le ,
C h in a  w o u ld  a r g u e  fo r  th e  e x clu sio n  o t vm in a j
. , „ „ rfc n f th e  lite ra tu re  h a v e  in c lu d e d  th e
w h ile  a t  th e  s a m e  tim e  so m e  p a rts  o t tn e
p , , .  , , . ^ „ .ra tiv e  studies. Consequently, an AsianPhihppines as part of their compa
, w ith o u t C h in a  is te ste d . Y e t  a n o th e r
d u m m y  (A s ia 2 )  w ith  th e  P h ilip p in es b u t w itn o m
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part of the literature, has grouped Singapore into a set of countries consisting 
of small city or island states.83 While the comparison of city-states in a 
stringent econometric analysis falters due to very limited data availability 
outside of the national accounting system, a construction of a small island 
dummy is possible. Following Findlay and Wellisz (1993) Ffong Kong, 
Jamaica, Mauritius, Malta and Singapore are combined into such a binary 
variable (Island).84 These countries do not only share the fact that they are 
small in the physical sense of area and population but also in the technical 
sense of being price takers in world commodity and capital markets. That is 
to say, they are severely limited in the extent to which they can influence 
their terms and conditions of trade. In addition to this equal exposure to the 
opportunities and the vicissitudes of world markets, these countries 
inherited similar institutions from their British colonial past. On the other 
hand, they differ notably in their natural resource endowment, in the ethnic 
variation in their population, and in the nature of their polities. Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malta have no natural resources other than their excellent 
harbours, while Jamaica and Mauritius depend on their land and climate to 
support their plantations economies. Jamaica, in addition, is well endowed 
with a valuable mineral, bauxite. As for ethnic composition, the population 
of Hong Kong is almost entirely Chinese; Singapore's is predominantly so, 
but with substantial Indian and Malay communities; Malta is homogeneous; 
and Jamaica and particularly Mauritius have a diverse mixture of 
descendents of African slaves, Indian and Chinese indentured workers, and 
European planters. Politically, Jamaica, Mauritius, and Malta have 
democratic governments with active and open competition among their 
political parties; Hong Kong during the period of observation was largely 
governed by British civil servants and Singapore by a single dominant party 
and an elite bureaucracy.
O i) *—
. . .™  example, see Stern (1989, p. 602) arguing for city-states and Findlay and Wellisz 
(1993) for small island states.
The following summary description draws largely upon Findlay and Wellisz (1993, pp.1-2)
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1.2.2. The Model-Building Algorithm
Linear regression models are estimated both on an annual and on a pooled 
(fixed-effects) basis. A full panel data analysis is unfortunately prohibited 
due to the sample properties, particularly the fact that it does not consist of a 
constant set of countries with observations for all years. Countries, which 
report data irregularly, would need to be excluded in order to allow for a 
minimum time-series dimension for each country.85 Moreover, it is likely that 
such an exclusion leads to a systematic bias in the sample. Therefore, it was 
decided to conduct both pooled and annual analyses. Furthermore, both 
general-to-specific elimination of insignificant variables and specific-to- 
general addition of potentially significant variables were used in separate 
model construction approaches.
A pooled sample, in which all observations across the whole time-period are 
included no matter from which year they stem, assumes that no differences 
between certain time-periods exist. In other words, whether country A 
achieved its respective saving ratio in year X does not matter. What matters 
is that it achieved it with the respective values of its explanatory variables. 
However, the (true) impact, i.e. the coefficients, of these variables might 
differ significantly over time and between time periods, particularly with 
such strong world-wide economic events as, for example, the oil-crisis years 
as part of the sample period. The use of annual time-dummies helps 
somewhat in capturing time-specific sub-period influences. However, it will 
not allow for the development of individual coefficients over time. Therefore, 
on the one hand, the explanatory quality of fixed-effects models must be 
considered generally weaker than that of annual models. On the other hand, 
they are still much preferable over simple averaged models, in which the 
observations for the individual variables have been averaged over the whole 
period, since this causes the complete loss of the time dimension in the
85 Loayza et al. (2000), for example, lose every twentieth observation in their sample by 
limiting its coverage to those countries with at least five consecutive annual observations.
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model. With fixed-effects models at least the respective relationship of the 
individual variables at a given time is taken into consideration by the 
regression analysis even though the final coefficient is fixed for the whole 
period.
The removal criterion for the general-to-specific elimination of variables is a 
joint-hypothesis F-Test of the variable's coefficient. A maximum probability 
of the F-statistic of 0.1 was allowed for the variable to remain in the model.86 
Variables were removed from the model in individual steps, i.e. one at a 
time. The additional use of a specific-to-general method of equation 
construction was made necessary since the general-to-specific model will 
require the countries to have observations for all the variables, no matter 
whether they turn out to be significant or not. The general-to-specific model 
will, therefore, almost always have a smaller sample size than the specific-to- 
general model, which only requires observations for all significant variables. 
Additionally, the specific-to-general method has the advantage of showing 
the incremental impact of individual variables, which is particularly 
important in order to separately capture the impact of the three main 
explanatory dimensions of non-policy, external and peer-group effects.87 In 
order to combine the advantages of both approaches a general-to-specific 
elimination is generally followed by a specific-to-general model of those 
variable which have proven significant in the former removal process.
°° A more stringent criterion for the removal of individual explanatory variables has been 
proposed by Edward Learner (1985). In his attempt to try to identify robust empirical relations 
in the economic growth literature he developed the 'extreme-bounds test , which in essence 
amounts to saying that if one finds a single regression for which the sign of an individual 
coefficient changes or becomes insignificant, then the variable is not (absolutely) robust and 
should be dropped. For a critical assessment of Learner’s extreme-bounds test see Xavier X. 
Sala-i-Martin (1997, p.178-9), who argues that the test is too strong for almost any variable to 
pass it. The Joint-Hypothesis-Test, on the other hand, determines whether an equation with 
the variable in question is significantly different from the equation without that variable.
87 The case in favour of the general-to-specific method is generally associated with David 
Hendry. See for example chapters 6 and 9 in Hendry (1993) or Hendry (1986). However, the 
potential disadvantage of the general-to-specific method of unnecessarily reducing the 
sample size and the advantage of the specific-to-general approach of showing incremental 
effects of the inclusion of individual variables is not taken into account by Hendry.
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A restriction of the sample to countries which in some way are similar to 
Singapore has been resisted in order to prevent the comparison of like with 
like. Rather than excluding countries with potentially different influences 
and developments, the study tries to control for those factors which seem 
significant in explaining the variance among the sample, which should result 
in a much more illuminating benchmark for Singapore's performance. 
Instead of just comparing Singapore with its own kind, the country is 
compared to all kinds with the statistical techniques putting a value on the 
impact of all significant differences. Additionally, a number of independent 
variables seem to be sensitive to selection bias, particularly the relationship 
between age distribution and saving.88 Moreover, a restriction to 
'comparable' countries will bias the overall outcome of the analysis, by -  so 
to say -  already incorporating odds for the extra-ordinarity of Singapore s 
saving performance. If the study, for example, had only taken other 
successful countries the potential range of these odds would have been pre­
determined by sample selection. This, however, also requires that the 
regional dummies are generally only added in the final specific-to-general 
stage.
The possible existence and impact of a number of potential statistical pitfalls, 
such as multi-collinearity, heteroskedasticity or simultaneity, will be 
investigated in the sensitivity analysis in order to highlight their likely effect 
on Singapore's benchmark savings.
The statistical software package employed for all statistical computations 
was SPSS version 10.07.
88 rv
See for example: Collins (1991, p.364)
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1.2.3. Data Sources and Potential Problems
The main source of data is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI) CD-Rom (2001 edition), which offers the by far widest international 
coverage of any publicly available database with observations for 208 
countries including Singapore and observations going back to I960.89 
Nevertheless, for our purposes the source had to be extended with data for 
Taiwan, which is not recognised by the World Bank, as well as with 
institutional and geographic variables, and with respect to the sensitivity 
analysis with estimates for initial income distributions, purchasing-power- 
parity income estimates and the terms-of trade.911 Furthermore, Singapore's 
data was further supported with data from Singapore's own official data 
sources.
The Taiwanese data was taken from various issues of the Statistical 
Databook, published by the country's Council for Economic Planning and 
Development. In order to obtain observations for Taiwan's urbanisation and 
literacy rate this source was further supported by various issues of the 
country's Statistical Yearbook, published by the Republic of China. Since the
03 An alternative source, which was specifically designed for investigations of saving 
behaviour across the world, is the World Bank's saving database, which has been created by 
the Bank's own research project into this subject and is described in Loayza et at. (1998). 
This particular data source was not used, because it only offers data until 1994/5 and thus 
excludes with the second-half of the 1990s one of the main periods of interest in Singapore's 
case. Moreover, the saving definition used in this research project adds Net Transfers from 
Abroad to the country’s GNP in order to obtain Gross National Saving, although GNP 
includes already at least Current Transfers (in contrast to GDP). Loayza et al. (2000, p. 168, 
footnote 9), which use this database, make a point that the additional inclusion of capital 
transfers makes only very little difference, so that this particular treatment becomes even 
more questionable. A query emailed to the research team about this surprising treatment has 
gone unanswered. The saving data, furthermore, includes an imputation for capital gains. 
While this might be desirable, the outcome of any analysis of the thus derived dataset will be 
rather sensitive to the assumptions underlying the imputation. It is questionable whether this 
added sensitivity is worth taking on board. Moreover, it should be assumed that the main 
potential advantage of using this particular dataset, namely that the research team claims to 
have vetted the data for any internal inconsistencies, should by now have found its way into 
the five years later edition of the Bank's main database, the World Development Indicators. 
The research team worked from the 1995 release while this exercise uses the 2001 edition. 
Between the two editions there are substantial differences in individual series, which must be 
hoped are the resulting improvements.
90 The institutional and geographical variables and their sources were already described in 
section I.2.1.2., which also mentions the main articles containing the detailed calculations 
and assumptions behind these variables. A further explanation of the variables is therefore 
not included here.
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country does not directly report Net-FDI, the observations were calculated 
based on the Balance-of-Payments statistics of Direct Investment in Taiwan 
and Abroad published in the Statistical Databook.
The data about the initial income distributions in the early 1960s is taken 
from two sources. Perotti (1996) offers income shares of the second and third 
quintile for sixty-eight countries with observations closest to I960.91 Chenery 
and Syrquin (1975) use the closest available observation to 1965 and have 
altogether fifty-three countries in their sample, of which eight are additional 
to the Perotti dataset. This way the income shares of the second and third 
quintile were obtained for seventy-six countries, largely from before or very 
close to the beginning of the period of observation.92 For those countries 
which are listed in both data sources the values are either identical or very 
close, so that the combination of the two sources is not likely to introduce 
inconsistency into the sample.
Unfortunately, the same can not be said for a potential combination of 
Maddison's (2001) and the WDI's purchasing-power-parity estimates of per- 
capita income.93 Estimates for some countries and years vary widely between 
the two sources. Since the WDI CD-Rom does not offer PPP estimates before 
the early 1970s and a combination of the two sources is not possible, the 
Maddison (2001) estimates were employed. Maddison (2001) offers per- 
capita estimates denominated in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars for 
122 countries, including Singapore. However, the dataset offers observations 
for 1999 only for a minority of countries, nor does it cover countries from the 
former Soviet Union, so that potential differences in the outcome of the 
analysis might be due to differences in coverage.
31 One such country is Dahomey, which is later incorporated into Nigeria. Therefore, Perotti's 
estimate for Dahomey was used as Nigeria’s income sn ■ variable nrnves
*  Unfortunately, neither dataset 'ncludes an obseivati^Jor^ ingap re. Sjngapore would be 
to be significant in the regression analysis, an e
necessary in order to obtain a bf  c^ ark saV' ^  v^ e penn Wor|d Tables. However, the
A further common source of ppp 'e^ ™ ^ e s  a h e T a b l e s  both in 
publication of Maddison's latest estimates now surpasses irve ^ ^  
terms of the number of countries as well as the leng
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work with population estimates, which include non-residents.95 The WDI 
with substantially lower estimates seems to disregard the sizeable non­
resident share of Singapore's population. Unfortunately, no such option of 
substitution was possible for EcoAcRat, because Singapore publishes only 
data on age distribution for residents. Therefore, the WDI's figures for total 
(resident) population and its age distribution were used to calculate 
EcoAcRat for Singapore. The share of the economically active population is 
probably lower among the resident than among the total population due to 
the most likely higher proportion of people in working age among the non­
resident population. Consequently, the benchmark savings for Singapore 
derived with this very likely lower than actual figure for the share of the 
economically active population will be a conservative estimate. In other 
words, if the share of the economically active population proves to be a 
significant and positive factor in the regression analysis, the resulting 
benchmark savings will be lower than if the demographic effect of the non­
resident population was also taken into consideration.
The Gross Domestic Saving Ratio for Singapore was also taken from official 
Singaporean statistics.96 The series are largely identical with the exception of 
the early 1960s, for which the WDI offers highly negative and the official 
statistics low positive savings. While this difference does not affect the 
dependent variable (GDSrat), because no regressions are estimated before 
1965, it does substantially alter the inertia variable (IniGDS). According to 
the WDI Singapore dissaved an average of 48.3% of GDP during 1962-64, 
while the official sources publish a positive Gross Domestic Saving ratio of 5 
percent of GDP. In 1964 alone, according to the WDI, Singapore experienced 
negative savings of seventy-four percent of GDP. Where this difference 
comes from is not clear. However, while lower savings and possibly even
°° The exact online address is: http://www.singstat.gov.sg. The version used was last 
updated March 2002. The series refers to total population only excluding foreigners staying 
for less than one year.
96 The exact sources are: for 1960-94 from Singapore Dept, of Statistics (1996) table A.8 pp. 
65-67 and for 1995-2000 Dept, of Statistics: Yearbook of Statistics 2001 (as available online 
at www.singstat.gov.sg; May 2002)
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negative savings could be expected for this very difficult period in 
Singapore's economic history, this degree of dissaving seems to be 
unreasonable, particularly because the WD1 still reports positive capital 
formation for the same years with an average of 18.2 percent. Furthermore, 
the Singapore government has no apparent reason to over-state savings for 
those years. As a matter of fact, a substantially negative saving figure would 
support the government's overall view of this time period, which stresses the 
crisis aspects of those years. Therefore, the official figures are used for the 
country's saving performance, including the calculation of Singapore's initial 
saving ratio.
Combining these sources and removing any annual observations per country 
for which no GDS value is reported, leaves a maximum sample size of 4,644 
annual observations from over 160 countries spanning thirty-five years from 
1965-99, not counting Singapore's. However, only a minority of the 
represented countries offers a complete set for all variables for all years. 
Missing data was excluded in a listwise fashion, i.e. only those countries with 
observations for all the variables tested in the respective equation and for the 
respective time period were included. Using restrictive variables, for which 
only a limited number of observations are available such as institutional 
proxies, can reduce the sample size to around 1500 observations for the full 
period or just above 60 observations for individual years. Net-FDI, is a 
particular case, because it is not available from the beginning of the period. 
Net-FDI does not become available until the early 1970s and for Singapore 
only from 1972 onwards. Therefore, any model including Net-FDI as an 
independent variable does not only reduce the sample size but also restricts 
the time-period covered.97 Yet, overall the sample size still compares 
favourably with any dataset tested in cross-country saving analyses.98
97 According to Lim and Pang (1991, p. 55), Singapore experienced growth in FDI as early as 
the late 1960s, particularly between 1966 and 1973: "During this period, manufacturing 
foreign investments rose from less than S$150million ($52million) to S$683million 
($235million), and the export manufacturing, petroleum refining and financial services sectors 
expanded rapidly, thanks to the boom in world trade. ' Therefore, if FDI proves to affect 
savings positively, as we expect, then the study is likely to produce a conservative saving
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1.3. Literature Review
The question of high-savings in Singapore, and all of East Asia, has attracted 
a fair share of interest. This stems from the fact that over the last three 
decades saving rates have experienced a marked divergence which has been 
particularly dramatic within the developing world: saving rates have risen 
steadily in East Asia, stagnated in Latin America, and generally fallen in sub- 
Saharan Africa." These regional disparities have been closely matched by 
diverging growth experiences: across world regions, higher saving rates tend 
to be correlated with higher income growth.98 100 A substantial number of 
studies have therefore used cross-country regression analyses to explain the 
variance either in international growth experiences or in saving 
performances. However, almost none of these investigations have tried to 
derive a benchmark value for any of the countries in their sample. These 
studies are purely interested in finding the reasons for the countries' 
respective economic performance, not in establishing what performance 
could have been expected given the countries' respective circumstances. 
Therefore, the literature review for this chapter is quite limited.101
Using regression analysis to obtain benchmark saving values for specific 
countries has not often been undertaken. Denizer and Wolf (1998) use this
benchmark for Singapore in the early years due to the exclusion of FDI from the list of 
independent variables.
98 In comparison, Loayza et al. (2000), which uses the WB’s saving research database and 
claims to have one of the largest samples of any investigation so far, work with an initial data 
set spanning the years 1966-95 and counting 1,254 observations. After removing a number 
of these observations for different statistical reasons to do with their panel-data approach, the 
sample is further reduced to 872 observations from 69 countries. Edwards (1997) examines 
only a sample of 50 countries and Mason et al. (1995) a sample of 61 countries.
99 Particularly comparisons between East Asia and Latin America have been common. See 
for example: Taylor (1998), Singh (1997), Birdsall and Jaspersen (1997), Dayal-Gulati and 
Thimann (1997) to name just a few. Also see Meier (1995, pp.33-61) for a summary of the 
stylized facts of comparative economic development in the LDCs post WW-II, offering a 
concise overview of East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Sahara, and Chinese economic 
development with references to all the main generalisations and many of the remaining 
questions.
100
Loayza et al. (2000, p. 165)
101 See Haque et al. (1999) and Loayza et al. (2000) for recent reviews of the literature 
regarding cross-country regression analyses of saving ratios. Also see Section II.4. for a 
summary of studies which deal explicitly with Singapore’s saving behaviour.
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method to model savings for twenty-five transition economies in Eastern and 
Central Europe as an attempt to estimate forced savings before the transition 
to a free-market economy. Yashiro and Oishi (1997) built a simultaneous 
equations model for the Japanese economy to forecast savings largely 
depending on changes in the country's demographic composition. Besanger 
et al. (2000) apply an economic modelling exercise to five Asian countries, 
among them Singapore, largely to predict the country's optimal future 
saving path.102
Denizer and Wolf (1998), however, still mix policy-induced and non-policy 
induced variables, so that the explanatory power of their benchmark is 
somewhat dubious in nature. Their models with R-squareds between 0.55 
and 0.63 and 131 observations taken from an unspecified set of market 
economies of, in their view, comparable development levels show that 
individual ex-communist countries were far from their predicted 
equilibrium, free-market saving rates. The models include as explanatory 
variables, which the authors refer to as fundamentals, the dependency ratio, 
urbanisation ratio, GDP growth, M2 to GDP ratio, inflation, changes in terms 
of trade, per capita GDP and a dummy for military conflict. The study, 
however, is plagued by a number of problems, foremost by the lack of a 
specification of the 'control group', i.e. the set of countries on which the 
initial regression is run. Furthermore, the restriction of the control group to l
ll“  Two related examples of an attempt at benchmarking using econometric techniques are 
Ostry (1997) and Kim and Roemer (1981). Ostry (1997) models Current Account Balances 
for five Asian economies, including Singapore. He finds that expectations of future income 
growth appear to be a significant determinant, economically and statistically, of current 
account behaviour in the sample of countries and that the CA deficits in the ASEAN region 
have primarily reflected high levels of investment rather than excessive private consumption. 
Kim and Roemer (1981) use the original Chenery and Syrquin (1975) equations, without re- 
estimating them, to determine expected values for the South Korean economy. In terms of 
saving they find that South Korea (p. 130) "performed substantially below the norm in 
accumulating both saving and investment in 1953-55 and 1960-62, but then had shot up well 
above the norm by 1972-74.” Based on this development they conclude (p. 131) that “Korea’s 
performance in saving, investing, industrializing, and exporting cannot be explained by cross­
country averages, even allowing for its rapid growth during the 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, 
government policies appear, from this evidence, to have been successful, not only in 
stimulating growth at a rate matched only by two non-petroleum-exporting Third World 
countries, but also in achieving levels of investment, saving, industrial output, and exports 
well above the average for a country of its income class." Chenery and Syrquin themselves 
have not really used their analysis to build benchmarks. Their studies remain one step
44
Chapter One Page 45
'comparable' countries also limits the power of the analysis. A world sample, 
in this case excluding all the former planned economies, would have been 
preferable particularly because the inclusion of a per-capita income variable 
already controls for different levels of development. Additionally, it must be 
noted that the time period for the regression is not specified and many of the 
variables are not significant.
Yahiro and Oishi's (1997) simultaneous equations model for the Japanese 
economy also struggles with a number of methodological problems .The 
equation model still exhibits autocorrelation of its residuals visible through 
low DW statistics, which can be due to either misspecification of the model 
or a missing lag structure or both. Moreover, the model uses the OLS 
technique with most likely non-stationary variables, which creates the 
problem of spurious regressions results. At the analytical level, the general 
problem of using past data to forecast future data, i.e. the underlying 
assumption that elasticities and thus preferences of the population remain 
unchanged in average, can be viewed critically. Overall, even if one 
disregards this potential analytical pitfall the methodological problems 
already render results far from robust.
A related literature, of which Besanger et al. (2000) is the example which 
specifically refers to Singapore, tries to construct a macro-economic model of 
the respective economies based on utility theory and resulting production 
functions in order to predict future, socially optimal levels of savings 
allowing for a variety of factors such as changing demographic structures, 
labour productivity and consumption demands.^05 Besanger et al. (2000) have 
applied this technique to five Asian countries, among them Singapore, 
largely to forecast the country's future saving path. The years of their 
resulting predictions of optimal savings, for which we now have actual data,
removed. Therefore, Sect,on 1,4.1. offers a replication of their approach with our dataset and
«  : r : * a c ,  economic mode„in3 e,ercise see Gees, and McDonald
(1998 as well as 1999).
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1996-99, would argue that Singapore saved in excess of the country s optimal 
level of just above 30% of GDP.104 Our study does not follow this literature 
because of the inherent conceptual differences between socially optimal 
savings and to-be-expected savings. It is far from reasonable to equate 
optimal achievements with those which are actually to be expected. 
Furthermore, the necessary assumptions on the rate of time preferences, rate 
of technological progress, wealth to consumption ratios, planning horizons, 
interest rates, depreciation rates, elasticity of output to capital, elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour etc. and, even more, the 
development of these factors over time make the results very sensitive. 
Moreover, such an analysis will not allow for a separation of policy and non­
policy induced circumstances. Therefore, this technique can not be used to 
determine what could have been expected of Singapore given her 
circumstances.105
The by far largest part of the cross-national saving literature is content with 
trying to find the significant explanatory variables without an attempt to use 
the resulting models to derive benchmark values. Some are also more 
concerned with the direction of causality between saving and growth rather 
than modelling saving performance let alone establish benchmark values, 
e.g. Carroll and Weill (1994) and Attanasio et al. (2000). Yet, since the first 
step of any benchmarking process is still to built such a cross-country model 
it is nevertheless opportune to review at least the more recent efforts of this 
literature as well. However, it must be noted that the different objectives will 
also result in differing models. A benchmarking exercise does not attempt to 
explain what the analytical underpinnings of a country's saving behaviour 
are. Furthermore, the separation of policy and non-policy influenced factors,
Using forecast figures as benchmarks is problematic, because of the underlying 
assumption that there have not been any significant structural or functional changes in the 
economic environment between the period used as the basis for the forecasting exercise and 
the period of the benchmark comparison.
105 In a theoretically related exercise Masson and Tyron (1990) estimate a consumption 
function using regression analysis in order to derive a set of elasticities, which are in turn 
inserted into a macro-economic model (MultiMode) developed by the IMF to forecast the 
different effects of aging on the economic situation of seven industrialised countries, 
including their saving behaviour.
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which is necessary for a meaningful benchmark, is of no importance to the 
cross-country regression literature. Therefore, cross-sectional analyses 
always mix policy and non-policy influenced variables, which makes it 
impossible to use these models to determine what could have been expected 
of a certain country given its circumstances. Consequently, the value of the 
coefficients and thus their elasticities can not be directly compared. A 
detailed comparison of the potentially differing values of coefficients in 
different studies is therefore not particularly valuable for the purposes of this 
investigation and thus the overview will limit itself to a discussion of 
independent variables which have been found to be of importance in several 
cross-national studies.106
Loayza et al. (2000) offer a summary of the recent empirical cross-country 
studies and conclude that only a few saving determinants appear to be 
consistently significant across different studies and with their estimated signs 
according to theory. These factors are the terms of trade, domestic and 
foreign borrowing constraints, fiscal policy variables, and pension system 
variables. Regarding other determinants for which consumption theories 
either differ regarding their signs or point toward ambiguous signs, as in the 
case of income growth and interest rates, the empirical studies differ widely. 
They also differ in reported significance levels of variables for which theories 
tend to agree on expected signs, such as income level, inflation, and 
demographic ratios. Loayza et al.'s (2000) own exercise, which uses the 
World Bank's saving database to model private saving, largely supports 
these conclusions from the earlier literature, which all used smaller samples. 
In addition, they find that saving inertia, as measured by the lagged private 
saving rate, has a positive and significant coefficient revealing a large degree 
of persistence.
,uo For a detailed review of the elasticities of factors influencing savings see section 11.4. in 
the next chapter which deals with explaining Singapore's saving behaviour in a time-series 
analysis.
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Masson and Tyron (1990) in their attempt to fit a consumption function to a 
pooled sample of seven industrial countries from 1967-87 use a lagged real 
wealth to consumption ratio as one of their independent variables.107 Wealth 
is defined as the sum of the discounted present value of future (non-interest) 
disposable income plus the real value of financial wealth held in form of 
domestic outside money, government bonds and net claims on foreigners. 
Naturally, the estimation of future income streams is highly speculative and 
thus the results from any such exercise must be considered very sensitive to 
the underlying present-value assumptions.
Mason (1987) concentrates on the effect of demographics. He concludes that 
the available evidence supports the proposition that a higher dependency 
ratio leads to lower saving, particularly among countries with moderate to 
high rates of income growth. At the mean rate of growth observed over the 
last two decades for the seventy countries analyzed, a decline from a high- to 
a low-childbearing regime generated an increase in the net national saving 
rate of about five percentage points -  nearly a 50 percent increase.108
Collins (1991) runs regressions on five-yearly averages (1960-64, 65-69, 79- 
74,75-80 and 80-84) with the GNS-ratio as the dependent variable, and young 
dependency, per-capita income levels and real growth as independent 
variables. She also includes two interaction variables: growth * young 
dependency and growth*per-capita-income. Her main finding is the potential 
importance of these interaction variables, because according to her study, 
most factors that influence saving behaviour will have both level effects and 
'growth-tilt' effects. These effects need not have the same sign. According to 
Collins (1991) econometric estimates of the determinants of savings are 
therefore mis-specified if the interactive effects are omitted.109 She finds that 
even though exclusion of these effects causes only a modest reduction in
107 The other independent variables are real long-term interest rates, real after-tax domestic 
product, dependency ratio and country dummies as well as a time dummy for the period after 
1980.
108
Mason (1987, p. 5491
109 n '
Collins (1991, p. 362)
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overall fit, it does severely bias the parameter estimates.110 Overall, her 
models can explain between 38 and 56 percent of the variation in the sample. 
But the variables change their significance depending on the inclusion of the 
interaction variables. The real per-capita income level is the only one that is 
consistently significant.
Edwards (1997) tries to model ten year averages (1983-92) of the private and 
public saving ratios for a group of 50 nations. Looking at his beta-coefficients 
indicates that growth is the most important variable in explaining cross­
country differences in private savings. His sensitivity analysis neither finds 
the degree of urbanization significant nor the structure of the economy, 
measured by the share of manufacturing, mining, and agriculture in GDP. 
On the other hand, the dependency ratio has a significant impact, while the 
current account is only significant for public savings. In order to avoid a 
potential problem of simultaneity, however, he uses instruments derived by 
averaging the observations of his independent variables for the period 1970- 
82. The potential explanatory power of this exercise is questionable unless we 
assume rather long-term effects of his set of independent variables on a 
country's saving performance.111
Daval-Gulat and Thimann (1997) compare econometrically the private saving 
ratios of five Asian and 9 Latin American countries in a fixed-effects model 
for 1970-95. Interestingly, they make a distinction between policy and non­
policy influences in the description of their variables. Unfortunately, this 
distinction is not carried through in their econometric analysis. As the main 
policy variables they list fiscal policy and government saving, social security 
arrangements, financial market development, and macroeconomic stability. 
The non-policy factors most likely to affect saving, in their view, are growth, 
demographics, and external factors. These may be influenced by economic
Collins (1991, p. 364) nahips includes’ the current account balance, the
1 Edwards (1997) set of independent v^«abtes mcl d . ^  monetjsatiof1i prjvate credit, 
dependency ratio, real interest rates, grow , 9
government savings, social security, income dist
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policy, but are not themselves policy variables. Growth, they argue, affects 
savings through demographics following the life-cycle hypothesis and 
should thus be included in the non-policy set. However, while the effect of 
growth on saving might not be policy induced, growth itself can be -  at least 
partly -  policy influenced by such factors as education, macro-economic 
stability and the institutional environment. Therefore, the grouping of 
growth as non-policy by Daval-Gulat and Thimann must be considered 
somewhat questionable.
Masson et al. (1998) also examine a set of possible determinants of private 
saving behaviour using cross-sectional and time-series data for twenty-one 
industrial as well as forty developing countries. In particular they find that 
demographics and growth are important determinants of private saving 
rates, and that interest rates and terms of trade have positive, but less robust 
effects. Furthermore, their results indicate that private saving is partially 
offset by public saving and (for developing countries) by foreign saving. 
Increases in per capita gross domestic product seem to increase saving at low 
income levels (relative to the United States) but decrease it at higher ones.
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1.4. Findings
The investigation takes its point of origin from the Chenery-Syrquin models, 
then continues to separately probe the predictive power of strictly non-policy 
circumstances before combining them with factors, which are at least 
partially policy influenced.112
1.4.1. Chenery-Syrquin Models
Both Chenery-Syrquin (1975, 1989) publications used a fixed-effects linear 
regression model applied to a world sample with 1432 and 2954 valid 
observations for their respective periods of 1950-75 and 1950-83. The (main) 
regression equation is the same for both publications as well as for any of the 
dependent variables investigated:
a + 3r InY + p2*lnY2 + yrlnN + Y2*lnN2 + 6*F + £*T(i-4)
Where 
a = Constant
P, y. 5, e = Coefficients to be estimated by regression analysis 
Y = per capita GNP in 1964 and 1980 constant US dollars respectively 
N = population in millions
F = imports less exports of goods and non-factor services as a share of GDP 
T = time dummies, which for the two publications were defined as:
Ti = 1 for 1950-54 T, = 1 if t >= 1960
T2 = 1 for 1955-59 Tz = 1 if t >= 1967
T3 = 1 for 1960-64 T3 = 1 if t >= 1973
T4 = 1 for 1965-69 T4 = 1 if t >= 1979
In this study the above equation was replicated for the time period of 1965-99 
using annual time dummies as well as three different per-capita income 
variables. The former alteration became necessary due to the extended time 
period in this study and the latter because it is questionable whether 
converting a current income series using one year’s exchange rate for all of
Due to the large number of regression analyses required by the benchmarking 
methodology the following findings only present the essential statistical results. For a full 
presentation see the appendix at the end of the thesis, which offers a complete disclosure of 
both the data used and the statistical output.
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the years in the observation period results in a meaningful testable series. 
Moreover, since Chenery and Syrquin's studies several purchasing-power- 
parity estimates have become available. Therefore, per-capita income in 
current USdollars, in USdollars adjusted for different inflationary 
developments between different countries using the World-Bank s Atlas 
exchange rates and Angus Maddison's (2001) per-capita PPP estimates were 
used in separate regression models. GDP instead of GNP was used as the 
basis of the income variable in order to keep consistency within the equation 
since the dependent variable as well as Net-Exports are 'denominated' as a 
percent of GDP and not GNP.
The immediate outcome of these models was to point to a near perfect multi- 
collinearity between the logged and their respective quadratic terms.11-' As a 
matter of fact, the correlation between InN and InN2 as well as InY and InY2 
for all the income variables was above 0.994. Therefore, dropping the 
quadratic terms can only improve the model by removing the multi- 
collinearity problem in the regression while at the same time the remaining 
variable still has the same variance over time as the eliminated variable and 
will thus model the relationship with the dependent variable just as well. 
Consequently the quadratic terms were removed from the original equation.
In a next step any insignificant annual time-dummies were removed using 
Joint-Hypothesis-Testing. Table 1.4.1. offers the results of the thus derived 
regression models.
Using the obtained equations to calculate predicted annual saving ratios for 
Singapore results in average predicted savings for the whole period of 
around 24 percent of GDP, which is one third less than Singapore's actual 
average GDS-ratio of 36 percent. Therefore, if Chenery Syrquin had indeed 
applied their methodology to obtain benchmark values for Singapore, they 13
113 For clarification purposes, the quadratic terms refer to the square of the natural log of V or 
N respectively, i.e. not the natural log of the square of Y or N, since this would have resulted 
in a perfectly linear combination with ln(Y2) = 2*lnY.
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would have considered the country somewhat of an outperformer in regards 
to gross domestic savings. However, they would have also not been 
surprised to find above world-average saving rates in Singapore.
Table: Fixed-Effects Estimation Models
1965-99 1965-98
Constant 5.599 (4.2) 7.291 (5.3) -5.792 (-3.6)
Net-Export Ratio 0.724 (87.1) 0.724 (83.5) 0.798 (70.4)
LnGDPpc (current US$) 2.529 (27.4)
LnGDPpc (Atlas) 2.488 (26.1)
LnGDPpc (PPP) 3.48 (28.1)
LnN -0.219 (-3.5) -0.308 (-4.7) -0.133 (-1.7)
T1965 1.796 (2.1) 2.029 (2.2)
Not significant
T1966 1.422 (1.7) 1.598 (1.8)
T1967 1.639 (2.0) 1.726 (2.0)
T1968 1.580 (1.9) 1.449 (1.7)
T1969 1.610 (1.9) 1.696 (2.0)
T1970 2.633 (3.3) 2.524 (3.1)
T1971 2.883 (3.6) 2.779 (3.4)
T1972 2.368 (3.0) 2.455 (3.0)
T1973 2.724 (3.5) 2.837 (3.5) 1.562 (2.0)
T1974 3.907 (5.0) 4.082 (5.1) 3.088 (4.1)
T1975 3.420 (4.5) 3.620 (4.6) 3.322 (4.4)
T1976 3.557 (4.7) 3.800 (4.9) 3.436 (4.6)
T1977 3.220 (4.4) 3.606 (4.8) 3.691 (5.0)
T1978 3.041 (4.1) 3.482 (4.6) 3.661 (5.0)
T1979 2.296 (3.1) 2.460 (3.3) 2.815 (3.8)
T1980 2.582 (3.7) 2.574 (3.5) 3.125 (4.3)
T1981 1.764 (2.6) 1.775 (2.4) 2.694 (3.8)
T1982 Not significant 1.518 (2.1)
No. of Observations 4,497 4,167 3,275
Adj. R-Squared: 0.748 0.744 0.727
Predicted Avr. Saving 
Rate for Singapore 24.08% 24.20% 23.36%
T-Ratios in parentheses. The model using Maddison's PPP estimates can not be 
extended into 1999 since Maddison’s dataset only offers few 1999 PPP estimates. 
Time-dummies for the period after 1982 were included but did not prove significant 
and were thus removed from the model.
With the increased availability of data and statistical computing power since 
their pioneering investigations, the simple Chenery-Syrquin equation and 
their fixed-effects methodology are not quite satisfactory anymore. A 
number of potentially important explanatory variables beg for inclusion. 
Moreover, annual modelling as well as a -  at least initially -  separated
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investigation of non-policy variables as well as annual modelling promises a 
more revealing benchmarking process.
1.4.2. Non-Policy Models
This section tries to establish what kind of saving performance could have 
been expected of post-independence Singapore given her situation at time of 
independence, her geographic location and her population s demographic 
development over time. Due to the very limited availability of variables 
describing institutional quality across nations in the early 1960s, this aspect 
of Singapore's inheritance at time of independence will be investigated via 
proxy variables in a separate step at the end of this section. Initially fixed 
effects models will be employed before a more detailed annual analysis is 
undertaken.
In order to maximise the sample size the fixed-effects model has been built in 
a specific-to-general approach starting with the description of the initial 
situation in 1965, which also includes the most likely strongest explanatory 
variable: the average GDS-Ratio for 1962-64. Demographic and geographic 
variables were included in consecutive steps. Finally, regional dummies and 
then the demographic-geographic variable capturing the exposure to malaria 
in a given country were added. Table I.4.2.a. offers the results.
The immediate result from this exercise is that Singapore's saving 
performance remains extraordinary given the country's initial situation, 
demographic and geographic profile. Unless we allow for peer-group effects 
via regional-dummies the saving rate, which could be expected of Singapore, 
would have been below the actual world average. What is of further interest, 
however, is that given the country's demographics, particularly her high 
urbanisation ratio the country must have had a strong potential to increase 
her saving performance beyond the initial, 'inherited' saving rate.
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Furthermore, if we accept peer group effects which might have driven 
Singapore's savings it could have been expected of Singapore to achieve 
above average saving rates similar to her successful regional neighbours.
Table I.4.2.a.: Initial Situation, Demographics and Geographies
1965-99
1 2 3 4 5 6
Const 5.579 5.404 -4.849 -8.188 6.627 5.439
IniGds 0.68 0.708 0.648 0.667 0.621 0.641
IniGDP -7.99E-04 -2.69E-03 -2.60E-03 -1.21E-03 -9.25E-04
Urb 0.106 0.067 0.069 0.077
ToTPop 1.00E-08 6.68E-09 not sig. not sig.
EcoAcRat 0.126 0.227 not sig. not sig.
Airdist -2.44E-04 not sig. not sig.
Tropicar 2.25 2.96 not sig.
Landlock -4.00 -5.83 -4.85
PoplOOkm not sig. -4.59 -4.62
Asia 10.1 10.8
Sahara -4.03 -5.56
LA -1.98 not sig.
Island not sig. not sig.
MalFal66 5.38
N 2,820 2,716 2,716 2,424 2,424 2,322
adj. R-sqr. 0.332 0.340 0.375 0.410 0.445 0.456
Predicted Avr. Saving 
Rate for Singapore 8.96% 8.57% 16.14% 16.69% 24.48% 22.11%
[not-sig = removed based on joint-hypothesis testing and equation re-estimated without 
this variable;]
From a statistical point-of-view, it is striking how strong the explanatory 
power of the initial GDS-ratio is. This inertia effect is the by-far strongest 
variable in any of the above equations, with consistently high beta- 
coefficients never below 0.5 and always the highest of all beta-coefficients. 
The somewhat surprising negative sign for the initial level of per-capita GDP 
appears to support the view that this variable is rather an indicator for a 
country's stage of development than its saving potential. It seems to measure 
whether the country is a mature economy with high income but low savings 
or a developing economy with high investments/savings but comparatively 
low income. It is also of interest to note how the ratio of the economically 
active population, the total size of the population as well as the distance from 
the nearest commercial centre all lose their significance once regional
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dummies are included. This seems to suggest that these regional dummies 
capture the demographic and distance effects. Similarly, the inclusion of the 
country's exposure to malaria makes the regional dummy for Latin- 
American countries and the degree of exposure of the country to tropical 
climates lose their significance. This seems to suggest that the effect of both 
these variables on a country's saving performance might be driven by the 
economic impact of malaria. However, the positive sign of the malaria 
variable, while the Latin American dummy had a negative sign and the 
tropics variable a positive sign, makes this conclusion rather precipitate. In 
general, these results concerning the loss of significance upon inclusion of 
other variables should not be over-interpreted due to the good but not 
excellent R-Squareds, which hint at the likelihood that still missing variables 
might yet again change the significance of the variables included so far. It 
must also be noted that some equations suffer from a mild degree of multi- 
collinearity with the tolerance indicator for some variables only slightly 
above 0.3.
In order to test the sensitivity of these findings a number of variables were 
individually replaced, the terms-of-trade as well as annual time-dummies 
added. While the significance of some variables changed due to these 
alterations, the overall finding of substantially higher actual than expected 
savings for Singapore given the country's strictly non-policy circumstances 
could not be revised. Thus, while the model is yet not completely robust 
from a statistical point-of-view, its main analytical conclusion remains 
unaltered.
In the above equations initial per-capita GDP was modelled using the 1962- 
64 average measured in current US dollars. Replacing that measure with 
Maddison's purchasing-power-parity estimate for 1964 in Model 4 leads to a 
considerable reduction in sample size (2,161 observations instead of 2,424). 
The variable remains significant only as long as regional dummies are not 
included. Replacing the proportion of those aged above 15 and below 65 as a 
share of total population (EcoAcRat) with the share of the labour force within
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the total population (LaborRat) leads to only a small drop in sample size 
(2,389) and the variable is able to sustain its significance even after regional 
dummies are added. However, the resulting predicted average savings for 
Singapore of 26 percent is not too different from the expected value derived 
from Model 5 above. Adding the Terms-of-Trade proves to be significant but 
reduces the sample size to 2105 observations. The predicted savings of 27.7 
percent for the period for which there are terms-of-trade observations for 
Singapore (1975-95) is also still substantially below the country's actual 
saving rates for those years (41.1 percent), but above world averages and 
Singapore's initial saving rates. The inclusion of annual time dummies yields 
significant dummies for the years 1973, 74 and the whole period after 1980. 
The predicted savings of 26.9 percent is again not substantially different. 
However, the continuous significance of the time dummies for the second 
half of the period is a strong indication that the model is lacking explanatory 
strength over that period, which is most likely due to the loss of modelling 
power over time of the initial GDS-ratio.
One of the main effects which has not been modelled so far is that of a 
country's institutional quality on its saving performance. Therefore the three 
proxy variables for institutional quality discussed in section I.2.I.2. were 
tested in fixed-effects regression models, which also included the main 
variables of the above models, i.e. initial GDS-ratio, initial GDP per capita, 
urbanisation ratio, ratio of the economically active population and the 
distance from the nearest commercial centre. Regional as well as Time- 
Dummies were omitted in order to avoid a possible masking of the impact of 
the institutional variables.
The inclusion of the institutional variables leads to a substantial fall in 
sample size, so that direct comparisons with earlier models are somewhat 
hindered, because differences can be due both to the impact of the respective 
institutional variable and/or the exclusion of observations from the sample. 
However, none of the models can alter the main conclusion derived from 
table I.4.2.a. Given Singapore's non-policy situation the country managed to
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save more than what could have been expected of her. But similar to the 
earlier findings given the country's institutional arrangements, it could hav 
been expected of Singapore to raise her savings beyond the nation's initial 
level to around or even slightly above world average levels.
Table I.4.2.b.t Inclusion of Institutional Proxy Variables
Const
Ini Gds
Ini GDP
Urb
EcoAcRat
Airdist
|HumCap
'SocCap
Mortality
Inilnc
N
adj. R-sqr.
1965-99
-12.448
-3.73E-03
0.481
Not sig
8
-10.856
-9.23E-03
0.59
0.432
-2.51 E-04
0.316
0.072
0.361
-4.13E-04
0.754
-3.283
-2.05E-03
0.52
0.138
0.126
-1.75E-04
0.299
Predicted Avr. Saving 
Rate for Singapore
1,757
0.300
18.05%
1,693
0.380
18.86%
1,455
0.367
20.07%
10
-15.286
-2.09E-03
0.308 
not sig. j
0.712
not sig.
-30.691
1,594
0.272
24.09%
[not-sig = removed based and equation re-esti^ ted  without
this variable]
Statistically speaking it is surprising to find that the initial saving-rate and 
the initial GDP-level switch signs once the institutional proxies are included. 
Moreover, the positive sign of the mortality variable is surprising. Combined 
with the not so outstanding r-squareds, these issues might indicate that the 
models are still far from complete and thus not yet very robust. Testing the 
sensitivities of these models is somewhat difficult because the inclusion of 
further variables will lead to an even more drastic reduction in sample size. 
Therefore, only two further variables were tested for their explanatory 
power. The income share of the third and fourth quintile of the country s 
income distribution (Inilnc), which is available for 76 countries for the early 
1960s, was tested as well as a compound living-standard measure for 1965, 
similar to the Human-Development-Index (IniHDI*), combining per-capita 
income, life-expectancy and educational attainment.114 IniHDI* offers the
114 Unfortunately, no estimate for Singapore’s income distribu^on is 'f ^ h fquintiIe was
1960s. Therefore, as a proxy, Hong Kong’s income share of the third and tourtn quimue w
used to calculate the benchmark value.
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largest sample size of any of the models which include an institutional proxy 
with 1997 observations but did not prove significant, although it is highly 
correlated with both the measure for Social Capability and Human Capital 
Stock with correlation coefficients above 0.8. The subsequent loss of 
significance would therefore support the view that the other institutional 
variables might take their explanatory ability from the sampling rather than 
from their own statistical variance. The income-equality variable, however, 
resulted in an interesting model, which is shown as number ten above. The 
negative sign of the equality variable seems to support the traditional view 
that a more egalitarian income distribution lowers a nation's savings.
What remains to be investigated is the detailed behaviour of both the 
statistical qualities of the models as well as the resulting benchmark saving 
rate for Singapore over time in annual models. In order to do so while still 
keeping the sample size at a level which allows for a qualified benchmark the 
institutional variables are not used to build the annual models. Instead a two 
step procedure was used in which first a set of variables describing the initial 
situation as well as the demographic and geographic profile is reduced in a 
general-to-specific procedure to include only those variables still significant 
and then in a second step regional dummies are added, which are 
subsequently reduced to only those which add significantly to the model. 
The initial situation was described by the countries' average saving ratio for 
the years 1962-64 and their respective average per-capita income for the same 
years (measured in current US dollars). The demographic development is 
captured by the proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64 and 
the urbanisation rate. Describing the geographic profile of a country, the 
Gallup-Sachs-Mellinger variables were used again: the countries' distance 
from the nearest international economic centre, the proportion of the 
population living within 100 kilometres from the coast, the proportion of the 
country with tropical climates as well as a dummy, describing whether the 
country is landlocked. Regional dummies for Latin American and Sub- 
Saharan countries were employed together with the Asian dummy.
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Cst Initial
GDS
Initial
GDP Urb
Eco
Ac
Rat
Tropic
Pop
100
Km
Land
lock
Airdist Asia Sa­hara N
Adj.
R-
Sqrd
Pre­
dicted Actual
1966 1.02 0.98 72 0.87 5.92 9.86
1966 0.22 1.03 72 0.85 5.36 13.71
1967 0.74 1.05 -1.95E-03 72 0.83 5.07 13.75
1968 1.02 1.05 -1.91E-03 72 0.80 5.38 18.35
1969 2.05 1.04 -2.17E-03 72 0.77 6.23 18.03
1969 1.82 1.02 4.76 72 0.77 10.79 18.03
19/0 3.33 0.99 -2.15E-03 72 0.71 7.26 18.35
1970 3.08 0.97 ' ~2!ìùCD3 5.04 72 0 72 11.94 18.35
1971 2.49 0.95 71 0.71 7.23 18.92
19/1 2.19 0.94 5.49 71 0.72 12.37 18.92
1972 3.54 0.94 71 0.65 8.20 24.58
19/3 5.06 0.95 71 0.55 9.77 29.29
19/4 3.84 1.09 I 71 0.53 9.25 29.07
1975 2.22 0.99 71 0.54 7.13 29.41
1976 3.58 0.97 71 0.48 8.40 32.64
19// 4.22 0.89 71 0.45 8.67 33.51
19// 8.54 0.78 -7.12 71 0.48 12.42 33.51
19/8 4.56 0.68  ^ 5 97 71 0.45 13.90 33.99
19/8 9.93 0.62 8.29 -6.47 71 0.50 21.36 33.99
1979 3.36 0.95 69 0.48 8.10 36.32
1979 7.77 0.84 -7.28 69 0.51 11.93 36.32
1980 2.19 0.97 69 0.48 7.02 38.08
1980 6.45 0.86 -7.06 69 0.50 10.73 38.08
1981 _ -2.68 0.75 "014 69 0 4 9 15.35 41.29
1981 3.48 0.73 fü"‘07 -6.92 69 0.51 13.82 41.29
1982 -2.83 0.57 -4.31 E-03 0.23 70 0.36 21.06 44.04
1983 2.57 0.75 70 0.31 6.32 46.55
1983 6.62 0.61 10.27 -7.47 70 0.35 19.94' 46.55
1984 -0.73 0.56 0.15 69 0.32 17.16 46.29
1984 -0.21 0.59 B m 13.00 69 0.35 26.23 46.29
1985 8.95 0.51 -8.27 69 0.29 11.49 40.62
1985 7.72 0.50 -6.98 13.22 69 0.34 23.43 40.62
1986 -42.84 0.56 -5.28E-03 0.92 69 0.31 22.61 38.19"
1986 -24.01 0.54 « S I I 11.27 69 0.34 27.61 38.19
1987 -58.68 0.40 1.12 7.51 68 0.29 30.78 38.12
1987] -34.53 0.43 0 .6 9 E E S Î 13.04 68 0.33 35.04 38.12
1988 -54.04 0.49 -5.43E-03 1.15 68 0.31 28.47 41.29
1989 -55.38 0.49 -4.46E-03 1.16 68 0.36 28.87 43.36
19901 -54.27 0.54 -6.94E-03 1.14 68 0.41 28.37 43.59
1991 ” -66.001 0.34 -1.61E-02 1.71 -14.1 -9.59 -1.42E-03 67 0.50 31.12 45.54
I992
1992
-67.28 0.35 -5.80E-03 1.38 67 0.44 31.77 46.39
-50.90 0.34 -4.57E-03 1.07 10.22 67 0.46 36.32 46.39
T993I -61.29 0.41
¿38ÉS
1.24 67 0.41 38.22 45.77
19931
1994
-41.12 0.40 0.86 12.83 67 0.45 34.29 45.77
-47.85 0.27 0.99 6.87 -11.86 67 0.42 31.03 48.50
1994 -22.20 0.31 -12.84 12.82 67 0.45 35.50 48.50
1995 -27.32 0.26 0.72
—
-7.87 67 0.34 25.00 50.03
1995 -6.89 0.29 B B T -8.82 13.54 67 0.39 31.85 50.03
1996] 9.82 0.19 -11.00 67 0.23 28.42 50.67
T996j 10.29 0.16 -10.59 11.97 67 0.27 37.76 50.67
1997 -35.63 0.33 0.80 67 0.34 2309 52.23
1997 -19.72 0.37 0.50 11.40 67 0.37 29.12 52.23
1998 -30.26 I 0.80 -8.51 66 0.34 26.58 52.43
1998 -8.69 10.04 14.01 66 0.41 3491 52.43
1999
1999
lT _  L. A
-41.09 ----------10.99 -5.78 63 0.47 28.78 51.73
r~-26.60 [ = J 0.73 -6.92 9.54 63 0.51 34.60 51.73
were added]
fact that the variable was not significant anymore once regional dummies
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Table I.4.2.C. shows the results from this investigation. If the individual 
variable does not have a coefficient associated with it in the table, the 
variable was not able to remain in the model. Some years can have two 
models if one or more of the regional dummies significantly improved the 
first-step equation. The last two columns offer the predicted benchmark 
saving rate for Singapore next to the country's actual saving rate.
Analytically, two immediate findings result from the investigation: Firstly, it 
should not be surprising to see Singapore achieve at least world average 
saving rates by the mid-1980s given her exogenous circumstances, 
particularly her favourable demographic development. Allowing for peer- 
group effects captured by the Asian Dummy variable raises the expected 
savings even above world average levels. Secondly, Singapore was able to 
consistently go beyond this benchmark. Thus, while a substantial 
improvement in Singapore's saving behaviour beyond her initial situation 
and eventually beyond world averages should not be surprising, the actually 
achieved saving ratios remain beyond expectable levels given the country s 
strictly non-policy environment as is the speed and degree of the 
transformation before 1980.
Statistically, three findings stand out. Firstly, it must be noted how long the 
period of significance of the saving inertia actually lasts. Not until after a 
period of over 30 years is the effect of the initial saving rate overcome in the 
world sample. Secondly, some variables which were still significant within 
the fixed-effects models lose their statistical powers, particularly the 
geographic variables become very erratic. Only the landlocked dummy was 
strong enough to appear consistently at least in the later half of the period. 
Chenery-Syrquin's measure for the size of the economy, i.e. its total 
population, was never able to survive the general-to-specific removal 
process. Thirdly, the fact that the adjusted r-squared falls in line with the loss 
of explanatory power of the inertia variable points to the fact that a number 
of important influences do not seem to be captured yet in the model. The
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behaviour of individual variables also suggests that the model is not yet fully 
robust.
1.4.3. Mixed Models
International cross-sectional analyses, which try to explain savings, often 
include such purely policy induced variables as the government's budget 
balance or the countries respective pension systems and such strongly policy 
induced variables as inflation or interest rates. This study avoids these 
explanatory factors because it does not attempt to explain cross-country 
saving behaviour instead it tries to determine exactly how much can be 
attributed to policy by controlling only for non-policy induced variables. 
However, there are a number of factors which are often targeted by 
government policy but can not be brought about by their own doing, i.e. they 
depend to a substantial degree on exogenous forces. For Singapore, two of 
the main ingredients to the country's economic development plan are such 
factors: her export performance and net-foreign-direct-investments. Both of 
these were clearly targeted by Singapore's economic policies, but by their 
nature depend largely on the actions of third parties outside of government 
control. Even if such actions could be induced by such means as tax regimes, 
these facilitating policies are certainly not created to improve saving ratios.
This section will try to control for the country's net-export and FDI 
performance together with the already introduced strictly non-policy factors. 
Additionally, per-capita income will be tested as a potential explanatory 
factor because it is such a fundamental variable and can also be considered 
not to be fully within the government's realm of influence. Initially, fixed 
effects models are estimated, whose findings are then further investigated in 
annual models.
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Table I.4.3.: Fixed-Effects Models
1965-99
Cst 21.471 3.124 0.720 2.102 9.566 5.115 17.356 13.829
NetExRat 0.796 0.775 0.788 0.851 0.83 0.769 0.751 0.758
Urb 5.39E-02 5.21 E-02 4.35E-02 7.39E-02 3.03E-02 5.44E-02 6.01 E-02
EcoAcRat 0.271 0.324 0.315 0.159 0.233 not sig. 0.109
GDPpcAt -1.05E-04 -1.45E-04 -1.13E-04 not sig. not sig. not sig.
PoplOOKm 1.797 not sig. 2.486 not sig. not sig.
Landlock not sig. not sig. not sig. -0.932 not sig.
Airdist -2.23E-04 not sig. -1.46E-04 1.86E-04 1.50E-04
T ropicar -0.658 not sig. -2.384 -1.639 -1.114
IniGDS 0.185 0.161 0.156
IniGDP -2.40E-03 -1.62E-03 -1.86E-03
NetFDI
Asia 7.315 6.988 6.136
LA -2.291 -2.270 -2.470
Sahara -2.532 -3.201 -3.211
Time-Dum. Yes
N 4,587 4,386 4,021 3,513 3,513 2,314 2,314 2,314
Adj. R-sqr. 0.686 0.705 0.714 0.766 0.784 0.778 0.793 0.803
Predicted 
Avr. Sav. 20.56 25.61 25.65 25.12 32.92 21.88 28.33 29.13
1972-99 115
Cst 10.824 19.498 16.427
NetExRat 0.809 0.782 0.791
Urb not siq. 2.74E-02 7.51 E-02
EcoAcRat 0.165 not sig. not sig.
GDPpcAt not sig. not sig. not sig.
PoplOOKm 3.284 not sig. not sig.
Landlock not sig. -1.370 not sig.
Airdist not sig. 2.51 E-04 2.19E-04
Tropicar -4.308 -2.749 -1.961
IniGDS 0.126 9.77E-02 7.44E-02
IniGDP -2.16E-03 -1.27E-03 -1.74E-03
NetFDI 0.690 0.636 0.700
Asia 8.520 8.270
LA -1.970 -3.060
Sahara -3.370 -3.660
Time-Dum Yes
N 1,754 1,754 1,754
Adj. R-sar. 0.767 0.787 0.801
Predicted 
Avr. Sav. 28.11 36.04 39.56------------ ,---------------i________  ' --------------- 1
[Among the annual time-dummies only those for 1973 
to 1982 and 1999 remained significant. All others were 
removed]
116 Since NET-FDI is only available for Singapore
was only estimated for the period 1972-99. The average actual saving
that period was 41.2 percent.
effects model 
Singapore for
63
Chapter Onp Page 64
In order to maximise the sample size and to make the respective effects of the 
individual variables stand out more, the battery of independent variables 
was added in a specific-to-general fashion starting with the variable with the 
largest sample size. Using the joint-hypothesis F-test, the resulting regression 
equation was then reduced to include only those variable which add to the 
model in a statistically significant way. The Net-FDI ratio was added last, 
because the variable offers observations only from the 1970s onwards. Table
1.4.3. presents the results.
Similar to the earlier analyses, given the country's resource balance, 
demographics and geographies, as well as her initial situation, above world 
average savings should have been expected based on the fixed-effects 
models. However, once all explanatory dimensions are included Singapore's 
expected average savings is very close to the country's actual saving rates.
In order to further probe this finding, annual models were estimated 
following the same combined specific-to-general and general-to-specific 
approach. Annual models with the resource balance, the urbanisation ratio 
and the economically active proportion of the population predict saving 
ratios for Singapore above world average, but below actual. The transition to 
saving rates beyond the initial levels was also to be expected. Statistically it is 
striking that the urbanisation ratio loses its significance in the late 1970s, 
while the economically active proportion of the population does not become 
significant until the 1980s. Adding geography and per-capita income 
variables does not alter these findings. Moreover, income is rarely significant 
and the several geographic variables exhibit a very erratic significance with 
no clear pattern. Adding the inertia variable and the initial income levels, 
alters the results somewhat.116 The early years until the first half of the 1970s 
have much lower predicted saving rates than without modelling the initial 
situation. Particularly, the inertia variable lowers the expected saving rates, 
which is also at least partly due to the fact that the urbanisation ratio loses its
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significance in those years and is thus removed from the equation. However, 
from the mid-1980s onwards, particularly once the economically active 
proportion of the population becomes statistically significant, benchmark 
savings rises to levels substantially above world average. In other words, the 
model would still predict a strong transition from Singapore's early saving 
rates to levels above world average. Consequently, for the whole period this 
yields an average benchmark saving rate of slightly above world levels. 
Adding regional dummies does not materially alter this finding, although 
the Asian dummy proves significant in all but six years. The average saving 
rate is increased somewhat but still remains substantially below the actual 
level. The transition to higher savings is predicted to be somewhat faster 
than without the regional dummies but still not as fast as if the initial 
situation remained outside of the model. Adding Net-FDI, however, does 
increase the expected saving rate substantially, even if the inertia variable is 
included in the equation.10 *17 The model even predicts savings above the 
actual levels for individual years. Overall the average benchmark savings for 
1972-99 is 34.5 percent of GDP compared to an actual of 41.2 percent. If 
regional dummies are included, this average predicted saving level rises 
further to 37.5 percent.118
The effect of the additional inclusion of institutional proxies was also tested, 
but did not substantially alter the benchmark values for Singapore's saving. 
If anything, the modelling of an institutional dimension reduces the expected 
savings for Singapore. In fixed-effects models based on those described 
above but yet without regional dummies or NetFDI, the separate inclusion of
110 GDP per capita had to be removed from the model once the initial GDP level was included
due to a strong correlation between the two variables.
117 It is noteworthy, that this positive and significant impact of FDI on savings is in contrast 
with parts of the FDI-literature. For a summary see for example Kentor (1998) who argues
that FDI dependence can have a long-run negative impact. Similarly to dependency theory he
argues that an economy controlled by foreign interests would not develop organically (p.
1025): “It would grow in a disarticulated manner. The natural linkages that would evolve from
locally controlled capital would not occur. Profits would be exported. The interests of the
ruling elite would be allied with those of owners of the foreign capital. Income inequality would 
grow. The economy would stagnate.”
118 It must be noted, however, that once Net-FDI and regional dummies are included the 
restricting influence of the inertia variable only rarely proves to be significant and is thus 
removed from many annual models.
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all five institutional variables resulted in expected saving levels for 
Singapore of 18-25 percent of GDP for 1965-99, which is slightly below the 
earlier models without the institutional variables.119 Once regional dummies 
and Net-FDI are also included in the equation the benchmark saving rate 
rises to levels significantly above world average. The models using IniHDI*, 
HumCap, SocCap or Inilnc result in average expected savings of between 25 
and 31 percent for 1972-99, which is again slightly lower than the models 
without institutional proxies presented in table 1.4.3. Statistically, it can be 
noted that the inclusion of institutional variables in some cases results in the 
loss of significance for the urbanisation ratio. Also, the mortality variable is 
only significant in a few models. Generally, the composite living standard 
measure, IniHDI*, yields the strongest models.
Overall, the findings from the mixed models support the earlier results, 
namely that Singapore saved more than could have been expected of the 
country given her strictly non-policy circumstances. However, once all three 
explanatory dimensions (non-policy, external and peer-group) are jointly 
controlled for Singapore’s actual savings are very close to expected levels. It 
should not be surprising that Singapore was able to raise her saving rate 
substantially beyond her saving performance at time of independence and by 
the mid-1980s to above world average levels. Furthermore, rather than the 
world-record saving rates of the 1990s, which usually attract the most 
attention, the annual analysis points to the first half of the 1970s and if we 
allow for saving inertia also the late 1960s as Singapore s most sustained 
period of extraordinary savings.
119 The independent variables included in detail were: NetExRat, Urb, EcoAcRat, Airdist, 
Tropicar, IniGDS, and IniGDP. The institutional proxies tested were: SocCap, Humcap, 
Mortality, IniHDI* and Inilnc. Time-dummies were not used. The institutional variables were 
tested one at a time. The regression equation was reduced in a general-to-specific way as 
described in the methodology section. In a second and third step regional dummies (Asia 
LA, Sahara) and NetFDI were added and the resulting equation reduced again by way of 
joint-hypothesis testing The use of the institutional proxies resulted in a substantial reduction 
of the sample sizes, ranging from 1125 -  1992 observations. The models offered decent to 
Qood explanatory powers with adjusted R-Squareds of between 0.57 and 0.81.
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1.4.4. Non-Policy and Mixed Models without removal of variables
So far only the results from models, from which any insignificant variables 
have been removed, were discussed. However, one can argue that in order to 
calculate a benchmark for Singapore all potentially important variables 
should be included in the models even though they might not be statistically 
significant for the world sample in a certain given year. This would allow the 
benchmark process to continuously control for all factors and thus result in a 
more consistent benchmark over time instead of being forced to use different 
models for different years. Moreover, since the equations will not change 
from year to year, the stepwise revision of Singapore's deceptive 
extraordinarity will become more visible. Statistically, the difference to the 
regression models with only significant variables should not be too 
substantial since the removal of the variables was based on a joint-hypothesis 
F-test, which determines whether the full equation is significantly different 
with or without the variable. The benchmark results, however, are likely to 
differ somewhat more. Therefore, the following section functions largely as a 
narrative device, which nicely brings the findings so far obtained to a 
concluding point.
Based on the experience from the earlier models, the following five equations 
were adopted:
Model 1: Net-Export-Ratio, Urbanisation Rate and Economically Active Population
Model 2: same as Model 1 plus Net-FDI for the years after 1971
Model 3: same as Model 2 plus Asian regional dummy
Mode) 4: same as Mode) 2 plus )nifial-GDS ratio and Initial per-capita GDP
Model 5: same as Model 4 plus Asian regional dummy
Table 1.4.4. summarises the outcome from these models. The last column 
gives the average over- or under-saving by Singapore. A positive (negative) 
number indicates that in average Singapore saved more (less) than what the 
model would predict, controlling for the country s circumstances. Graph
1.4.4.a. shows the respective over-/ (under-) saving for each year for models 
4, 2, 4 and 5, contrasting the results with a comparison merely based on
Ì
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averages. The detailed coefficients and their t-ratios for each year are 
available in the appendix.120
Table I.4.4.: Annual Mixed Models without removal of insignificant 
variables -  Summary Statistics121
Sam ple Size , Adi. R Sqrd. Average Benchm ark
m in-m ax avr. m in-m ax Avr. Savinq Over/Under
NetExRat + Urb + EcoAcR at 90 -1 6 0 125.31 0.55-0 82 0.73 26.16 9.97
+ N et-FD l 8 4 -1 5 0 114.89 0.61-0 81 0.73 ' 31.14 4.99
+ Asia 84 -1 5 0 114.89 0 6 1 -0 .8 2 0.74 37.93 -1.81
+JMet-FDI + Im G D S  + IniGDP 6 5 - 8 0 72.77 0.62-0.90 0.78 29 75 6 38
+ Asia 6 5 - 8 0 72.77 0.64-0.90 0.79 34.76 1.37
N et-FD l was only included from 1972 onwards due to limited data availability.
Graph I.4.4.a.: Annual Mixed Models without removal of insignificant 
variables
27.5 Over- /(Undor-) Saving
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Geographic variables were not tested due to their erratic and ^  
performance in the earlier annual models. Institutional proxy ^ b t e s  ateo n o is e d
since they will cause a substantial reduction of the sam ple sire  t o a ,  variance of the 
findings extremely sensitive to the variations within the sam ple ,ns*- . .  . have not Keen
explanatory variables. Both of these types of variables as well as o followina section
employed so far will be tested via an extensive sensitivity analysis control for thè
which will also include a Tw o -S tage-Least-S quare  procedure in 
potentially endogenous nature of the N et-Export variable.
121 Statistically it must be noted that in the early part of the period, w h e n st ^ j ard 
prove significant, the variable attracts a small negative coefficient g 9 9 SinqaPOre'S 
theory of the variable's expected impact. This, however, shouW affect Singapore^ 
benchmarks in a conservative manner and rather lead to unders P
the country.
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Very similar to the earlier findings, these models confirm that Singapore 
saved in average between 5 and 10 percent of GDP more than would be 
expected of a country with similar circumstances given a world sample. If 
one controls, however, for Singapore being part of a very successful peer 
group of neighbouring countries this 'over-saving is almost completely 
neutralised. Therefore, the transition from the country's low saving 
performance at time of independence should not be surprising, even if we 
allow for the country's initial situation in the early 1960s affecting the 
subsequent years. Particularly, the country s favourable demographic 
development, export and FDI success makes savings far above world 
average levels by the late 1970s the norm for Singapore. The transition to 
these above average saving rates, however, took place much faster and more 
strongly than what could have been expected of the country, particularly if 
her weak starting position is taken into account. Moreover, the world record 
saving rates in the 1990s -  at least until the Asian crisis -  become much less
extraordinary.
In terms of policy impact, it must be concluded that Singapore s savings 
must have been positively affected by the country s policies resulting in
69
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higher savings beyond what could have been expected of the country given 
her circumstances. This policy effect, however, is comparatively small in 
relation to strictly non-policy and external factors. Furthermore, the policy 
impact can be econometrically explained by Singapore s place within a 
particular peer group of neighbouring countries. In other words Singapore 
over-saved in average somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of GDP, which, 
however, is in line with the saving behaviour of her regional 'control group . 
Singapore's saving performance within an Asian perspective, therefore, is far 
from extraordinary. Even outside of this Asian perspective, the country s 
saving is far less spectacular than a pure comparison of GDS-ratios would 
indicate once a number of important non-policy and external circumstances 
are controlled for. However, independent of one s view on the Asian peer 
group factor, policies must have certainly increased the speed and strength 
of the transition in the late 1960s and early 1970s away from the country s 
initial saving behaviour. 12
Graph I.4.4.b.: Annual Mixed Models without removal of insignificant
122 The graph shows the young dependency ratef econo^cal^ac^ve population, 
driving force behind the development of the share of the economically acuve v
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Graph I.4.4.b. visually shows the development over time of the main 
influential variables of the regression models -  except for those variables 
with fixed values such as those describing the initial situation. It becomes 
clear how extraordinary Singapore's early saving performance was given the 
country's highly negative resource balance and the still high yet falling 
dependency ratio. On the other hand, the ten years after Singapore s 
recession in 1985/6 are far from extraordinary given her very successful 
external position by that time both in respect to the country's net-exports as 
well as Net-FDl and the by then very low dependency rate.
1.4.5. Sensitivity Analysis
Any statistical analysis is prone to be sensitive to a number of issues, such as 
excluded variables, the theoretical underpinnings of those variables included 
as well as the interpretation of the models' statistical robustness.
The statistical diagnostics appear decent to good, with continuously high 
adjusted R-Squareds, particularly for the models incorporating all three 
explanatory dimensions, and largely significant coefficients. Statistically, the 
models are potentially most sensitive to changes in the sample, both in 
respect to size and composition. However, every effort was made to 
maximise the available sample within the given dataset in order to reduce 
this sensitivity to its lowest possible level.
Most of the significant variables, especially NetExRat and IniGDS, behave in 
a robust fashion. They either have stable coefficients over time or show a 
clear and explicable time-trend, e.g. falling influence of IniGDS. Of the 
generally significant variables, only FDI shows a certain degree of volatility 
among its coefficients over time. Yet, given the very volatile nature of FDI- 
flows in general, any other result for annual regressions over a period of 35 
years would be dubious. While the significance levels of some variables have
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b eh av ed  d iffe re n tly  b etw een  an n u al an d  fixed -effects m o d els , th e  o v e ra ll  
fin d in g s h a v e  re m a in e d  ro b u st. N ev erth eless , th ese fin d in g s n eed  to  be  
tested  fo r th e ir  p o te n tia l sen sitiv ity  to  ad d itio n al in flu en ces w h ich  h a v e  n o t  
been m o d e lle d  y e t  a n d  to  d ifferin g m ea su re m e n t tech n iq u es a n d  d ifferen t  
so u rce s  fo r  a lre a d y  in clu d ed  variab les. A d d itio n ally , th e  im p a ct of a 
P o ten tia l p ro b le m  of s im u ltan eity  b etw een  th e sav in g  ra tio  a n d  th e  re s o u rc e  
b alan ce  n e e d s  to  be in v e stig a te d . F u rth e rm o re , it m ig h t be h elp fu l to  p ro b e  
the A sia n  D u m m y 's  effect in o rd e r  to  g e t  a b etter u n d e rs ta n d in g  o f w h a t  it 
c a p tu re s .
A s th e  fo llo w in g  se n sitiv ity  an alysis w ill sh o w , n o  m a tte r  h o w  th e  m o d e ls  
a re  c h a n g e d  th e  th re e  fu n d am en tal co n clu sio n s re m a in : F irstly , it c o u ld  h a v e  
b een  e x p e c te d  o f  S in g a p o re  to  a ch ie v e  w o rld  a v e ra g e  sa v in g  le v e ls  b a se d  o n  
‘h e  c o u n tr y 's  s tr ic tly  n o n -p o licy  c ircu m sta n ce s . S eco n d ly , a b o v e  w o rld  
^ e r a g e  le v e ls  co u ld  h a v e  b een  e x p e cte d  if w e  a lso  co n tro l for th e  c o u n tr y 's  
Very su cce ssfu l e x te rn a l s itu atio n . F in ally , if w e  fu rth e r  a llo w  f o r  p o te n tia l  
P e e r-g ro u p  m e ch a n ism s  b y p lacin g  S in g ap o re  w ith in  a  g ro u p  o f  su ccessfu l  
A sian  c o u n tr ie s , th e  a ctu a l sa v in g  p e rfo rm a n ce  w a s  v e ry  c lo se  to  w h a t  co u ld  
n a v e  b e e n  e x p e c te d .
•4-5.1. Additional Influences
T ab le I .2 .1 .5 , a b o v e  lis ted  a  n u m b er o f  v ariab les  n o t a lw a y s  te s te d  for In th e  
""a in  r e g re s s io n  a n a ly se s  of this s tu d y  b u t for w h ich  e x is t  s u p p o rt  in  th e
'f e a t u r e .  In  o r d e r  to  in v e stig a te  h o w  th ese  a d d itio n al v ariab les  m ig h t affect
thm „ in d iv id u ally  to  fiv e  b asic  fix e d -e ffe cts
ne e a rlie r  re s u lts , th e y  w e re  a d d e d  m d iv ia u a u y
models.
Model 1: 
Model 2: 
Model 3: 
Model 4: 
Model 5:
EcoAcRat, Airdistance, IniGDS and IniGDP (1965-99) 
! a s  Model 1 plus NetExRat (1965-99)
> as Model 2 plus Asia (1965-99)
Model 2 plus NetFDI (1972-99)
Model 4 plus Asian regional dummy (1972-99)
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The first stage combines the three non-policy dimensions: demography, 
geography and initial situation. In separate consecutive steps NetExRat, 
NetFDI and Asia are added in a specific-to-general mode. Each resulting 
model is reduced to only its significant contributors using joint-hypothesis 
testing.
Table I.4.5.I. Average predicted Savings -  Additional Variables123
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 N Adj. R2
Basic 15.1 23.3 27.7 31.1 37.2 2424-1807 0.4-0.8
+ Apri 16.8 25.1 29.8 30.4 ias 36.6 2214-1686 0.5-0.8
+Jnilnc 21.8 22.3 26.7 30.7 36.9 13U 1594-1222 0.3-0.6
+ NetFuel 'Jl 25.0 28.5 33.6 29.2 36.4 144 965-919 0.5-0.7
18.0 26.4 30.4 31.8 38.6 2105-1649 0.4-0.8
+ GDPpc Never s 9
+ GDPPPP 21.3 144 22.7 26.9 30.3 14a 36.3 130 2112-1566 0.4-0.7
+ GDPpcAt Never sig
+ Growth 15.8 23.4 27.6 31.2 37.3 2412-1806 0.4-0.8
+ GroPPP 20.5 13/ 23.1 26.7 29.1 34.2 2112-1566 0.4-0.7
+ GroAt 15.3 24.0 28.7 31.5 38.6 2310-1751 0.4-0.8
+ NER*Asia n/a n/a 29.0 n/a 37.6 2419-1807 0.8-0.8
+ Urb*EcoAcRat138 8.5 23.5 28.0 31.2 37.5 2424-1807 0.4-0.8
+ EcoAcRat'Growth Invalid model
144 The number of observations and the adjusted R-Squared listed refer to models 1 an 
respectively. For those models, for which model 1 is not significant, the figures for model 2 
are given. If model 2 is also not significant model 3 is shown.
124 These models do not include the urbanisation ratio due to strong multi-collinearity 
between Agri and Urb.
125 EcoAcRat did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
126 EcoAcRat did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
127 Neither of these models includes the urbanisation ratio because it did not prove to be 
significant after the inclusion of Inilnc.
128 AirDist did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
129 AirDist did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
130 IniGDP did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
131 The models only refer to 1980-1999, since no observations for NetFuel from before 1980 
were available. Singapore's average saving rate for this time period was 45.41 k.
32 Urb did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
133 Since no observations for ToT from before 1975 or after 1995 were available for 
Singapore, the average expected saving ratios refer to the period 1975-95. The country s 
average saving rate for this time period was 41.25%. The fixed-effects model on the world 
sample was nevertheless estimated for the whole time-period.
134 EcoAcRat did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
5 Urb did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
136 EcoAcRat and AirDist did not prove significant in this model and were removed from the 
equation.
AirDist did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
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Table 1.4.5.1. summarises the predicted average savings for Singapore for 
each of the resulting models. Singapore's actual average savings ratios for 
1965-99 and 1972-99 were respectively 36.13 and 41.32 percent. World 
average levels were around 18 percent. Overall, these fixed effects models 
suggest that the expected values for Singapore's saving ratios obtained in the 
analyses above and the three main derived conclusions are robust. Only the 
non-policy model using the interaction variable between the urbanisation 
ratio and the share of the economically active population would not have 
predicted savings similar to those obtained in the regressions tested in the 
main part of the chapter. This would indicate that the above results might 
indeed be affected by a multi-collinearity problem between these two 
variables.
The Agri variable, which intends to capture the country s economic structure 
and exposure to a sector with an arguably low savings potential, is highly 
negatively correlated with the degree of urbanisation. Therefore, its inclusion 
requires the removal of the urbanisation ratio in order to prevent a high 
degree of multi-collinearity from affecting the model. Unfortunately, the 
inclusion also causes the share of the economically active population to lose 
its significance in some of the equations. In the remaining equations 
EcoAcRat attracts a negative sign if Agri is included. Given the somewhat 
questionable theoretical support of the Agri variable in terms of its effect on 
savings, the impact the variable has on the statistical performance of the 
other demographic measures seems to indicate that it might actually capture 
demographic effects rather than those stemming from a sub-optimal 
economic structure.
The inclusion of Inilnc, a measure of the income distribution, results in a 
rather weak model with a substantially lower sample size. It attracts a 
negative coefficient, which would support the traditional view that a more 138
138 These models do not include the urbanisation ratio and the share of the economically 
active population separately.
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equal society saves less. Again the urbanisation ratio loses its significance 
and in some models AirDist and IniGDP do so as well.
Net-Fuel-Exports, which were included to see whether the regression results 
are possibly driven by the high-saving ratios of oil-exporting nations, leads 
to an even stronger reduction in sample size because no observations were 
available from the period before 1980 and the country coverage was also 
limited. Its main effects on the regression equation are to give a negative 
coefficient to the urbanisation ratio, to slightly lower the Net-Export 
coefficient but raise the parameter for the share of the economically active 
population.139
The inclusion of the terms-of-trade yields a theoretically supported and 
statistically significant model at decent sample sizes. However, it does not 
alter the main findings. Mathematically, the positive coefficient of the terms- 
of-trade variable is offset by a negative constant. Therefore, while the terms- 
of-trade are indeed an additional aspect of the external situation of the 
country, which is not modelled with the other variables, its impact on the 
benchmarking is limited.
In terms of income variables, only the per-capita income figure measured in 
purchasing-power-parities is able to attract statistical significance in the 
equations.140 But again, it is not able to alter the benchmark for Singapore, 
except if per-capita income was included among the non-policy variables, i.e. 
model 1. In this case, the relatively high per-capita income of Singapore 
would result in a higher benchmark for Singapore's savings, which other 
models only reach once the external dimension is incorporated as well.
139 In respect to Singapore, it must be noted that the country started with high net-fuel imports 
but due to the very successful built-up of a refining industry was able to almost balance its 
fuel imports and exports, i.e. the value added in the refining industry almost made up for the 
country’s fuel consumption. The Net-Fuel balance for 1990-99, for example, stood at only - 
1.2% of GDP. The equivalent figure for the 1980s was -11.7%. The inclusion of a Net-Fuel 
variable in the benchmarking exercise would therefore lower the expected savings of 
Singapore’s early but not its later years.
40 GDPpcPPP remains significant even if the initial level of per-capita income is measured in 
purchasing-power-parities, i.e. if IniGDP is exchanged with IniPPP.
t a p "
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As theory would predict, growth enters the equation significantly no matter 
what the measurement concept. However, only very slight differences in the 
benchmarking results exist which cannot contradict the central findings. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of growth does not remove any of the other 
variables from the equation, which means that the variance of the growth 
variable is an additional factor in modelling savings and thus suggests that 
the other dimensions do not model growth.
Adding an interaction variable between Net-Exports and the Asian Dummy 
alters the benchmarks for Singapore only very slightly.141 The same is largely 
true for the interactive variable between the Urbanisation ratio and the share 
of the economically active population, particularly for the equations 
including the external situation. Therefore, even if a potential multi- 
collinearity problem between these two variables might have affected the 
regression results those benchmarks for Singapore, which also take account 
of her external situation, remain almost identical. The non-policy model, 
however, would predict a lower saving rate for Singapore. This result 
together with the not completely robust behaviour of these two demographic 
variables in the other parts of the sensitivity analysis points to a possible 
weakness of the main models.
The combination between growth and the share of the economically active 
population, as propagated by Collins (1992), leads to a near perfect multi- 
collinearity between growth and the new interaction variable.142 This is easily 
explained, because the combined variable's variance is predominantly driven 
by the growth variable due to the small cross-sectional and time-series
The interaction variable receives a negative coefficient while the separate parts retain their 
positive signs. This result is very difficult to interpret. One possible explanation could be that 
if the fast industrialising Asian countries ran trade deficits, they were largely due to the import 
of investment goods, which would increase the saving rate. For a discussion ot the 
relationship between net-exports, investment and the saving rate see the excurse at the end 
of the chapter (section I.6.).
142 The correlation coefficients between the interaction variable and the respective growth 
variable (current US$, PPP, or Atlas method) are above 0.99.
76
Chapter One Page 77
variance of the share of the economically active population. Collins (1992) 
finding of a growth-tilt effect must, therefore, be considered questionable, 
because it must be assumed that her models basically included the growth 
variable twice.143
In summary, an inclusion of additional variables beyond those controlled for 
in the main models is not likely to be able to disprove the central findings. 
However, the frequent loss of significance of the urbanisation ratio and the 
fact of its potential multi-collinearity problem with the share of the 
economically active population indicates that these variables might not be 
too robust.
14.5.2. Differing Variables
Variables from different sources or with different measurement concepts are 
tested following the same algorithm as the preceding section on additional 
explanatory dimensions. However, the central findings remain intact.
The main point about the total trade variable is that it enters significantly 
alongside the Net-Export-Ratio which can be interpreted as an indication 
against Levine and Renelt's (1992) argument that -  at least in growth 
regressions -  the export share or any other trade statistic basically captures 
the degree of openness of the economy. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of 
Trade does not substantially alter the coefficient of the Net-Export-Ratio. 
Moreover, its beta-coefficient is the second strongest in any of the five 
models -  after Net-Exports. Therefore, the resource balance does not appear 3
3 Collins (1992) used an interaction variable between the young-dependency rate and 
growth. The young dependency rate has a slightly higher variance than the share ot the 
economically active population. However, the correlation coefficients between the interaction 
variable using young dependency and the respective growth variable (current US$, PPr, or 
Atlas method) are still all above 0.96 in our sample.
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to capture the policy choice regarding the degree of openness of the 
economy.
Table I.4.5.2. Average predicted Savings -  Differing Variables144
M odel 1 M odel 2 M odel 3 M odel 4 M odel 5 N A d j. R*
B a sic 15.1 23.2 27.7 31.1 37.2 2424-1807 0.4-0.8
+ Tra d e  14 45 23.3 41.6 42.3 58.9 55.2 2419-1807 0.4-0.8
+ Beri72 Not sig. Not sig. 22 8 146 1478 28.5 u l 30.1 14B~" 818-624 0.7-0.7
+ In iH D I* 149 150234*6789 16.0 24.7 28.9 1bu 32.6 101 39.1 ls2 1997-1490 04-0.8
+ ln iL ife + ln iL it7 0  163 8 4 1S4_ 22.8 1“ 28.5 lsb 30.4 1S' 4 T 4 ^ " 1997-1490 0.4-0.8
+ IniPPP 169 20.2 16U 23.2 27.5 29.9 35.7 2265-1668 0.4-0.7
+ L a b o rR a t101 Not sig. 22.2 27.6 28.6 35.9 162 2384-1779 0.8-0.8
+ Asia2 16j n/a n/a 27.3 n/a 36.8 1M_ 2419-1807 0.8-0.8
+ Island 17.3 25.5 28.9 34.5 42.7 1bi~ 2424-1807 0.4-0.8
144 The number of observations and the adjusted R-Squared listed refers to models 1 and 
respectively. For those models, for which model 1 is not significant, the figures for model z 
are given. If model 2 is also not significant model 3 is shown.
145 All of these models end in 1996, since no observations for imports and exports as percent 
of GDP was available after 1996. The country’s average saving rate for the respective time 
periods, 1965-96 and 1972-96, were 34.63% and 39.89%.
146 IniGDP did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
147 Urb did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
148 EcoAcRat did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
149 These models do not include IniGDP.
150 EcoAcRat did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
151 Urb and IniGDS did not prove significant in this model and were removed from the 
equation.
152 EcoAcRat and IniGDS did not prove significant in this model and were removed from the 
equation.
153 In order to be consistent with the measurements combined into IniHDI*, this equation uses 
IniGDPat instead of IniGDP.
154 IniLife did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
165 IniLife did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
156 EcoAcRat and IniLife did not prove significant in this model and were removed from the 
equation.
157 Urb and IniLife did not prove significant in this model and were removed from the 
equation.
158 EcoAcRat, AirDist and lniLit70 did not prove significant in this model and were removed 
from the equation.
159
These models do not include IniGDP.
160 AirDist did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
161 These models do not include EcoAcRat.
162 IniGDP did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
These models do not include Asia.
164 AirDist did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
165 EcoAcRat did not prove significant in this model and was removed from the equation.
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Given Singapore's small market, low natural resource endowment and 
geographic location it is arguable whether its high degree of openness does 
actually constitute a policy choice for this particular country -  especially after 
the failed merger with Malaysia. If we assume that Singapore had no choice 
but to remain open to the world economy and consequently include total 
trade as a non-policy variable, the benchmarking process would argue that 
Singapore 'should' have saved even more than it actually did. This finding 
does not only not disprove the central findings of the main section of this 
chapter, it actually gives them a conservative character.
The Beri72 estimates behave similarly to the earlier variables used as proxies 
for the initial institutional quality, somewhat reducing the level of expected 
savings. However, it does not prove significant unless the external situation 
is modelled as well. Moreover, its inclusion substantially reduces the sample 
size and significantly alters the consistency of the sample, so that a direct 
comparison between models with and without proxies for institutional 
quality is problematic.
The living standard measure of IniHDl*, which can be interpreted as a 
variant on the institutional proxy variables, enters significantly as well but is 
correlated with almost all of the other independent variables already 
included in the model.166 This problem might also explain that it attracts a 
negative sign unless the external situation is modelled. Overall this seems to 
suggest that its inclusion might not be too robust. Therefore, the three 
components were also tested as separate independent variables, which 
results in the life expectancy variable struggling for significance in the 
models and the loss of significance of one of the two demographic variables 
once the external situation is modelled as well.167 Overall, the initial literacy
,DD Its correlation coefficients are above 0.5 with all of the other independent variables, except 
for Airdist.
167 Samwick (2000 p. 267) points out the ambiguity of effects of changes in life-expectancy, 
which can explain the insignificance in saving regressions: Higher life expectancy genera y 
means a greater fraction of life spent retired, and, as a result, it should increase saving for 
lifecycle reasons. However, if differences in life expectancy are driven primarily by differences
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rate has a similar effect as SocCap or HumCap: the higher the educational 
standards among the population the higher is the savings ratio.* 168 Apart 
from model 1 the benchmarking results are largely the same as in the other 
equations. The expected savings derived from model 1 are negatively 
affected by a surprisingly high, negative coefficient for the initial per-capita 
income, which is cut almost in half once the external position is included. 
Overall, the inclusion of living standard measures does not seem to result in 
robust cross-country models for savings.
Exchanging IniGDP with IniPPP does not alter the benchmarks much. Only 
the non-policy model offers a substantially higher expected saving figure for 
Singapore, which is due to the loss of significance of the distance variable. 
The share of the labour force instead of the share of the population in 
working age also does not alter the findings. However, it is not significant 
until the external situation is modelled. Changing the composition of the 
Asian Dummy variable by excluding China and instead incorporating the 
Philippines does not change the benchmarks either. However, the additional 
inclusion of a small island dummy does increase the expected savings, 
particularly once Net-FDI flows are also controlled for. This effect is on top of 
the Asian dummy, so that it can be argued that Singapore's savings 'should 
have benefited from both an Asian as well as a small, ex-British Colony peer- 
group effect given a world sample.
A further alternative testing set-up would include Singapore in the actual 
sample together with a country dummy for Singapore. This would allow us 
to see whether even after controlling for the country's circumstances 
Singapore's savings were still indeed extraordinary which would show 
statistically through a significant country dummy. On the other hand, the
in mortality before retirement, then it might be the length of the working years that increases 
with life expectancy and the saving rate may fall.
168 The bivariant correlation coefficients between lniLit70 and SocCap or HumCap are above 
0-82. SocCap and HumCap have a correlation coefficient of 0.7. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that they capture very similar effects even though HumCap and SocCap claim to 
incorporate more aspects than merely literacy rates.
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inclusion of Singapore in the sample prohibts the calculation of a savings 
benchmark since this would in essence allow Singapore's actual saving 
performance to predict its own expected value. Therefore, this alteranative 
route will only be a check on how well the regression does actually capture 
all relevant aspects of Singapore's environment. Adding Singapore to the 
sample and running model 5 above does yield a significant country dummy 
for Singapore, which indicates that these fixed effects models might indeed 
not yet fully capture Singapore's position.169
1.4.5.3. Probing of Asian Dummy
The sensitivity analysis has brought already some insights into what the 
Asian Dummy variable might actually be capturing. As argued above, it does 
not appear to model growth, since growth variables enter the regression 
equation significantly without altering the significance of the other 
independent variables, including the Asian Dummy. On the other hand, the 
repeated loss of significance of the share of the economically active 
population once Asia is part of the regression, suggests that the Asian 
Dummy does incorporate demographic effects shared among the eight 
countries. Comparing separate scatter plots for Asian countries and the 
remaining countries shows that Asian countries have indeed a shared and 
distinct demographic development.
A further variation would be the inclusion of country dummies. However this would 
necessitate the removal of other country constant variables since they would be perfectly 
collinear. Particularly the removal of IniGDS and IniGDP would be both analytically and 
statistically regrettable. The existing regressions already capture country specific effects and 
they do so more explicitly and analytically revealing than a mere country dummy will be aD e 
to. The inclusion of country dummys is therefore suboptimal. The significance of the o er 
country constant variables indicates that indeed they will most likely prove significant, but do 
not have the interpretive powers.
Graph I.4.5.3. 3-D Scatterplot of EcoAcRat in Split Samples 170
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The graphs clearly show how the Asian countries exhibit a distinct pattern 
over time of a strongly rising share of the economically active population not 
shared in the same way by the wider sample. Moreover, the range of their 
achieved saving rates at any given share of their countries' economically 
active population is much narrower than in the remaining sample and in 
average at substantially higher levels. Statistically, the latter two facts should 
result in a more significant and higher coefficient of EcoAcRat in a regression 
analysis for the Asian countries than for the remaining sample. In the 
complete sample, however, the one average coefficient will leave a 
substantial amount of variance stemming from the Asian countries 
unmodelled. While it can not be determined with ultimate certainty, it is 
however very likely that the Asian dummy variable picks up exactly that 
difference to the countries not included in the dummy variable.
In order to support this visual analysis and to investigate further effects, 
which could possibly drive the significance of the Asian dummy variable, 
single, fixed-effects regressions of all the independent variables on the Gross- 
Domestic Saving ratios were run using the two split samples, in order to pin- 170
170 Similar graphs for Net-FDI are not able to make a distinct pattern clearly visible due to the
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point substantial differences in the 'explanatory' powers of the individual 
dimensions between the two samples. Table I.4.5.3.a. offers the R-squareds of 
the five strongest variables in the Asian sample and their respective results in 
the non-Asian and complete samples.
Table l.4.5.3.a. R-Squareds of Split Sample, Single Regressions
Asian Sample Remaining Sample Total Sample
EcoAcRat 34.8% 9.5% 11.8%
NetExRat 24.7% 69.4% 68.6%
NetFDI (1972-99) 14.7% 0.2% 0.2%
Mortality171 12.1% 4.7% 5.3%
IniGDS 9.9% 35.8% 33.3%
While the share of the economically active population can 'explain' almost 35 
percent of the variance in the GDS-ratios among Asian countries, it is only 
able to model a little under ten percent among the remaining sample. This 
supports the view that the significance of the additional inclusion of the 
Asian Dummy in the saving regressions is indeed driven by demographic 
effects among the Asian countries, which the coefficient of the EcoAcRat 
variable averaged across the world sample is only able to model partially.
Similarly, it appears that the significance of NetFDI is almost purely driven 
by Asian countries. On the other hand, the Net-Export-Ratio is extra­
ordinarily strong among the non-Asian countries. The saving-inertia also 
seems to affect the saving performance of non-Asian countries more than 
those of the eight countries included in the Asian peer group variable.
It is also important to note that none of the geographical variables in either 
sample are able to model more than five percent of the variance in the GDS- 
ratios. Therefore, in terms of this study, the thesis stemming from findings in
much wider range of the observations.
171 Observations are only available for three of the eight countries, namely Hong Kong, 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Thus the results for the distinct behaviour of the mortality variable 
might be driven by a selection within the Asian sub-sample, rather than a different selection 
between Asian and Non-Asian samples.
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growth regressions that the significance of regional dummies is potentially 
driven by geographic effects can be rejected.
A further investigation of differences in the means and standard deviations 
of the variables as well as the values of the coefficients in the respective 
samples further supports this view. Table I.4.5.3.b. reviews these summary 
statistics for the five strongest independent variables and the dependent 
GDS-ratios. The unstandardised as well as the standardised beta-coefficients, 
which the respective variable attracts in a single regression on the GDS-ratio, 
are shown.
Table l.4.5.3.b. Descriptives
Mean Std Dev. Coefficient Beta-Coef.
Asia Rest Asia Rest Asia Rest Asia Rest
GDSrat 30.3 16.0 7.2 15.35
EcoAcRat 62.1 57.1 6.1 6.3 0.697 0.730 0.590 0.308
NetExRat 1.4 -6.4 5.6 16.4 0.638 0.783 0.497 0.833
NetFDI 1.2 1.7 1.9 4.2 1.031 0.153 0.383 0.045
Mortality 67.5 263.9 72.8 496.9 -0.039 0.004 -0.360 -0.216
IniGDS 18.2 16.3 8.4 12.5 0.272 0.684 0.315 0.598
What stands out is the substantially larger beta-coefficient of EcoAcRat 
among the Asian sample, which shows again that its explanatory power is 
much stronger among the eight Asian countries than among the remaining 
sample. The unstandardised coefficients are, however, not too different, so 
that both sub-groups seem to have derived similar saving effects for the 
changes in their demographic structure, i.e. the average elasticity of the share 
of the economically active population in respect to saving ratios have been 
very close between both samples. This in turn could be interpreted as a sign 
that policy choices, which would try to improve the elasticity, have in 
average not affected the saving performances and can thus not explain the 
significance of the Asian dummy. If policy choices trying to take advantage 
of the demographic transition among the eight Asian countries had 
positively affected savings, we would expect to see a higher coefficient 
among the Asian subgroup. But in fact, the high saving Asian countries were
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only able to derive the same if not slightly lower benefits from the fall of the 
dependency ratios as the other countries.
On the other hand, Net-Foreign Direct Investment has much more positively 
affected savings among the eight Asian countries than in the remaining 
sample. This in turn could be interpreted as a sign that policy differences as 
regards FDI are partially captured by the Asian dummy variable. Similarly, 
the lower impact of the inertia variable among the Asian peer group 
countries indicates that they have been able to change saving behaviour 
much more and possibly faster than the other countries, which would again 
argue for the potential influence of policy. The impact of NetExRat also 
seems to have been stronger among the Non-Asian sample. However, since 
the coefficients are closer together the statistical difference is not likely to be 
as substantial.
Similar investigations into the other explanatory variables reveal that in 
general independent variables describing the initial situation have lower 
modelling power among the non-Asian sample. The group of Asian 
countries combined into the dummy variable have clearly overcome their 
initial situations more strongly and possibly faster than the countries in the 
remaining sample. None of the growth variables is particularly strong in 
either sample, with neither of them able to 'explain' more than 2% of the 
variance in GDS-ratios except for growth of per-capita income measured in 
PPPs, which is able to model 9.4 percent of the variance among the eight 
Asian countries but only 1.2 percent among the remaining sample.
In summary, this investigation into the Asian dummy variable has shown 
that its significance is most likely driven by a more pronounced demographic 
transition among the eight Asian countries, by a stronger saving response to 
foreign-direct-investment and less impact of the initial saving ratio and 
possibly of the resource balance. The Net-FDI and saving inertia differences 
are probably policy influenced.
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1.4.5.4. Potential Endogeneity of Net-Export-Ratio (Reverse Causation)
A further complication is introduced by the possibility of simultaneity 
among the variables, well known in almost any econometric model working 
with macro-data.172 If the causation in the relationship between two variables 
runs in both directions it implies that the regressor and the disturbance term 
are correlated. Hence the estimation by OLS would yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the structural parameters. The least square 
estimator will overstate the true parameter value, even in large samples.173
With respect to this study, the countries' savings could potentially determine 
the net-export performance through a reduction of the imports of 
consumption goods, i.e. the causation would run from savings to net-exports 
and not the other way as implied in the regression models.174 Alternatively, 
the causation could be bi-directional, i.e. both factors are jointly determined. 
If either was the case the coefficient for the resource balance in the 
regressions would be positively biased, which would result in an overstated 
savings benchmark for Singapore.
The Two-Stage-Least-Squares technique allows and controls for joint 
endogeneity, by calculating a fictitious but exogenous data series in place of 
the potentially endogenous explanatory variable using independent 
instruments which are able to describe the exogenous components of the
12 As early as 1963 Ando and Modigliani (1963, p. 67) have pointed Out that the least- 
squared method applied to saving equations can lead to biased estimates when one or more 
of the independent variables are related to the dependent variable by other simultaneous 
relations.
173 A positive disturbance shock, e.g. an increase in the error term of the regression, will 
increase both the endogenous explanatory variable, e.g. NetExRat, and the dependent 
variable, e.g. GDSratio. Consequently, there is a tendency for positive disturbances to be 
associated with relatively higher values of the endogenous variable, and for negative 
disturbances to be associated with relatively lower values of the endogenous variable. This 
has the effect of rotating the OLS regression line anticlockwise increasing its slope and thus 
overestimating the ‘true’ slope parameter leading to a positive inconsistency.
174 Other cross-country saving regressions potentially suffer from the problem of simultaneity 
even more, because they tend to include such policy induced variables as interest rates and 
growth, which are very likely to be endogenous (see Loayza et all, 2000, pp. 169-170).
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endogenous variable. However, often it is extremely difficult to find such 
truly independent instruments, which are nevertheless able to realistically 
model the exogenous components of the explanatory variable. Therefore, so- 
called internal instruments, which are based on lagged values of the 
explanatory variable, are generally used to control for endogeneity. This 
requires the relaxation of the assumption that the explanatory variables are 
strictly exogenous. In turn, the assumption is that the variables are 'weakly 
exogenous/ which in our case means that unforeseen changes to the saving 
rate do not influence previous realizations of the saving determinants, i.e. the 
current year's saving ratio will have no effect on the previous year's net- 
export-ratio. Statistically, the problem of correlation of the errors with the 
explanatory variables due to reverse causality is thus resolved.175 Yet, as 
Andres Solimano points out in his comment to Edwards (1997, p. 160), the 
causality problem remains at the analytical level. Fortunately, since the 
benchmarking exercise of this study does not intend to explain saving 
behaviour, it does not need to worry about the direction of causality beyond 
the statistical level. In other words, as long as the coefficients of the 
regression are statistically unbiased and consistent, the calculated benchmark 
will be so as well, no matter what the underlying processes are. This study 
only controls for these processes. It does not intend to explain them.
Consequently, the basic fixed-effects models used so far in this sensitivity 
analysis were also used as the basis for a two-stage-least-squares approach 
using in the first stage the lagged value as an instrument for the net-export- 
ratio while the other explanatory variables serve as their own instruments. 
The coefficients obtained in the first stage regression were used to calculate 
the expected net-export-ratio of Singapore given the country's lagged ratios. 
These expected net-export-ratios were then inserted into the equation 
obtained from the second stage regression in order to derive the benchmark 
for Singapore controlling for potential endogeneity given a world sample.
175 See Loayza et at. (2000, pp. 169-170) for a discussion of internal instruments and 
endogeneity in saving regressions.
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Table I.4.5.4. Average predicted Savings -  Two-Stage-Least-Squares176
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 N Adi. R"
Basic (OLS) n/a 23.3 27.7 31.1 37.2 2419-1807 0.8-0.8
Basic (2SLS) n/a 22.7 27.1 29.6 35.7 2416-1805 0.8-0.8
The average benchmark saving ratios are slightly lower than those resulting 
from the OLS procedure, but not enough to contradict the main findings. 
Thus, even if endogeneity is affecting the regression analysis and thus the 
benchmark savings for Singapore, it does not appear to do so to a degree 
which would reverse the central findings of this study.
1.4.5.5. Other Potential Sources of Sensitivity
Four further potential sources of sensitivity exist: over-identification of the 
regression equation, data-errors, heteroskedasticity and multi-collinearity 
among the independent variables.
Over-Identification
Gross Domestic Saving is derived as a residual from the basic national 
accounting identity:
(1) Y = I + C + G + NX
rearranged as (2) GDS = l + NXc Y - C - G
where
Y = Gross Domestic Production
I = Investment
C = Private Consumption
G = Government Final Consumption
NX = Net-Exports
GDS = Gross Domestic Saving
176 The number of observations and the adjusted R-Squared listed refers to models 2 and 5 
respectively. Models 2 and 3 of the 2SLS approach refer only to 1966-99 because of the loss 
of the first observation due to the lagged variable. Model 1 does not include NetExRat and 
was therefore not re-estimated using 2SLS.
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Since those models, which incorporate the external situation of the countries, 
already include net-exports it must be ascertained that the other independent 
variables do not simply model investment. If they did the equation would be 
considered over-identified and the regressions would practically only test 
whether the basic accounting identity holds across a large sample. Assuming 
that the accounting identity holds in the world sample, an over-identified 
equation would necessarily yield an expected savings for Singapore not too 
different from the actually achieved savings. Therefore, the results of an 
over-identified regression would lead us to wrongly conclude that 
Singapore's savings were less than extraordinary.
In order to test whether the independent variables replicate investment they 
were regressed in two fixed-effects models on Gross-Fixed-Capital 
Formation as a percent of GDP (GFCrat). The first model uses IniGDS, 
IniGDP, AirDist, Urb, EcoAcRat and Asia as independent variables and is 
only able to model 14 percent of the variance of GFCrat between 1965-99. The 
additional inclusion of NetFDI raises the explanatory power to 17 percent, 
but also reduces the sample period to 1972-99. The low R-Squareds must be 
interpreted as a sign that these variables do not imitate the investment 
behaviour of the respective countries and that therefore the saving 
regressions are not in danger of being over-identified.
Data Errors
Data errors in such a large sample can not be fully ruled out. However, as 
discussed in section 1.2.3. only internationally respected sources, which are 
regularly made use of in the literature, were employed. Nevertheless, one 
particular potential error must be examined, namely whether Singapore's 
sustained high saving ratios can be trusted in the first place. How can a 
nation, some might ask, in average save over one third of its income every 
year over a period of thirty five years? To some such a strong sustained
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saving performance and thus continued repression of consumption might 
look impossible, causing doubts about the quality of our dependent variable.
However, as graph I.4.5.5.b. shows, if we can believe Singapore's income 
figures her savings do appear credible, because the country was able to 
combine rising consumption levels with rising savings due to the 
outstanding growth performance of the economy. Given this development 
Singapore's high saving ratios do not appear unreasonable.
Graph I.4.5.5.a. Income, Consumption and Saving in Singapore 177
Heteroskedasticity
A heteroskedastic equation violates one of the basic assumptions underlying 
the OLS procedure, namely that the variance of the disturbance terms must 
be constant. On the assumption that the model is not mis-specficed, the OLS 
estimators retain the properties of unbiasedness and consistency even if the 
disturbances are heteroskedastic. However, the estimators are no longer 
efficient and thus normal formulae for calculating variances of estimators
177 World Development Indicators CD-Rom (2001 edition). Additional income absorbed by 
saving is derived as the increase in per-capita income less the increase in government and 
private consumption.
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and consequently their respective significance levels are biased and 
inconsistent. In turn this means that better estimators might exist, which 
manifests itself in wide confidence intervals. Therefore, heteroskedasticity 
can affect the model building process by leading us wrongly to remove 
variables due to their low significance. The sensitivity of the results to this 
aspect of heteroskedasticity is best tested in our case by not removing 
variables and comparing the benchmark results to those obtained after a 
selection process. Since the full models above (model five in section 1.4.4.) do 
no yield substantially different benchmark savings for Singapore, the results 
do not appear to be sensitive to a likely selection bias introduced through a 
potential problem of heteroskedasticity. But even for those variables which 
remain in the equation more correct estimators could theoretically be found 
if the equation is plagued by heteroskedasticity. Therefore, the residual plots 
were examined as well, plotting the residuals against each independent 
variable. The plots for 1985 are shown in graph I.4.5.5.b. The plots for the 
other years look very similar.178 No trace of heteroskedasticity was found.179
178 More formal testing for heteroskedasticity, e.g. a Goldfeld-Quandt, Breusch-Pagan or 
White tests, was not undertaken because no assumptions could be made about the likely 
form of heteroskedasticity, nor did it seem appropriate given the residuals’ behaviour. Since 
no basis for the assumption of heteroskedasticity and its likely source and form could be 
found alternative estimation procedures such as Wheigted Least Squares were not 
employed.
179 Only the Asian Dummy variable exhibits a different variance between its two sub-samples. 
However, this only shows that indeed the Asian dummy is working. Using the ‘binary’ variable 
as a weight for a WLS procedure is not possible since a division by zero is mathematically 
not defined.
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Graph I.4.5.5.b. Examplorary Residualplots for 1985
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Multi-Collinearity
Multi-collinearity, the event that the explanatory variables which are 
assumed to be independent of each other are actually correlated, is an often 
disregarded source of sensitivity.180 Collinear relationships between the 
explanatory variables make it difficult to disentangle the effects of the 
individual variables and to assess their relative importance. Technically, this 
results in large standard errors, which are a sign that the estimated 
parameters lack precision. In turn large standard errors mean low t-ratios, 
which makes it difficult to clearly determine whether the affected variables 
are significant. The problem of the determination of significance is resolved 
in this study through the use of joint-hypothesis testing, which is not based 
on individual coefficients' t-ratios. Therefore, multi-collinearity unless it is 
perfect should not affect the outcome of the model-building procedure. 
However, its effect on the precision of the estimators remains, which in turn 
can affect the quality of the benchmark calculated based on these imprecise 
coefficients.181
What makes it difficult to deal with multi-collinearity is that a clear threshold 
beyond which multi-collinearity will affect the model does not exist.182 It is a 
matter of degrees. Following the statistical literature, perfect or near perfect 
relationships between two variables have already been omitted in any of the 
models discussed above.183 However, even less than perfect pairwise
180 Loayza et al. (2000), for example, control for simultaneity and country heterogeneity but 
the potential problem of multi-collinearity does not even get mentioned. However, their 
explanatory variables include those, which this study finds potentially affected by multi- 
collineraity, namely urbanisation and dependency. They also include young and old 
dependency as two separate variables, which is very likely to result in serious multi- 
collinearity as well. Collins (1991) finding about the growth-tilt effect is also probably driven by 
the collinear relationship between growth and the interaction variable of growth and 
dependency ratio.
181 Statistically, coefficients affected by multi-collinearity are still ‘blue’ unless their collinear 
relationship is perfect. Thus, OLS will still result in the best available parameter, even though 
it is imprecise and may be far away from the true parameter. In other words, no other 
estimator will be better, even though the one calculated by OLS might not be very good, 
statistically speaking: uninformative.
182 See Kennedy (1998, pp. 186-193) for a summary of the discussion surrounding multi- 
collinearity.
183 The correlation matrix does not indicate any relationship of this nature among the 
variables used, except for (not surprisingly) the initial per-capita value and the later annual
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correlations can still impact the regression results and moreover a 
combination of several variables can together have a collinear effect even 
though in pairwise comparison they do not. Thus, it is necessary to not only 
determine potential collinear effects between any given pair of variables, but 
also within the whole equation.184 For this purpose the use of so-called 
condition indices, which evaluate the degree of multi-collinearity within the 
whole regression system, has been advocated in persuasive fashion by 
Belsley et al. (1980).185 While a clear critical threshold does not exist, Kennedy 
(1998) argues that as a rule of thumb a condition index greater than 30 
indicates strong collinearity.186
Calculating the condition indices for the equations, on which the findings of 
this study are based, does indeed reveal multi-collinearity beyond the 
threshold set by Kennedy (1998). Looking at the individual variables with 
tolerance values of below 0.5 in these systems points to a potentially collinear 
relationship between the degree of urbanisation and the share of the 
economically active population, which although not perfect could potentially 
impact the quality of the estimated parameters particularly in combination 
with correlations with yet other independent variables.187 As a matter of fact,
per-capita observations. Therefore, the use of both variables in the same equation was 
avoided. Some degree of collinearity, but far less than perfect, exists between value-added in 
agriculture as a percent of GDP and per-capita income as well as the degree of urbanisation.
184 Two statistics, which measure the collinear quality of individual variables, are the VIF and 
tolerance measures. The VIFs, or variance inflation factors, are the diagonal elements of the 
inverse of the correlation matrix. They are given by (1-R2)-1 where R2 is the R2 from 
regressing the ith independent variable on all the other independent variables. As a rule of 
thumb, according to Peter Kennedy (1998, p. 190), a VIFf of larger then 10 indicates harmful 
collinearity. The tolerance statistic is defined as 1 -  the squared multiple correlation of that 
variable with the other independent variables. Its values range between 0 and 1. When the 
value is close to zero, the variable is almost a linear combination of the other independent 
variables. In other words, the tolerance statistic measures that part of the variance of the 
independent variable, which is indeed independent from the other independent variables. 
Therefore, if the tolerance is close to one all of the variable's variance is used to explain the 
dependent variable and we can safely assume that multi-collinearity does not exist.
185 Belsley et al. (1980, chapter three)
186 Kennedy Peter (1998, p. 190)
187 The bi-variate correlation of the two variables for the full pooled sample is 0.675, which 
means that either variable can ‘explain’ about 46% of the other variable's variance in a single 
regression model, which is far from a perfect collinear relationship. VIFs for the two variables 
also never get close to 10, which indicates that the multi-collinearity problem does not simply 
arise through the pairwise correlation of the two variables.
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once either of the variables is removed from the respective equation the 
condition index falls to levels substantially below the threshold.
However, due to the strong and separate theoretical support for both 
variables it would be beneficial to still be able to capture the impact of both 
dimensions but without the potentially damaging collinear effect. Therefore, 
an interactive variable between Urb and EcoAcRat was tested to allow at 
least for their joint effect. Since both variables are predicted to have the same 
sign such a combination does not bear the risk of neutralisation of the 
variables through their joint inclusion. Nevertheless, the interaction variable 
is still slightly different from a separate inclusion, because the effect of the 
two factors is 'averaged' across the two dimensions, which will affect the 
values for countries which have a high observation for one dimension but a 
low figure for the other. This will alter the variance of the interaction variable 
as compared to the separate inclusion of the two factors. Thus a potential loss 
of significance of the interactive variable can be due both to the avoided 
collinear effect and/or a different variance structure.
Table I.4.5.I. above already include fixed-effects models using the interactive 
variable, which indeed score well below any threshold of the multi- 
collinearity measures. While the findings in respect to Singapore's 
benchmark savings for the models including the external situation are not 
significantly different from those which use the two variables separately, the 
non-policy model results in substantially lower expected savings. Therefore, 
a potentially harmful effect of multi-collinearity for at least one part of the 
findings can not be fully ruled out.
1.4.6. Post Sensitivity Models
As the analysis above indicates, the results appear largely robust when tested 
for potential sources of sensitivity one by one in fixed-effects models.
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However, in order to investigate how the findings behave if some of the 
influences, which have shown a potential impact on the results, are 
combined and if they are tested in a purely cross-sectional environment 
annual regression models were re-estimated.
Annual non-policy models, which include all three dimensions, i.e. the 
interaction variable of Urb and EcoAcRat for demography, IniGDS, IniPPP 
and IniLit70 for the inherited situation as well as PoplOOkm, Airdist, 
Tropicar and Landlock for geography, and remove insignificant variables 
using joint-hypothesis testing result in average expected savings for the 
whole period of 20.3 percent.188 The development over time with low 
expected savings in the early parts of the period and above world average 
savings in the latter half is also similar to earlier findings, namely that it 
could have been expected of Singapore to achieve world average saving 
levels once the impact of the initial saving performance has been overcome 
and that the country was able to improve its inherited saving ratio faster and 
more strongly than the world sample would predict. Statistically, the 
geography variables as well as IniPPP struggle for significance. The 
interactive demography variable is only able to remain in the model once the 
impact of the initial saving ratio has waned.
Adding the external situation, i.e. NetExRat and from 1972 onwards also 
NetFDI, but without the geography or IniPPP variables due to their weak 
performance in the non-policy models, yields average predicted savings for 
Singapore of 24.9 percent.189 The further inclusion of the interactive variables 
between the Asian dummy and the share of the economically active 
population on the one hand and Net-FDI on the other, raises the expected 
savings further to 31.3 percent.190 If statistically insignificant variables are not 
removed and allowed to remain in the model, the resulting benchmark 
saving of 37.0 percent lies even slightly above Singapore's actual average
188 The resulting annual over-/(under) saving is shown as the second column in graphs I.4.6.
189 The resulting annual over-/(under) saving is shown as the third column in graphs I.4.6.
190 The resulting annual over-/(under) saving is shown as the fourth column in graphs I.4.6.
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saving of 36.2 percent. However, allowing insignificant variables to remain in 
the equation results in very volatile annual benchmarks due to the very 
volatile, but constantly insignificant coefficient for the interactive variable 
between Net-FDI and Asia.
Applying the two-stage least squares method in order to account for a 
potential endogeneity of the resource balance with the help of its own lagged 
observations as instruments, yields expected savings of 30.8 percent if the 
models are reduced to only significant independent variables and 33.6 
percent if all variables are allowed to remain in the annual equations.191 
Again the development over time tells the same story, with Singapore's 
savings during the late 1980s and early 1990s being far from extraordinary 
even though the actual saving ratios were moving towards fifty percent. On 
the other hand, the early savings stand out when Singapore reached world 
average saving levels much faster than her circumstances would predict.192
Graphs 1.4.6. show the annual over-(under) saving of Singapore based on 
these models with increasing levels of control for the countries' 
circumstances from left to right. The first column for each year represents the 
difference between the world average saving rate and Singapore's. The 
second column controls for Singapore's non-policy environment and the 
third column additionally controls for the countries' external situation. 
Finally, the fourth column adds peer group effects and thus models all 
dimensions. Its annual results are shown in a lighter colour. The fifth column
191 In the 2SLS method the removal of insignificant variables was based on t-ratios, since the 
joint-hypothesis F-test was not available for 2SLS in the software package. The variables, 
which proved significant at least for parts of the period, were: Urb*EcoAcRat, IniGDS, IniPPP, 
lniLit70, NetExRat, NetFDI, EcoAsia. These variables also formed the equation of the model 
without removal. The resulting annual over-/(under) saving is shown as the fifth column in 
graphs I.4.6.
192 Including Singapore in the sample and a Singapore country dummy among the 
independent variables, yields a significant country dummy for only 7 years (1968,1972 only if 
FDI is also included, 1975, 1976, 1990, 1995 and 1997). Contrary to the finding of the 
sensitivity analysis, once the models are run on an annual basis and thus the coefficients are 
allowed to pick-up year specific effects the models seem to adequately capture Singapore’s 
situation. Moreover, the finding that Singapore exceeded expectations in the early years and 
if anything was below its saving benchmark in the later years is supported by the fact that the 
country dummies attract positive coefficients for 1968, 1972, 1975 and 1976, while it has 
negative coefficients for 1990,1995,1997.
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uses 2SLS instead of OLS. It becomes nicely visible how the status of extra­
ordinarily is removed step by step from Singapore's saving performance.
Graphs I.4.6.: Annual Comparative Over-/(Under-) Saving
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Statistically, the models perform very well with high adjusted r-squareds 
similar to those in the earlier equations. The potential multi-collinearity 
problem between the urbanisation ratio and the share of the economically 
active population has been resolved with very low condition indices for all of 
these regressions. A possible endogeneity of the resource balance does also 
not appear to alter the benchmarking results significantly.
In summary, while not all individual regression models are fully robust, the 
central findings of the benchmarking exercise appear very robust to a wide 
variety of potential sources of sensitivity.
1.5. Conclusion
Controlling for those explanatory variables exogenous to a country's saving 
policies, which prove to be significant in modelling variation in GDS-ratios 
across a world sample, renders Singapore's gross domestic saving 
performance significantly less spectacular. Furthermore, the research 
suggests that the key to understanding Singapore's saving behaviour must 
lie in the turnaround achieved during the first decade of the country's 
independence. Therefore, looking merely at the country's more recent saving 
performance will not be able to answer how Singapore was able to achieve 
its world-record saving ratios.
This study therefore removes Singapore's saving performance from its 
pedestal as an outlier in economic history, with the reputation of being 
hardly transferable and possibly not even desirable. Instead, the results of 
the benchmarking exercise clearly show the transferability of at least the 
saving aspects of Singapore's economic history. Moreover, this approach also 
highlights those circumstances, which are not directly related to saving 
policies but must be taken into consideration if transferability is assessed, 
particularly the demographic structure and external position. The cross­
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country saving analysis furthermore gives an indication to what degree these 
pre-requisites are likely to affect a country's saving.
The exercise lends further support to the view of a favourable starting 
position as proposed by Huff (1994) and Peebles and Wilson (2002) and thus 
goes against Singapore's -  or rather the PAFs - own folklore, which 
describes Singapore in the 1960s as a backward fishing village.193 This, 
however, does not lessen the achievement of the Singapore government and 
its people. Simply having the chance does not mean that one is able to realise 
this opportunity. They did.
In terms of policy impact, the study shows that Singapore's savings must 
have been positively affected by the country's policies resulting in higher 
savings beyond what could have been expected of the country given her 
circumstances. This policy effect, however, is comparatively small in relation 
to strictly non-policy and external factors, which are the strongest factors in 
the country's transition from low to high savings. Not more than one third 
can be attributed to policy even in conservative estimates. Furthermore, the 
policy impact can be econometrically explained by Singapore's place within a 
particular peer group of neighbouring countries. In other words Singapore 
over-saved in average somewhere between five and ten percent of GDP per 
year, which, however, is in line with the saving behaviour of her regional 
'control group'. Singapore's saving performance within an Asian 
perspective, therefore, is far from extraordinary and even within a world 
sample the country's saving is far less spectacular than a pure comparison of 
GDS-ratios would indicate.
193 Huff {1994, p.1) summarises: “Post independence economic development in Singapore ... 
began from a strong foundation and with very substantial advantages." See also: Huff (1995, 
1422-23), Rodrick (1996), Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp. 24-26)
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1.6. An Excurse: The Current Account Balance in Saving Regressions
The literature dealing with cross-country saving behaviour often uses the 
Current-Account (CA) Balance as an explanatory variable at least for some of 
their equations, for example Agrawal (2001), Loayaza et al. (2000), Edwards
(1997), Masson et al. (1995 and 1998) Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991). With 
the CA Balance the authors try to capture foreign borrowing constraints, 
arguing that a CA deficit, which due to its mere existence must have been 
financed through the Capital Account, is an indication that the country is not 
facing a foreign borrowing constraint. Therefore, the question arises whether 
foreign borrowing complements or substitutes domestic saving. The 
evidence points towards a substituting but not fully off-setting relationship 
with current account deficits showing negative coefficients in the saving 
regressions, i.e. the larger the deficit the lower the saving rate.194 However, 
while this argument appears intuitive in respect to the direction it is being 
propagated, i.e. a deficit being an indication for the absence of borrowing 
constraints, it is questionable whether in turn a CA surplus actually means 
that the country is facing such constraints. The economic history during the 
period under investigation of such successful exporting nations like Japan, 
Germany or even the recent Singapore do not seem to indicate that they have 
been facing foreign borrowing constraints. If anything, their strong financial 
position suggests that successful exporting countries do not require foreign 
borrowings.195
194 See Dayal-Gulat and Thimann (1997, p.136) for a summary of the results of the CA 
balance in saving regressions. They also point out that the inclusion of the CA balance in 
regression which already incorporate public saving will result in an over-identified regression 
system.
195 A further weakness of the interpretation of the CA balance as a proxy for borrowing 
constraints is pointed out by De Brouwer (1999, p.49), particularly with respect to East Asia. 
A country might experience an increase in its CA deficit, yet not an improvement in its 
economy’s borrowing constraints, if the corresponding increase in foreign capital is absorbed 
by the country’s reserves. If the standard CA account interpretation was followed, it would 
appear as if foreign borrowing has improved while actually the real economy remains 
constrained.
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However, if the CA variable does not pick-up borrowing constraints what is 
it modelling? A look at the basic national accounting identity might be 
helpful. For simplicity sake the following equations do not include Net- 
Factor-Income from abroad and thus restrict themselves to the Net-Export- 
Ratio instead of the Current Account Balance and the corresponding figure 
for income, GDP instead of GNP.
(1)Y = I + C + G + NX
where
Y = Gross Domestic Production 
I = Investment 
C = Private Consumption 
G = Government Final Consumption 
NX = Net-Exports
Gross Domestic Saving is then derived as a residual:
(2) GDS *  I + NX *  Y - C - G
where
GDS = Gross Domestic Saving
The same relationship is visually explained in somewhat more detail in 
Graph 1.6. As the graph indicates the less than perfect trade-off between the 
domestic saving rate and the CA balance found in earlier studies can 
potentially be explained by the capital goods imports, simply because if the 
current account deteriorates due to an increase in imports of capital goods 
the saving ratio does not fall.
Graph I.6.: The Resource Balance and Domestic Savings
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Rather than modelling the absence of foreign borrowing constraints, the 
current account balance (or the resource balance) stands for an opportunity 
for the country to increase its saving rate without having to reduce the 
citizen's or the government's consumption. The more positive the Resource 
Balance the higher can be the saving ratio without affecting the absolute level 
of consumption. Therefore, an increase in savings (and thus investment) can 
be financed by absorbing an increase in the resource balance, instead of a 
reduction in the people's consumption. The more negative the resource 
balance, on the other hand, the more difficult the nation will find it to finance 
domestic investment with purely domestic savings, since this would require 
a reduction in the levels of consumption.196 The off-setting financial 
transaction in the capital account will only increase the country's savings by 
the proportion of capital goods financed with it. This circumstance explains 
the positive (negative) relationship found in the studies between the CA 
balance (CA deficit) and the saving rates, as well as the less then perfect off­
setting relationship.
This discussion leads straight to the question of how a country can possibly 
restrict her citizens' consumption in order to either allocate most of the net- 
export gains to saving/investment purposes or lower consumption in the 
first place to keep imports down. This question as it relates to Singapore's 
economic history will be addressed via a time-series analysis in the ensuing 
chapter.
196 Alan Taylor (1998, p. 20), for example, argues similarly in terms of the effect of exports on 
growth when contrasting East Aslan NICs with Latin America. He argues, in line with the 
export-led growth literature, that exports permitted long-run capital imports, both financial 
(foreign saving) and physical (foreign investment goods), which underlie the accumulation 
response that massively differentiates East Asia from Latin America.
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II. What drove Singapore’s saving performance?
In the context of saving performance, Singapore can be compared to a child with a 
good athletic built growing up in a family environment of sports enthusiasts. The 
odds that the child will become a successful sports person are in its favour. This is 
what Chapter One has established. Nevertheless, the odds themselves do not bring 
the Olympic medals. What did the child do, how did it train, what did its 
competitors do etc. -  these are the metaphorical questions which this chapter 
intends to address.
Past attempts at explaining Singapore's saving behaviour have not been satisfactory 
- largely on methodological grounds. Therefore, no clear picture has yet emerged. A 
detailed time-series analysis for 1965-97 of all main saving aggregates, namely 
voluntary private, compulsory private and public national savings, will try to fill 
this gap, testing for all main influences argued for by the relevant theories, 
particularly income, demographics, borrowing constraints and the role of the 
government, including the role of Singapore's Central Provident Fund. The 
individual saving aggregates are then combined to form the country's Gross 
National Savings in a novel additive procedure, which is able to avoid a number of 
statistical pitfalls and offers a more differentiated insight into Singapore's 
spectacular saving transition since the country's independence.
The final models are able to 'explain' over ninety percent of Singapore's evolution 
from a low saving to one of the highest saving nations of the world, which in turn is 
fundamental to understanding the country's overall economic development. Not 
surprisingly, this change cannot be attributed to a single factor. In fact, contrary to 
parts of the past literature, all four main influences can be shown to have had a 
significant impact on the country's savings. Income, particularly its dynamic, i.e. 
transitory, component is the single strongest factor, followed by the CPF, whose 
dynamic effects were offset by lower voluntary and public savings but its long-term 
effects more than compensated. Falling dependency is shown to have had opposite
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effects, positively adding to voluntary savings particularly during the early years 
but reducing public savings for the whole period. The lowering of borrowing 
constraints over time has led to more consumption and thus lower savings among 
the private sector, which was however compensated by a positive impact on public 
savings. Full Ricardian Equivalence has not been present, so that public saving has 
had a positive net effect on the country's gross national savings.
Since voluntary savings was the driving force behind the early saving transition and 
voluntary saving in the early years was itself largely driven by the rising labour 
force ratio, the favourable demographic environment must be considered to having 
been central to Singapore's saving 'take-off', supporting tire favourable initial 
situation hypothesis proposed in the first chapter. Moreover, the fact that the 
positive effect of the CPF was largely due to positive net-contributions to the fund, 
shows how important this demographic change was even outside of voluntary 
savings. Singapore, therefore, used the chance to exploit this demographic dividend 
very well, by both kick-starting a changed voluntary saving pattern and by using the 
demographic window for the creation of a CPF 'hump-saving'.
Further investigation of some still outstanding questions would require the access to 
household data, which are currently not being made publicly available by the 
Singapore Department of Statistics.
The chapter is split into six sections. The first will give an overview of relevant 
theories on saving behaviour, which motivates sections two and three taking a closer 
look at Singapore's demographic development and the country's institutional 
framework. The fourth part will summarise the existing literature, followed in 
section five by a battery of econometric tests on Singapore's saving aggregates with 
the objective to determine the main influences on the country's saving behaviour 
from 1965 to 1997.197 Finally, the sixth section will conclude. 187
187 The period of investigation ends in 1997 because the inclusion of the Asian Crisis years with their 
additional strong volatility can substantially affect the results of the time series analysis for the period
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11.1. The Theory
In the second half of the twentieth century two main theories have dominated the 
discussions about saving behaviour: the Life-Cycle Hypothesis of Saving (LCH) and 
the related Permanent-Income-Hypothesis (PIH). Additionally, demographic 
dependency effects, which are partly included in the LCH, have been put forward as 
a separate factor. With the rise of New Institutional Economics these theories were 
amended by institutional considerations, particularly the effects of financial market 
liberalisation and borrowing constraints, but also government sponsored or 
controlled saving schemes.
The LCH argues that individuals smooth consumption over their lifespan in order to 
allow during their earning span for the accumulation of assets, which in turn are to 
be consumed during their retirement. The thus modelled forward-looking 
individuals create what is called 'hump-saving', which is passed on from generation 
to generation. The main implications of the LCH are that the aggregate saving rate 
depends on the growth of the economy, both in respect to population and 
productivity growth, and on transitory deviations from the households' income 
expectations. Consequently, just as saving has a salutary impact on capital 
accumulation and thereby on growth, prosperity influences saving through a 
'growth dividend' on the saving rate.198 This interdependence of growth and saving 
is at the root of theories of self-generating growth.
Similar but not identical with the LCH, the PIH postulates that saving depends 
largely on short-term deviations from the consumer's expected permanent income. 
However, it differs in the predicted effects of productivity growth, which it argues
before the crisis and thus potentially yield misleading results. In other words, if the Asian Crisis is part 
of the period under observation the danger exists that the statistical OLS algorithm, which tries to 
minimise the unmodelled variance along the whole time period, is unduly driven by the strong volatility 
of -  in Singapore’s case - the 1998 crisis year and the strong rebound in the following years.
19BLahiri (1989), p.229
108
Chapter Two P a g e . 1Q9
will lower the saving ratio since the income effects of higher productivity are 
presumed to be permanent.
Dependency theory, on the other hand, focuses on the impact of population growth. 
It proposes that a country's aggregate saving rate is lower, ceteris paribus, to the 
extent that it has more dependents in its population. Since children and the retired 
population contribute to consumption but not to production, a high ratio of 
dependents to the working age population might be expected to impose a constraint 
on a society's potential for savings.
11.1.1. The Life-Cycle Hypothesis
The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving (LCH) was developed by Franco Modigliani 
and his collaborator Richard Brumberg in the 1950s initially as an attempt to explain 
certain empirical findings, which did not fit the Keynesian consumption function. In 
terms of the history of economic thought, the LCH can thus be considered an 
attempt to expand and match to empirical findings Keynes' fundamental 
psychological law "that men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to increase 
their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the increase in 
their income."199 In particular, Modigliani and Brumberg were interested in finding 
reasons for why saving ratios stay the same in long-run time series although 
incomes rise, why the long-run marginal propensity to save appears to be lower 
then the short-run, and why consumption fluctuates less than (disposable) 
income.200
199 Keynes (1936), p. 96
200 Simon Kuznets (1946) was among the first to point to this incompatibility of Keynes’ psychological 
law with the actual historic developments of saving ratios and income in the United States since the 
19th century.
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The Hypothesis
As an answer to the questions arising from these empirical observations, the LCH 
states that consumers in making their consumption and saving decisions do not 
concentrate exclusively on this year's disposable income. Instead, the LCH proposes 
that the rate of consumption in any given period is a facet of a plan which extends 
over the balance of the individual's life, while income accruing within the current 
period is but one element which contributes to the shaping of such a plan.201 The 
other major variables are income expectations and initial assets, with tire latter 
depending again on previous income and income expectations.202
Correspondingly, the aggregate LCH consumption function is a linear and 
homogeneous function of current income, currently expected income and the 
weighted sum of the net worth of each age group at the beginning of the year:203
[Equation 11.1.1 .a.] Ct * a/ Yt + a2 * Yt* + a3 * Am
Where:
Ct: Consumption in period t
ai, a2, a3: coefficients dependent on preferences as to the distribution of consumption over life 
(and to bequests), on the rate of return on assets, on the age structure of population and on the 
previous history of income.
Yt: Income in year t defined as personal income less dividends plus corporate income minus direct 
personal and corporate taxes or equivalently as disposable income plus corporate savings. 
Corporate savings are included in income due to the consideration that they will result, at least in 
the long-run, in an increase in private net worth by way of its effect on the market value of 
corporate equity.204
Y®: Expected future income discounted to a present value for period t
At-v Net-worth at the end of the period preceding t, i.e. past accumulated wealth
201 Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), p. 392
202 Modigliani and Brumberg (1979), p. 137
203 Modigliani and Brumberg (1979), p. 135
204 Modigliani (1966), p. 184
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Figure II.1.1.: The Life-Cycle Hypothesis of Saving
Its Predictions
Based on a number of assumptions and a ceteris paribus approach to relaxing them, 
the LCH derives a set of predictions about saving behaviour.205 The main 
implications are that the aggregate saving rate depends on the growth of the 
economy and on transitory deviations from the households' income expectations.
The LCH model with its constant income assumption shows that aggregate saving 
will only be positive if that assumption is being contradicted, i.e. if there is growth. 
In the long-run the proportion of aggregate income saved depends not on the level 
of income as such but, rather, on the rate of growth of income.206 The aggregate 
saving rate will be higher the higher the long run growth rate of the economy. It will 
be zero for zero growth since the dissaving of the retired will just offset the 
accumulation by the active population. Until the economy has reached its steady
2 5 Modigliani (1963, p.59) and Modigliani (1986, p.264) offer a summary of the assumptions and 
continue to discuss ways of their relaxation. In its most restrictive model, which would also include 
equation II.1.1.a., the LCH comes with five main assumptions: 1) Income is constant until retirement, 
zero thereafter, 2) The rate of return is constant or zero: 3) Consumption is constant; 4) There are no 
bequests and 5) Households are rational, profit-maximising and make their decisions in perfect 
markets. For a summary of the LCH predictions see also Modigliani (1986) pp. 264-8.
111
Chapter Two Page 112
growth path the saving ratio will be positively correlated with growth. Once on the 
steady growth path it will be constant and wealth, i.e. total accumulated saving, will 
also remain constant in the aggregate, though it is continuously being transferred 
from dissavers to savers in exchange for current resources.206 07 If income fluctuates 
cyclically around its growth trend, the saving ratio will fluctuate pro-cyclically.208
In a growing economy the accumulation of aggregate saving is due to two effects: 
the Neisser effect referring to population growth and the Bentzel effect in respect to 
productivity growth. The Neisser effect states that if the economy's population is 
growing, younger households in their accumulation phase account for a larger share 
of population and consequently retired dissavers for a smaller share. This results 
automatically in a higher saving ratio as compared to an economy with no or lower 
growth. The Bentzel effect argues that productivity growth (defined as growth of 
per capita income) implies that younger cohorts have larger life time resources than 
older ones and will thus save more in order to sustain their higher living standard 
during their retirement. Consequently, saving during their earning span will be 
higher then the past saving of the currently dissaving retired cohorts. The saving of 
each generation of workers in a growing economy, therefore, exceeds the dissaving 
of the concurrent retirees.
The LCH uses these arguments to demonstrate that differences in national saving 
rates are not due to cultural elements, e.g. a differential degree of thrift between 
citizens of different nations. Instead, the LCH claims that differences in saving ratios 
can be explained through the countries' respective growth experiences and life-cycle 
stages.
206 Modigliani and Brumberg (1979), p. 143
207 Modigliani (1966), p.163; Through this mechanism, called hump saving or hump wealth, an 
economy can accumulate a very substantial stock of wealth relative to income even if no wealth is 
passed on by bequests.
208 Modigliani (1966), p.161
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The main parameter that controls the saving rate for a given level of growth is the 
prevailing length of retirement. The LCH offers a very simple formula for a 
stationary economy, in which the amount of annual consumption over the whole life 
span is given by:209
where
C = annual consumption 
R = number of retirement years 
E = number of earning years 
Y = average annual income 
S = savings = Y - C
The higher the number of earning years versus retirement years the lower will be the 
consumption ratio and consequently the higher will be the national saving rate, 
since there will be more people saving than dissaving.210
The LCH states that saving is independent of the absolute level of per capita income 
and instead depends on changes in the age structure of the population and on 
expectations of future income and thus growth. Changes to a household's income, 
however, can be of a short-term or of a long-term nature. Long-term changes affect 
the expectations of future income (or in Friedman's terminology permanent income) 
and lead to the effects discussed in the previous section. Short-term fluctuations of 
income around basic income expectations are called transitory and considered to be 
generally unexpected. According to the LCH (and the PIH) a household, whose 
current income unexpectedly rises above the previously 'accustomed' level (where 
the term 'accustomed' refers to the average expected income to which the household 
was adjusted), will save a proportion of its income larger than it was saving before 
the change and also larger then is presently saved by the permanent inhabitants of
209 Modigliani (1986), figure 1 on p. 265
210 This relationship runs counter an intuitive look at individual household behaviour which would argue 
that the greater E compared to R the lower will be the saving rate since there is less need to support a
[equation 11.1.1.b.]
or
or
C « R / (R  + E)*Y 
C/Y«R/(R+E)
S/Y = 1 -  [ R / (R+E) ]
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the income bracket into which the household now enters.211 The statement, of 
course, holds in reverse for a fall in income. In other words, consumption is 
considered to be sticky and to not change due to a short-term increase or decline in 
income. Therefore, the fraction saved out of the transitory component of income is 
predicted to be very close to unity.212
Criticism and Limitations
In general, the LCH has come under attack mostly on two fronts. Firstly, households 
do not behave as rational and forward-looking as assumed. Secondly, there are other 
variables influencing consumption and saving decisions beyond those proposed by 
the LCH. Consequently, the direction of causality from growth to saving and tire 
resulting virtuous circle have been questioned.213
The first criticism receives its support form cross-sectional studies. Upon 
disaggregation of national saving into the behaviour of individual households they 
show a largely different saving behaviour compared to the one put forward by tire 
LCH. As Deaton (1992) points out life-cycle saving, when it occurs, takes place in 
middle or late middle age, not long prior to retirement. Whether there is saving 
among the young, or dissaving among the old, is something that varies from data set 
to data set, and has been the subject of a good deal of controversy.214 The notion of 
hump saving is questioned. The marginal propensity to consume - at least in some 
subsections of the population - is also often found to be higher than a forward­
retiree in the years of his retirement and thus the forward looking household will save less during its 
earning years.
211 Modigliani and Brumberg (1954), p.406
212 Modigliani and Brumberg (1979), p. 145
213 For a summarised recent assessment see the introduction to Deaton and Paxson (1999). Mayer 
(1972) offers a summary of early tests of the LCH along with other wealth theories. He concludes that 
the strict LCH model must be rejected, yet a broad understanding of its mechanisms could still apply. 
On the other hand, Deaton (1992, p.44) surveying and re-assessing more recent work offers the 
conclusion that while "there seems little doubt that growth and saving are indeed linked, it cannot be 
established that life-cycle saving is the cause.".
214 Deaton (1992), p. 53
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looking consumer would suggest215 Consequently, the relationship between income 
and consumption is closer than the LCH would predict.216
Table 11.1.1.: Influencing Factors of Saving Behaviour beyond LCH 217 218
Liquidity/borrowing constraints on the side of the consumer
Need or desire for precautionary saving (i.e. for emergencies and not purely for retirement)
Degree of financial development and deepening in the financial sector
Interest rates and demand for investment, which in turn can influence interest 
18
Land and housing prices219
Cultural factors (e.g. differing degrees of risk aversion, role of extended family and 
importance of bequests)
Social security and tax system220
Type of income, i.e. whether from employment or property and entrepreneurship221
Relative level of income (i.e. low or high income family) as well as degree of income
inequality in society222
Initial stock of wealth223
Price stability and unanticipated inflation224
Terms-of-trade developments225
Degree of export orientation226
Access to foreign savings
(Real)
rates2
215 Blinder (1981) and Hall and Mishkin (1982)
218 However, as David Miles (1996 and 1999) points out saving estimates in cross-sectional household 
studies usually do not account for the depletion of pension assets, I.e. they do not trace how the 
‘hump-saving’ moves from the older to the younger generation. If the depletion of pension assets is 
included the saving rate among the old is also falling among micro-data. Thus, the criticisms based on 
the observation that older generations do not dissave as much as the lifecycle hypothesis would 
predict might be due to weaknesses in the national account measures. Miles (1999) continues to show 
in an over-lapping general equilibrium generation model how such a model based on the lifecycle 
hypothesis can be successfully reconciled with micro-data. Similarly, Deaton and Paxson (1999) find 
that once the object of investigation is the individual and not the household anymore, the life-cycle 
hypothesis appears to hold up better for their study of households in Taiwan and Thailand. However, 
the necessary data can only be imputed from already less than abundant household information. 
Therefore, the revision of the revision depends significantly on the assumptions made to derive 
individual information from the household surveys.
217 Kopits and Gotur (1980) in their introduction offer a very good and concise explanation of most of 
these potential influencing factors of the saving ratio. For a recent summary of the determinants of 
Private Saving Rates used in Panel Studies see also Loayza et at. (2000)
218 See Deaton (1992), pp. 60-65 for a summary of the literature on interest rates and saving 
behaviour, as well as Balassa (1989 a/b) with a special focus on the developing world.
219 See for example: Hayashi (1986)
220 See for example: Hayashi (1986), Hubbard (1995)
221 See for example: Houthakker (1965), Williamson (1968)
222 See for example: Feldstein (1977), Hubbard (1995)
223 See for example: Hayashi (1989) or Scott (1990), who shows that the inclusion of liquid assets 
helps explain long-run consumption behaviour in the UK (1969-88). However, in the dynamic short-run 
regression model liquid assets did not prove significant.
224 See for example: Williamson (1968), Lahiri (1989), Gupta (1987)
225 See for example: Lahiri (1989)
228 See Lahiri (1989) for a summary of the findings about the Influence of a country’s export orientation.
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The second criticism about neglected other influencing factors stems from the fact 
that even if one accepted the LCH, there still remain unexplained components in 
many tests, which result in the search for additional explanatory variables. Table
II.l.l. lists the most often cited other influencing factors.
11.1.2. The Permanent Income Hypothesis
Milton Friedman published his Permanent Income Hypothesis in 1957 at a similar 
time as Modigliani and Brumberg advanced their life-cycle hypothesis.227 Not only 
in time but also in content are the two theories highly related, particularly in regards 
to the importance of transitory income. Modigliani himself summarised the PIH in 
his Nobel lecture. Once we accept, he argued, that
“the representative consumer will choose to consume at a reasonably 
stable rate, close to his anticipated average life consumption, we can 
reach one conclusion fundamental for an understanding of individual 
saving behavior, namely that the size of saving over short periods of 
time, like a year, will be swayed by the extent to which current income 
departs from average life resources. (...) The notion that saving largely 
reflects transitory income has a number of implications which have been 
made familiar by the contributions of Friedman."228
The permanent-income hypothesis (PIH) focuses on the household's differentiation 
between permanent and transitory income, where perceived changes in the former 
affect consumption more than changes in the latter. Both theories, therefore, 
conclude that the size of saving over short periods of time, say a year, will be 
swayed by the extent to which current income departs from the household's 
forward-looking assumptions, which in the case of the PIH is defined as permanent 
income and for the LCH as (expected) average life-time resources.
227 Friedman (1957)
228 Modigliani (1986), p. 263
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The main difference between the LCH and the PIH lies in the definition of 
permanent versus expected income, which manifests itself in a differing view of the 
impact of productivity changes. The PIH would predict falling saving ratios in case 
of productivity increases, with the argument that the efficiency improvements will 
lead to increases in permanent income and thus to more consumption.229 
Productivity increases within the LCH, on the other hand, would result in a 
temporarily reduced saving ratio only if the productivity increase would fall short of 
the (expected) steady growth path of the economy.
11.1.3. Demographic Dependency Theory
Dependency theory, which proposes that a country's aggregate saving rate is lower, 
ceteris paribus, to the extent that it has more dependents in its population, 
developed in two stages. It was first voiced in 1958 in an article by Ansley Coale and 
Edgar Hoover. But not until Leff (1969) published an article solely dealing with the 
inverse relationship between dependents and the saving ratio was it brought into 
mainstream economic theory.230 Several studies have been undertaken since, 
however, with controversial results.231
229 Friedman (1957), p. 234
230 See Higgins and Williamson (1997) for a recent review of the history of dependency theory and Its 
applicability to Asia, that part of the world where its founders, Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover (1958), 
thought it mattered most. Rossi (1989) also offers an overview of the development of dependency 
theory starting from Leff (1969) and the controversy his article has stined up. For a recent summary of 
the literature on demographics and development see Birdsall et al. (2001).
231 See Rossi (1989) for a summary of dependency studies. In her article she also argues for the 
inclusion of liquidity constraints into the model, in order to reconcile the different outcomes of the 
individual studies. Liquidity constraints reduce the possibility of intertemporal substitution, 
Consequently, differences in the applicability of dependency theory between countries might be due to 
differences in liquidity constraints in these countries, very similar to a common criticism of the LCH.
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Theory behind Dependency Theory
Leff's conclusion about the inverse relationship followed from the observation that a 
rapidly growing population due to sustained high fertility and falling mortality 
includes a large number of young people, who tend to consume more than they 
produce. In the absence of an offsetting increase in the income of adults or a 
decrease in their consumption, the effect will be a reduction in aggregate saving.
Beyond its effect on household saving dependency theory would also argue for a 
reduction of corporate and public saving in case of rising dependency ratios. As 
early as 1969, Leff argued for an automatic reduction of corporate saving if private 
saving should fall, since shareholders will withdraw profits from companies if their 
private funds are not sufficient for their financial needs.232 Bilsborrow (1980) also 
points out that dependency rates can potentially influence corporate saving by 
forcing households to spent their income mostly on food and other subsistence 
requirements, while lowering their expenditure on manufactured and luxury items, 
which would carry a higher profit margin. This effect can result in reduced 
corporate profits and thus lower corporate saving.233
Additionally, dependency burdens may also reduce government saving. As Leff 
(1980) argues, government tax revenues may be lower in countries where high 
dependency burdens limit the tax base of supernumerary income. At the same time, 
government expenditure on education and health may be proportionately higher 
because of the political pressures which derive from such demographic 
conditions.234
Likewise many of the other unmodelled influences in the LCH, listed in table 11.1.1., can be seen as 
also limiting the explanatory power of a pure dependency explanation.
232 Leff (1969), p. 888
233 Bilsborow (1980), endnote 16. p. 199
234 Leff (1980), p. 207
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On a more general level going beyond saving behaviour, a relationship between 
development and demographic transition has been fundamental to both 
development theory and economic history. The classic statement of the theory of 
demographic transition in Notestein (1953), although based on predecessors, formed 
a dominant paradigm until the early 1970s. Crafts (2001, p. 302-3) summarises:
The approach was that of a stage theory of development in which 
societies pass from a low population growth phase in which both birth 
and death rates are high through a phase of rapid population growth 
in which modernization causes mortality and then, after a lag, fertility 
to decline to a mature phase in which both birth and death rates are 
low and population growth is once again modest. Widely interpreted 
to imply that ‘development is the best contraceptive’, this vision, 
based on impressions of historical European experience, contained 
both good news and bad news. While eventually economic 
development would solve the population problem because 
modernization changes the economics of childbearing, in the short 
term it would inevitably exacerbate demographic pressure.
While the prediction that demographic transition will accompany 
economic development is not invalidated by (...) historical experience 
but what has disappeared is any pretence that the precise point at 
which fertility will fall is predictable (Kirk, 1996). Thus, Bongaarts and 
Watkins (1996) find that for today’s developing countries fertility 
seems generally unresponsive when the Human Development Index 
(HDI) is below 0.4 but past 0.6 nearly all countries are in transition 
which seems also to have been the case in the European fertility 
transition using the estimates of HDI in Crafts (1997).235
235 With France being a notable outlier, which started her transition at an estimated HDI of below 0.3
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Dependency Theory and the LCH
In his Nobel lecture Modigliani not only embraced the P1H but also dependency 
theory, pointing to the fact that as predicted by the LCH consumption differs with 
age, "largely reflecting variations in family size, as one might expect if the consumer 
smoothes consumption per equivalent adult."336 However, die strict LCH does not 
include dependency considerations in its model, which assumes a constant 
consumption level and a straight line accumulation of wealth over the entire life 
span. On first view dependency theory and the LCH should be contradictory, 
because the LCH states that population growth through the Neisser effect will 
increase saving rather then lower it. This contradiction is due to the fact that the 
LCH describes a world restricted to only active adults and retired dependents, i.e. 
the LCH recognises old age, but not childhood.* 237 Or as Deaton (1992) puts it: 
"Workers spring from the womb, tools in hand, and immediately begin 
accumulating wealth for their retirement"238 Yet, on a second look, the combination 
of the two theories, might be able to adequately reflect the differing impact of 
population growth along the total life-span. Faster population growth, e.g. a baby 
boomer generation, will temporarily increase the ratio of children to workers. Yet, as 
the children reach adulthood, they eventually will also increase the ratio of workers 
to the retired population. The net effect of population growth on saving can 
therefore initially be negative, but over time become positive until the 'baby 
boomers' reach retirement, when their negative effect on the saving ratio can be felt 
again.
The relationship between the LCH and dependency theory is further complicated, 
by the effect of income changes. Leff pointed to the overall problem of causation
238 Modigliani (1986), p.270
237 This, however, did not stop Modigliani (1986, p.270) from claiming dependency theory findings as 
support for or even part of the LCH: “It is also worth noting that available evidence supports the LCH 
prediction that the amount of net worth accumulated up to any given age in relation to life resources is 
a decreasing function of the number of children and that saving tends to falls with the number of 
children present in the household and to rise with the number of children no longer present."
238 Deaton (1992), p. 48
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possibly invalidating dependency theory. He asks whether it can really be "assumed 
that dependency rates are exogenous factors which influence savings rates, or, might 
not both variables be endogenous, determined perhaps by per capita income?"239 A 
potential income effect on fertility rates argues that rising per capita income might 
lead households to reduce the number of children, as they start focusing more on 
'quality than quantity' and as access to birth control and modem contraception 
methods improves. Thus, with rising incomes, saving will rise as predicted by the 
LCH and at the same time dependency rates will fall leading to a further increase of 
the saving ratio. In this circumstance, the LCH and dependency theory will 'work 
together'.
However, in other combinations of income and dependency developments, the 
theories' combined prediction is not so clear. For example a rising dependency 
burden with a rising income, would result in a falling saving ratio according to the 
dependency theory. However, the LCH would only predict the same development if 
actual per capita income growth falls short of expected per capita income growth. It 
is open to argumentation and future experience as societies around the world grow 
older, which of the two effects has/will prevail.
Dependency Theory and International Capital Flows
A very important aspect of dependency theory, is its interaction with investment 
and international flows of capital. An increasing dependency burden through its 
reduction of aggregate saving will also tend to reduce resources available for 
investment. While at the same time a high young dependency rate would tend to 
increase investment demand. In an economy, which is not well integrated into 
international flows of capital, the corresponding disequilibrium will have to be 
balanced through interest rate adjustments, reducing investment demand and
239 Left (1969), p.890
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possibly raising aggregate saving.240 The lower investment rate will further keep the 
saving rate low through its negative income effect and thus the country might be 
stuck in a low development state. An economy open to capital flows, on the other 
hand, can be able to mitigate the disequilibrium without reducing the investment 
demand through capital inflows. It might thus be able to use the increased young 
dependency burden as a take-off scenario.
As Higgins and Williamson (1997) argue, for a financially open economy, a shift in 
the population age distribution toward younger ages should produce a tendency 
toward current account deficits: saving falls due to the increased dependency 
burden, even as investment rises in response to higher labour force growth. As the 
age distribution shifts towards the centre, saving supply should increase, even as 
investment demand slackens, pushing the current account into surplus. In their 
study for 16 Asian countries between 1950 and 1992 they are able to show that in 
average this shift from negative to positive saving effect takes place when the 
population reaches a demographic centre of gravity at age 39. Up to that point a 
current account deficit is necessary to finance the overhang of investment demand 
over domestic aggregate saving.241 In respect to Singapore, they are able to estimate 
that "due to dependency rate effects alone, the share of the current account balance 
in GDP would have switched from -1.7 percent in 1965-69 to 6.8 percent in 1990-92, 
for a total rise of 8.5 percentage points. Over the same period, the CAB share 
actually rose by 16.9 percentage points, so that the falling dependency rate 
accounted for about half of the rising CAB."242
240 Apart from rising interest rates, the disequilibrium might be temporarily balanced through inflation, 
i.e. through monetised government investments. Inflation, however, is nothing but a tax in disguise and 
thus it will eventually reduce (real) disposable income further and put even more pressure on the 
saving rate.
241 Higgins and Williamson (1997), p.275; In Williamson and Taylor (1994) this thinking is also applied 
to the capital flows from Great Britain to the New World in the late nineteenth century. In 
counterfactual scenarios the authors argue that a large part of the capital flows can be explained by 
push/pull factors stemming from differing dependency burdens.
242 Higgins and Williamson (1997), p.279
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11.1.4. Institutional Factors
Rules that govern the financial market and their likely effect on savings have 
attracted a substantial amount of interest. Roughly, the discussions can be grouped 
into two more or less unrelated fields. One deals with the quality of financial 
markets and the resulting signals sent out to potential savers. This part includes the 
often inter-linked literatures on financial liberalisation and the importance of a high 
degree of financial intermediation or financial depth as it is sometimes called, the 
existence and effect of borrowing constraints and the influence of interest rates. The 
second part deals with the impact of government sponsored or controlled saving 
schemes.
Quality of Financial Markets
The early literature on consequences of distortions in the financial markets, 
following the financial repression arguments by McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
stressed the potential role of higher interest rates in mobilizing savings which in 
turn could be put to more productive use. The greater scope granted to market 
forces in determining interest rates and in allocating credit in general, including 
such considerations as bank ownership, prudential regulation, security markets and 
openness of the nation's capital account, was supposed to increase both the saving 
ratios and the effectiveness of the allocation process and thus the productivity of the 
whole economy.243
3 The heart of the McKinnon and Shaw argument is that as long as a country has negative interest 
rates (or equilibrium i) then investment tends to be in unproductive assets such as inventories since 
the liquidity preference increases. This leads to low efficiency investments and low rates of return, 
possibly even negative returns. In other words, capital is not used for financial intermediation since 
there is no incentive to do so. In this situation, which could be regularly found in import substituting 
economies with a high degree of financial repression, liberalisation of financial markets and the 
resulting increased interest rates were supposed to lead to more savings, a higher degree of financial 
intermediation and an improved allocation procedure and thus overall productivity growth.
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Unfortunately, the link of higher interest rates leading to increased savings turns out 
not to be as straight forward as initially predicted and therefore the crucial 
argument that financial liberalisation leads to more savings has remained somewhat 
controversial. Whether saving responds positively or negatively will depend on the 
relative strengths of, on the one hand, the consumer's personal elasticity of 
substitution between present and future consumption and, on the other hand, the 
wealth effects of higher interest income on past savings.244 The situation is further 
complicated by differing degrees of budget or borrowing constraints, which in turn 
prevent the consumer to behave according to his actual preferences. Moreover, 
financial liberalisation usually also incorporates the reduction of borrowing 
constraints, such as easier access to consumer credit or housing finance.245 This in 
turn can lead to lower savings even though interest rates have risen at the same 
time, so that one effect might offset the other. Not surprisingly, the relevant 
empirical literature has been subject to long controversies on the actual sign and size 
of the interest rate elasticity of private savings, in both tire industrial and developing 
countries.246 *248
244 If the consumer is target saving for retirement higher interest will increase consumption because he 
will need to save less in order to achieve this target.
245 Along the same lines, Hoff and Stiglitz (2001, p. 448) in an interesting twist on the traditional
transitory income argument also point out that growth and borrowing constraints can reinforce each
other as impacts on savings. If the consumer experiences severe borrowing constraints his 
consumption plan will largely depend on past income. If growth is significant but income levels from 
earlier years are used to determine current consumption, the saving rate will increase. In this way, 
constraints on borrowing against future income can make saving rates an increasing function of 
growth. In other words, borrowing constraints can increase transitory income, which in turn is likely to 
be saved.
248 For recent summaries and critical assessments on Financial Liberalisation see Bandiera et al. 
(2000, particularly pp. 240-242), Edwards (1997) or De Brouwer (1999, pp. 128-142) which has a 
special focus on East Asia and also covers the effects of liberalisation on wages, trade balances, and 
the real exchange rate among other aspects. Gupta (1987), Balassa (1989 a and b), McKinnon (1991) 
and Carroll and Summers (1991) discuss and extend the earlier findings of the literature. For a recent 
summary and critical assessment of the by now rather substantial literature on borrowing constraints 
see De Brouwer (1999, pp. 143-169) or Lopez et al. (2000), which also discuss the effect of fiscal 
policies in general. For earlier discussions see, for example, Fumio Hayashi (1987), Hubbard et al. 
(1987) and Rossi (1989).
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Government Sponsored or Controlled Pension Schemes
In general, as Datta and Shome (1981) argue and Wickramanayake (1998) 
summarises, the impact of government sponsored pension schemes on voluntary 
savings can be understood to incorporate the relative strengths of three effects:
Firstly, substitution effect is the effect to which savers regard their social 
security contributions as a form of savings substitutable to other forms of 
savings. Secondly, education effect is the result of educating the savers with 
the idea of long-term financial planning. Thirdly, forced-saving effect 
incorporates the impact of introducing a compulsory saving scheme which 
increases household savings with the coverage of non-savers. While, the 
substitution effect is always negative, the forced - saving effect is always 
positive. But the education effect can be either positive or negative. Thus the 
relative strengths of the three effects determine the final impact of compulsory 
savings on discretionary savings.247
Additionally, Kopits and Gotur (1980) point to possible effects transmitted through 
the level of disposable income and through the degree of income inequality related 
to the benefit and tax structures implemented to support the social security system. 
Moreover, the benefit structure can impact retirement decisions and thus the work 
force participation among the aged, which in turn can impact the saving ratio.248
The relative strengths of these conflicting effects have been tested mainly in two 
historic environments: countries which have recently moved from a Pay-As-You-Go 
to a more or even fully funded pension scheme and the United States introduction of 2478
247 Wickramanayake (1998), pp.436-37. The substitution effect can also be extended to include the 
whole welfare system. If individuals perceive that they will be entitled to high social security benefits in 
their old age, they might tend to reduce their savings during their active life-span. This extended 
substitution effect, however, is very unlikely to have been active in Singapore's case because of the 
country’s very limited welfare system.
248 Kopits and Gotur (1980, p. 185). The retirement effect in their interpretation increases the marginal 
propensity to save, since the existence of a pension induces earlier retirement which in turn may 
increase the consumers' desire to save. However, one could also argue that early retirement reduces 
the proportion of the working population and thus increases the dependency burden and lowers
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tax-incentivised saving instruments (IRAs and 401(k)s). In some cases government 
sponsored retirement schemes seem to have led to some increases in savings, 
although the results are far from robust or consistent. The reasons for the differing 
results are still being discussed.249
On a theoretical level Loh and Veall (1985) and Datta and Shome (1981) argue that 
the CPF does not distort private consumption behaviour, because individuals 
consume out of lifetime wealth, whose present value is not changed by tire CPF 
because it is fully funded and earns interest. However, they do not consider the 
effects of low and often even negative real interest rates credited to CPF accounts, 
nor possible effects of borrowing constraints. Koh (1987), on the other hand, points 
out that if individuals consume out of current disposable income instead of life-time 
wealth, an increase in the CPF reduces this income and would serve to reduce 
individuals' consumption below what it would be in the absence of tire CPF, 
supporting the view that the CPF has added to savings.250 Similarly, the argument 
that the CPF was used as an anti-inflationary device to mob up purchasing power in 
order to minimize the domestic inflationary impact of the government's wage 
adjustment policy would argue for a positive saving effect of the CPF.251
savings. For a study dealing with the relative strengths of these effects see Feldstein (1977), Wailich 
(1983) or more recently Hubbard (1995)
249 Samwick (2000) offers an overview and analysis of pension systems and savings, with a special 
focus on the shift from unfunded to funded systems and the resulting effects on savings. Also see, for 
example, Schieber and Shoven (1996) or Dayal-Gulati and Thimann (1997), who review recent 
pension reforms in Chile, Australia and Sweden toward a (more) funded pension system and compare 
the results with East Asian provident fund schemes. The Japanese pension system is well described 
in Noguchi, U. (1985). For discussions of the effects of the United States saving incentives see 
Hubbard and Skinner (1996), Porterba, Venti and Wise (1996) or Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996).
250 Koh (1987, p. 86) Whether individuals consume out of life-time wealth or disposable income is still a 
controversial question, which is extremely difficult to resolve. It requires an investigation on a micro, 
i.e. household or individual, level for a comparatively long period of time. Such datasets are only very 
rarely available.
251 Lee (1982) and Wong (1986, p. 56). Since 1972 almost every round of NWC recommendations of 
wage increments was accompanied by an increase in the CPF contribution rates.
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11.2. Singapore’s institutional Framework
There is no doubt that Singapore's development in general and her saving and 
investment performance in particular was led by the government through both its 
policies and its statutory boards and government-linked companies (GLCs). The 
natural starting point for a discussion of the country's institutional framework and 
its effects on the nation's saving behaviour is therefore the government itself.
11.2.1. The Government
In February 1965, a few months before the country was discharged into final 
independence, Dr. Goh Keng-Swee, the city state's LSE educated finance minister252, 
gave a paper at a conference organised by the East West Center:
Economists are agreed that by far the most important single economic variable 
determining the scope and effectiveness of a development plan is the amount 
of domestic savings what can be made available from the economy during the 
plan period, or more precisely, the proportion of the nation’s income that can 
be saved.253
Goh refers to Arthur Lewis' fundamental challenge to all development economists 
that the central problem in the theory of economic development is to understand the 
process by which a community is able to substantially transform saving in order to 
finance the necessary capital accumulation.254 From the outset saving policy was a
282 Dr. Goh obtained his doctorate in 1956 at the LSE in applied statistics for a dissertation about 
“Techniques of National Income Estimation in Underdeveloped Territories, with special reference to 
Asian and Africa”
253 Goh (1972, p. 63)
284 Lewis (1954, p. 155)
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central element to Singapore's development strategy.255 Beyond the government's 
regulatory power to create and control institutions like the CPF, HDB and the 
POSBank discussed below, there are four further important roles through which it 
can affect saving behaviour and decided to actively do so:
1. financial intermediary through its own saving
2. entrepreneur through its direct involvement in the Singapore economy 
affecting corporate saving as well as wages, which in turn influence 
household saving
3. regulator of disposable income and of the welfare system
4. driver of attitudes towards saving
For the period from 1965 to 1999 the government's own savings equalled 48 percent 
of gross national saving.256 No matter whether or not Ricardian Equivalence held in 
Singapore, it is important to point out that through its decision to redirect such 
substantial funds from the economy into its own saving and the resulting need to 
find financial investment vehicles, the government basically acted as a nationalised 
investment fund manager.
5 Huff (1995, p. 1426) gives another reference supporting this view further: “As early as 1963, 
Singapore's Minister of Finance, Goh Keng Swee, pointed to a high investment ratio as ‘the paramount 
need ... in an economy which wants to expand its basic wealth at a fast rate, a target like 20% or more 
should be a aimed at” (Singapore Legislative Assembly, November 1963). Goh concluded in 1968 that 
Singapore had achieved ‘take-off, and recalled telling Lee Kuan Yew that the higher saving rate which 
could thus be attained would sustain double-digit growth (Goh In an 1989 interview with Huff).“
256 Government saving is defined as Total Government Revenue less Government Consumption. Koh 
(1987, p. 82) expands this view to include the whole public sector, i.e. government run companies and 
statutory boards. According to Koh, the public sector in Singapore commanded in the mid-1980s 70% 
of savings but only 30% of investment, leaving the government with a substantial intermediary task. 
For a more detailed discussion of concepts of government saving see section II.4.3. below.
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Graph 11.2.1.: Government Saving257
Through its role as a significant entrepreneur in the Singapore economy, the 
government also directly affected the level of corporate savings. But potentially even 
more importantly, it influenced wage levels particularly in combination with its 
National Wage Council setting guidelines for the whole economy. According to 
Alten (1995) the public sector - comprising civil service, statutory boards and 
government owned enterprises - employs about 20 percent of Singapore's 
workforce.257 58 This position gives the government considerable leverage and critical 
mass to see its wage policies through and thus affect disposable income without the 
need to use the tax system.
Disposable income in Singapore is characterised by relatively low levels of income 
tax and no taxes on capital gains. Singapore's tax revenue to GDP ratio is rather low, 
fluctuating between 15 and 18 per cent during 1991-99.259 However, its total revenue 
to GDP ratio was substantially higher during the same period, moving between 29
257 GNS is the official Gross National Saving Ratio, i.e. without adjustment for investments in HDB 
housing financed with CPF savings. Sources: For series on Government saving as a percent of GNS 
see data appendix. Government Surplus/Deficit was taken from IMF: International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook (for 1965-1969 from the 1992 edition, the remainder from the 2000 edition). All data refer to 
year ending December 31“ .
258 Alten (1995), p. 148
269 Asher (1999b, p. 4 + 22), Asher (2002, p. 402) and Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 82); Alten (1995, 
p. 107) calculates Singapore's tax to GDP ratio for 1990 as 15.77% and points out that this was the 
lowest among ASEAN countries, while its total revenue to GDP ratio in the same year was the highest 
among ASEAN countries.
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and 43 percent of GDP, This is largely due to a high degree of government revenue 
not classified as taxes such as fees and levies, yet with a strong tax-nature in their 
design.260 Consequently, the government has a multitude of avenues to pursue if it 
wants to alter disposable income.
It is also noteworthy, that income taxes are not automatically deducted. An 
employee receives his gross monthly salary after the deduction of only his CPF 
contributions and is not assessed until the end of the year. He then has six months 
time to pay his tax debts in instalments. On a net present value basis, this procedure 
reduces the (direct) tax impact on income further.261
Low (direct) taxes, however, are combined with a system which offers compared to 
western standards virtually no welfare benefits.262 Low (1999) points out that
the PAP government is steadfast in its belief that self-help must be 
encouraged first - from the individual level to family and community 
levels - before the government steps in. (...) There are no unemployment 
insurance benefits because of the economic philosophy of the 
paternalistic government which believes that maintaining a bouyant 
economy is the best 'insurance'.263
260 Asher (2002, p. 404), Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 123)
261 However, it can also lead to a pro-cyclical re-enforcement of the business cycle, a potential further 
reason for the 1985/86 recession, which only Singapore experienced.
262 Asher (1994, p.70) describes the welfare system, referring to an unpublished study by Uew (1992): 
“the paternalistic nature [of the welfare system in Singapore] is reflected in the attempt, so far 
successful, to control the discourse on welfare in Singapore, and to treat welfare provisions as 
essentially privileges to be doled out at the discretion of the government in return for gratitude from the 
citizenry.“
263 Low (1999), p. 1085 and 1078; Yet, in her view, “many CPF schemes and some non CPF schemes 
together make up a macro social plan which takes care of housing, health, education and asset 
enhancement but not unemployment and other more traditional welfare state benefits."
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The reliance on the family as a welfare provider has been institutionalised in 1995 
with the Maintenance of Parents Act, which makes it a criminal offence for a son not 
to take care of his aged parents.264
As a consequence of this welfare policy, government expenditure on social security 
in Singapore has always been relatively low, especially if compared with high 
income countries. In 19971.79% of the government's total expenditure was spent on 
social security and welfare, with another 6.72% on health. Switzerland, which ranks 
only slightly above Singapore in PPP adjusted GNP per capita, spent 50.51 % of its 
government's expenditure on social security and welfare and another 19.74% on 
health.265 Even among its Asian peer-group Singapore's government is in the lower 
half, behind Korea and Malaysia.
The fourth avenue through which the government steers saving is through its 
influence on public attitudes toward saving as well as its ability to create a stable 
environment conducive to saving. Singapore's political and financial stability, 
combined with its openness and integration into international markets must have 
certainly been beneficial to aggregate saving.266 Low levels of inflation have 
amended the incentives to saving by comparatively appreciating future gains and 
lowering the risk-premium.267 The government's policy to improve educational 
attainment will have also helped, by making people more aware of the need and 
ways of saving, by attracting higher value-added jobs and thus higher disposable 
incomes and not least by its limiting effect on population growth through the 
education of women. Moreover, as Fawcett and Khoo (1980) point out, the public
264 Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 93) write that “up until early 1999 there were 424 applications of 
which 328, about 77 per cent, were successful. About two-thirds of the applicants were Chinese. 
Monthly payments ordered ranged from $10-$1500 and as any parent can receive support from more 
than one child the range of payments received was from $20 to $2700 a month (Sunday Times, 4 
April, 1999)."
265 IMF: Government Finance Statistics; 1999
268 In July 1973 the Singapore dollar started to float, supervised by a currency board, which allowed for 
its gradual appreciation. In June 1978 exchange controls were lifted, allowing Singaporeans to invest 
their (non-CPF) savings anywhere in the world.
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was constantly reminded "that Singapore is economically vulnerable: only a 
combination of good government planning and continued hard work and sacrifices 
by the people will assure continued prosperity. The government's economic success 
allows it to speak with authority in this area."267 68
11.2.2. The Central Provident Fund (CPF)
The CPF was created by an Act of Parliament in 1953 and launched on 1 July 1955 
still under colonial administration with the objective of securing retirement incomes 
for the elderly. It functions on a provident fund principle, under which individuals 
can withdraw their own and their employer's contributions plus interest on 
retirement, rather than receive payments being made to retirees from the 
contributions of those still working. Among the economies classified by the World 
Bank as high-income Singapore is, with the exception of Hong Kong, unique in 
using the mandatory national provident fund mechanism to finance its social 
security.269
Contributions are withheld at the source, i.e. on payment of salary, and the CPF is 
only allowed to invest them in government securities. Membership is mandatory for 
all resident workers.270 The self-employed were not obliged to make contributions 
before 1992. Foreign workers and unpaid family workers have never been required 
to be active members. Nevertheless, the coverage of the CPF has increased
267 It might be of interest to note, that the low levels of inflation can be seen as both a means and a 
result of saving. The high levels of saving allowed the government inflation free access to funds, which 
it used to finance development investments.
268 Fawcett and Khoo (1980, p. 552); During the 1997/98 Asian crisis the government temporarily 
changed its perspective on saving. Government representatives suggested that Singaporeans might 
save too much and urged for more consumption.
269 Asher (1994), p. 33
270 Exceptions are a separate pension schemes for some government employees, which is a non­
contributory, unfunded scheme with the pension benefits being paid on a PAYG basis, and a provident 
fund scheme for certain armed forces personnel, which came into existence in March 1998. See Asher 
(1999a) endnote 2.
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gradually, from about one-half of the labour force in the mid-1970s to over three- 
quarters in the early 1990s.271 On top of their own contributions, children are 
encouraged to top-up the CPF accounts of their parents and at times the government 
also offered top-up schemes.272
Over time the CPF has been transformed from a simple pension fund to a 
multipurpose saving scheme, which has been used by the government both as a 
channel of resource allocation and as a macro-economic stabilisation device.273 
Among the main alterations over time was the introduction of early withdrawals for 
the purchase of public housing in 1968, which was extended in 1981 to include 
residential properties for investment purposes, for medical (1984 and 1990) and 
educational expenses (1989) and for approved financial investments (1978,1993 and 
1997).274 Correspondingly, the pattern of withdrawals has changed over time, see 
Graphs II.2.2.a. and b.
In 1987 the Minimum Retirement Sum Scheme was introduced. Ever since the mid- 
1980s the government was increasingly inclined to increase the customary
271 Faruquee and Husain (1998, p.203), who do not offer an explanation for this increase of the 
coverage of CPF membership. However, it must be assumed that a large part is due to an increase in 
formal employment and after 1992 to the inclusion of the self-employed. Early on the Singapore 
government made sure of a wide participation in the fund through strict enforcement and better 
administration. The CPF Annual Report for the year ended 31.12,1967 (p. 3) writes: “With an 
increased field force, over 25,000 visits were made to places of employment and over 11,000 persons 
were interviewed at the Board's offices. (...) Criminal proceedings were, however, taken against 36 
employers for failing to pay contributions for their employees after previous warning and over $118,000 
penalty interest was collected from employers who paid their contributions late." Additionally, from 
1971 on the CPF used Singapore's identity card numbers as its uniform membership numbers, which 
improved membership administration. A positive side effect of the CPF must therefore have also been 
a reduction of informal employment.
272 Low (1999, p. 1084). Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 91) comment: “These transfers from 
government surpluses have been quite small, a few hundred dollars a time, and infrequent and are not 
intended to return government surpluses to the taxpayers or redistribute it to those whose balances 
are low. The latest top-up announced in August 2000...was seen as a pre-election handout by many."
273 Lee, Kuan-Yew (2000, p. 96) writes: “The colonial government had started the Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) as a simple savings scheme for retirement: 5 percent of wages contributed by the 
employee with a matching 5 percent by the employer, to be withdrawn at age 55. As a pension 
scheme it was inadequate. Keng Swee and I decided to expand this compulsory savings scheme into 
a fund that would enable every worker to own a home.” There exist now a number of very good 
publications which sketch this transformation. See for example Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp. 87-91), 
IMF (2000, p. 53-67), Wong and Park (1997) or Asher (1994), p. 35-71; On the issue of the use of the 
CPF as a macro-economic stabilisation device see also Asher (1999b) and Low and Aw (1997); and 
particularly for the early years of the CPF, see National University of Singapore (1985).
274 See IMF (2000, p.59) for a complete listing of the extension of withdrawal rules since 1955.
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retirement age (see section II.3.3.). Yet it did not raise the official age of withdrawal 
of CPF funds, which remained at 55. Instead it required CPF members to leave a 
certain minimum sum in their accounts until age 60. The minimum sum initially set 
at S$30,000 has been steadily raised to S$80,000 by the year 2003. After the 
introduction CPF members were able to use their property to pledge two-thirds of 
this amount. By 2003 that proportion has be lowered to half. At the official 
retirement age, which has been continuously raised over the recent years to 67 by 
the year 2003, each member may receive either a monthly income from this sum plus 
interest until it runs out or buy an approved life annuity or alternatively deposit it 
with an approved bank.
Graphs II,2.2.a. and b.: Pattern of CPF Withdrawals275
276 Sources: Monetary Authority of Singapore: Annual Reports; various years. Withdrawals under 
Section 15 refer to withdrawals for retirement, death, disability, and leaving Singapore and West 
Malaysia permanently. Other withdrawals mainly include various pre-retirement investment schemes 
and loans for financing tertiary education in Singapore.
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Since 1986 the CPF rate of interest has been an average of the month-end saving and 
one year fixed deposit rates paid by the four major local banks with a guaranteed 
minimum nominal rate of 2.5%.276 Nevertheless, according to Beckerling (1996) and 
Tyabji (1996), the real rate of interest was actually negative in 1973,1974,1980, 1981, 
1989, 1992 and 1994. Asher (1999a) calculates that the real rate of interest for the 
period 1987-97 was close to zero percent, while the annual compound growth in real 
wages in Singapore was 5.3 per cent.277 Since July 1999, the interest rates of fixed 
deposits and saving deposits, which have so far been weighted equally, have 
attracted respective weights of 80% and 20% in order to reflect more accurately the 
long-term nature of CPF savings. This is also likely to have raised the CPF interest 
rate since fixed deposits generally attract higher returns. As Asher (1999a) points 
out, "paying short-term interest rates for long-term funds, and further restricting the 
rate to what four relatively insulated local banks pay on local currency deposits 
clearly shows the administered rather than the market determined nature of the 
return on CPF balances for the members."278
The increasing early withdrawals and the low rate of interest have been blamed for 
the comparatively low replacement levels of CPF savings once the final balances are 
withdrawn at retirement. The CPF does not publish actual replacement values, but 
simulations performed by Wong and Donghyun (1997) put them within a range of 
25-35 percent of final salary, while the actuarial firm Watson Wyatt as reported by 
Beckerling (1996a) show replacement ratios between 15% for a high income, married
278 Between the fund's creation and 1962 the rate was fixed at 2,5%. From 1963 until 1986 it moved 
between 5.25% (1963-65) and a top rate of 6.5% (1974-81). See Wee and Han (1983) for the early 
development of the interest paid on CPF balances.
277 Asher (1999a, p. 3689). Earlier, Wee and Han (1983, pp. 37-38) had already pointed to the fact that 
high inflation might eat into the present value of CPF balances, if the interest rates do not adequately 
reflect developments in the price level. Asher (1994) considers the low rate of return on CPF balances 
an implicit tax. He estimates the value of this tax for 1990 as S$470 million or 6.6% of that year's 
contribution. A further reading of early CPF annual reports from before independence strengthens this 
argument. The CPF Annual Report for the year ended 31. 12. 1964 (p.2) writes: “As long as present 
[market] interest rates are maintained the annual surplus on income and expenditure account can be 
expected to increase and if this proves to be the case there seems to be no reason why members of 
the Fund should not, in due course, enjoy an even higher interest rate than at present.’  The interest 
rate credited to members in 1964 was still 5.25%. The conclusion that after independence the 
government started to use the CPF increasingly as a source for cheap funds at the expense of the 
CPF's members is very suggestive.
278 Asher (1999a), p. 3693
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contributor with a dependent spouse to 48% for a low income, single contributor. As 
the IMF (2000) study points out these ratios are well below the 66% of final wage, 
generally considered the benchmark for a comfortable level of retirement, and are 
considerably lower than the equivalent figure for other industrialised countries, e.g. 
US (56%), UK (50%), Japan (52%).276 *79 This view gives rise to the claim that 
Singapore's retired are asset rich, due to their high share of housing ownership, but 
cash poor.
On the other hand, it must be noted that the CPF offers a very lucrative tax shelter 
because all contributions reduce the employee's taxable income and both interest 
earned and withdrawals are tax free. This advantage, however, accrues largely to 
high-income individuals due to the progressive income tax rates in Singapore and 
due to the fact that the largest part of the tax-benefit is captured at contribution. The 
latter favours those individuals with CPF balances above the minimum requirement, 
who can withdraw their funds quickly again and thus make use of the tax shelter 
while at the same time minimising the penalty of low CPF interest rates.
From a government perspective the CPF also offers the opportunity to be used as a 
macro-economic stabilisation tool, in that the adjustment of CPF contribution rates 
can either free or bind consumption.280 Singapore has used this mechanism in both 
the recent Asian crisis and in its earlier 1985/86 recession.281 The government has
276 IMF (2000), p. 56 - 57; replacement rates for industrialised countries refer to retirement at the age
of 55 in 1995. The adequacy of CPF savings remains a controversial issue - particularly in Singapore.
See Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp. 91-93) and Urn (2002) for recent discussions.
280 Lee, Kuan-Yew (2000, p.97) describes this mob-up process in his autobiography: “Every year, the
National Wage Council recommended an increase in wages based on the previous year's economic 
growth. Once workers got used to a higher take-home pay, I knew they would resist any increase in 
their CPF contribution that would reduce their spendable money. So, almost yearly I increased the rate 
of CPF contributions, but such that there was still a net increase in take-home pay. It was painless for 
the workers and kept inflation down. This was only made possible by high growth year after year. And 
because the government fulfilled Its promise of fair shares for workers through the ownership of their 
homes, industrial peace prevailed."
281A further macro-economic benefit of the CPF has been Singapore’s ability to escape or successfully 
manage the trilemma problem, which states that a country can not have a fixed exchange rate, full 
capital mobility and an independent monetary policy. In the long-term the country must abandon one of 
the three. Singapore's strong control over domestic savings allowed the country to oversee a 
controlled appreciation of its currency under a regime of full international capital mobility while not 
being negatively affected by international monetary developments, which in theory for a small open 
market economy like Singapore would dictate the country's domestic monetary policy if it chose to
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now adopted a long-term target of 40% although it did reduce the rate in 1999 to 
30%. Graph II.2.2.C. shows the development of different measurements of the 
contribution rates.
Graph H.2.2.C.: CPF Contribution Rates282
As a final word of caution, it must also be noted, that depending on one's view of 
the government's asset position, the limitation of die CPF's investment to 
government bonds can be construed as analytically analogous to a Pay-As-You-Go 
scheme since it may be the future generations from whose taxes the bonds will have 
to be redeemed.28 83
control its exchange rate and allow full capital mobility. Similarly, Singapore was in the relatively 
fortunate position not to have to worry about the limitations defined by the Mundell-Flemming open- 
economy hypothesis, which states that monetary policy does not work with a fixed exchange rate, only 
fiscal policy is available. Or as Dr. Goh (1995, p. 166) puts it in his partamentary speech delivered at 
the Second Reading of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (Amendment) Bill 1984 on 24 August 
1984, answering the self-posed question why the MAS does not watch the development of the money 
supply: “Why do we ignore our Ms? For the very reason Western central banks have to watch theirs. 
Their public sector accounts are in a state of chronic deficit. Ours are in a state of chronic surplus. We 
are in a state of chronic surplus because employees have 50% of their pay packet sequestered in the 
Central Provident Fund. Further, the Finance Ministry does not part easily with the revenues harvested 
by its assiduous tax collectors."
282 Sources: see Data Appendix. Although the vast majority does, not everybody pays the maximum 
contribution rate. At times rates changed during the year. In those cases changes were apportioned 
respectively. The effective contribution rate is defined as total contributions over an estimate of total 
employees’ remuneration. This figure takes into consideration that not necessarily everybody pays into 
the CPF and that not everybody pays at the top rate.
283 Asher (1999a), p.3691
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11.2.3. Post-Office Savings Bank (POSBank)
While the CPF is the most important institution with respect to compulsory private 
saving in Singapore, the POSBank arguably was the most important institution with 
respect to voluntary private saving. In 1966 the POSBank was put under control and 
management of the Singapore Postmaster General. However, under the Post Office 
Savings Bank Act 1972 the POSBank was again separated from the Postal Service 
Department and given its own identity as a government-owned institution with the 
objective to provide retail banking services and to mobilise deposits for public 
development. In November 1998 it was sold to DBS-Bank, a government led 
company.
Postal savings institutions particularly in developing countries offer low-income 
households greater security and lower transaction costs than private banks, and 
provide two important elements that encourage savings: security and an orientation 
toward small savers. Japan established the region's first postal savings program in 
1875, drawing on British experience, with the explicit goal of fostering saving by 
rural dwellers and people with low to moderate incomes in the cities and towns. 
Until then, such people were effectively excluded from the financial system, which 
lacked rural networks and discouraged small depositors by requiring minimum 
balances or paying very low interest rates on small deposits.284 Commercial deposit 
banks preferred large clients due to the lower transactions costs on their deposits.
Deposits with Singapore's POSBank had the further advantage of being tax-exempt 
until after its sale to tire Development Bank of Singapore (DBS).285 As a further 
incentive, in 1974 the Bank began to offer a higher interest rate than commercial 
banks. The amount of new POSBank saving deposits exceeded the aggregate of 
deposits placed with all the finance companies together, for every year between 1977
2M Page (1997, p.38) and World Bank (1993, p. 218)
285 Following the sale in 1998 the tax exemptions were slowly rolled back in the subsequent years.
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and 1988.286 By the mid-1980s the savings deposits placed with the POSBank 
exceeded those of all Singapore's commercial banks put together.287 On 31 December 
1995 a total of 4.7 million saving accounts and 511/000 current accounts were held at 
POSBank, with total depositors' balances of S$22.3 billion.288 In June 1998, a few 
months before its sale to the DBS, the number of accounts stood at 5,866,200 far 
exceeding total population.289
The tax concessions enjoyed by the POSBank s depositors certainly played a 
significant role in its growth. However, Lim (1988) also points to the POSBank s 
aggressive expansion strategy after 1972 formed around many innovative services 
such as group savings, save-as-you-eam, Giro payment, and a highly computerised 
banking system.290 A two tier-interest rate structure, which pays higher interest rates 
for deposits below $100,000 then for deposits above, will have also helped to attract 
the mass market of the saving public.
11.2.4. Domestic Financial Markets291
The main issues about the domestic financial market in Singapore are its high- 
degree of government control and its overall stability. The control, which the 
government exerted over funds available in the system, becomes evident, once one 
considers the mere size of public and CPF saving. In aggregate they accounted for 
71.2% of GNS in the years 1965-99. Moreover, if one was to add voluntary savings, 
which were deposited at POSBank and DBS, as well as retained earnings by its
‘ “ Urn (1988, p.226)
287 Huff (1994, p. 336)
288 Beckering (1996, p.68) The total population in 1995 is estimated as a little less than 3.5 million so 
that in average every Singaporean had 1.34 savings accounts with the POSBank.
289 Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 117)
290 Lim (1988, p.226). In 1996, for example, the POSBank accounted for 60% of all cash-less 
payments in Singapore through its wide ATM system.
291
For a more encompassing description of Singapore’s financial markets and their development over 
time see for example Khalid and Tyabji (2002), Ariff and Khaild (2000) or Tan (2000).
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statutory boards and GLCs, it is a conservative estimate that the government had in 
fact exercised direct control over the equivalent of eighty percent of the nation's 
gross national saving in this period.292 Additionally, the design of withdrawal rights 
from the CPF gave the government yet another but more indirect lever of control. 
On top of this already extremely strong position, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore acts as an (additional) watchdog.
In the light of the central role of the government, it should not be surprising to find 
that Singapore's capital markets (fixed income as well as equity) and the fund 
management industry are comparatively less developed according to the IMF (2000) 
and have played a smaller role in contributing to Singapore's financial growth.293 
The IMF (2000) study also points to a number of reforms underway or planned for 
the future with the objective to improve this situation.294
Commercial international banking and foreign exchange, on tire other hand, are a 
strong point in the country's financial development. Singapore - together with Hong 
Kong and Japan - was among the first in East-Asia to strengthen prudential 
regulations of banks already in the 1970s, e.g. the introduction of Bank of 
International Settlement (BIS) capital adequacy requirements. Malaysia, Thailand 
and Taiwan, for example, did not follow suit until the 1980s. When Indonesia finally 
did, it had problems achieving BIS capital requirement levels,295 In 1975 a cartel 
arrangement, which had fixed commercial banks' interest rates, was broken up 
when the Monetary Authority of Singapore introduced a policy to promote free and
292 See Chapter Three for details.
293 See Murinde and Eng (1994) for an econometric analysis of financial development and growth in 
Singapore.
294 See IMF (2000, pp. 42-49), as well as IMF (2001, pp.20-32); For a detailed description of the 
reforms and the reform process see Tan (2000, pp149-177) or Kahlid and Tyabji (2002). For a critical 
assessment see The Economist, July 7m, 2001, p. 95
295 World Bank (1993, p. 213)
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open competition.296 In 1978 exchange controls were abolished. The repatriation of 
foreign profits is unrestricted and generally tax-free for foreign investors.
The resilience of Singapore's banking system was recently confirmed during the 
1997/8 Asian crisis, when most of its Asian counterparts struggled severely while 
Singapore's banks seem to have escaped any major disturbances. Accordmg to the 
IMF's ex-post classification, Singapore had the lowest ratio of non-performing loans 
with only 4.4% of GDP or 4% of the total loan portfolio.297 Since the 1990s, the 
country also ranks fourth in foreign exchange trading after London, New York and 
Tokyo and fifth in derivatives trading.298
11.3. Singapore’s Demographic Development
With respect to saving behaviour the development of the age structure of the 
population is of particular interest - especially the relative size of the working, i.e. 
saving, population versus the adolescent and the retired, i.e. dissaving population. 
These ratios are influenced by the development of life-expectancy, fertility, time of 
retirement and net-migration.
11.3.1. Population Age Structure - an Overview
Graph II.3.1. shows Singapore's age structure at the respective census years between 
1957 and 2000. Both the growth of the population from 1.44 million to 4.02 million in 
2000 and the transition from an expansive age pyramid in 1957 to a constrictive age
Wong (1986, p.57) It might be noteworthy that the government had started its own commercial bank 
(DBS) only six years earlier and that in the year prior to the cartel break-up the government’s 
POSBank started to pay higher interest rates on deposits than its commercial banking competitors.
297 IMF (1999)
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distribution in 1990 as well as an increasingly stationary age structure by 2000 
become apparent.
The main reason for this development must be seen in the falling fertility after I960, 
combined with increasing life expectancy and particularly falling mortality rates for 
the first five years of a new-born's life. The progressive age pyramids above clearly 
show how the last high fertility generation bom in the 1950s to mid-1960s move 
through their life-cycle. Not until the first half of the 1990s has the size of the under 5 
year old age cohort again been above 125,000 as it was in the second half of the 
1950s.
Graph 11.3.1.: Singapore’s Changing Age Structure* 299
1957 Age Pyramid
75 + 
70-74 
6569  
60-64 
5569  
50-54 
454 9  
4044  
35-39 
3034  
25-29 
2024  
15S  
«•14 
5 9  
0 4
ONfete □ Ferrate
H
1
175000 125P00 75,000 25000 25,000 75000 125000 75,000
1970 Age Pyramid
75+
7074
65-69
60-64
55-59
5054
4549
4044
35-39
3034
25-29
2024
•649
014
5 9
0 4
I □ Ntele □Fenale
175000 125000 75000 25,000 25,000 75000 125000 V5P00
IMF (2000), p.26
299 Sources: 1957 and 1970 are taken from Seng et al. (1971) tables 1 and 3, pp. 78-80; 1980 and 
1990 are taken from the respective Census publications of Singapore's Department of Statistics (1980, 
1990 and 2000). A breakdown by ages including the non-resident population for the census 2000 has 
not been published. The age pyramids for 2000, therefore, show the Department of Statistics' 
Residents-Only figures for 2000 and the projection by the U.S. Bureau of the Census published as part 
of their international online database. Their estimate for the total population of 4.15 million is slightly 
above the actual Singapore Census figure of 4.02 million.
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11.3.2. Dependency
From the mid-1960s onwards Singapore was able to reduce its young dependency 
ratio substantially. In 1965 under 15 year olds constituted 43.7% of the total 
population. Every 15 - 64 year old had to support in average 0.81 children under the 
age of 15 and for every 20 - 60 year old there were 1.34 under twenty year olds.300 By
300 For sources see explanation to Graph 11.3.2. below
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1999 the under 15 age cohort only accounted for 18.6% of the total population. Every 
15-64 year old had to support only 0.25 children under the age of 15 and for every 20 
- 60 year old there were only 0.38 under twenty year olds. Young dependency 
dropped during these 35 years by over two-thirds. Graph II.3.2. shows the 
development from 1965 onwards.301 302
Graph 11.3.2.: Dependency Ratios302
During the same time period old-age dependency as measured by the size of the 65+ 
age cohort relative to the 15-64 age cohort increased from 5% in 1965 to 9% in 1999. 
Nevertheless, if old and young dependency are given equal weights, total age-
It is noteworthy, that the decline in youth dependency In Asia was compressed within two or three 
decades, only half the time it took most late-nineteenth century industrialising countries to record less- 
spectacular reductions. Taylor and Williamson (1994, appendix table A1, pp. 352-3) document very 
high dependency rates in the countries of the New World when they started their modern economic 
growth transition. For example, 56 percent of Canada's population in 1851 was younger than 15 years. 
For Argentina the same ratio in 1869 stood at 45.2 percent.
302 Sources: Data for the breakdown into below 20 and above 60 years of age was taken from 
Singapore Dept, of Statistics (1982) table 2.2. p.8 for the years 1957-1980, for 1981-89 from Statistical 
Yearbook (1991), for 1990-1999 from US Census Bureau internet site -  international demographic 
database. Observations for the years 1981-89 refer to resident population only, i.e. exclude 120,000 -  
320,000 non-residents with a predominantly working-age distribution. This data inconsistency can 
explain the sudden drop in dependency ratios in 1990. Data for the breakdown into below and 15 and 
above 65 years of age was taken from Dept, of Statistics: Key Statistical Indicators (various years) for 
1969-81; 1981-99 same source and data problem as the breakdown into 20 and 60 age brackets. The 
observation for 1965 is taken from UN: World Population Prospects; 1966 from Seng et al. (1971) 
table 1 p.79; years 1967 and 1968 are linearly interpolated.
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dependency still fell by over 60% due to a substantial decline of the average fertility 
rate, which more than counter-balanced the increase in life expectancy.303
Fertility among the resident population fell from an average of 4.7 children per 
woman in her child-bearing years in 1965 to slightly under 1.5 by 1999. 
Correspondingly, die crude birth rate fell from 30.7 new-borns per 1000 residents in 
1965 to 12.8 in 1999. Fertility has been below replacement level of 2.1 from 1975 
on.304
The fall in fertility can be attributed to changes in nuptiality patterns. The potential 
additional effect of a restrictive "Stop at Two" population policy employed after 
1966 remains controversial. Fawcett and Khoo (1980) conclude that the population 
policy certainly had an impact, but are not able to quantify its magnitude. They also 
point out that the fall in fertility had started before the implementation of the policy. 
However, a closer look at the developments in the 1980s, i.e. after their study, offers 
suggestive evidence about the impact of the policy. After Singapore had sustained a 
fall in fertility for over twenty years, the government introduced a policy supporting 
the status-quo in 1980. In 1986 the Population Planning Unit (PPU) was formed by 
the Ministry of Health, which in 1987/8 officially publicised its pro-natalist policy 
under the slogan of 'Have three, more if you can afford it'. Subsequently, the fertility 
rates increased again from a low of 1.43 in 1985 to 1.96 in 1988, at which point it 
started to decline again to 1.475 by 1999, still above its 1985 level. The government's 
population policy can thus be seen as at least supportive to an already existing trend 
of falling fertility and possibly as an enhancing factor to that development, 
supported by the fact of the 1985-88 correction. The effects of the correction in the
3 One could raise the argument that with mounting health care costs, compounded by the longer life 
expectancies of older people, old-dependency should receive an increasingly higher weight than 
young dependency. In other words, older dependents might be increasingly more expensive than 
young dependents and should thus have a higher impact on the saving behaviour of the working 
population. Moreover, a reduction of the importance of the extended family would increase the 
necessity for saving even further.
304 Fertility and Crude Birth Rates for the resident population are taken from World Bank Development 
Indicators CD-Rom (1999 edition) for the period before 1997 and thereafter from Sing. Dept. Of 
Statistics: Yearbook of Statistics. Data referring to fertility developments among the non-resident 
population are not published.
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mid-1980s can also be seen by the increase in the size of the age cohort of children 
below 10 years between the 1980 and the 1990 censuses - see the respective age 
pyramids above.
The policy's main tools were discrimination against families with more then two 
children, emancipation of women and incentivisation of education.305 Families with 
more than two children were penalised through lower priorities in public housing 
and schooling, progressive hospital fees for births after the second child, decreasing 
child support and decreasing maternity leave options. The integration of women 
into the workforce was supported, leading to an increased female participation rate 
up from 29.7% in 1970 to 47.9% in 1985. Abortion was legalised in 1970, resulting in 
a more than 13-fold increase of the (officially reported) abortion rate per 1000 births 
(up from 41.6 in 1970 to 552 in 1985), so that by 1985 in average every third 
pregnancy was aborted. This high abortion rate came on top of a high utilisation of 
contraceptives. In 1982 the percentage of women aged 15 - 49 practising any form of 
contraception was reported as 74.9% in Singapore, which compares to the USA at 
68%, Japan (1984) 57%, ThaUand (1984) 65%, Hong Kong (1985) 72% or the UK 
(1983) 82%.306
Education, particularly for women, was also directly incentivised. For example 
women with five O levels could take advantage of a special form of tax relief. 
Nuptuality patterns also changed, with the age at marriage rising steadily. While 
close to one in five women aged 15-19 was married in 1957, the proportion was less 
than one in 20 in 1975. Among women aged 20-24, two out of three were married in 
1957. In 1975 less than one out of three was married. These policies went hand in 
hand with the government's efforts to promote female labour force participation. For 
example, protective restrictions on the employment of women have been removed
305 For a more detailed description see Urn et al. (1988a. pp. 111-136) and Shantakumar (1996, pp. 
52-54)
306 World Bank Development Indicators CD-Rom (1999)
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and the government fostered childcare, part-time work, job sharing, and flexible 
shifts.307
11-3.3. Life-Expectancy and Retirement
Life expectancy at birth increased in Singapore from 64.5 years in 1962 to 77.6 years 
in 1999. Particularly the falling mortality rate before the age of 5 from 40 per 1000 
live births in 1960 to 6 in 1997 must be noted in this regard. But also the mortality of 
men and women between ages 15 - 60 dropped dramatically during those years: for 
men from 305 to 136 and for women from 210 to 77 per 1000 male/female adults 
between 1960 and 1997.308 309
7 In 1965 15.7 percent of all women aged 15-64 were part of the labour force. In 1999 this figure 
stood at 39,3 percent; World Development Indicators CD-Rom (2001). Findlay and Wellisz (1993. 
P-117), measuring female labour force participation as a percentage of total female population, write 
that at the country's independence 17 percent of women worked, while In 1993 already 46 percent 
were part of the labour force. They also mention that it was the government’s goal to achieve a 50 
percent female participation by 1995.
308 World Bank Development Indicators CD-Rom (1999)
309 Source: World Bank Development Indicators CD-Rom (1999). The under-5 mortality rate measures 
the probability of dying before reaching the fifth birthday per 1000 live births. Life-Expectancy was not 
available for 1960. The closest date was 1962, which is given above. Under-5 Mortality was not 
available after 1997.
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Correspondingly the length of retirement increased. However, the effect of increased 
life-expectancy was partially offset by postponing the official retirement age. Prior to 
legislation adopted in 1993, the mandatory age of retirement in Singapore was 55. 
Yet, as early as 1984 a Ministry Health committee report, popularly known as the 
Howe report, recommended increasing the retirement age, first to 60 and later to 65. 
The National Wage Council had also, since 1988, urged companies to raise the 
retirement age norm from 55 to 60 or above. Employers were reluctant to do so, 
largely because of the seniority wage system.310 Since employers were generally 
unwilling to change retirement practices, the government passed the Retirement 
Age Act in April 1993. This act prohibits employers from dismissing workers below 
age 60 on the basis of age. The retirement age will be raised further to 67 by the year 
2003.
Graph ll.3.3.b.: Economically Active Population311
The combined actual effect of increasing life-expectancy, postponement of 
retirement age as well as other economic and social factors such as education can *31
0 Bauer (1996), p.137
311 Source: International Labour Office (Geneva), various years; no information given for years 1958- 
69,1971-75,1981,1991
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best be seen by studying the developments within the economically active 
population, shown in graph II.3.3.b.
The development of the 50-54 age bracket shows a slow but steady increase in its 
participation rate. This age group is clearly part of the working population. Whether 
the rise of the participation, particularly after the 1984/5 recession is due to 
increased pressure on postponing retirement, increased financial needs for 
retirement or simply due to the strong economic conditions is not clear. The 
development of the 55-59 age group is very suggestive. Its participation rate falls 
from 57.9% in 1957 until the mid-1980s and starts to climb significantly again from 
1988, when the NCW made its recommendation for postponing retirement age until 
60. By 1999 it is only 4.9% below its 1957 level. The very fast fall between 1957 and 
1970 however is more difficult to explain. Hie contemporaneous increase in 
participation among the 20-24 year olds seems to indicate a substitution between age 
groups. The short-term recovery between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s is probably 
due to a tight employment market. On the other hand, the continuously falling 
participation rate of the 60+ age group must be seen as a clear sign of Singapore s 
overaU economic development. Retirement after 60 has clearly become the norm by 
the mid-1980s, while in 1957 still 29.3% of the 60+ age group had to work.
The younger ages are also of interest. The 15-19 age bracket exhibits the most 
striking development with a participation rate falling from 49.5% to 14.7% between 
1970 and 1998. This is most likely due to increases in enrolment in secondary 
education, which rose from 46% to 67% during the same time period, coupled with 
higher incomes of the upbringing families.*« An initially opposite development in 
the 20-24 age bracket with rising participation rates until 1980, is slightly reversed in 
the following years. The increase between 1957 and 1980 is most likely due to an 
overall reduction of unemployment, higher female participation and falling tertiary 312
312 Some of the annual interpolations, by the ILO however, seem dubious particularly between the 
1970 and 1980 censuses. Yet, the overall trend is unaffected. Gross enrolment taken from World Bank 
Development Indicators CD-Rom (1999).
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education enrolment rates (down from 10% in 1965 to 7.8% in 1980). After 1980 a rise 
in enrolment in tertiary education (26.8% in 1993) and the less restrictive population 
policy must have lowered participation rates in this age bracket. The main age group 
of those aged 25-49 shows a steady increase in overall participation in the workforce, 
again most likely due to falling unemployment and higher female participation 
rates.
11.3.4. Migration
Beyond falling fertility, declining mortality and the correspondingly increasing life- 
expectancy, we also need to consider the effects of net-migration in order to explain 
the changing age structure of Singapore's total population. In 1970 non-residents 
numbered 60,900, which corresponded to 2.94% of the total population. By 1999 the 
number of non-residents had increased to 676,200 or 17.4% of total population. This 
means that the non-resident population between 1970 and 1999 has grown in 
average by 8.75% per year, while the resident population experienced a growth rate 
of 1.62% only.313 Moreover, a (large) proportion of the growth of the resident 
population must be due to the transition of some non-residents into resident status 
or direct migration into resident status considering the fact that total fertility rate 
was below replacement from 1975 on.
Unfortunately, beyond such a general view the development of Singapore's non­
resident population is not well documented, particularly in respect to age- 
composition, workforce participation, dependency and its potential transition into 
resident status. Hui (1998) offers foreign workforce estimates for selected years 
between 1970 and 1997. However, it turns out that his foreign workforce 
participation rate remains constant at 75% over the whole period, which casts doubt
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on the correctness of his data. Wong (1997) also offers some foreign work-force 
estimates. However, once compared to total non-residents, the estimates show a 
very low work-force participation among foreigners in 1970 of slightly above one- 
third, which changes to a participation rate of slightly above 90% by 1980. This high 
volatility again casts doubt on these estimates.* 314
In the absence of better data, a separate assessment of the impact of migration on the 
Singaporean population, particularly its age structure and dependency rates, is not 
possible.
Graph II.3.4.: The Non-Resident Population315
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3 At the same time outward migration of Singapore residents is also likely to have increased. Peebles 
and Wilson (2002, p. 29) write that: “In 2000 there were 200.000 Singaporeans living outside 
Singapore. This would include retirees, students and workers."
314 Hui (1998), table 5, p.204, based on figures obtained from the Singapore Ministry of Labour. The 
foreign workforce is estimated as that part of the foreign population aged between 20 and 60 years 
old; Wong (1997), p. 140, table 4
315 Source: Singapore Department of Statistics online data resource: www.sinqstat.aov.sa. At this 
source nor at other sources, was data for the non-resident population available for the years before 
1970 or 1971-79.
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11.4. Literature Review
The spectacular growth performance of Singapore and its concurrently high saving 
rate has attracted a fair share of attention. However, a consistent answer to what 
drove the saving rate, i.e. how much of it was due to demographic or institutional 
factors and how much was due to income effects, has not emerged. Most studies 
have focused on a comparatively short period of time or a cross-sectional 
comparison at one point in time across a number of countries. Moreover, the 
definitions of saving as well as the testing methods have varied widely. 
Unfortunately, a substantial part of the literature - particularly earlier studies - must 
be rejected on methodological grounds. Investigations into sub-aggregates of Gross 
National Saving have been rarely undertaken. What remains is a rather limited state 
of investigation into Singapore's saving behaviour.
11.4.1. Results of Earlier Studies
The findings of earlier studies into saving behaviour in Asian-Pacific countries, 
including Singapore, have been summarised in Chandavarkar (1993), Faruqee and 
Husain (1998), Wickramanayake (1998) and Tan and Soon (1997). The IMF (2000) 
offers a summary specifically dealing with Singapore as does Peebles (2002) and 
Peebles and Wilson (2002).316 Wickramanayake (1998) and Asher (1994) offer a 
review with a particular emphasis on the effects of the CPF, Largely, however, these 
reviews remain methodologically uncritical and report results of earlier studies 
notwithstanding their statistical weaknesses. This section will concentrate on the 
overall areas of disagreement in the literature and highlight the findings of the few
studies, which appear comparatively robust.
316 Peebles and Wilson (2002. pp. 81-86)
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H ie  m ain  d isag reem en ts  ab o u t w h a t influenced the sav in g  b eh av io u r in  S in gap ore  
ca n  b e su m m arised  in to  fo u r m ain  g ro u p s of d eterm in an ts aro u n d  w h ich  the  
co n tro v ersies cen tre , w ith  the d eg ree  o f  d isag reem en t in creasin g  a lo n g  the follow ing  
o rd er: in co m e m easu res, d em o g rap h ic  v ariab les, C P F  sa v in g  an d  other  
m iscellan eou s facto rs.317
T h e  R o le  o f In co m e
In a lm o st all stu d ies in co m e in  on e form  o r an o th er h as b een  sh ow n  to  be an  
im p o rta n t d eterm in an t of sav in g  in  S in gap o re. M o st often  th e  g ro w th  ra te  w as  
sh o w n  to  be significant. L evels of in com e w ere  less often  cited  as m ean in gfu l  
variab les. T h e in vestigation  of tran sitory  in co m e stru g g led  w ith  gettin g  to  term s  
w ith  its m e a su re m e n t a n d  w a s  n o t often  u n d ertak en . C au sality  h as u n til recen tly
b een  ra re ly  tested .
C arroll, W eil a n d  S u m m ers (1993) a n d  C aroll a n d  W e il (1 9 9 4 ) stu d ied  th e in co m e- 
savin gs relation sh ip  in  a  b ro a d  cro ss  sectio n  o f  eco n o m ies. T h eir resu lts  in d icate  th a t  
w h ile in co m e an d  savin gs g ro w th  are  h igh ly  co rre la ted , in co m es h a v e  often  risen  
b efore sav in g s ra tes  ra th e r  th an  after, su g g estin g  th a t  g ro w th  in d eed  d riv es sav in g s  
ra th er th an  the o th er w a y  aro u n d . G avin , H a u sm a n n  a n d  T alvi (1 9 9 7 ) rep licate  th eir  
tests an d  fin d  v e ry  sim ilar resu lts. A ttan asio  e t al. (2 000) a lso  in vestigate  the  
ro b u stn ess o f C arro ll a n d  W eill's  (1994) fin din gs. H o w e v e r, tlrey sh o w  th a t the  
resu lts a re  sen sitive to  the in stru m en tal sch em e, to  the fact th a t th ey  u sed  fiv e-y ear  
av e ra g e s  a n d  to  th e  re la tiv ely  sm all sam p le  size  o f 64  co u n tries  u se d  in  their  
an alysis. In their o w n  stu d y  A ttan asio  e t  al. (2 000) fin d  th a t g ro w th  a n d  sa v in g  a re  
m u tu ally  an d  p ositively  re la ted , b u t th at G ran g er cau sality  eith er w a y  c a n  n o t be 
estab lished  in  a  ro b u st fo rm at. R o d rick  (1 998) co n clu d es fo r his c ro ss-co u n try  
stu d ies o n  econ om ies w h ich  exp erien ced  sav in g  tran sitio n s, th a t e v e n  after o th er
317 Faruqee and Husain (1998, pp. 197-99), as 
of most of the potential determinants of saving
well as Tan and Soon (1997) offer a concise summary 
behaviour. See also Section 11.1. above.
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possible d eterm in an ts a re  co n tro lled  for lag g ed  in com e g ro w th  exerts  a  statistically  
positive effect o n  th e sav in g  rate . This effect op erates en tirely  o n  p riv a te  sav in g . 
L ag g ed  g ro w th  h as n o  significant effect on  public savin g.318 L o a y z a  e t  al. (2000) find  
in th eir p an el s tu d y  of 69  cou n tries fo r 1 9 66-99  th at as p red icted  p riv ate  sav in g  ra tes  
rise w ith  th e level an d  g ro w th  ra te  o f real p er cap ita  in com e, b u t th at the influen ce of  
in com e is la rg e r in  d ev elo p in g  th an  in  d ev elo p ed  cou n tries.
The W o rld  B ank (1993) assign s m o st of the reaso n  for the d ev elo p m en t of savin gs in  
E a st A sia  to  ra p id  g ro w th , ra p id  d em o g rap h ic  tran sition  an d  th e go v ern m en t. The  
stu d y  tests for G ran g er-C au sality  ru n n in g  fro m  sav in g  to  g ro w th  o r fro m  g ro w th  to  
sav in g  for e ig h t E a s t A sian  cou n tries an d  the U n ited  S tates. In  g en eral its resu lts  
in d icate  th at p a s t v alu es of p e r  cap ita  G D P g ro w th  a t  1 9 8 5  in tern ation al p rices  a re  a 
v e ry  go o d  p re d ic to r of the G ross S avin g R ate, b u t th at the re v e rse  is n o t tru e .319 
H o w ev er, S in g ap o re  is the o d d  co u n try  in the sam p le, w h ere  the g ro w th  v ariab le  is 
n o t sign ifican t o n  a n y  of the five lags tested  in  p red ictin g  savin gs for the p erio d  
1 9 6 0 -8 4 , w h ile  savin gs is  sign ifican t in  p red ictin g  gro w th  a t least o n  lags 4  an d  5 .32° 
A s a  co n clu sio n  for S in gap o re , the W o rld  B ank (1993) th erefo re  follow s a  stu d y  b y  
the M o n etary  A u th o rity  o f S in gap o re  (1991) an d  arg u es  th at in co m e ch an g es w e re  
n o t a  sig n ifican t facto r in  the sp ectacu lar rise  in  sav in g  ra tes  in  th e  1 9 7 0 s  a n d  1980s, 
co n sisten t w ith  th e v iew  th at d em o g rap h ic  facto rs an d , to  a  lesser ex ten t, the policies  
o f th e  C en tra l P ro v id e n t F u n d  d eterm in ed  the rise .321 P ag e  (1997) ech oes this
con clu sion .322
F aru q ee  a n d  H u sain  (1998) fo u n d  in their e rro r-co rrectio n  m o d el th a t ch an g es in  the  
ra te  o f  g ro w th  p o sitiv ely  affected  th e sav in g  ra te  in  th e  sh o rt-ru n , su g g estin g  a  
possible tran sito ry  in com e effect.323 T heir E C M  m o d el w o u ld  in d icate  th a t an
318 Rodrick (1998, p. 16)
319 World Bank (1993), p. 245
320 World Bank (1993); Table A5.2, p.244
321 World Bank (1993), p. 204
322 Page (1997), p. 33
323 Faruqee and Husain (1998), p. 215
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in c re a se /(d e cre a se ) o f  1% in  the g ro w th -ra te  o f  real p riv a te  d isp osab le in com e  
w o u ld  resu lt in  a n  in c re a s e / (d ecrease) of 0.37%  o f the p riv ate  sav in g  ratio  in  the  
sh o rt-ru n . Since th e  g ro w th  variab le  in  their sam p le p ro v es to  be s ta tio n ary , it  is n ot  
in clu d ed  in  th eir lo n g -ru n  co -in teg ratio n  form u la. In stead , re a l p e r  ca p ita  p riv ate  
disp osab le in co m e is sh o w n  to  be co -in teg rated  w ith  the p riv ate  sav in g  ratio  and  
thus Faru q ee  an d  H u sain  (1998) co n clu d e th a t S in g ap o re 's  su stain ed  ra p id  in crease  
in  p e r  cap ita  in co m e ap p e a rs  to  h a v e  h a d  a  s tro n g  lo n g -ru n  rela tio n  w ith  sav in g .324
In a  ra re  a tte m p t to  in vestigate  savin g  b eh av iou r o n  the in d ivid u al level, D eaton  an d  
P a x so n 's  (1 9 9 9 ) resu lts  in d icate  th a t fo r T aiw an  (u sin g  an n u al cross-section s  
b etw een  1 9 7 6 -9 5 ) in creases in  g ro w th  c a n  re su lt in  la rg e  in creases in  sav in g  ra tes , 
p articu larly  w h en  the ra te  of p op u lation  g ro w th  is low . B y co n trast, for T h ailand  
(u sin g  six  cro ss-sectio n s b etw een  1 9 7 6-92 ) th ey  find th at in creases in  econ om ic  
g ro w th  ra ised  th e w ealth  o f  th e  v e ry  y o u n g e st in d ivid u als, w h o  a re  d issav ers , 
ca u sin g  a  red u ctio n  in  th e ag g reg ate  sav in g  ra te . R o d rik  (1998) fo cu sin g  o n  co u n tries  
w h ich  exhib ited  tran sition s in  their sa v in g  an d  g ro w th  p e rfo rm a n ce  find th a t w hile  
g ro w th  tran sition s lead  to  su stain ed  in creases in  sa v in g  ra tes , sa v in g  tran sition s ten d  
to  resu lt only in  tem p o rary  in creases in  grow th , w h ich  su p p o rts  th e  h yp oth esis th at 
it is m ain ly  g ro w th  th a t d rives th e  tim e-series relation sh ip  b etw een  th e  tw o  
variab les. T h e estim ated  coefficients in d icate  th a t a n  in crease  in  th e g ro w th  ra te  o f  
on e p e rce n t raises the n atio n al a n d  p riv ate  sav in g  ra te s  the follow in g  y e a r  b y  
b etw een  0 .2  a n d  0 .3  p ercen tag e  poin ts o f n atio n al in com e. H o w e v e r, for S in gap o re  
R o d rik  c a n  n o t estab lish  cau sality  e ith er w a y , w h ich  m ig h t b e  exp lain ed  b y  th e  
im p o rta n t role  o f th e  C P F , A g ra w a l (2001), on  th e  o th e r h an d , fin ds u n i-d irection al  
cau sality  w ith  in creasin g  in com e p e r  cap ita  g ran g er ca u sin g  in creasin g  savin gs in  
S in gap o re . H is D O LS m o d e l sh o w s th a t this is d u e  to  b o th  d y n am ic  a n d  lo n g -term
Faruqee and Husain (1998), p. 209; The coefficient of Singapore’s real disposable income variable 
in the Engle-Granger OLS co-integration procedure is 0.19. However, an exact elasticity is not 
obtainable, since it appears that the income variable was actually a ratio of real (PPP) income per 
capita in Singapore in relation to the equivalent US figure. Unfortunately, no details or data are
supplied.
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effects, w ith  the in crease  in  p er-cap ita  in com e acco u n tin g  for a little o v er half of 
S in gap o re 's  risin g  G N S ratio  b etw een  19 7 0  an d  1990.
T h e  R o le  o f D e m o g ra p h ics
The significan ce of d em o g rap h ic  v ariab les has v aried  acro ss  different stu d ies. A  
co m p ariso n  is fu rth er co m p licated  b y  th e fact th at the stu dies h av e  also  differed on  
the tim e-p eriod s co v e re d , the d em o g rap h ic  variab les u sed , the m eth o d o lo g y  ap p lied  
an d  p erh ap s m o st im p o rtan tly  the list of o th er d ep en d en t v ariab les tested . 
A d d ition ally , a  m u ch  cited  stu d y  b y the M o n etary  A u th o rity  of S in gap o re  (1991) has  
n o t b een  m a d e  p u b licly  available. A ssu m in g  su p erior access  to  d a ta , its fin d in g (as  
cited  b y the W o rld  Bank, 1993) th at the in creased  savin g  ra te  from  1 9  to  4 6  p e rce n t  
b etw een  19 7 0  an d  1 9 8 9  w a s  (largely) attributable to  d eclin in g d ep en d en cy  ratios  
takes p articu lar w eigh t.
Faru q ee a n d  H u sain  (1998) find th at shifts in  the d em o g rap h ic  s tru ctu re  of the  
p o p u latio n  a p p e a r to  be the m ain  facto r exp lain in g  the su stain ed  rise  in  the ra te  of  
sav in g  in  th e fo u r co u n tries (In donesia, M alaysia , S in gap o re , T h ailan d ) tested  for the  
p eriod  of 1 9 7 0 -9 2 . M o reo v er, the lo n g -ru n  im p a ct of d em o g rap h ic  ch an g es on  sav in g  
is n early  id en tical in  th ree  of th e  cou n tries in  the sam p le, an d  ev en  stro n g er in  the  
fou rth  (In d on esia).325 S in gap o re  sp ecific, h o w e v e r, their co in teg ratio n  tests in d icate  
th at d em o g rap h ics  as m easu red  by th e p ro p o rtio n  of the w o rk in g  ag e  p op u latio n , 
i.e. th ose  ag ed  1 5 -6 4 , a lon e can n o t exp lain  the lo n g -ru n  m o v em en ts in  p riv a te  secto r  
sav in g .326 In d eed , E n g le-G ran g er estim ates in d icate  th at fin an cial d eep en in g  an d  
possib ly  p ro v id e n t fu n d  savin g , in  ad d itio n  to  d em o g rap h ics , jo in tly  exp lain  the  
lo n g -ru n  m o v em en ts  in  th e  sav in g  ra te . A ltern atively , ch an g es  in  p ro v id e n t fu n d  
sav in g  a n d  p er ca p ita  in com e are  able to  jointly exp lain  tren d  m o v em en ts in  th e  ra te  
o f p riv ate  sav in g . W ithin  their co -in teg ratio n  equ ation s the coefficien t o f the
325 Faruqee and Husain (1998), p. 197
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p ro p o rtio n  of the w o rk in g -ag e p op u lation  obtains a v alu e b etw een  1 .03  an d  1 .38 . 
Since th e p ro p o rtio n  of the w ork in g-ag e p op u lation  h as in creased  b y  ab o u t 12 .7  ^ 
b etw een  1 9 7 0 -9 2  an d  the p rivate  savin g  ratio  has risen  b y 16 .5  ^ d u rin g  th e sam e  
p eriod , Faru q ee  an d  H u sain 's  findings w o u ld  attrib u te the m ajority  of the rise in  
savin g  to  d em o g rap h ic  effects. H o w ev er, since w o rk in g -ag e p o p u latio n  d oes n ot  
a p p e a r to  be sig n ifican t b y  itself, this d em o g rap h ic  effect a p p e a rs  to  n eed  th e  
(statistical) su p p o rt of C en tral P ro v id e n t Fu n d  savin g  an d  either fin ancial d eep en in g  
o r p er ca p ita  in co m e.* 327 A g ra w a l (2001) finds a  s tro n g  n eg ativ e  co rrelatio n  b etw een  
p er-cap ita  in com e a n d  the d ep en d en cy  ratio  for S in gap ore, w h ich  p ro m p ts  h im  to  
d ro p  the latter v ariab le  from  his co in teg ratio n  p ro ced u re  in  o rd e r  to  re m o v e  the  
m u lti-co llin earity  fro m  the D O LS p ro ced u re .
T h e  R o le  o f  th e  C e n tra l P ro v id e n t F u n d
T h e resu lts o f existin g  stu dies in to  the role  o f p en sion  sch em es h a v e  b een  m ix e d , 
w h ich  also  m irro rs  the generally  in con clu sive th eo retical literatu re . T his is larg ely  
d u e  to  th e  p rob lem  o f fin d in g  sep ara te  p ro x y  variab les fo r th e  resp ectiv e  
m ech an ism s th ro u g h  w h ich  p en sion  sch em es a re  th o u g h t to  e ith e r su b stitu te  o r  
c ro w d -o u t v o lu n tary  savings. T h e d iscu ssion  in  re g a rd s  to  S in g ap o re  is co n d u cted  
on  th ree  levels: a n  analysis o f sim p le sa v in g  ratios an d  d ev elo p m en ts of these ratios  
o v e r  tim e, a  m o re  fo rm al a p p ro a ch  v ia  reg ressio n  m o d els  to  d eterm in e  w h eth er a  
v a rie ty  o f C P F  variab les ca n  b e sh o w n  to  be statistically  sign ifican t a n d  an  
in v estig atio n  of a  p oten tial c ro w d in g -o u t relation sh ip  b etw een  v o lu n tary  an d  
co m p u lso ry  sav in g s. T h e la tte r  s trin g  of the d iscu ssion  is th e  cru cia l o n e, sin ce even  
if C P F  variab les m ig h t p ro v e  statistically  significant, this d o es n o t sh o w  th a t th e  C P F
32fl Faruqee and Husain (1998), p.2Q9
327 Agrawal’s (2001) finding about the necessity of the inclusion of the CPF rate in order to obtain a 
cointegration vector (see below) strengthens this interpretation of Faruquee and Husain's (1998) 
finding. However, Faruqee and Husain (1998) do not offer this conclusion. Nor do they supply the data 
for their variables, so that this interpretation of their co-integration findings is based on data collected 
for this thesis, which uses a slightly different definition for private saving and possibly different sources
for the working population (see Data Appendix).
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w as actu ally  able to  m obilise ad d ition al savin gs, w h ich  Singap orean s w ou ld  n o t  
h av e  sa v e d  an y w ay .
The M o n etary  A u th o rity  o f  S in gap o re  (1991) on ly  attrib u tes a  m in or role  to  the C P F. 
O f the in crease  of the g ro ss n atio n al savin g  ra tio  b y  37 p ercen t b etw een  1970-89, only  
3.9 p ercen t w ere  d u e  to  the C P F .30 *2® Farucjee an d  H u sain  (1995 an d  1998) find so m e  
evid en ce o f co m p u lso ry  sav in g  h av in g  h ad  a lo n g -ru n  im p a ct on  th e tren d  ra te  of 
sav in g  in  S in gap ore. B u t a lm o st th ree-fou rth  of the rise  in  co m p u lso ry  sav in g  w as  
offset b y  a  red u ctio n  in  v o lu n ta ry  savin g .329 A  1 % in crease  in  th e ra tio  of C P F  sa v in g  
to  p riv ate  disp osab le in com e on ly  led  to  an  in crease  in  the lo n g -ru n  p riv a te  savin g  
ra tio  of 0.29% w ith in  th eir co -in teg ratio n  form ula. In their E C M  m o d el, th e  au th ors  
fou n d  th at a n  in crease  o f 1% in  their C P F -sav in g -ra te  ad d e d  0.48 A to  the p riv ate  
sav in g  ra tio  in  the sh o rt-term . A g ra w a l (2001) finds th a t the C P F  ra te  has  
con trib u ted  significantly  to  S in g ap o re 's  h ig h  sav in g  ra tes , acco u n tin g  fo r savin gs  
in creasin g  b y n early  six p e rce n t of G N P  o u t of a  to ta l in crease  of 14.5 p e rce n t  
b etw een  1975 a n d  1990. In fa ct, A g ra w a l's  sav in g s-rate  fu n ction  d o es n o t co in teg rate  
u nless the p ro v id e n t fu n d  ra te  is in clu d ed  as a n  exp la n a to ry  variab le , su g g estin g  
th at h ig h  C P F  ra tes  h a v e  b een  a  cen tra l facto r b eh in d  th e savin gs p erfo rm an ce  in
Singapore.
Many of the earlier studies have also investigated the CPF s effect on savings. 
However, due to their methodological weaknesses their econometrical findings are 
somewhat questionable. Table II.4.1. offers their results in summary. Section II.4.2. 
below presents the detailed methodological criticisms.
30)AS C't8d by World Bank I1993- p. 219), which also echoes this view, and Ermisch and Huff (1999, p.
328 Faruqee and Husain (1995, p. 20) also point out that compulsory provident fund saving within their 
co-integration model for Malaysia was not significant. They argue that this difference “may well be tied
to each country's differing experience in the management of their compulsory saving schemes."
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T a b le  II .4 .1 . H is to rio g ra p h y  o f L e ss-T h a n -R o b u st In v estig atio n s
Article Methodology Finding
Kopits and Gotur(1980) OLS on pooled 
sample of 54 
industrial and 
developing 
countries 
(inlcuding 
Singapore) using 
average annual 
observations for 
1969-71
For the developing countries the net effect of social security 
schemes was a ‘draw’ - there was neither a positive nor an 
adverse net-impact on voluntary saving.
Datta and Shome (1981) OLS and 2SLS 
regressions for 
Singapore (1961- 
76) and for 
pooled sample 
(1965-74) for 
Singapore, 
Malaysia, The 
Philippines and 
Sri Lanka
No statistically significant effect of compulsory saving on 
non-compulsory saving. However, even though the 
compulsory saving variable is not significant at the five 
percent level, it consistently obtains a positive coefficient 
indicating that compulsory saving might add to non- 
compulsory saving. Depending on the sample and 
regression method employed one dollar of compulsory 
saving can add up to 97 cents to voluntary private saving. 
Only in the pooled 2SLS equation is the crowding out effect 
almost complete, i.e. an increase in the compulsory saving 
rate by one percent is estimated to add only 0.09% to the 
voluntary saving rate.
Wee and Han (1983), Interpretation of 
correlation matrix 
between private 
expenditure, 
CPF-contribution 
rates, disposable 
income and 
private savings, 
for 1971-80
Negative correlation between change in employee CPF 
contribution rates and private savings are interpreted as a 
sign that CPF savings have crowded out private savings. 
While the positive correlation between changes to the total 
CPF contribution rate and private expenditure are seen as 
indicating that in the light of the employer’s contribution the 
consumer is actually decreasing his voluntary savings by 
more than his own CPF savings, resulting in increases in 
personal expenditure.
Loh and Veall (1985) OLS regression 
1966-79
Find no evidence that social security provisions (including 
CPF benefits) had any significant impact on private saving 
for Singapore, suggesting that crowdinq-out did not exist.
Wong (1986) OLS regression 
1974-83
Compulsory saving has crowded out voluntary saving from 
1974 to 1983. One Singapore dollar saved through the CPF 
has reduced private non-CPF savings by 1.25 dollars. "In 
other words, CPF saving has served as a substitute for 
voluntary saving."(p.67)
Lim et al (1988a, pp.215- 
236)
OLS regression 
1974-84
Voluntary saving during 1974-84 was positively related to 
disposable income and negatively related to CPF savings. 
However, the negative coefficient is quite small, so that one 
additional Singapore dollar saved through the CPF is only 
reducing private voluntary savings by less than two cents, 
which is hardly a case for crowding out, although Lim et al. 
(1988a) argue differently merely focusing on the negative 
coefficient.
Lim (1988 p 226) gives an example of crowding out: “Endowment policies, closest in nature 
to the CPF savings plan suffered a decline of 18.6 percentage points in their share of total new 
annual premiums from 1979-84. During that period, CPF contributions increased from 33 per cent 
of wages to 50 per cent."
159
Chapter Two Page 160
T ab le  II.4 .1 . co n tin u e d :
Hoon (1991) Overlapping
generations
model
As long as CPF savings earn the same market rate of 
interest as the employees’ regular savings would, 
employees’ contributions to the CPF are exactly offset by a 
fall in private non-CPF savings. On the other hand, 
however, a rise in the employer’s contribution is not fully 
offset by a fall in savings. An increase in the employer’s 
lifetime contribution rate raises the worker’s lifetime 
resources, and hence leads him to raise current 
consumption to a degree and thus lower private savings. 
Yet, this effect does not fully offset the increase in the 
employers compulsory savings, so that total savings rise. 
However, if wages adjust to an increase in the employers 
CPF contribution (i.e. wages fall), the increase in the 
employers’ savings will be fully offset by a fall in the 
employees' voluntary saving
Hoon (1992) Extension of 
Hoon’s (1991) 
overlapping 
generations 
model
A potential increase in income tax will result in rising private 
saving, while an increase of capital tax will lead to a fall in 
private saving. However, if the government has to reduce 
its spending due to the tax-free status of CPF contributions, 
this might lead to lower disposable per capita income, and 
thus have a negative impact on private saving
Chandavarkar (1993) Observation and 
view on existing 
literature
the phenomenal rise in Singapore’s national saving rate is 
largely accounted for by ‘forced saving' through the CPF 331
Huff (1994) Observation, i.e. 
tracking of saving 
rates over time 
1974-85
After 1974 public-sector and CPF savings progressively 
reduced the importance of voluntary private sector savings. 
The contribution of voluntary private savings fell from 
almost three-fifths of national savings in 1974 to less than 
one-quarter by 1983.332
Husain (1995) 2SLS for 1970-92 The CPF saving rate is not found to be statistically 
significant in modelling the first differences of real per- 
capita consumption. This is interpreted by the author as a 
sign that CPF savings have been fully offset by reduction in 
private voluntary saving.333
Gao and Ng (1995) OLS on quarterly 
voluntary savings 
1977Q3 to 
1994Q2
CPF saving has not distorted people's behaviour of 
voluntary saving, i.e. the high gross private saving in 
Singapore has not been due to high compulsory saving.
Han (1996) OLS, 2SLS and 
3SLS
According to the 3SLS, one percentage point increase in 
CPF savings increases the growth rate of total gross 
national savings by only 0.0062 percentage points. The 
growth rate of CPF savings is not found to be significant.334
Peebles and Wilson (1996) Observation of 
national income 
identities
“quite clearly, the CPF, being a form of forced saving, 
depresses individual spending so that the private con­
sumption rate in Singapore is the lowest in the world.” 335
" 1 Chandavarkar(1993), p. 13
332 Huff (1994, p. 332-334)
333 Husain /1995 D 491
334 u , ' Q cinnifirance of the CPF variable as arguing against crowding-out.Han (1996) interprets the lowsigni eo j i  growth of Gross National Savings and
However, since Hans dependent vanabe is ne ra 9 accounted for 13 percent of total 
s nce even according to Han s to zera a?fual y indicates that savings created through the
volU"tar*  ~  SavingS' ° theWiSe' theCPF variable should actually attract a positive coefficient.
335 Peebles and Wilson (1996), p. 24
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Chen and Tan (1998) OLS regression 
1974-96
The effective CPF rate is significant in their regression 
model and positively related to private saving with a similar 
strenath of imoact as the arowth rate of GDP.
Wickramanayake (1998) unrestricted error 
correction model 
for the sample 
period of 1970-94
finds significant positive effects on financial (voluntary) 
savings in real terms and also on real private savings. On 
average an increase (decrease) of one percentage point of 
CPF savings would increase (decrease) the level of real 
financial savings and real private savings by 0.81% and 
0.56% respectively. This would translate into an increase 
(decrease) of real domestic savings and real national 
Savinas of 0.18% and 0.21% respectively.
The Role of Other Factors
Even though other factors, which might influence saving behaviour, are often not 
explicitly discussed, their exclusion and the possibility of missing (statistical) effects 
on the outcomes of the investigation of income, demographic, or CPF variables, 
make them implicitly the most controversial aspect of the discussion. In other 
words, the largest disagreement lies in what to agree on testing in the first place. 
Particularly, the role of the government and the impact of the quality of a country's 
financial institutions are still controversial issues.
Loayza et al. (2000) find in their panel study of 69 countries for 1966-99 that fiscal 
policy is a moderately effective tool to raise national saving. An increase in public 
saving by 4% of Gross-National-Disposable-Income will raise national saving by 
2.8% of GNDI within a year, but only by some 1.2% of GNDI in the long term. The 
evidence points against full Ricardian equivalence. Inflation has a positive impact on 
private saving supporting a precautionary motive argument, i.e. people tend to save 
more in an unstable environment. Financial liberalization, on the other hand, is 
found to be detrimental to private saving rates. Enhanced credit availability reduces 
the private saving rate, while larger financial depth does not raise saving, and nor 
do higher real interest rates.
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Similar to Loayza et al. (2000), Edwards (1997) also finds that although higher 
government savings crowd out private savings, they will not do so one-to-one 336 
Rodrik's (1998) panel study focusing on countries which have experienced saving 
transitions (including Singapore) estimates that an increase in public saving of one 
percentage point of national income raised total national saving by 0.40-0.74 points. 
While public saving crowd out private saving, the regressions reveal that the 
crowding out is far from complete. Moreover, he notices an increase in public saving 
around the time that the transition begins. He concludes that all in all, mobilizing 
public saving seems to be one of the most potent ways of raising national saving. 
Generally, the degree to which Full Ricardian Equivalence is rejected differs widely 
in the literature.* 338 Lopez et al. (2000) attribute part of this variance to differences 
between developing and industrialised countries, while Edwards (1997) points to 
potential differences in the political economy influencing the saving decisions of the 
resepctive political decision makers, namely on the probability that the governing 
party will still be in power when the investment financed through government 
saving comes to fruition.
With respect to Singapore, Faruqee and Husain (1998) show financial deepening or 
monetisation, as measured by the ratio of money and quasi money to disposable 
income, to be significant. A one percent increase in the ratio of money and quasi 
money to private disposable income added 0.05% to Singapore's long-term private 
saving ratio between 1970-92. Similarly, Dayal-Gulati and Thimann (1997) find that 
the M2-to-GDP Ratio as a proxy for financial deepening and the inflation rate as a 
proxy for macro-economic stability both contributed positively to South East Asian 
high saving rates -  particularly private saving. As far as national saving is 
concerned, much of the difference between South East Asia and Latin America can 
be explained by higher public saving in Southeast Asia and especially by the
JJ0 Edwards (1997, p. 147)
338Rodrick (1998' P-1®) .. i1h Ricardian Equivalence see Lopez et al. (2000). For
For a recent review of the literature dealing ee for example Seater (1993).a discussion of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem see tor exa p.
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relatively low offset coefficient in that region of 0.15 against 0.7 in Latin American 
countries.
The World Bank (1993) points out that the positive impact of real interest rates 
appears to be especially evident for changes from highly negative to positive real 
interest rates and the impact of that change on financial savings. Agrawal (2001) 
finds the impact of real interest rates not to be significantly different from zero for 
Singapore. Even when the coefficients are significant for some of the other countries 
tested, they are very small, so much that a five percent increase in real interest rates 
will change savings by less than one percent of GNP in Indonesia or Thailand. 
Furthermore, the effect is negative in Indonesia and positive in Thailand. Overall, 
Agrawal (2001) concludes that interest rates have only limited impact on saving 
rates. This contradicts Rodrik (1998) and Loayza et al. (2000) who find a negative 
coefficient for the real interest rate in their cross-country analyses. On tire other 
hand, Bandiera et al. (2000) do not find a reliable interest rate effect at all in their 
cross-country study of eight developing countries. Faruqee and Husain (1995 and 
1998) do not investigate the role of interest rates.
De Brouwer (1999) finds some evidence of domestic liquidity constraints in 
Singapore. But his results also suggest that liquidity constraints have eased in 
Singapore over time, as a result of financial deregulation eventually allowing for 
some degree of consumption smoothing. De Brouwer (1999) also speculates that 
forced savings through the CPF might be a reason why borrowing constraints still 
appear higher in Singapore than for example in Hong Kong or Australia.' 
Nevertheless, Singapore is less inhibited by borrowing constraints than the 
remaining Asian countries in his sample (Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Japan, South Korea and the Philippines). 39
339 De Brouwer (1999. p. 178)
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11.4.2. Methodological Problems of Earlier Studies
A number of studies have run Ordinary-Least-Square (OLS) or Two-Stage-Least- 
Square (2SLS) regressions to sort significant from insignificant determinants of 
saving behaviour. However, most of the variables used, particularly income, 
demographic developments as well as CPF data are most likely non-stationary and 
thus if tested in standard OLS fashion yield spurious regression results. The 
statistical findings of Datta and Shome (1981), Loh and Veall (1985), Wong (1986), 
Lim et al. (1988a) and Chen and Tan (1998), which all use OLS or 2SLS regression 
techniques, are therefore highly questionable on methodological grounds.«« Some of 
the OLS regression models will also most likely suffer from multi-collinearity among 
their explanatory variables. Neal (1990), for example, points out that per capita 
income and inflation are generally correlated to financial depth, the former 
positively and the latter negatively. Thus, the results regarding the importance of 
financial deepening, for example by Lim et al. (1988) and Faruqee and Husain's 
(1995 and 1998) OLS Engle-Granger co-integration, might be sensitive to issues of 
multi-collinearity.340 41
The International Monetary Fund has sponsored a series of papers dealing with 
Asian Saving - Lahiri (1988 and 1989), Husain (1995), and Faruqee and Husain 
(1995), which is also the basis for Faruqee and Husain (1998). Lahiri (1988 and 1989) 
cover the period of 1965-84 for Singapore together with similar time periods for 
seven other South-East Asian countries. The fact that Lahiri first-differenced the 
dependent variable (log of private consumption) indicates that he must have been 
aware of non-stationarity issues. Yet, he gives no information about the stationary 
properties of his explanatory variables and continues with OLS equations. But some
340 c^r „  nf this Droblem see any recent advanced statistical textbook. For a
J S ' J S I ! ! ? S S f “ « r o f S - K n a r ,  applied to saving invostlga.io„S saa ,or
example Agrawal (2001, p. 500-501).
Wong’s .1986) findings a l s o ^ t i d s e T o h ^ n d  V e^|0(i985)Ualso8for re ^ rtin V ^g re s^ tm
ra-as,ima.ing ,ha egoaiion,
invalidates their findings.
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of his independent variables are most likely to be non-stationary in Singapore s case, 
for example the percent of the population aged between 15 and 64. Similarly, Husain 
(1995) uses 2SLS with the first difference of the log of real per capita private 
consumption as the dependent variable. A number of explanatory variables are in 
first-difference format. However, they prove not to be significant and are thus 
dropped from the final equation. The final 2SLS results find the rate of growth of 
disposable income, the lagged consumption ratio, the percentage of the population 
aged 15-64 and a dummy for the 1985-6 recession significant. However, Husain 
(1995) does not offer unit-root tests for these variables and some of them are likely to 
be non-stationary.342
Some authors do not use statistical analysis to support their claims. Instead they 
derive conclusions from merely looking at the development of different saving 
^SST^S^tes. Huff (1994), for example, argues that the CPF increased the domestic 
saving rate due to its Provident Fund principle and that after 1974 public sector 
together with CPF savings progressively reduced the importance of voluntary 
private savings.343 Peebles and Wilson (1996) argue for crowding out effects of CPF 
savings simply due to the CPF's compulsory nature, but after surveying the 
literature conclude that there is no definite answer yet,344 Sandilands (1992) remains 
completely on the descriptive level and so do his conclusions. Chandavarkar (1993) 
argues that "the phenomenal rise in Singapore's national saving rate is largely 
accounted for by 'forced saving' through the CPF."345 However, he does not support 
his claim with any evidence beyond the high proportion of CPF saving as part of 
total saving in 1990. Except for its Granger-Causality test for the link running from 
growth to saving, the World Bank (1993) also derives its conclusions about 
determinants of saving behaviour in East-Asia from observational evidence 
supported by an unpublished study by Singapore's Monetary Authority (1991).
342 Husain (1995, p. 48) theoretically discusses and refers to the error correction model proposed
by Davidson et al. (1978) but nevertheless continues with 2SLS.
343 Huff (1994), p. 334
^Peebles and Wilson (1996), p. 24
346 Chandavarkar (1993), p. 17
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Some studies do not include the Central Provident Fund in their investigation, e.g. 
Lahiri (1988 and 1989) and Gupta (1987). With such a strong compulsory saving 
regime in Singapore, this would only be acceptable if it had been proven that the 
CPF did not influence saving behaviour. However, this is still one of the most 
contested aspects in the literature. Therefore, the results of these studies by 
implicitly assuming that the CPF did not matter must be considered very unstable. 
Tan and Soon (1997) drop their significant CPF variable from their cointegration 
formula with per capita consumption as the dependent variable because its 
inclusion results in a negative coefficient for old-age dependency. This, they argue, 
is a sign of misspecification of the model, since it goes counter their expected 
relationship, which would argue that an increase in old-age dependency will lead to 
an increase in consumption. However, one can make the argument that such a 
negative relationship could exist in reality and should thus not be a sign for 
misspecification. An increase in old-age dependency could lead to a fall in 
consumption if it leads to changes of retirement expectations of the working 
population resulting in higher savings (possibly enforced by a compulsory scheme) 
or alterations in the government's saving behaviour. Han (1996) works with growth 
variables and thus escapes the non-stationarity problems. However, Han's 
regression equation omits a number of potentially very important factors. Han's 
equation only tests for the influence of the interest rate, growth of GDP and growth 
of CPF savings, of which only GDP growth proves significant.
Hoon (1991) tries to escape these econometric pitfalls altogether by constructing an 
overlapping generations, general equilibrium model which tries to take into account 
some of the institutional factors of tire CPF. However, the model's very general 
assumptions (for example: perfect capital markets, i.e no borrowing constraints, full 
employment and no young dependency, i.e. population consists only of workers
and retirees) limit the applicability to Singapore s actual history.
A study by Wickramanayake (1998), which appears robust on its statistical 
methodology, suffers from a substantial weakness in the definition of its saving
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variable. Wickramanayake (1998) employs unrestricted error-correction models to 
overcome the non-stationary quality of the data. However, he defines public saving 
simply as the government's budget balance, which seriously under-estimates public 
saving and consequently leads to an over-estimation of private saving.
Faruquee and Husain (1995 and 1998) adopt co-integration to deal with the non- 
stationary character of the data for Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia 
both in individual time-series and panel analyses. Both studies are essentially 
identical, apart from the inclusion in the 1998 paper of real per capita income among 
the explanatory variables. The time period under investigation is 1970-92 and the 
dependent variable is the private saving ratio. They run a battery of tests: OLS 
Engle-Granger co-integration for each country's time series, pooled panel OLS and 
non-linear-least-square (NLS) regressions as well as an error-correction model. 
However, they derive private saving by deducting tax revenue and private 
consumption from national income, which is likely to overstate private saving - 
particularly in Singapore's case where a large part of the government's income 
stems from non-tax revenue (see section II.2.1. above). Additionally, they do not 
state how their explanatory variables were calculated, i.e. how they define CPF 
saving or real private disposable income, and their OLS-time-series still suffer from 
serial correlation with DW-statistics for Singapore of around 1.4-1.6. Nevertheless, 
their methodology is a substantial improvement and it should not be surprising that 
their results contradict Husain's (1995) in relation to the effects of CPF savings.
Overall, the most robust investigation to date has been undertaken by Agrawal 
(2001) Agrawal regresses national saving ratios for Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, 
Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan and India on a selection of variables including per-capita 
income, growth, foreign savings as per cent of GNP, young and old dependency 
burdens, interest and provident fund rates. The period covered for Singapore is 
1965-92. The cointegration vectors are estimated via dynamic OLS (DOTS) following 
Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993). The DOLS procedure was chosen 
because it has the advantage that endogeneity of any of the regressors has no effect,
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asymptotically, on the robustness of the estimates, allows for direct estimation of a 
mixture of 1(1) and 1(0) variables and since the estimators are asymptotically 
normally distributed allows for inferences to be drawn from the coefficients. 
Moreover, Granger causality tests were used to determine die direction of the 
relationship between growth and saving. Nevertheless, a few weaknesses remain, 
namely the lack of potentially influential explanatory factors and likely multi- 
collinearity affecting the quality of the coefficients.
11.4.3. Accounting Identities and Differing Concepts of Saving Aggregates
In its most basic definition, saving is the difference between income and 
consumption. Gross National Saving (GNS) is, therefore, generally calculated as a 
residual in the National Income Accounts, after measuring the country's GNP and 
total consumption. Private National Saving (PNS) is then derived by deducting 
public saving from national saving. Depending on the availability of data, private 
saving can be split further into voluntary and compulsory saving, as well as into 
corporate and household saving. Consequently, all explorations into saving 
behaviour are extremely sensitive to the quality of the national accounts and the 
definition of public saving.346
Some studies dealing particularly with private saving consider tins issue so 
fundamental that they try to avoid using national income accounts altogether and 
estimate private saving by adding money balances and different measures of private 
investments, generally called financial saving.347 This approach, however, often
348 Also see section 1.2.1.1., which discusses the problems of saving estimates in cross-country 
studies.
347 See for example: Wickramanyake (1998), Lim (1988a), and Datta and Shome (1981), who use M2 
balances plus finance company deposits, POSBank deposits and life insurance savings as their 
estimate for voluntary private saving. Yet another approach is propagated by Bradford (1991), who 
argues that the correct saving measure should be the change in wealth, which in turn should be 
derived from the change in stock market valuations. Joseph Stiglitz in his comment on Bradford's 
article disagrees.
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encounters major data coverage problems particularly in respect to saving held 
overseas by residents, which are therefore generally not included, and the necessary 
differentiation between deposits held by public and by private entities. Furthermore, 
it does not net loan obligations and excludes savings which have been invested in 
equities or other traded securities. Stemming from their construction, financial 
saving estimates end up tracing money supply rather than private saving. However, 
private saving and money supply are often highly correlated. Graph II.4.3.a. 
contrasts the annual increases of Singapore's M3 money supply and the voluntary 
private saving figures derived from the country's national income accounts. The 
correlation between the two for the years 1976-99 is 0.77.348 349
Graph II.4.3.a.: Private Savings from National Accounts or Money Supply349
The year 1999 is a good example of the weaknesses of financial saving estimates. In 1999 the 
government’s total revenue fell by S$10 billion and the net-contributions to the CPF fell by a further 
S$3 billion compared to 1998, while total national saving still increased by S$4 billion. In other words, 
a large portion of what the government used to save has now been saved by the private sphere. Yet, 
the private sphere did not increase its financial savings, i.e. currency holdings or deposits with banks 
or other financial institutions. As the data compiled for Chapter Three shows, in 1999 private banks 
increased their overseas investment by over S$18 billion and private investments in Singaporean 
equities increased by S$10billion. Both of these transactions would not be recorded in the financial 
saving measure.
349 M3 is defined as the Sum of Currency in Circulation, Demand Deposits, Quasi Money (Fixed 
Deposits, Savings and other Deposits), Net Deposits with Finance Companies and POSBank. M3 is 
taken from MAS Annual Report (various issues). The MAS does not report M3 before 1975.
169
Chapter Two Page 170
In summary, financial savings are no substitute for national savings and even if the 
study was to exclude public savings a number of substantial problems remain 
particularly in a financially advanced and open economy. In the case of Singapore 
with both the government being a very important saver and her citizens and 
corporations having access to a number of investment vehicles not traced by 
financial savings, using national income accounts remains the best option. However, 
caution must be applied in deriving public and thus private savings.
Due to the high degree of government involvement, the definition of public saving is 
crucial to Singapore. In order to derive the correct estimate for public saving, let us 
consider how Gross Domestic Saving is derived in Singapore's National Accounts, 
starting from the basic national accounting identity:350
(1) Y s I + C + G + NX
where
Y = Gross Domestic Production 
I = Investment 
C = Private Consumption 
G = Government Final Consumption 
NX = Net-Exports
Gross Domestic Saving is then derived as a residual:
(2) GDS = I + NX *  Y - C - G
where
GDS = Gross Domestic Saving
Since only Government Consumption is deducted from GDP in the GDS calculation, 
total government saving must equal the difference between Total Government 
Revenue (TGR) and Government Consumption.
(3) PuDS ■ TGR . G
where
PuDS = Public Domestic Saving 
TGR = Total Government Revenue
For simplicity's sake of the following calculations only GDS is considered. The extension from 
Gross Domestic to Gross National Saving would require the inclusion of Net-Factor-Income-From- 
Abroad (NFIA). The income concept would then be extended from GDP to GNP. Equations (1) and (2) 
would read: (V) GNP -  I + C + G + NX + NFIA; (2’) GNS » I + NX + NFIA ■ GNP - C . G; where NX + 
NFIA can also be expressed as the Current Account Balance (CA).
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Deducting government saving from GDS then defines Gross Domestic Private 
Saving as:
(4) PDS ■ GDS - PuDS ■ GDS - TGR + G
where
PDS = Gross Private Domestic Saving
Substituting GDS with the equation (2) GDS = Y - C - G from above yields
(5) PDS = Y  - C - TGR
Private saving itself can be separated into voluntary and forced saving:
(6) PDS = VPDS + FPDS
where
VPDS = Voluntary Gross Private Domestic Saving 
FPDS = Forced Gross Private Domestic Saving
Since the CPF is Singapore's only mechanism for forced saving, CPF saving can be 
substituted for FPDS. Then solving for VPDS yields:
(7) VPDS ■ PDS - CPFsav
where
CPFsav = CPF saving
The literature, however, features a number of differing concepts estimating public 
saving.351 Defining public saving as the government's budget balance, for example, 
will lead to a substantial underestimation of government saving. It does not account 
for the fact that the government needs to save money in order to finance its capital 
expenditures and lending activities. A second approach, deducts current 
expenditure instead of government consumption from total government revenue.352 
Since current expenditure and government consumption are not exactly equal, this 
approach leads to yet another saving estimate. In Singapore's case the former 
usually exceeds the latter and thus this procedure will also lead to a slight
361 See also Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 82) for a discussion of the differing concepts defining public 
saving.
352 See for example Asher (1999b)
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underestimation of public saving.353 Yet another approach is to deduct tax income 
raised by the consolidated government from GNP to derive disposable income and 
then deduct private consumption to yield private saving.354 This third approach is 
similar to equation (5) above. But a reason why only tax revenue and not total 
government revenue should be deducted, is not clear. Particularly in Singapore, 
where a large proportion of government revenue stems from fees, which have a tax­
like nature, the third approach seems to understate public and thus overstate private 
saving for no apparent reason. Moreover, all alternative approaches are not 
consistent with national income accounts, which can lead to empirical problems if 
other variables taken from the national income accounts are used in statistical 
modelling. This paper will, therefore, employ the definition set-out in the above 
equations.
Nevertheless, a number of problems remain with Singapore's saving aggregates. 
Firstly, the government cultivates a number of off-budget and therefore also off- 
national-accounts items.355 Secondly, the government is highly involved in the 
corporate sector either through statutory boards or through Government- 
Controlled-Enterprises (GCEs), whose saving should arguably be included as public 
saving depending on one's view about their respective market-orientation. 
However, data limitations restrict both the formation of a well-based view and the *364
3 Final government consumption, following the United Nations definition (United Nations, 1995, p, xiii) 
and Singapore's national accounts reporting, is “equal to the service produced by general government 
for Its own use. Since these services are not sold, they are valued in the gross domestic product at 
their cost to the government. This cost is defined as the sum of (1) intermediate consumption, (2) 
compensation of employees, (3) consumption of fixed capital and (4) payments of indirect taxes, less 
(5) the value of own account production of fixed assets, and less (6) sales of goods and services.’  The 
deduction of (5) and (6) plus a more selected inclusion of current expenditures limited to items (1) to 
(4) create the difference between final government consumption and current expenditure. In 
Singapore’s case current government expenditure can include “Investment expenditures as well as 
financial items such as current and capital transfers, e.g. CPF topup schemes for households, 
payment to telecos for early liberalisation of the telecommunication sector." (email from Singapore’s 
Department of Statistics to Author; March 02, 2002)
364 See for example Faruquee and Husain (1995 and 1998)
368 IMF Consultation with Singapore, Public Information Notice No. 00/46, June 30, 2000, p. 3: 
“Directors also emphasized the benefits of fiscal transparency and encouraged the authorities to 
consider providing more information on the government's investment Income, and to consolidate the 
various off-budget accounts, so as to enhance fiscal analysis on a consolidated basis."
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calculation of the respective savings in the first place.356 Therefore, saving by GCEs 
and statutory boards can not be differentiated from private saving. Thirdly, no 
information on household versus corporate saving is publicly available, so that 
private saving can only be subdivided into voluntary and compulsory. The 
necessary data on household consumption patterns appear to exist in Singapore as 
part of the information raised in the country's regular household surveys conducted 
by the Department of Statistics, which however are only published in aggregate 
form. In fact, the Department of Statistics itself has used the unpublished 
disaggregated source data obtained through the household surveys for a number of 
initial investigations into the consumption and saving behaviour of Singapore 
residents published in the department's Occasional Papers series, albeit without the 
original data.357 A request by the author to obtain access to the original data 
collected in the quintannial Household Surveys has been rejected by the Department 
of Statistics due to privacy issues.358 On the other hand, it can also be argued that 
aggregate savings figures are after all the correct measure because of substitution 
effects between corporate and private saving -  at least in the long-run. See for 
example Leff (1980, p.207) who summarises the question and evidence on whether 
to look at household saving or aggregate saving.
356 Only for the years 1974-84 consolidated public accounts exist, which Include the seven major 
statutory boards within the government accounts. See Huff (1994) or Wong (1986).
357 For example Occasional Paper No. 47, April 1999: 'Income, Expenditure, Saving and Investment of 
the Household Sector1 calculates income, expenditure, saving and investment of Singaporean 
households for 1997 and 1998. 'Private Consumption Expenditure - Concepts and Trends', (Occ. 
Paper, No. 30, August 1997) estimates a private consumption expenditure time-series which according 
to the paper exist at the Department of Statistics since 1956. ‘Life Cycle Analysis of Singapore 
Households', (Occ. Paper, Nov. 1993) reclassifies 1990 census data to look at households in different 
life-cycle stages based on children per family and marital status, but does not link it to saving, instead 
some linkage with housing information, educational profiles and average monthly income exists. 
'Households in Mid-Life: Asset and Consumption Profile' (Occ. Paper, Jan. 1995) offers consumption 
patterns of selected life-cycle households based on 1992/3 household survey as well as some limited 
information about asset holdings.
368 Asher (1994, p. 34) writes about the strategic use of data by the Singapore government: "It should 
be noted that In Singapore a paternalistic approach to government is combined with regarding 
economic, social and related information as a strategic resource at the state’s disposal rather than a 
public good. (...) In the Singapore context, paternalism has meant the government defining what Is In 
the public interest, that is, it sets goals and agenda. It also formulates strategies to achieve these 
agenda. The Singapore style of paternalism derives from an organic concept of the state and those in 
disagreement with state policy are afforded little or no room to manouvre."
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A fourth and final problem lies in finding the correct figure for CPF saving, i.e. 
estimating what proportion of the withdrawals from the CPF are merely portfolio 
shifts from one type of saving into another and what proportion is actually dissaved, 
i.e. used for consumption purposes.359 The broadest measure considers all 
contributions to the CPF plus accrued interest on past balances as saving. Without 
netting consumptive withdrawals, such as for medical care, this measure overstates 
the contribution to national saving. The narrowest measure includes only the change 
in CPF balances during the year, thus regarding all withdrawals as current 
consumption, which particularly after the opening of the CPF in respect to 
withdrawals on behalf of other saving vehicles such as designated equities or 
investment funds will lead to an underestimation of voluntary private savings. The 
estimate employed in this paper will, therefore, use total contributions plus interest 
earned less withdrawals under Section 15 and less withdrawals for medical 
reasons.360 In other words compulsory CPF savings are defined as the increases in 
the members' balances plus withdrawals under the Housing and Other categories. 
The Other category includes withdrawals for equity and investment funds, which 
are simply shifts from one saving portfolio to the other. Withdrawals for the 
purposes of buying HDB housing analytically also simply constitute a shift from one 
asset category to the other, particularly considering Singapore's unique institutional 
framework with a strong cohabitation between the HDB and the CPF. However, 
based on international accounting convention investment by private individuals into 
residential housing is considered consumption for national accounts' purposes. 
Therefore, this adjustment leads to an inconsistency within the national saving 
aggregates. In order to compensate GNS needs to be adjusted for withdrawals from 
the CPF for purchases of HDB housing. Adding these withdrawals to Gross- 
National-Savings, which the national accounts would consider consumption, allows 
us to keep consistency within the individual saving sub-aggregates and to
359 For a discussion of the different methods see also Asher (1994, pp. 66-69)
360 Withdrawals under Section 15 refer to withdrawals for retirement, death, disability, and leaving 
Singapore and West Malaysia permanently. Since not all withdrawals under Section 15 will lead to 
Immediate consumption, this figure still slightly understates compulsory saving via the CPF.
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appropriately capture Singapore's pecuUarities in respect to the CPF and its close tie 
with investments in HDB housing.
On the other hand, the study also needs to keep consistency with the literature 
which so far has made no such adjustment to the official GNS-Ratio. Therefore, both 
the official GNS-ratio and the adjusted GNSratio (GNSrat2) will be econometrically 
tested alongside the voluntary (VPNS), compulsory (FNS), private (PNS) and public 
(PuNS) national saving sub-aggregates. Graph IU .3.b. shows the development of all 
these saving aggregates over time.
Graph II.4.3.b. Singapore's Saving Aggregates over time
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11.5. Econometric Models of Singapore’s National Saving
11.5.1. Statistical Methodology
The investigation has five distinct stages. Initially the order of integration of the 
respective variables needs to be established. In a second stage single explanatory 
dimension models are estimated in order to verify whether a single factor, such as 
income or demographics, can 'explain' Singapore's saving behaviour. This will also 
include an investigation into the direction of causality based on Granger causality 
tests. The third stage will replicate Agrawal's DOLS model for Gross National 
Savings. In the fourth stage multiple regression models are estimated for each 
saving sub-aggregate, namely voluntary private, forced private, private and public 
saving. Finally, the fifth stage will combine the models found for these sub­
aggregates of saving and compare the findings with the Agrawal reproduction 
models.361 Depending on the stationary quality of the dependent variable, OI_S 
models or DOLS procedures will be employed.
Testing for Stationarity
A stationary time-series fluctuates around its mean in a seemingly random manner, 
while a non-stationary series appears to have different mean values for different 
periods of time. A stationary time-series therefore shows very quickly declining 
autocorrelations, while the autocorrelations for a non-stationary time-series only fall 
very slowly as the number of lags increases. Therefore, a first way of determining
1 An investigation into net-savings is unfortunately not possible, because Singapore does not publish 
capital consumption allowances. National rather than domestic savings are used (following Agrawal, 
2001) because the former include net factor income from abroad while the latter do not. GNS Is 
therefore the more appropriate measure in this part of the thesis dealing with savings available to 
finance domestic capital formation. Contrary to Chapter One, the single-country time-series analysis is 
not affected by issues of differing concepts and differing data quality between individual nations.
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the stationary quality of a given time-series is to visually inspect its correlogram. 
Graph II.5.1. shows the correlograms of the real per-capita income time-series for 
Singapore and its corresponding growth series. The graph clearly distinguishes the 
levels of per-capita income as non-stationary while its growth variation is stationary.
Graphs II.5.1. Correlogram of Stationary and Non-Stationary Time-Series
RYPC GROWTH
Unfortunately, correlogram patterns are not always as clear cut as the two examples 
shown in graph II.5.1. Therefore, more formal ways of testing for stationarity have 
been devised, generally known as unit-root tests. The best known is the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test whose Null-Hypothesis states that the series is non- 
stationary. The ADF test uses an autoregressive process of level and first-differenced 
observations, which are regressed on the first-difference of the respective variable, 
and tests the significance of the resulting coefficients of the autoregressive terms. 
The optimal number of lags of the autoregressive process is usually determined by 
maximizing the value of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).362 If the resulting
362
Depending on how the AIC is calculated the optimal number of lags can either be determined by 
maximising or minimizing the AIC, see Pesaran and Pesaran (1997, p. 353). For the software package 
used in this case, Microfit 4.1, the AIC needs to be maximised (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997, pp.212- 
16), while Agrawal (2001) minimizes it to derive the appropriate lag structure, suggesting that the AIC 
in his case was calculated using standard errors while Microfit uses the maximum likelihood estimator.
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ADF-statistic at the optimal number of lags Ues above the critical value devised for 
ADF-tests the Null-Hypothesis can be rejected and the series is thus found to be 
stationary.363
Regrettably, the ADF-test is not a completely precise procedure either, particularly 
in small samples. Simulation studies have shown the test to lack power and thus an 
actually stationary series might not always be detected as such by the ADF test. In 
addition, it is sometimes not clear how many differenced terms should be included 
in the regression equation. Again this can be particularly detrimental in small 
samples because the inclusion of additional autoregressive terms will lower the 
degrees of freedom which in turn will widen the confidence intervals of the test and 
thus make it more difficult to reject the Null-Hypothesis. Therefore, at times 
different results are obtained depending on the number of lags tested for.
Due to the smallish size of the sample and the problems this can cause for the ADF- 
test as well as due to the test's general sensitivities, both visual inspection and ADF- 
tests were employed to determine the stationary quality of the variables in this 
study. The critical values for the ADF-test were based on a 95% confidence limit. Tire 
ADF equation was estimated with and without a trend term. Judging the 
applicability of the trend term was based on the behaviour of the series over time. 
The ADF-test was conducted with three as well as four lags and the optimal lag 
structure within each test was chosen by maximizing the Akaike Information 
Criterion. For non-stationary variables, the first-differences were also investigated to 
determine the order of integration. If the first differences are stationary, while the 
levels are not, the variable is said to be integrated of the order of one, also written as
363 The exact ADF-regression equation to test whether variable X is stationary at the optimal number of 
lags r is given by:
AX( <* a + pi * Xu + P2 * AXm + P2 * AXt-1+ ••• + Pr-1 * AXi-m +
The Null-Hypothesis of non-stationarity, i.e. the variable has a unit root, can then be defined as H0: pi 
= 0. In other words, if p, is found to be significantly different from zero the Null-Hypothesis can be 
rejected in favour of stationarity of the variable, i.e. no unit root. The equation can also include an 
additional trend term (Qi * t), depending on whether the series exhibits a time trend. For a.J™!? 
detailed description of the ADF Test see most recent econometrics textbooks, e.g. Thomas (1997,
178
Chapter Twn £agejj?9
1(1). If not even the first differences are stationary then the variable is integrated at a 
higher order.364
Dynamic OLS Procedure (DOLS)
As mentioned in the literature review above many of the past attempts at modelling 
Singapore's saving behaviour have stumbled over methodological issues, 
particularly the non-stationary quality of many of the variables, hr order to avoid 
similar pitfalls, this chapter will use the Dynamic OLS procedure developed by 
Saikonnen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993), taking its methodological inspiration
from  A g ra w a l's  (2001) investigation.
DOLS is asymptotically equivalent to the maximum likelihood estimator of Johansen 
(1988) and has been shown to perform well in finite samples (Stock and Watson, 
1993).365 By incorporating the lags and leads of the first differences of the 
independent 1(1) variables into the regression equation, this procedure gains die 
advantage that endogeneity of any of the regressors has no effect, asymptotically, on 
the robustness of the estimates and that it allows for direct estimation of a mixture of 
1(1) and 1(0) variables. Moreover, the DOLS estimators have the advantage of being 
asymptotically normally distributed. Thus, statistical inference on the parameters of 
the cointegration vector is possible, although some caution needs to be exercised in 
small samples as ours.
The equation resulting from the DOLS procedure is said to be cointegrating if the 
residuals of the DOLS regression are stationary. By way of statistical definition, a set 
of n difference stationary variables is said to be cointegrated if there exists at least 
one linear combination - i.e. cointegrating vector - of these variables which is itself
pp.405-409) or the original papers by D.A. Dickey and W.F. Fuller, e g. Dickey and Fuller (1979 or 
1981).
364 The statistical software package used for the ADF-tests was Microfit version 4.1.
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stationary, defining their long-run equilibrium relationship(s). Intuitively, 
cointegrated variables may drift apart temporarily, but must converge 
systematically over time.365 66
Unfortunately, the DOLS procedure has a number of disadvantages of its own. 
Firstly and foremost, due to its dynamic components the DOLS regression has an 
almost innate tendency for multi-collinearity, particularly if variables are included 
which do not have a high volatility, i.e. tend to change only slowly over time. The 
advantage of the DOLS procedure to be able to make statistical inferences on die 
parameters might be impaired by the lacking accuracy of the coefficients because of 
potential multi-collinearity within the cointegrating vector. Secondly, the high 
number of independent variables leads to a reduction of the degrees-of-freedom, 
which makes the construction of an inclusive yet still statistically powerful 
regression system difficult in medium and small sized samples.
Additive OLS Procedure
In order to counter the problems of the DOLS procedure and other cointegrating 
methods, the thesis will take advantage of the fact that in Singapore's case the main 
saving sub-aggregates are stationary and that gross-national saving is nothing but 
the sum of these sub-aggregates. Therefore, OLS-regression results describing the 
behavioural traits underlying the saving sub-aggregates can be added together to 
derive an additive OLS model for GNS based on the accounting identities presented 
above in section II.4.3. The results from this additive procedure will be contrasted 
with the reproductions of Agrawal's (2001) DOLS approach.
365 See Agrawal (2001, p. 505) for an explanation of the methodology as applied to saving behaviour.
366 For the development of cointegration techniques see the original articles of Engle and Granger 
(1987), Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Johansen (1995). A recent comprehensive treatment of the 
methodology is presented by Greene (1997). For a discussion of cointegration methodology as applied 
to long-run savings see Faruquee and Husain (1998, pp. 204-205).
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The additive procedure is likely to be much more informative in revealing the 
underlying processes behind saving in Singapore, because in essence nobody saves 
on a gross-national basis and GNS is nothing but an artificial compound of separate 
and potentially quite different saving patterns. On the other hand, due to the 
stationary nature of these saving sub-aggregates econometrical considerations only 
allow for the inclusion of stationary explanatory factors. This leads to the use of 
largely first-differenced variables and might therefore not appropriately capture the 
influence of level effects. Statistically, the use of more level variables although not 
possible from a methodological stand-point could result in yet other conclusions. 
However, the pre-dominance of transitory factors in the theory of saving behaviour 
actually asks for the inclusion of dynamic rather than level effects.
Explanatory Dimensions
Based on the theories which try to explain saving behaviour there are essentially 
four main explanatory dimensions: income, demographics, the quality of the 
financial system and the influence exercised by the government over the economy's 
saving.
Income can be potentially important through level but particularly through 
transitory effects, namely growth and deviations from an assumed income trend, A 
variety of income series is tested, including real vs. nominal series and wages vs. 
disposable income vs. per-capita GNP series.367 The demographic dimension is
M7 A General Note on modelling transitory income: When modelling transitory income, intuitively one 
could use the residuals of the income variable's own AR-process, e.g. regress last three lags of per- 
capita income on current per-capita income. However, this process is not admissible because AR 
processes of non-stationary variables lead to spurious regression results. Furthermore, the coefficients 
would be ex-post although the consumer makes his decision ex-ante. The coefficient is ex-post 
because the regression algorithm uses the whole time period as a basis to find these coefficients, in 
other words the weights for the respective lags is based on the experience of the whole period and not 
only the past years. This is unrealistic. Therefore, Gupta (1987), for example, defines Transitory 
Income as the deviation of actual income from a three-year moving average. We estimate transitory 
income through first differences of the income measures and through a separate income series, which 
uses the average of the last three years' growth rates to predict the ex-ante expected income (See 
Data Appendix).
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largely captured by the ratio of the active labour force as a percent of total 
population, alternatively by a dependency ratio which compares those within to 
those outside of working age.368 369Theoretically, life-expectancy and thus length of 
retirement should matter as well. However, since life-expectancy changes only very 
slowly relative to changes in saving ratios, econometric investigations are not likely 
to pick up any effect from changes in life-expectancy other than those already 
incorporated into the labour force ratio.38’ The quality of financial institutions, in the 
literature often referred to as the degree of financial deepening, is best captured by 
the degree of borrowing constraints inherent in the system. In turn borrowing 
constraints are empirically captured through estimates of ihe amount of credit 
available to the economy and particularly to the private sector as a percent of total 
GNP.370 371*Beyond domestic budget constraints, the negative of the current account 
balance as a percent of GNP is also used to capture potential foreign borrowing 
constraints, following a large part of the relevant literature.373 Interest rates are also 
tested for. However, due to tire controversial theoretical and weak statistical support 
in past investigations as well as the fact that they are only available from 1968 
onwards when the MAS was founded, their potential effect is only investigated in 
the sensitivity analysis. The government's control over saving behaviour is captured 
by the sum of the employee's and employer's CPF contribution rates and 
alternatively by an estimate of the effective contribution rate, i.e. total contributions
“ * Generally the labour force ratio is the preferable vanable because it is not really the age that 
matters for the saving decision but the chance to earn an income out of which to consume or save. 
This is true Darticularlv for Singapore, since the country has no social security system for the 
unemployed. M ore ove rJabour force statistics are available very regularly, while dependency burdens
are often based on interpolations between separate census years.
369 Pnr -akA the Dotential effect of life-expectancy is tested within the sensitivity
anafyses0?  « 2  respectiveresults Furthermore, it is important to note that all studies (this one 
included! fuffe? fram a maior drawback when it comes to evaluating demographic effects. Annual 
p o p u f f i S  ¡re  o n l y ^ S  between decennial censuses - possibly somewhat supported
by annual iurJIvs This interpolation procedure will create a strong time-trend and thus make any 
a L u a i in te rp re S n s  of the data as needed for regressions with annual observations somewhat
questionable, although no better alternative exists. . . . .  . ..
370 At times monev supply is used instead. However, since Singapore publishes statistics on domestic
. m o Hi rort  and ootentiallv revealing vanab e is used here. Moreover, money
3 P are al so consider* substitutes for statistics on savm9 ratios 
b y p a i t i S ^  money supply as an explanatory variable would then simply
have saving aggregates on both sides of the regression equations.
371 See section I.6. for a critical assessment of current account balances as a measure for foreign
borrowing constraints.
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made over total remuneration.372 Given the government's predominant role in 
Singapore the variables describing domestic borrowing constraints should also be 
considered largely government driven.373
The government's influence and the very likely resulting crowding-out effects of its 
own saving, i.e. the question of Ricardian Equivalence, also need to be explicitly 
modelled and thus tested for. This can be achieved by including the public saving 
ratio (PuNS) in the regression models describing private national saving (PNS) or 
respectively voluntary private national saving (VPNS). However, it is important to 
test for this effect in a separate regression step. The first step needs to build the 
model describing private saving or respectively voluntary private saving behaviour. 
Only once an acceptable model has been built, should the public saving ratio be 
added to see whether it can significantly affect the model. Otherwise, the danger 
exists that the regression equation takes its significance not from its power to model 
saving behaviour but from the way saving aggregates are calculated. In other words, 
if for example the public saving ratio is included from the outset, the remaining 
explanatory variables might model GNS rather than PNS, because PNS is derived at 
by deducting PuNS from GNS. In this case, a negative coefficient for the public 
saving ratio and thus a confirmation for -  a very likely almost complete degree of -  
crowding-out is pre-programmed in the regression system. This result is however 
misleading because all the regression truly shows is that GNS less PuNS does 
indeed yield PNS. In order to avoid this potential pitfall, a regression system needs 
to have been built which clearly models PNS or respectively VPNS before it is tested
for R icard ian  E q u ivalen ce effects.
A similar problem applies to the investigation of the likely crowding-out effect of the 
CPF on voluntary private saving, since the CPFrate is highly correlated with FNS.
2 Since the CPF might very likely also affect saving behaviour through lagged influences, the lag of 
the CPF-rate is also included. Moreover, since arguably the government can anticipate its own future 
changes to the CPF contribution rate, PuNS models will also include the lead of the CPF-rate.
373 For an exact definition of the individual variables and a description of sources see the Data
Appendix.
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However, on the other hand, the exclusion of a CPF variable would mean that a 
major decision factor for the private saving function is not modelled. While the 
behavioural effects of public saving on private saving are less direct, CPF saving 
must be considered a main direct component of the private saving decision. Thus, 
the CPFrate will be included immediately in the regression system. However, the 
sensitivity analysis will re-estimate the function without the CPF and then add the 
CPFrate in a separate step to see whether complete models might have been over­
identified.
Yet another statistical problem related to many of the variables, including tire 
CPFrate, is their non-stationary quality while VPNS, PNS and PuNS require 
stationary regression models. Therefore, the non-stationary variables can only be 
included in first-difference format, which carries a somewhat different analytical 
value than level variables,374
The Model Building Process and a Note on Data-Mining
In an initial stage, single explanatory models are estimated in order to investigate 
whether a single factor has by itself been driving saving behaviour. The second stage 
will include variables describing all four main explanatory dimensions. As argued 
above for different reasons life-expectancy, real interest-rates and Ricardian- 
Equivalence will not be tested until the sensitivity analysis. The core stationary 
model will include one of seven transitory income measures, growth of real per- 
capita income, first-difference of growth, and the first differences of the dependency
One explanatory dimension, macro-economic stability, is not explicitly tested for because the power 
of the variable usually used to model it, the rate of inflation, is questionable, particularly in single 
country time-series studies. If inflation falls from say 6% to 3% from one year to the other, does this 
really mean that macro-economic stability has doubled? In a cross-country study the inclusion might 
make more sense, because Indeed it can be argued that a country with 3 percent inflation appears 
macro-economically more stable than a country with say 12 percent inflation. Possibly time-series 
studies which work with countries that experienced hyperinflation could benefit from the inclusion of 
the inflation rate, particularly If saving behaviour before, during and after the period of hypennflation is 
compared. However, overall Singapore has been very stable over the whole period since Its
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ratio, the labour-force ratio, the negative of the current account balance, the domestic 
credit ratio, the private credit ratio, the share of private credit as part of total 
domestic cred it, a s  w ell a s  the CPF contribution rate and the lagged CPF 
contribution rate. Based on joint hypothesis F-tests the initial model will be reduced 
hi a general-to-specific manner to only significant variables on a 90% confidence 
level. The process is repeated for each of the seven income measures since no clear 
theoretically preferable income variable exists and the outcome of tire model 
building process is likely to be sensitive to the respective income measure's variance.
The process will by design result in a number of statistical models. Which of these 
models to chose as the most appropriate is probably also the most subjective step in 
the whole model-building process. Therefore, all models which offer decent 
diagnostics, i.e. no serial correlation of the residuals, good adjusted r-squared, and 
low multi-collinearity, are presented in the results.^ Tire choice between these 
diagnostically acceptable models possibly based on tire notion of parsimony or the 
conformity of its parameters with theory is open to argument. Even if the process 
should not result in a 'pareto-optimal' model, the differences within tire models can 
be very informative. Moreover, even if the significance of individual variables 
behaves differently depending on the income variable or tire respective saving sub- 
aggregate used as the dependent variable the overall analytical result might not be 
too different. From this angle, the wide research design also incorporates many 
aspects from the start which would necessarily have to be investigated in a 
sensitivity analysis if the initial regression stages were less inclusive.
independence, with possibly less anticipated stability at the beginning of the period. Anticipated 
macro-economic stability, however, is hardly captured in a statistical time-series.
376 Technically the problem of serial correlation of the residuals could have been potentially resolved 
through the use of the Cochrane-Orcutt method. The problem of serial correlation of the residuals is 
due to a misspecification of the model, which in turn can be either due to a lacking lag structure or 
missing or wrong independent variables. The former problem can be resolved through the Cochrane- 
Orcutt method, which is effectively an (iterative) procedure of introducing a specialised lag-structure 
into a previously static model. However, the purely mathematical tool of the Cochrane-Orchutt method 
was not applied as long as it could be shown that a model exists with no serial correlation of the 
residuals and a similar set of variables. In that circumstance, it is not likely that the low Durbin-Watson 
statistic in the related model was due to a missing lag structure, instead this points to a 
misspecification of the set of explanatory variables. Only if such a model does not exist and there is a 
good argument for the inclusion of lags should the Cochrane-Orcutt algorithm be applied to the
regression equation.
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Every effort which intends to determine statistically which factors were influential 
in a given circumstance will include some degree of data-mming, i.e. the sorting of 
variables into those which prove statistically significant and those which do not. 
This sorting process can affect the significance levels of the resulting regression 
equations. In general, the more removal steps the general-to-specific process 
requires to get to the final model, the lower the 'true' significance.37* Therefore, the 
number of regressors in the initial models was kept to a minimum, based on those 
factors most regularly put forward by theory. Altogether, due to the at times 
contradictory state of the literature a certain amount of 'data-mining' is not fully 
preventable.
Granger Causality
Contrary to tire concept's everyday use, in econometrics causality refers rather to the 
ability to predict than to cause. A variable is said to granger-cause another variable 
if its past and present observations can improve the forecast of the other variable.* 377 
As Engle and Granger (1987) have shown if two or more variables cointegrate there 
necessarily exists causality in at least one direction. It is therefore opportune to 
investigate links of causality here since at least for the non-stationary saving 
aggregates the DOES methodology will already have determined cointegration 
relationships. To do so a standard vector error correction procedure (VECM) for 
pairs of non-stationary or respectively a vector autoregression procedure (VAR) for 
pairs of stationary variables is employed.
In case of the VECM, this involves finding a cointegration relationship between a 
pair of 1(1) variables, lets call the dependent variable X and the independent Y, and 
inserting tire residuals derived from this cointegration relationship into an error
379 See Thomas (1997) pp. 350-354 for a general description of the effects of data-mining on the 
significance levels and pp. 360-361 on the effects particular to a general-to-specific approach.
377 See Granger (1969)
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correction model. The ECM itself is nothing else than a 'second stage' OLS 
regression with the first difference of variable X as the dependent variable and using 
as independent variables n number of lags of the first differences of both variables X 
and Y as well as the residuals from the 'first-stage' cointegration relationship ('the 
error-correction term'). The optimal number of lags n is determined by maximizing 
the Akaike Information Criterion.378 Using an F-test on the coefficients of the lagged 
first differences of variable Y will determine whether they are significantly different 
from zero. If they are, they indeed improve the forecast of X and therefore granger 
causality running from Y to X is established. Following Agrawal (2001) the 'first- 
stage' cointegration relationship is established by static OLS regression between X 
and Y and an ADF-test on the residuals, whose optimal lag structure is chosen by 
maximizing the Akaike Information Criterion. The VAR procedure follows the same 
principle but does not require first differences or the use of residuals from a 'first- 
stage' cointegration relationship.379 The causality tests are conducted in both 
directions, i.e. switching Y to become the dependent and X the independent 
variable, in  order to ascertain whether indeed causality is uni-directional.
On a cautionary note it must be said that time series which reflect forward-looking 
behavior are often found to be excellent predictors of economic time series like 
income or inflation for example. This clearly does not mean that these series cause 
income or inflation to move up or down. Instead, the values of these series reflect 
the market's best information as to where GNP or inflation might be headed. 
Granger-causality tests for such series may be useful for assessing the efficient 
markets view or investigating whether markets are concerned with or are able to 
forecast GNP or inflation, but should not be used to infer a direction of causality.380 
Thus, if income is shown to granger-cause savings then this should be interpreted as
378 Alternatively the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) can be used. The SBC is likely to chose a 
lower ope r and thus allow for more degrees of freedom in the subsequent ECM regression. If the SBC
resulted in a different lag structure, both models are reported.
378 For a more formal description of Granger causality tests see any recent advanced econometrics 
textbook, e.g. Thomas (1997, pp. 461-463) or the original paper by Engle and Granger (1987). For a
methodological explanation of the application of Granger causality tests to Investigations of saving
behaviour see Agrawal (2001).
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a reflection of consumer assumptions underlying future saving decisions. In other 
words, the existence of granger causality will show that consumers anticipate certain 
income levels and base their saving decision on that. In turn, the existence of 
granger causality will confirm rather the forward-looking behaviour predicted by 
the life-cycle and permanent-income hypotheses than show that income causes 
savings.381
Périodisation
The period of observation is restricted to 1965-97 in order to avoid the variance 
introduced by the Asian crisis including the resulting rebound from affecting the 
statistical models for the whole period. Since the study is concerned with 
Singapore's development history and its saving behaviour which financed the 
substantial amounts of capital accumulation underlying the economic development, 
the danger that the statistical OLS or DOLS algorithms may be unduly driven by the 
strong variance of a few years at the very end of this process needs to be avoided. In 
theory, the period should potentially also be sub-divided into two subsections, 
namely pre and post 1986's peculiar recession, which only Singapore experienced. 
The recession can be seen as somewhat of a watershed for Singapore's policies, see 
the discussions on CPF contribution rates, retirement age or even fertility policies 
which all took place around this time some of them directly initiated by the 
recession. However, splitting the period leads to a major statistical problem through 
a reduction of the degrees of freedom, which particularly affects the DOLS 
procedure due to its necessarily high number of explanatory components.382
360 Hamilton (1994, pp. 307-308)
381 This criticism on the true content of granger-causality can be intuitively summarised as the 
argument that Christmas Cards do not cause Christmas. Christmas Cards can be used as a tool to 
forecast Christmas because they are a manifestation of the consumers' forward looking behaviour but 
can not be seen as the cause for the festive season.
382 See for example Thomas (1993, pp. 111-112) on the effects of low degrees of freedom on the 
robustness of the OLS procedure. While this study does still offer a relatively high level of degrees of 
freedom compared to the earlier literature, it must nevertheless be noted that particularly for equations 
with a large number of independent variables the resulting low degrees of freedom can have a
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11.5.2. Summary Results
The reservations already mentioned in the methodological section about the DOLS 
procedure and in general about an undifferentiated investigation of Gross-Nadonal- 
Saving are confirmed in the findings. The sub-aggregates of national saving behave 
quite differently, which is lost in Agrawal's (2001) exercise and other studies of 
Singapore's GNS-ratio. The effect of the CPF tends to be over-estimated if only GNS 
is analysed. Studies of the top non-stationary aggregate are not able to adequately 
model behaviour underlying the individual stationary sub-aggregates. In an 
econometric analysis, the non-stationary GNS series appears to be largely driven by 
the non-stationary compulsory saving series.
In fact, contrary to parts of the past literature, all four main explanatory dimensions 
proposed by theory can be shown to have had a significant impact on the country s 
savings. Income, particularly its dynamic, i.e. transitory, component is the single 
strongest and statistically most robust factor, followed by the CPF. While the 
dynamic effects of changes to the C PFs contribution rate were fully compensated by 
their negative impact on voluntary and public savings, in the long-term compulsory 
saving increased by more than these crowding out effects, leaving a positive net 
contribution to the country's savings. This leaves the conclusion that these positive 
net-effect must be due to long-term developments in the country's wages, in the 
fund's coverage and the monthly contribution ceiling since these are the only other 
factors influencing CPF saving beyond the contribution rate. Falling dependency is 
shown to have had opposite effects, positively adding to voluntary savings 
particularly during the early years but reducing public savings for the whole period. 
The lowering of borrowing constraints over time has led to more consumption and 
thus lower savings among the private sector, which was however compensated by a
negative effect on the standard errors of the OLS estimators and the relevant critica * 
student's t-distribution. In response, it was always tried to maximise the degrees of freedom given the 
analytical restrictions and the requirements put forward by theory. Moreover, the study will only report 
adjusted r-squareds, which take account of the available degrees of freedom in the respective 
regression equation, see Maddala (2001, pp. 164-168).
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positive impact on public savings. Full Ricardian Equivalence has not been present, 
so that public saving has had a positive net effect on the country's gross national
savings.
Since voluntary savings was the driving force behind the early saving transition and 
voluntary saving in the early years can be shown to having been largely driven by 
the rising labour force ratio, the favourable demographic environment must be 
considered central to Singapore's saving 'take-off, supporting the favourable initial 
situation hypothesis proposed in the first chapter. Moreover, the fact that the 
positive effect of the CPF was largely due to positive net-contributions to the fund, 
shows how important this demographic change was even outside of voluntary 
savings. Singapore, therefore, must be considered to have used the chance to exploit 
this demographic dividend very well, by both kickstarting a changed voluntary 
saving pattern and by using the demographic window for the creation of a CPF 
'hump-saving'. The government control behind the saving success of the CPF must 
thus be seen to have exploited the country’s demographic transformation very well.
Overall, the main saving theories are supported as they apply and deal with 
voluntary savings. They do not appear to be able to adequately deal with behaviour 
in other saving aggregates, which is not surprising since their object of interest is 
personal savings. Again, top aggregate investigations therefore tend to result in
contradictory conclusions.
These findings are robust to a variety of other influences and changes to the 
statistical procedure, even though not every model is able to survive the sensitivity 
checks fully intact. The strongest source of sensitivity comes from the choice of 
income variable. Explained in an intuitive way: the strong income factor basically 
leaves residual variance to the other potential but statistically weaker explanatory 
variables, which depending on which income factor has been used is better 
modelled by one variable or the other. Therefore, a number of models are possible. 
For a few models it can be argued that they are superior due to better diagnostics,
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e.g. higher R-squareds, better Durbin-Watson statistics, less multi-collinearity, or 
due to parsimony or consistency with theory. But no clear pareto-optimal and thus 
fully robust model could be found.
While the lacking absolute robustness means that we can not make exact claims 
about the individual effects, we can nevertheless make claims about reasonable 
ranges within which the respective effects seem to have operated. Table II.5.2. 
summarises the main elasticity ranges. However, it must be noted that instead of a 
single variable one really needs to consider the whole explanatory dimension. 
Therefore, the detailed discussion of the individual regression results below will use 
an impact analysis which combines the individual variables into the four main 
explanatory dimensions.
Table II.5.2. Selected Elasticity Ranges
VPNS Pu n s
Transitory
Income
A  one dollar rise from  the preceding 
year in average wages is estimated 
to have added in average between 5 
and 10 basis points to the VPNS-rate
A  one dollar rise from the preceding 
year in real per-capita income is 
estimated to have added in average 
between 0.2 and 0.4 basis points to 
thePuNS-rate
CPF Crowding 
out
An increase from the preceding year 
in the CPF contribution rate by one 
percentage point is estimated to have 
lowered VPNS by between 0.5 and 
2.7 percentage points
An increase from the preceding year 
in the CPF contribution rate by one 
percentage point is estimated to have 
lowered PuNS by between 0.5 and 
0.8 percentage points
Demographics A  one percent increase from the 
preceding year in the labour-ratio is 
estimated to have added in average 
between 1.0 and 2.6 percentage 
points to the VPNS-rate
A  one percent fall from the preceding 
year in the dependency rate is 
estimated to have in average lowered 
the PuNS-rate by between 1.5 and 
2.3 percentage points
Ricardian
Equivalence
An increase from the preceding year 
in the Public Saving Rate by one 
percentage point is estimated to have 
lowered the VPNS-rate by 25 basis 
points
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11.5.3. Order of Integration
Table II.5.3. offers the results of the visual inspection of the variables correlograms, 
as well as the ADF-test statistics for the respective variable's levels and first- 
differences. The ADF-test used a maximum number of three lags and determined 
the optimal lag structure by maximizing the Akaike Information Criterion. The data- 
appendix offers the additional results for ADF-tests conducted with four lags.
Of the variables shared with Agrawal (2001) the tests result in different 
classifications for two out of five variables. The Current Account Balance and the 
Dependency Rate, which he finds to be stationary, are both non-stationary in our 
sample.383 Additionally, if the ADF test of RYPC was conducted on four lags, the 
first differences would not be found stationary unless we use the Schwarz-Baysian
Criterion instead of the AIC.
However, the most intriguing result of the exercise is the different behaviour of the 
saving aggregates. Private and public saving ratios are found to be stationary, while 
the compulsory saving ratio is not. Gross National Savings, in both varieties, is also 
found non-stationary, although its private and public saving components are clearly 
stationary, only the forced saving ratio is not. This would indicate that statistically 
CPF saving has been driving gross national saving, unless the other two sub­
aggregates, PuNS and VPNS, by chance add-up together to jointly form a non- 
stationary drift. The other variables behave as expected. Income levels, both nominal 
and real, are non-stationary, while growth and transitory income (i.e. AvrGro and 
the first differences of the income levels) are stationary. All demographic, CPF and 
borrowing constraint variables are also integrated of the order of one, while the real 
interest rate is found to be stationary.
383 Our definition of Dependency also includes those aged 65 and above, while Agrawal (2001) uses 
only young dependency, I.e. those younger than 15 years. The dependency variable is nevertheless 
still largely driven by young dependency and even by itself young dependency would be clearly non-
stationary in our sample.
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Table II.5.3. Results of Stationarity Tests
Visual
Inspectior
ADF
Statistic
ADF 
S tatistic 
F irs t Diff.
Order o f 
Integration
GNSrat 11 -2.73 T -5.36 * 11
c GNSrat2 11 -2.35 T -5.34 * 11
■oc Pu NSrat 11 (?) -5.22 * T -5.67 * 100)aa> PNSrat I1 (? ) -3.93 * T -5.70 * 10
Q FNSrat 11 -1.73 -4.53* 11
VPNSrat IK ? ) -5.34 * T -4.93* I0
RYPC 11 -0.13 T -5.28 * T 11
NWage 11 1.50 T -6.81 * T 11
RWage 11 1.54 T -5.01 * T 11
a>
c YPC 11 -0.93 T -4.08 * T 11
o
o DispY 11 0.13 T -5.38 *T 11c
DispYCPF 11 1.07 T -9.13 *T 11
Growth I0 -5.73 * -5.31 * 10
NWGro I1 (? ) -3.36 * -5.94 * 10
AvrGro I0 -6.91 * -8 .65* 10
d>o LabRat 11 -2.01 T -4.00* 11
Ea> Dep I 2 (?) -1.59 T -4.20 * T 11
Q Life I 1 -2.30 T -4.42 * 11
CO CABal I 1 -2.5 T -5.40 * 11
£ DoCrRat I 1 -1.54 T -5.79 * M
•e
C  "
priDoRat I 1 -1.78 T -6.01 * 11
s ^riCrRat 1 1 -1.48 T -5.43* 11
I0 -3.48 * -4.92 * I0
f r (iPFra t 11 -0.88 T -4 .23* 11
«  ciP Feff 11 -0.09 T -3.52* 11
GNSrat is the officially reported Gross-National-Saving Ratio. 
GNSrat2 refers to the GNSratio after adjustment of CPF 
withdrawals for housing purchases. All variables refer to 1965-97, 
except for the real interest rate R, which is only available from 1968 
onwards. For a description of all variables and their sources, as 
well as the sensitivities of the ADF test for individual series see the 
Data Appendix.
* denotes that the null hypothesis of a unit root, i.e. of non- 
stationarity, can be rejected at a 95% critical value. In other words,
* denotes that the variable has been found to be stationary.
T denotes that a Dickey-Fuller regression with a time trend was 
used in the ADF-test.
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11.5.4. Reproduction of Agrawal (2001) Models of Gross National Saving
The statistical outcomes of the reproduction of Agrawal's (2001) model for Gross 
National Savings are shown in the table II.5.4. below. The first column gives 
Agrawal's (2001) own results. GNSa, GNSb and GNSrat2 refer to reproductions of 
his approach with our data. GNSa assumes that the current account balance is 
stationary, notwithstanding our own findings. GNSrat2 uses the adjusted GNS 
series. The names of first differenced variables start with a capital D, while leads are 
denoted by a capital L in front of the name and lags by a capital L at the end of the 
variable's name.
The impact column shows how much changes in the respective factors changed the 
saving ratio, based on the GNSb model. The impact is measured in percent of GNP. 
It is calculated by multiplying the difference of the variable's observations between 
1968 and 1997 with the econometrically determined coefficient. This way the impact 
analysis is able to determine how much of the change from the starting position can 
be attributed to each explanatory dimension.384 A comparison of these impact 
figures with Agrawal's (2001) regression results is unfortunately not possible, 
because a) this study is using different sources for its variables and b) it is not clear 
from Agrawal's (2001) article exactly how the different variables are denominated, 
i.e. are percentages given before or after the decimal point (e.g. 30.0 or 0.30), and 
which deflator he used for his real per-capita income and real interest rate series. In 
his own calculations, without giving details, Agrawal mentions that increases in real 
per-capita income and CPF contribution rates resulted in an increase of Singapore's 
savings by respectively nearly 8% and 6% of GNP between 1966 and 1992. In 
general, it must be noted however, that these impact figures can substantially 
change depending on which years are being compared. Therefore, graphs II.5.4. a-b 
show the development of the impact over time, by comparing each year's respective 
observation with the base year 1968,
384 For example, the Increase in real per-capita income in the GNSb model between 1968 and 1997 
has added 13.88% to the GNSratio according to the regression results. The dynamic effect of real per- 
capita income In 1997 has only added 1.89%. Overall the GNSratio has risen by 34.6% between 1968, 
when It stood at 19.66%, and 1999, when it reached 54.25%.
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Table II.5.4. Agrawal's Model reproduced
Coefficients Impact 1968 v s .1997
Agrawal GNSa GNSb GNSrat2 GNSb
Constant 0.089*’ 10.519** 11.446 ** 10.274**
RYPC 0.48E-5** 4.373E-4 ** 4.914E-4 ** 4.236E-4 ** 13.88
CABal -0.171** -0.216 ** -0.223 ** -0.231 ** 6.07
CPFrat 0.59E-2** 0.509 ** 0.477 ** 0.628 ** 13.83
R 0.57E-3 0.158* 0.232 ** 0.243 * -0.43
dr ypc - 0.73E-5* 7.985E-4 1.021E-3 9.607E-4
ld r y p c - 0.33E-05 1.052E-4 3.572E-4 -5.59E-5 1.89
d r y p c l - 0.73E-05 -1.90E-5 -6.57E-4 3.467E-4
DCABal not incl. not incl. 1.887E-2 3.569E-2
LDCABal not incl. not incl. -4.58E-2 -2.10E-2 0.32
DCABalL not incl. not incl. -9.32E-2 * -5.57E-2
DCPFrat -0.11E-2 -1.09E-2 9.198E-2 -0.159
LDCPFrat 0.19E-2* 0.384 ** 0.333 ** 0.227 -0.76
DCPFratL 0.41 E-4 9.886E-2 0.148 -0.155
Adj. R2 0.989 0.992 0.994 0.992
D/W 2.03 1.949 1.910 1.491
Cond. Index n/a 22.256 35.975 35.975
Residuals 
ADF Statistic
Stationary
-4.09
Stationary
-3.96
Stationary
-4.33
Stationary
-3.80
Notes:
GNSa assumes that CABal is stationary as it was in Agrawal’s sample. By contrast, GNSb 
considers CABal to be non-stationary as our sample would indicate. GNSrat2 assumes 
CABal to be non-stationary and uses the adjusted GNS-series.
** denotes significance at 1% level 
* denotes significance at 5% level
Agrawal's model refers to 1966-92, while GNSa, GNSb and GNSrat2 cover 1968-97.
Cond. Index stands for Condition Index, a measure of multi-collinearity.
For sources and descriptions of variables see Data Appendix.
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Graphs II.5.4. a- b: Impact Over Time (based on GNSb model)
Statistically, on the one hand, the adjusted r-squareds are consistently high, the 
Durbin-Watson statistics indicate no serial correlation of the residuals except 
possibly for the GNSrat2 model and all equations cointegrate. The significance levels 
of the individual variables are very similar, with the exception of the real interest 
rate which is found to be significant in our sample contrary to Agrawal's model. On 
the other hand, the inclusion of the dynamic components for the current account 
balance which becomes necessary due to its non-stationary quality increases the
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multi-collmearity in the equation beyond the generally accepted threshold of 30 for 
the condition index, which casts some doubt over the accuracy of the coefficients.385
If we disregard the possibly distorting effect of multi-collinearity for the time being, 
it becomes clear that the CPF contribution rate was the predominant force behind 
the rising saving rates in Singapore. Therefore, based on these models the strong 
transition from low to high gross-national savings must be predominantly attributed 
to the transformation of the CPF.386 The availability of foreign savings as measured 
through the negative current account balance affected Singapore s savings 
negatively. In the first half of the period, when Singapore had a negative current 
account balance and was thus dependent on foreign credit, national savings were 
negatively affected. The opposite is the case in the latter half of the period when 
Singapore experienced a large current account surplus.387 Real interest rates are 
shown to have a positive impact on savings. However, as the impact analysis shows, 
generally falling real interest rates since 1968 have affected Singapore's savings 
transition negatively.
However, unfortunately these results can not be considered robust yet. As 
mentioned already the multi-collinearity problem casts doubt over the accuracy of 
the parameters. But moreover, potential influences of still missing factors, such as 
demographics or domestic borrowing constraints, have not yet been determined. 
Additionally, individual sub-aggregates of savings may have been affected by other 
determinants. Gross National Savings is after all just an artificial sum of the savings 
behaviour of very different groups. Particularly in Singapore, the danger exists that
« w . >4 aaq a Qf\\ Thf» correlation between RYPC and CABsl in our sample is even
stronger 90S than S J K i n S E S S  S ip  and RYPC (r « 0.799), which Agrawal raters to 
Steranees ta js tlcs to r CABal and RYPC are as low as 0.1 and fall close to 
aera on9ce the d |S n !te  ^mponents of CABal are also Included. The correlation between the CPF 
contribution rate and RYPC is also quite high at 0.7.
386 Agrawal's interpretation of his own findings argues that increases in RYPC had the largest impact
with 8%, more than CPF with 6%. (Agrawal. 2001. pp.507-8) ■.
387 -  .. ... . ____ „ „ i . , : . .  hohAtnen the Der-caoita income senes and the current account
b a i i s s . " s t a r
borrowing constraints. As already argued in section I.6. it rather appears that the current account 
balance affects savings through its income effect.
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any econometric investigation of Gross National Savings will be largely driven by 
the substantial degree of forced savings, as the results from the ADF tests already 
suggested. While this might not be a wrong conclusion per se, it nevertheless 
prevents us from noticing distinct and potentially very different developments in 
other saving sub-aggregates, which are just as important for understanding 
Singapore's unique savings transition.
11-5.5. Gross Voluntary Private Saving
Following the general-to-specific removal process based on joint hypothesis F-tests 
described in the methodological section, all main influences were tested using 
different income measures in separate regression algorithms. Not all regressions 
resulted in significant, i.e. diagnostically acceptable, models. Table II.5.5.a. shows 
the results of those models, which are able to offer good adjusted R-squareds, low 
condition indices and decent Durbin-Watson statistics.
The impact analysis shows that the Voluntary Private Saving Ratio was largely 
driven by transitory income, particularly from the mid-1970s on. This applies for all 
models. There are only slight differences in the timing aspects. Model D, which only 
refers to the 1965-86 period, shows demographics to be the strongest influence for 
the early years of the country's saving transition. Regression equations, which 
model the whole period up to 1997, are not able to pick up this slight but very 
important difference. Graphs II.5.5.a-d give a visual inspection of the respective 
explanatory dimensions' impact on changes in the country's voluntary saving 
pattern over time.
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Table II.5.5.a. Voluntary Private Savings388
Model A 
1965-97
Model B 
1965-97
Model C 
1965-97
Model D 
1965-86
Impact
1965-97
Impact
1965-86
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Model A Model D
_  Constant 5.618 4.295 7.850 8.143 12.422 10.086 7.873 8.077
Growth 0.371 2.109 not incl. Not sip. (1.579) not sip. (1.577)
12.84 3.07
DGrowth -0.573 -4.136 -0.725 -3.579 -0.611 -4.176 -0.318 -1.851
DNWaqe 7.677E-2 9.041 7.719E-02 8.087 not incl. 0.116 6.288
_  DR Waqe not incl. not incl. 5.019E-02 3.456 not incl.
___AvrGro not incl. 2.878E-03 2.328 not incl. not incl.
DDep not siq. (0.293) not incl. 1.785 3.402 not siq. (0.667) 1.41 0.34_ DLabrat 0.932 1.876 1.211 2.103 2.456 4.333 1.822 3.890
DCABal -0.216 -2.840 not incl. -0.283 -3.533 -0.276 -3.419
0.72 0.32
__DDocRat not sip. (-1.223) -0.171 -1.733 -0.151 -2.185 not sip. -3.649
_DPrDoRat not siq. i b> CD o -4.48E-02 -1.716 Not sig. (-0.955) not sip. (-1.766)
_DPriCrRat not siq. (0.815) not incl. Not sig. (0.157) 0.582 2.898
DCPF not siq. (0.567) not sig. (0.499) 0.574 2.797 not siq. (-0.468)
0.00 -4.02DCPFL -0.833 -4.720 -0.557 -3.005 -0.910 -4.269 -2,009 -4.755
N01< 0.811 0.791 0.789 0.785
D-W 1.691 1.741 2.277 2.249
C-l 7.755 5.472 7.005 6.060
Notes: ..
T ° R a E 5 e ^  been remoVed from the equation basedgiven is the one obtained by the variable in its last stage of
the general-to-specific removal process.
Voluntary savings appears to have behaved largely as predicted by the main saving 
theories. Transitory income has had a (strong) positive impact on savings, which 
seems to indicate that consumers in Singapore have consistently under-estimated 
the future development of (permanent) income in their forward-looking behaviour. 
The somewhat surprising negative coefficient of DGrowth and the frequent 
insignificance of Growth itself should not be over interpreted, because in practice 
the three distinct factors (Growth, DGrowth and the first difference of income) can 
not be clearly separated. Essentially these variables capture similar effects, namely 
transitory income developments and thus need to be considered one explanatory 
dimension. The combined effect of all income-effects in the regression models is pro- 
cyclical as theory would predict, i.e. deviations from the growth path affect savings 
in the same direction.
«  Only the statistically significant models are shown. The other regression results are included In the 
Appendix CD-Rom.
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As expected, the rising labour-force ratio has positively helped to raise the country's 
voluntary saving ratio. On the other hand, the effect of forced savings appears to 
have been largely driven by the substitution effect, lowering voluntary savings. 
While same-period changes in the CPF-rate, if found statistically significant, have 
positively affected voluntary savings, this effect is more than offset by the negative 
impact of the lagged variable.
The interpretation of the effects of borrowing constraints, however, is more 
complicated due to the varied statistical behaviour of the respective variables, which 
in turn are driven by their distinct developments over time. On the one hand, 
domestically available credit as a percent of GNP (DocRat) has almost continuously 
risen, overall by a factor of 4.25 between 1965 and 1997. On the other hand, the share 
of credit absorbed by the public sector has risen as well and thus the share of credit 
available to the private sector as a percent of total credit available (PriDoRat) has 
fallen by over 30%. This means that overall credit available to private individuals as 
a percent of GNP (PriCrRat) only increased by a factor of 2,6 and less consistently 
then DocRat. The generally negative parameter for the first differences of DocRat 
therefore indicate that increases of credit available to tire domestic economy in 
average lowered the savings ratio, or in other words lower borrowing constraints 
led to lower savings. Given the country's demographic composition this should not 
be surprising. It makes intuitive sense that a predominantly young population in 
their early life-cycle stages will use increasing amounts of domestic credit to increase 
their consumption. The positive coefficient for PrDoRat in Model D and the negative 
coefficient of PriCrRat in model B, however, seem to contradict this finding.
The current account balance is initially falling for Singapore, which indicates the 
Increasing availability of foreign credit. In the latter half of the period, however, the 
current account becomes strongly positive. Tire negative coefficient for CABal, 
which itself is the negative of the current account balance, shows that savings have 
hr average moved parallel to the development of the current account balance. If we 
accept the current account balance as a measure of foreign borrowing constraints
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this would indicate that the increasing availability of foreign credit in the 1970s has 
lowered voluntary savings, while falling foreign credit in the latter half has helped 
savings.
Overall, the effects of domestic and foreign borrowing constraints cannot be 
determined in a robust manner, since the analysis largely depends on which 
variable happens to remain in the final general-to-specific model. Based on the 
impact analysis of the statistically significant models the developments among the 
different borrowing constraint factors seem to have in balance added positively to 
the voluntary saving transition in Singapore. However, their developments are not 
uniform and thus it is impossible to determine with certainty whether increasing 
borrowing constraints or falling borrowing constraints or even income 
developments captured possibly by the Current Account Balance have achieved this 
effect.
Graphs 11.5,5. a-d: Impact Analysis
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The sensitivity analysis is not able to contradict these findings. However, it sheds 
light on a number of other issues. Firstly, the inclusion of other income measures 
results in weaker models with lower R-squareds and serial correlation of the 
residuals. However, they also affect the significance of other variables, which is 
difficult to interpret because there is no a priori best income measure. Generally, for 
the analysis of voluntary private saving wages seem to be the most appropriate. 
However, since corporate and household saving can not be separated in Singapore's 
case, this rationale does not necessarily apply. Nevertheless, statistically they remain 
the most meaningful variable.
Adding the first differences of the public saving rate (DPuNSRat) to model A in 
order to test the effect of public on private saving proves to be statistically 
significant with a negative coefficient of -0.248, i.e. if government saving increases 
by 1% of GNP then VPNS falls by 0.25%. Therefore, Ricardian Equivalence does not 
appear to hold fully, but some offsetting behaviour seems to have taken place. In 
other words, public saving must have had a positive net-effect on Singapore's 
national saving. However, it must be added that the Public Saving Rate (PuNSRat) 
itself is not able to add to the model and that even DPuNSRat is not significant for 
the early part of the period, which seems to indicate that not until the latter half of 
the period did private individuals take the government's saving pattern into 
consideration.
Substituting the CPFrate with the effective CPF-rate improves the model for 1966-86 
(Model E), but also leads to a higher degree of multi-collinearity and the potential 
danger of over-identifying the regression equation because CPFeff is very close to 
the Forced National Saving Rate (FNS). If the effective CPFrate is used for whole 
period models the serial correlation of the residuals is quite high, which indicates
that CPFeff does not seem to capture developments after 1986 very well.
The inclusion of the real interest rate (R) also proves to be significant (Model F) if 
tested for the whole period 1968-97. Higher interest rates have led to higher
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voluntary savings as basic economic theory would predict. However R is not 
significant in models which relate to 1968-86 only, which seems to indicate that the 
inclusion in the whole period model must be largely driven by developments in the 
latter half of the period and thus casts doubt over the inclusion of R m the full 
period regression in the first place.
Changes in the population's average life-expectancy were not able to significantly 
add to the regression.
n u n c  I i . 3 . 0
Model E 
1966-86
Model F 
1968-97
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant 12.542 6.132 3.999
2.919
Growth not siq. (0.222) 0.358
2.113
DGrowth -0.937 -5.596 -0.678
-4.810
DNWaqe 6.726E-2 4.044 8.559E-2
9.965
R not incliided 0.391 2.600
DDep 1.255 1.797 not siq.
(-0.286)
DLabrat 3.053 6.573 1.890 3.489
D C a R a l -0.245 -3.918 -0.193 ~' -2.845
DDocCrRat -0,450l -4.920 -0.248 -2.911
DPrDoRat -0,103' -4.109 -5.06E-2
-2.155
DPriCrRat not sia. (0.147) not sia.
(0.726)
DCPF not included not sia.
(1.019)
DCPFL not included -0.736
-4.629
DCPFeff not siq. (0.777) not included
DCPFeffL -2.734 -6.740 not included
DLife not incl jded not siq. I (0.520)
Adi. Rz 0.872 0.897
D-W 1.977 1.965
C-i 15.774 9.464
Impact
1966-86
Impact
1968-97
Model E Model F
-0.14 6.06
-0.72
-3.40 -0.55
0.38 0.78
-8.01 0.00
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Graphs II.5.5. e-h: Impact Analysis
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As discussed in the methodological section one could argue that the inclusion of the 
CPF-rate, which is correlated with FNS, leads to an over-identified system. 
Therefore, the general-to-specific process was re-run with NWage, RWage and 
RYPC respectively but without CPFrat in tire initial set of independent variables. 
CPFrat was only added after joint-hypothesis F-tests had determined the final 
equation with significant variables only. Hus procedure led to a number of very 
strong models even without CPFrat, but adding the CPF-rate in the final step was 
always significant. The findings of the full models in respect to the effects of the 
respective explanatory dimensions were not contradicted. Therefore, potential over­
identification does not appear to have affected the findings. Table II.5.5.C. offers the 
results.389 Particularly, Model G is of statistical interest due to its combination of 
parsimony, good diagnostics and yet still the inclusion of all explanatory 
dimensions.
A
“ 8 a side product of this exercise, it also becomes apparent how different income measures can 
influence the outcome of the general-to-specific selection process.
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Table II.5.5.c: Voluntary Private Savings
Model G 1965-97 
A B
Model H 1965-97 
A B
Model 11965-86 
A B
Model J 1965-97
A B
__Constanl 6.487 7.032 10.156 12.422 2.584 5.864 11.256 11.561_ Growth not siq. not incl. 0.438 not siq. 0.548 Not siq. not siq. nnt inr!
_ DGrowth not siq. not incl. -0.669 -0.611 -0.864 -0.553 -0.939 -0.921DNWaof; 8.706E-2 8.50E-2 not incl. not incl. not incl. Not incl. not incl. not incl
_DRWaqe not incl. not incl. 4.849E-2 5.019E-2 9.117E-2 8.061 E-2 not incl. not incl
___DRVPC not incl. not incl. not incl. not incl. not incl. Not incl. 4.257E-3 3.797É-3"
DDep not siq. not incl. 2.407 1.785 not siq. Not incl. 1.827 1 589
— DLabrat 
DCaBal
1.493 1.401 2.591 2.456 2.217 2.381 1.830 1.272
not siq. not incl. -0.239 -0.283 -0.184 -0.180 -0.223 -0 266DDocRat
_PPrDoRat
..DPriCrRat
-0.175 -0.141 -0.189 -0.151 -0.247 -0.228 not siq. not incl.
not siq. not incl. not siq. not incl. -8.24E-2 -5.86E-2 not siq. not inri
not siq. not incl. not siq. not incl. not siq. Not incl. -0.295 not sin
___ DCPF not incl. not siq. not incl. 0.574 not incl. 0.508 not incl. 0.427PCPFI not incl. -0.452 not incl, I -0.910 not incl. Not siq. not incl. -0.906
Adi. R^ 0.684 0.725 0.672 0.789 0.797 0.697 0.699 0.802
D-W 1.946 1.821 1.997 2.277 1.677 1.946 1.969 1.299
C-l 3.657 3.878 8.618 7.005 8.753 4.853 7.128 7.274
Overall, the sensitivity analysis supports the findings about effects of the respective 
explanatory dimensions derived from the initial general-to-specific regression 
procedure, even though individual models might not be fully robust, i.e. other 
significant models with a different set of independent variables can still be found. 
But in all models short-term dynamic effects, particularly transitory income, can 
'explain' over 60% of the variance of voluntary private saving in Singapore between 
1965-97. Wages seem to be -  at least statistically - the best income measure, resulting 
in the most significant models. CPF has generally had a negative effect, while 
demographics have a particular strong positive impact in the early years, where 
income and CPF are not yet as strong. On the other hand, the effects of borrowing 
constraints remain more contradictory and less statistically robust.
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Graphs II.5.5. i-k: Impact Analysis
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11.5.6. Compulsory Private Saving
Modelling the compulsory saving rate only with the CPFrate as a single explanatory 
dimension results in a very good r-squared but at 0.835 also a very low Durbin 
Watson statistic, which indicates that the model is yet unspecified. Moreover, the 
vector does not cointegrate since its residuals are not stationary. Adding the 
monthly CPF contribution ceiling does not improve the model significantly. A 
complete model, on the other hand, with the CPF rate, the CPF ceiling, the labour 
force ratio, domestic credit ratio and real wages results in a model with a condition 
index of 592 and tolerance indicators of below 0.25 for any of the theoretically 
independent variables.
The only statistically half-acceptable model incorporates borrowing constraints and 
real-wages next to the CPF contribution rate (Model A).390 The static components are 
all highly significant and the DOLS regression vector cointegrates, at a decent 
Durbin-Watson statistic but some degree of multi-collinearity. This would suggest 
that the Singapore government has taken domestic borrowing constraints and wage 
developments into consideration when setting a specific compulsory saving target. 
However, this potential finding is highly sensitive due to the multi-collinearity 
problem, which does not only affect the reliability of the estimates but in this case 
also substantially affected the model building algorithm.
Graphs II.5.6.a. and b show the impact analysis, which is able to visualise very well 
the fact that the model is largely driven by the level variables and is thus not as good 
in picking up short-term variation. Among the level variables tire CPF-rate still has 
the by far dominant impact. Income levels are negative but dynamic effects are 
positive, in other words transitory income leads not only to more voluntary but also
390 T ~ I  IIT th o  i ahnur Force ratio did prove to be significant and were thus not
in « « »
changes to the contribtuion rate.
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to more compulsory savings and increasing income seems to lower it.391 The positive 
coefficient for the share of domestic credit as a percent of GNP (DocRat) seems to 
indicate that the CPF has absorbed parts of the increase in available credit, which in 
turn suggests that the government has used the CPF to 'mop-up' parts of the effects 
from the falling borrowing constraints.
T ab le  II.5.6. Compulsory Private Savings
Model A 
1965-97
Impact
1965-97
Coefficient T-Ratio Model A
___Constant -0.786 -2.015
CPFrate 0.245 14.351 7.35
__ DocCrRat 6.100E-02 6.599 3.61
RWaqe -1.56E-03 -4.383 -1.43
___ DCPF 2.863E-03 0.073
LDCPF -8.70E-02 -2.061
__  DCPFL -2.59E-02 -0.638
DDocRat 1.812E-02 0.950
LDocRat 3.340E-02 2.543
DDocRatl -7.28E-04 -0.095
__ DRwaqe -1.56E-03 2.978
_ LDRWaqe -3.83E-03 -1.961
_  DRWaqeL 1.143E-02 3.708
Ad|. R2 0.991
D-W 2.334
C-l 28.171
Notes:
For sources and descriptions of variables see Data 
Appendix.
The impact figures include the dynamic components 
of the respective variable.
Residuals are stationary, ADF test statistic *  -5.88.
391 In theory the statistical behaviour of the income components would be in line with the permanent 
Income hypothesis. However, the PIH does not deal with compulsory saving. The negative coefficient 
for the static income component probably stems from the fact that rising income levels lower the share 
of forced saving in GNP.
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In summary, it must be said however that no fully satisfactory econometric model 
could be derived. But fortunately, the degree of compulsory private saving is by 
definition not driven by decisions of the private sector. Thus, there is essentially no 
need for a statistical model because saving for the CPF is fully determined by the 
rules governing the CPF. Assuming that the private individual or company has only 
very limited space to evade these rules, there are no behavioural patterns that need 
to be uncovered through econometrical means. FNSrat is clearly driven by the 
political decision setting the CPF contribution rules and the development of the
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country's wages. Therefore, the compulsoiy saving rate can be determined by a 
simple formula:
.., FNSrat = CPFeff. [Total Remuneration / GNPJ
Where
CPFeff is the effective CPF contribution rate, which equals Total CPF Saving divided by Total
Remuneration
The annual change in the effective contribution rate weighted by the respective 
year's wage share then gives us the saving effect achieved in the given year due to 
Changes in the rules governing CPF contributions. Graph 11.5.6.C. shows these annual 
changes in the effective CPF rate as a percent of GNP as well as the resulting 
crowding-out effects already determined econometricaly within the voluntary 
private saving aggregate (based on VPNS Model A above).
Graph H.5.6.C.: Dynamic CPF Effects on Gross-National Savings
What becomes visible are the negative net-effects of changes in the CPF-contribution 
rate. Apart from 1987/88, the dynamic CPF effects have generally been (over-) 
compensated by reductions in voluntary savings. Yet, if we do not only consider the
212
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dynamic effects of the CPF, we can observe that in the long-term the compulsory 
saving rate increased by more than the crowding-out effects leaving a positive net 
contribution to the country's savings. Graph II.5.6.a. visualises this development. 
This positive net-effect must be due to long-term developments driving the CPF's 
annual contributions, such as the country's wages and employment as well as the 
fund's coverage and its monthly contribution ceiling. Particularly the fund's 
coverage developed very strongly due to an increase in waged employment. At 
independence about half of the labour force were active contributors to the CPF. By 
1978 this share had increased to just under eighty percent.392
Graph II.5.6.d.: Contribution of CPF to GNS393
11.5.7. Gross Private Saving
Approaching the non-stationary Gross Private Saving (PNS) series with the same 
general-to-specific procedure as VPNS does not result in very good models. This is 
not too surprising because a large part of the variance of PNS must stem from the *39
Huff (1994, p. 335)
39S Based on Additive Model 1, which combines VPNS Model A and PUNS Model B -  see section
II.5.9.
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non-stationary FNS series, which as shown above requires the CPFrate to be 
modelled successfully. The CPFrate, however, can not be included in a stationary 
model due to its higher order of integration. Potential CPF influences can only be 
included through first differences, which are not able to adequately model the 
compulsory saving component in the private saving ratio.
The only decent model for the whole period stemming from the general-to-specific 
procedure is one in which DCPF is able to survive the joint-hypothesis tests and 
remain in the final equation (Model A). This in turn is only possible if tire influence 
of income is captured through the real wage series, which again goes to show how 
much the statistical results might depend on the choice made about the appropriate 
income variable. The only other statistically acceptable regression model 
incorporates the interest rates, restricts itself to the first part of the period and uses 
nominal wages as its income measure (Model B).
Table II.5.7. Gross Private Savings
Model A 
1965-97
Model B 
1968-86
Impact
1965-97
Impact
1968-86
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Model A Model B
Constant 20.849 10.113 12.868 3.857
Growth not. sig. (-0.276) not. sig. . (0 013)
_  DGrowth -1.149 -4.767 -1.075 -3.482
DRWaqa 9.219E-2 3.792 not. included 10.41 1.94
DNWaqa not. included 0.144 4.555
R not. included 1.098 3.946 Not. incl. -0.76
— DDep 2.959 3.391 2.390 1.817
DLabrat 3.282 3.762 3.417 3.396 w.lD -1.24
DCaBal -0.427 -3.185 -0.401 -3.295
DDocCrRat not. sig. (-1.169) -0.224 -1.868
_  DPrDoRat not. sig. (0.260) not. sig. (0.561) 1 , 4 2
_ DPriCrRat not. sig. (0.066) not. sig. (0.764)
PCPF not. sig. (0.611) not. sig. (-0.824) 0.00 not. sig.DCPFL 9.219E-2 3.792 not. sig. ■±1Q93)
Adj. Rz 0.775 0.840
D-W 1.840 2.011
C-l 6.470 11.713
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If Public Saving rates are added to Model A in order to capture possible Ricardian 
Equivalence effects, DCPF drops out of the equation and the model's Durbin- 
Watson statistic indicates serial correlation of its residuals. Replacing the CPF-rate 
with the effective CPF contribution rate does not result in significant models.
Overall, the results are not too encouraging due to their high degree of sensitivity, 
which goes to show how weak and potentially misleading statistical models can be 
if sub-aggregates of the dependent variable have very distinct behavioural traits, 
which can not be incorporated into one regression equation. Fortunately, however, 
private saving is but the sum of voluntary and compulsory saving, which itself can 
be expressed in a simple formula. Therefore, another option to model private saving 
is available, which will not require us to model a non-stationary sub-aggregate with 
stationary means.
The investigation into the voluntary saving rate has yielded a number of acceptable 
and in their findings robust models, which combined with the compulsory saving 
rate should be able to adequately model Private Saving without the statistical pitfalls 
of a separate regression analysis of PNS, Graphs II.5.7. e through h offer a visual 
inspection of the 'additive' procedure to build a PNS model, using alternatively
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models F and G (B) to capture the developments underlying the voluntary saving 
rate. Both VPNS-models are able to include all explanatory dimensions, have good 
diagnostics and cover the whole period.394 G(B) could be considered the slightly 
superior model -  at least from a statistical point-of-view -  because it is able to do so 
with fewer independent variables. The effects of forced savings were split between 
effects stemming from the change in the effective CPF contribution rate and changes 
in income.395 396
The resulting models offer a very good fit. In fact, Model C s  predicted change series 
has an R-squared of 0.93 with the actual change series and Model D an R-squared of 
0.91, i.e. the additive equations are able to 'explain' over 90% of the variance in the 
change of the compulsory saving rate since 1965. As should be expected, after the 
inclusion of forced saving the CPF has overall added to private savings due to the 
CPF's level effects and because the crowding-out effects found in the voluntary 
saving aggregate were not complete. As a result, income has lost its dominant role 
and is overshadowed almost during the whole period by the CPF. Moreover, Model 
D would also consider demographics to have had a stronger influence in the saving 
transition than income until the early 1980s and even stronger then the CPF until the 
early 1970s. As a slight word of caution, it must be noted that both models almost 
constantly under-estimate the change in private national saving, although not by 
much and to varying degrees over time.
394 Due to the inclusion of the real interest rate, which is not available before 1968, Model F loses the
first three years.
396 Splitting the effect of changes in the forced saving ratio was accomplished by weighting the 
increase in the effective CPF contribution rate by the base year’s share of remuneration In GNP. The 
remaining change In FNS must have been due to changes in Income, either GNP or total 
remuneration. Mathematically:
Impact due to CPF *  [CPFeff(t) -  CPFeff(t-l)] * Share of Remuneration in GNP(to)
This exercise shows again that rising Income has actually lowered the FNS-ratio, which was 
compensated by strong increases in the effective CPF-ratio. For example, in 1997 Increases in the 
effective contribution rate have added the equivalent of 13.79% of GNP to FNS since 1965, while 
increases in income have lowered the share of compulsory savings in GNP by 4.42%, leaving a net- 
increase of FNS by 9.36% of GNP.
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Compared to the DDLS regression analysis discussed above the additive models 
must be considered preierable because of their statistically more robust nature and 
because of their simple but mathematically correct way of dealing with a mix of 
Stationary and non-stationary influences, which regression analysis snuggles to
capture.
Graphs II.5.7. e-h: Impact Analysis of Private Saving Rate
218
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11.5.8. Gross Public Saving
The single dimension models, which were estimated in an initial stage and are 
described in this chapter's appendix (section II.7.) have shown that income 
developments by themselves can potentially 'explain' over seventy percent of the 
variance in the Public Saving Ratio. Based on the criterion of parsimony, these
219
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models would be the most preferable. Yet analytically they are not necessanly the 
most 'true' because they do not consider a number of potentially influenbal factors. 
Therefore, it is necessary to investigate whether other dimensions in combmatton
with each other could have togettter driven PuNS. Following the general-t^spedhc
t , r vpvic and described in the methodological section/ 
procedure already employed for VPNS a
„ . , -u anA rather robust models covering the wholewe find three statistically acceptable and ratner roou
period.
The immediate result is that all main explanatory dimensions are found to be 
significant in a robust manner, i.e. contrary to our finding in the VPNS investigation 
it does not appear to matter which income measure is used for the significance of the 
other explanatory variables. However, with respect to the findings of die single 
dimension models different income measures are found to yield the best statistical 
outcomes if combined with further potential influences on public saving. The Single 
dimension investigation has found real per-capita income (RYPC) and real 
disposable per-capita income (Dispy) to be the statistically strongest income
220
variable. Yet, in the general-to-specific regression procedure these income measures 
lead to models with high Durbin Watson statistics, which suggest yet unmodelled 
influences.
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Graphs II.5.8. a and b: Impact Analysis of Public Saving Rate
No matter which income measure is used, the developments of foreign borrowing 
constraints as captured by CABal and changes in the labour force ratio (LabRat) are 
never found to significantly contribute to the model. In contrast to regressions of the 
other saving aggregates, in case of public saving the dependency ratio is always the 
stronger variable. Additionally, once dependency is not included in the set of
221
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variables growth becomes significant (Model C), while the labour force ratio is not 
able to take the place of the dependency ratio.
In terms of impact on the saving transition in Singapore, the separate investigation 
of public saving yields a number of striking results. Falling dependency is predicted 
to have actually lowered the government’s saving, while falling borrowing 
constraints have raised it and rising CPF rates have had a negative impact. These 
results are consistent across the different models.
The negative impact of falling dependency burdens on public saving is difficult to 
explain. According to dependency theory, see for example Left (1980), fewer 
younger and older age cohorts should lower the consumptive expenditures for 
education and social services and thus leave more government funds for investment 
purposes. On the other hand, a falling dependency burden might require higher 
consumptive expenses by the government in order to provide jobs for the rising 
labour force. Potentially, the negative impact of the falling dependency ratio can 
only be explained in connection with the similarly negative effect of the CPF. The 
government appears to have used CPF saving as an alternative source of funding for 
its investment decisions. In this line of argument falling dependency burdens 
would have given the government a chance to raise compulsory saving through the 
CPF even further.
The positive impact of falling borrowing constraints is also very striking. Increases 
in credit available to the economy raised government savings, somewhat offset by a 
negative impact from a lower share of credit available to the private sector. This 
finding supports the story already included in the development of the private credit 
ratios. The government seems to have been able to absorb parts of the increasing 
amounts of credit injected into the economy into the government's own savings, for 
example through taxes and fees o n  consumptive economic activity which -  as the 
VPNS investigation suggested -  would have been stimulated by increasing amounts 
of domestic credit. In other words, while overall lower domestic borrowing
222
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constraints have lowered voluntary savings, the government's own saving has been 
able to benefit from the increased consumption. This feedback effect can be found in 
both saving aggregates directly controlled by the government, public savings and 
private compulsory savings.
The sensitivity analysis does not alter these findings. Real interest rates and changes 
in life-expectancy are not statistically significant. The restriction of the time period to 
1965-86 results in generally weaker models, except for B whose short period version 
(Model B2) is able to retain all its explanatory variables at roughly the same 
coefficients and with good diagnostics.396 Therefore, Model B appears to be the 
strongest of the public saving models. The exclusion of the CPF-rate from Model B 
leads to growth taking CPF's place in the regression equation (Model B3) but at a 
substantially lower adjusted r-squared, which suggests that CPF is the stronger of 
the two variables and Model B the more appropriate replication of public saving.
Table II.5.8.b. Gross Public Savings
Model B2 
1965-86
Model B3 
1965-97
Impact
1965-86
Impact
1965-97
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Model B2 Model B3
Constant 16.521 8.779 19.974 10.319
Growth -0.559 -2.045
-0.67 5.09DGrowth not included not. sig. (1.199)
DNWaqe not included
DYPC
... DLabrat 
Bl DCaBal
3.578E-3
2.333
2.081 2.202E-3 2.171
3.52? 2.046 2.459 ■4.30 -1.24
not included
not. sig. (-0.984)
not, sig. (-0.650)
7.54 7.34DDocRat 0.218 1.811 0.279 2.179
..DPrDoRat 8.497 3.094 8.415E-2 2.454
DPriCrRat not included not, sig. (0.304)
DCPF -1.394 -5.903
not included 4.68LDCPF not included
DCPFL 0.884 2.110
Adi. & 0.770 0.638
D-W 2.309 2.131
C-l 9.148 7.435
396 cinnifiranee of some of its variables but still results in a diagnostically good
mod* Model AKeepsi t s  variables but at a Durbin Watson statistic, which indicates unmodelled 
influences visible through the serial correlation of its residua s.
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Generally, the fact that income alone is a good 'predictor' of PuNS can potentially 
hurt the robustness of the multiple-dimension models the most. If all is due to 
income, this will naturally change the results derived as an explanation for the 
saving transition substantially - particularly since income is not found insignificant 
in the general-to-specific approach, i.e. can't be proven to lose its importance once 
other influences are modelled as well. If indeed the answer that public saving was 
solely driven by income effects is the 'true' answer, the conclusions derived from the 
multiple dimension models will be wrong.
U.5.9. Additive OLS for Gross National Saving
The investigations into the underlying influences of separate saving sub-aggregates 
have shown that the same factor can have opposite effects in different segments of 
national saving. Therefore, running one regression, which averages these effects 
across the whole economy, might not be too sensible. In the worst case the 
regression will find the factor not to have had an effect significantly different from 
zero and thus conclude that it was not an important factor although the opposite is 
true. Additionally, given the fact that one of the sub-aggregates is non-stationary 
while the others are stationary, it is not likely that one GNS-regression will be able to 
statistically differentiate the various effects very well. Moreover, the innate multi- 
collinearity problem in the DOLS procedure, casts doubt over the accuracy of the 
obtained parameters. The additive procedure, if based on significant models of the 
individual sub-aggregates, must therefore be considered the more revealing and 
accurate approach.
The three strongest VPNS models, namely Model A, D and G(B), are combined to 
form the three respective additive models 1, 2 and 3 with the strongest models for 
the public saving ratio, Model B and B(2), and the mathematical derivation of the 
respective influences within the compulsory saving rate of the CPF-rate and income
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developments.397 Graphs II.5.9. a - d offer a visual assessment of the thus derived 
impacts of the individual explanatory dimensions. The additive models offer a very 
good fit. All three are able to 'explain' over ninety percent of the transition of the 
(adjusted) GNS-ratio since 1965.
Most interestingly, the models offer quite separate and more differentiated insights 
into Singapore's national saving behaviour as compared to Agrawal's (2001) DOLS 
results, where the CPF rate was for the whole period the by far dominant force and 
die impact of income was almost linearly rising -  see graph II.5.4.a. above. The 
additive models on the other hand, show much more fluctuation from year to year 
and a less than clear dominance by the CPF. At the end of the period the CPF and 
the country's income developments have done most about transforming Singapore's 
savings, followed by falling borrowing constraints and a more or less neutral overall 
effect of lower dependency burdens. However, over the whole length of the period 
this picture changes. Early on the CPF is predicted to have had a negative impact, 
which did not turn substantially positive until the mid-1970s. Falling dependency is 
also shown to have had a negative effect. While, on the other hand, falling 
borrowing constraints have had a rather constant positive effect from the very 
beginning of the period.
However, even within the additive model important individual developments can 
be over-shadowed. As Chapter One has argued, particularly the early transition 
appears vital to the understanding of Singapore's saving behaviour. During the late 
1960s, voluntary private saving showed the strongest transformation, while public 
and compulsory savings remained largely the same (see graph II.4.3.b. above). As 
the VPNS investigation has shown this transformation within VPNS has largely 87
87 Models E and F for the VPNS-ratio would also be an option. However, the Investigation into the 
public saving rate has not yielded a significant model for the same time periods, namely 1966*86 and 
1968-97, so that the additive partner is missing. Yet, with the possible exception of the influence of the 
real interest rate captured in model F, the relative impact of the individual factors Is not too different. 
Before adding the models together their residuals were plotted against each Independent variable In 
order to ascertain that each regression was not affected by heteroskedasticity. See Section I.4.5.5. for 
a discussion of heteroskedasticity.
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been driven by demographic and income factors. Once all three saving aggregates 
are added into one GNS-model this effect is again lost, due to the highly negative 
hnpact of falling dependency burdens on public saving. Nevertheless, it should not 
be forgotten that voluntary savings started the transition. Further increases were 
then derived by income and CPF effects, but mainly in form of Public and 
Compulsory savings.
Graphs II.5.9. a-d: Additive Models for GNSrat2
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II. 6. Conclusions
Chapter One dealt with the cross-country assessment of the influence of Singapore's 
circumstances, establishing that Singapore's saving performance although 
outstanding in absolute terms, was far less extraordinary once we controlled for 
Singapore's situation. Consequently, lessons from Singapore s saving history must 
be considered transferable — at least to countries in similar environments. This 
chapter has tried to establish what these lessons are, beyond the favourable 
circumstances.
In the early years right after the country's independence, favourable demographic 
developments seem to have helped initiate the saving transition, which was then 
further fed by compulsory savings and increasingly by positive income 
developments. The effect of the compulsory saving regime, however, was only made 
possible through the underlying demographic development of the country, which 
allowed for the chance to built a 'hump-saving', which at the completion of the 
demographic change will simply be passed on from generation to generation. 
Nevertheless, the government has spotted this chance and has exploited it very well. 
In other words, the government has very successfully jumped on a moving train and 
made it go faster and further than the initial situation would have made possible by 
itself.
If the effects of borrowing constraints are interpreted very generally, we can 
conclude that an improved financial system has helped savings in Singapore, but 
through positive effects on public savings while it appears to have lowered 
voluntary private saving due to increased availability of consumption smoothing, 
which again is not surprising for a population undergoing a substantial 
demographic transition. The potentially positive effect of Public Saving is supported 
in Singapore's case, since Ricardian Equivalence is shown not to have been present 
in full force.
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Statistically, the results also advise a very substantial amount of caution when 
dealing with a mix of stationary and non-stationary data, particularly if stationary 
series incorporate non-stationary sub-aggregates. Moreover, investigating the top 
aggregate, Gross-National-Saving, by itself is likely to yield misleading results.
In comparison to the existing literature on Singapore's saving behaviour, this study 
is able to offer a much more differentiated and robust insight. Beyond simply 
avoiding a number of statistical flaws inherent in many other studies, the exercise 
does away with mono-causal explanations, e.g. MAS (1991), and is also able to show 
the interactive effects of individual factors among the separate saving aggregates, 
which earlier investigations focusing on one such aggregate have not been able to 
take into consideration. Therefore, for example, demographics have so far either 
been shown to have had a direct or no effect, while its more indirect, catalytic 
influence argued for by this study has gone unnoticed. Similarly, the crowding out 
controversy regarding the CPF's impact has so far not been able to get at the full 
picture and consider both dynamic and long-term effects as well as the CPF's 
separate impact on the different saving aggregates.
Applying the findings to give an outlook on Singapore's future savings would 
suggest that the saving rate will necessarily have to fall. The end of the demographic 
transition will particularly affect CPF-saving, as the by now accumulated hump­
saving will be transferred from one generation to the other without additions on the 
earlier scale. Tire positive CPF-effects must be considered to having been limited to 
one generation. Additionally, since the country's fast catch-up growth will be 
slowing income effects on savings will be less positive. Government saving is also 
likely to become weaker due to higher pressures on the government to provide a 
more pronounced welfare system more in line with other industrialised nations.
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11.7. Appendix: Single Explanatory Dimension Models
The following section is presented in the form of an appendix, because 
notwithstanding its substantiality its results can only be considered a preliminary 
Stage for the multiple dimension investigation. By themselves the single dimension 
models are only able to show that a single factor is not able to explam Singapore s 
saving behaviour by itself, except for possibly income predominantly driving public 
savings. Overall, the income dimension appears to be the strongest individual effect 
on savings. However, due to the lacking robustness of the results, this can not be 
established in full force. Even the Granger Causality tests of the income effect 
remain by themselves inconclusive because a unidirectional causality can not be 
established in a robust manner across different varieties of income measures, with 
the possible exception of VPNS being granger-caused by transitory income. 
Moreover, none of the DOLS models for adjusted or unadjusted GNS or FNS 
cointegrate.
11.7.1. The Income Effect
As becomes evident from the models presented below income factors are very 
strong. They are able to 'explain' a considerable amount of the variance of all saving 
aggregates, in some models as much as eighty percent. However, inconclusive 
Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that these models are not yet fully satisfactory, 
except the highlighted PuNS models.398 Multi-Collinearity does not seem to affect 
the stationary models. However, due to the at times strong correlations between the 
dynamic components required by the DOLS procedure, multi-collinearity is a 
serious problem in some of the non-stationary regressions. Moreover, the residuals
398 The Cochrane-Orcutt procedure if applied to the stationary models does generally improve the D-W 
statistic, but also results in substantially lower r-squareds. This suggests that even with an ‘optimised’ 
lag-structure the models are still not yet fully specified.
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can not be shown to behave in a stationary manner and thus the DOLS vectors do 
not appear to cointegrate, which in turn points to spurious regression results. 
Therefore, the statistical results indicate that even though income is likely to have 
been a very strong driving force behind the development of Singapore s saving 
aggregates, it can not by itself 'explain' the country s saving behaviour.
Since the models are not yet fully robust, it is not really helpful to discuss potential 
differences of the income effect between the individual saving aggregates. The 
power of interpretation of the signs of coefficients is also still somewhat vague. 
Beyond the statistical weaknesses of the regressions, it should also be noted that the 
individual variables need to be interpreted as referring all to one explanatory 
dimension, i.e. it is necessary to see all income variables together. Therefore, the 
generally negative parameter for growth should not be over interpreted.399
Table II.7.1.a. The Income Effect in Stationary Models 369
V P N S P N S P u N S
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant 9.305 6.067 21.137 9.284 18.361 12.307
Growth -0.388 -1.736 -1.450 -4.371 -1.431 -6.390
_  Dorowth -0.591 -3.372 -0.820 -3.152 not sig. (-0.026)
DRYPC 7.171E-03 7.116 1.167E-02 7.802 7.944E-03 7,663
Adi. R2 0.613 0.676 0.678
D-W 1.507 1.052 2.071
C-l 6.107 6.107 5.548
Constant 5.011 2.910 12.427 8.639 10.439 8.045
Growth 0.328 1.723 not sig. (-0.270) not sig. (-1.341)
__ Dgrowth notsig. (-1.519) not sig. (-1-277) not sig. (1.640)
DNWaqe 8.560E-02 7.494 0.138 8.042 8.316E-02 5.387
Adi. R2 0.629 0.666 0.467
D-W 1.442 0.820 1.586
C-l 6.154 2.926 2.926
_  Constant 7.505 7.793 12.427 8.639 12.098 8.294
NW Gro not sig. (-0.513) not sig. (-0.079) -0.448 -2.117
DNW Gro not sig. (0.286) not sig. (-0.584) not siq. (-0.81)
DNWaoe 8.103E-02 7.072 0.138 8.042 0.104 5.886
Adi. R2 0.605 0.666 0.521
D-W 1.501 0.820 1.559
C-l 2.926 2.926 4.518
369 Growth was also regressed separately on the stationary saving aggregates. However, by itself it did 
not prove to be significant.
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Constan 9.604 9.426 15.287 10.821 12.173 10.271
Growth not siq. (1.501 not siq. (-1.270 not sig. (-1.012)
___Dgrowth not siq. (-1.5111 not sig. (-1.220) not sig. (1.249)
— DRWane 7 969E-02 4.640 0.152 6.399 9.200E-02 4.604
____Adi. R2 0.391 0.555 0.387
D-W 1.290 1.071 1.618
C-l 2.360 2.360 2.360
__ Constant 8.862 7.279 21.323 7.193 18.407 13.717
Growth not siq. (-0.445) -1.051 -2.543 -1.328 -6.804
___Pgrowth -0.680 -3.082 -0.947 -2.724 not sig. (-1.194)
DDispyCPF 5.945E-03 4.340 1.055E-02 5.010 8.765E-03 8.903
Adi. R7 0.365 0.462 0.739
____ D-W 1.434 1.245 1.323
C-l 3.210 6.057 5.430
— Constant 7.872 7.030 20.967 8.363 18.057 12.970
Growth not siq. (-1.068) -1.275 -3.572 -1.365 -6.708
___Dgrowth -0.648 -3.460 -0.815 -2.854 not sig. (-0.168)
— Ddisov 6.450E-03 5.709 1.151E-02 6.781 8.496E-03 8.522
Adj. R7 0.504 0.612 0.722
D-W 1.379 1.198 2.032
C-l 3.278 6.073 5.470
— Constant 8.556 9.254 19.989 7.405 17.272 9.582
Growth not sig. (0.072) -0.782 -2.164 -0.917 -3.843
___Dgrowth -0.497 -2.993 -0.663 -2.236 not sig. (0.493)
DYPf: 3.982E-03 6.497 6.209E-03 6.196 4.192E-03 5.863
0.570 0.568 0.556
D-W 1.541 1.087 1.614
C-l 2.736 6.006 5.306
Constant 19.357 7.892 37.247 9.704 24.878 7.630
Growth -0.920 -2.619 -2.280 -4.144 -1.350 -2.869
— Dgrowth1 ' " "■ II
Avr Gro
-1.122 -4.036 -1.656 -3.807 not sig. (-0.258)
1.018E-02 4.636 1.621E-02 4.720 4.665E-03 2.032
Adi. R7 0.390 0.433 0.163
D-W 1.198 1.024 0.773
C-l 7.477 7.477 6.823
Notes:
All models refer to 1965-97.
GNS2 refers to the adjusted GNS-series
C-l refers to the Condition Index measuring the degree of multicollinearity in the 
model. Numbers above 30 indicate a serious multi-collinearity problem.
Not sig. refers to the fact that the variable did not prove significant based on a 
joint-hypothesis F-test and was removed from the model. The t-ratio of the 
variable before its removal is reported as an Illustration of its lacking statistical 
significance.
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Table II.7.1.b. The Income Effect in Non-Stationary DOLS Models
GNS 2 GNS FNS
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
-^_Constan 23.596 3.686 22.516 4.316 9.648 2.917
RYPr 1.101E-03 2.306 8.679E-04 2.23C 1.937E-04 0.785
-____ d r ypc 7.290E-03 1.183 7.713E-03 1.534 2.888E-03 0.905
------ LRYPC 5.161 E-04 0.302 7.195E-04 0.518 -1.34E-04 -0.151
____ _ RYPCL -3.18E-03 -0.778 -2.30E-03 -0.691 -1.43E-03 -0.678
Growth -1.068 -1.318 -0.965 -1.462 -0.768 -1.832
-___ PGrowth -0.758 -1.372 -0.688 -1.527 -0.330 -1.155
— ^TÀ d ìTR 2 0.846 0,866 0.598
D-W 0.638 0.736 0.477
C-| 32.006 32.006 32.006
____Constant 23.969 6.510 21.596 7.518 8.500 4.946
NWaqp 5.389E-03 1.146 2.947E-03 0.803 -1.12E-03 -0.510
____DNWaqe 3.601 E-02 0.693 3.43E-02 0.848 1.587E-02 0.654
-___LDNWaae 5.938E-02 1.049 6.716E-02 1.520 3.260E-02 1.234
DNWaqol 6.682E-02 1.630 7.007E-02 2.205 1.889E-02 0.994
Growth -0.401 -0.945 -0.184 -0.555 -0.477 -2.408
____ DGrowth -0.236 -0.711 -0.229 -0.885 -4.80E-02 -0.310
Adj. Rz 0.798 0.839 0.572
D-W 0.501 0.584 0.374
C-l 14.805 14.805 14.805
Constant 29.878 6.378 25.610 6.906 11.093 4.966
____  NGro -0.697 -2.034 -0.417 -1.539 -0.488 -2.991
_____  DNGro -0.329 -0.979 -0.307 -1.153 -7.50E-02 -0.468
NWaqe 7.229E-04 0.133 5.073E-04 0.118 -4.98E-03 -1.928
___ DNWaqe 7.991 E-02 1.417 5.920E-02 1.326 4.834E-02 1.798
_ _DNWaaeL -2.62E-03 -0.038 1.787E-02 0.331 1.271 E-02 0.390
LDNWaqe 0.125 2.495 0.111 2.788 4.912E-02 2.055
. Adi. Rz 0.818 0.851 0.598
D-W 0.553 0.626 0.383
C-l 19.361 19.361 19.361
___ Constant 28.600 6.898 26.150 7.740 10.230 5.348
___ Growth -0.758 -1.503 -0.592 -1.442 -0.643 -2.766
DGrowth -0.411 -0.969 -0.359 -1.039 -0.142 -0.724
YPC 8.774E-04 3.491 7.083E-04 3.459 1.638E-04 1.412
DYPC 2.512E-03 0.995 2.707E-03 1.316 8.284E-04 0.711
LDYPC -1.77E-04 -0.158 -1.65E-04 -0.181 -3.35E-04 -0.650
DYPCL -4.76E-04 -0.195 1.963E-04 0.098 -5.63E-06 -0.005
Adi. Rz 0.764 0.794 0.511
D-W 0.576 0.623 0.450
C-l 12.684 12.684 12.684
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Constant 24.108 4.335 19.930 4.259 10.789 3.934
Growth -1.074 -1.623 -0.551 -0.989 -0.896 -2.747
—  DGrowth -0.919 -1.734 -0.855 -1.916 -0.442 -1.688
Dispy 1.134E-03 2.511 1.207E-03 3.177 7.637E-05 0.343
__ Ddispy 9.087E-03 1.671 5.985E-03 1.308 5.031 E-03 1.876
__ LDDispy 1.441E-03 0.788 9.464E-04 0.615 5.961 E-04 0.661
— DDispyl -4.81 E-03 -1.106 -4.98E-03 -1.361 -2.20E-03 -1.023
Adj. R2 0.834 0.846 0.608
D-W 0.713 0.693 0.628
C-l 25.450 25.450 25.450
— Constant 20.696 3.857 16.644 3.739 8.803 3.379
_  Growth -0.701 -1.206 -0.213 -0.441 -0.648 -2.295
DGrowth -0.546 -1.173 -0.522 -1.352 -0.255 -1.130
_ DisDvCPF 1.649E-03 4.044 1.709E-03 5.053 2.958E-04 1.495
_ DDispyCPF 3.351 E-03 0.773 8.153E-04 0.227 1.857E-03 0.883
LDDsiovCPF -5.53E-04 -0.303 -7.21 E-Ó4 -0.476 -3.07E-04 -0.346
□DisovCPFL -2.03E-03 -0.553 -3.15E-03 -1.031 -9.18E-04 -0.514
Adj. R2 0.800 0.820 0.542
D-W 0.529 0.522 1 0.509
C-l 18.769 18.769 18.769
Constant 16.193 2.276 15.370 3.753 8.180 3.946
Growth -0.113 -0.256 -1.53E-02 -0.41 -0.334 -1.760
DGrowth -0.392 -1.259 -0.407 -1.529 -0.104 -0.773
RWaqe 1.257E-02 2.682 1.130E-02 2.824 -6.22E-04 -0.307
DRWaqe 7.144E-02 1.929 5.898E-02 1.865 3.686E-02 2.303
LDRWaqe 5.824E-02 2.159 5.983E-02 2.597 1.827E-02 1.567
DRWaaeL 4.709E-02 1.108 3.123E-02 0.859 2.852E-02 1.550
Adi. R2 0.807 0.816 0.649
D-W 0.545 0.625 0.427
C-l 14.716 14.716 14.716
Constant 63.982 9.695 56.996 9.748 18.023 9.254
Growth -3.922 -4.104 -3.284 -3.879 -1.386 -4.914
DGrowth -2.584 -2.290 -2.324 -2.325 -0.700 -2.101
AvrGro 3.361 E-02 2.345 3.023E-02 2.380 6.905E-03 1.632
DAvrGro -3.47E-03 -0.575 -3.40E-03 -0.635 -8.80E-06 -0.005
LDAvrGro -9.08E-03 -1.431 -8.64E-03 -1.537 -1.29E-03 -0.687
DAvrGroL 4.699E-04 0.138 5.462E-04 0.180 -3.38E-04 -0.335
Adi. R2 0.365 0.346 0.461
D-W 1.093 1.083 0.972
C-l 11.902 11.902 11.902
Notes:
Same as table 11.7.1.1.a.
The removal of insignificant Lead or Lag variables is not possible since they are 
required for the DOLS procedure. Consequently, removal based on joint- 
hypothesis F-tests was not possible.
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•1-7.2. Granger Causality between Income and Savings
°n e  variable granger-causes another if observations of the first variable help predict 
subsequent movements in the second, after taking into account the predictive value 
° f  the second variable's own history. For the non-stationary saving aggregates 
Granger Causality tests (VARs with three lags) suggest causality running in both 
directions with one exception. Past values of VPNS do not statistically affect present 
values of the first differenced series of per-capita income while the opposite is true if 
die variables swap sides, which in turn would argue for causality running from 
(transitory) income to voluntary savings but not the other way around.
VECMs for the non-stationary saving aggregates were not undertaken since none of 
the single dimension models cointegrate. Agrawal's (2001) causality relationship 
running from RYPC to GNS was remodelled. But also here cointegration could not 
be established, even if RYPC was replaced by other income variables. Thus Granger 
causality tests could not be undertaken, which contrasts Agrawal (2001), who finds 
cointegration between the two variables and uni-directional causality.
11.7.3. The Demographic Effect
Table II.7.3.a. The Demographic Effect in Stationary Models
VPNS PNS PuNS
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant 12.748 11.399 22.133 12.249 17.133 13.868
DLabrat 0.230 0.242 -0.905 -0.589 -1.888 -1.798
Rz 0.02 0.011 0.094
D-W 0.736 0.354 0.655
C-l 1.792 1.792 1.792
Constant 15.510 12.898 26.761 14.828 20.488 18.370
DDeo 1.908 3.033 3.778 4.002 3.293 5.644
RJ 0.229 0.341 0.507
D-W 1.141 0.685 1.285
C-l 2.469 2.469 2.469
In single-dimension models, demographics appear to be a weak explanation for 
savings. Overall, tire dependency ratio appears to be a somewhat better predictor
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than the labour force ratio. Within the DOLS models multi-collinearity seems to be 
present, although not yet at dangerous levels.
Table II.7.3.b. The Demographic Effect in Non-Stationary Models
GNS 2 GNS FNS
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
..Constant -31.144 -7.211 -25.273 -5.779 -11.170 -4.046
_  Labrat 1.710 17.924" 1.491 15.436 0.497 8.152
DLabrat -1.635 -1.988 -1.072 -1.287 -0.632 -1.202
J-ÔLabrat -0.418 -0.702 -0.338 -0.560 -3.75E-02 -0.098
PLabratL 0.102 0.245 -2.43E-Q2 -0.058 -0.382 -1.439
^.AdiTFF 0.944 0.924 0.788
_  D-W 0.835 0.725 0.242
C-l 17.752 17.752 17.752
.Constant 77.642 23.985 67.364 20.884 24.167 13.350
_  Dep -0.692 -8.910 -0.542 -7.001 -0.305 -7.037
_  DDep 8.019E-03 0.008 -0.150 -0.146 0.356 0.616
_  LDDep 1.261 0.993 2.128 1.681 -1.164 -1.639
_  DDeDL 1.307 1.612 0.844 1.045 0.345 0.760
AdTR7 o CD 1 0.927 0.829
D-W 0.828 0.782 0.533
C-l 21.107 21.107 21.107
Notes: . .
DOLS models using Labrat refer to 1967-1997 du. f  Ibe raquirernen o 
leads and lags o f the first differences, which necessitates obseivations from 
before 1965 which were not available. Dep models refer to 1965-97
H.7.4. The Effect of Borrowing Constraints
Borrowing constraints exhibit a surprisingly dichotomous performance: weak 
among the stationary models, but strong for the non-stationary models. This appears 
to indicate that it was not so much the changes from year to year but die level, which 
might have affected saving behaviour. However, autocorrelation among the 
residuals in the DOLS regressions also indicate that the regressions can not be 
considered robust yet. Moreover, a strong correlation between the current account 
balance and income casts doubt over whether CaBal really captures foreign 
borrowing constraints.400
400 Sea also the discussion in section II.5.4.
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Table II.7.4.a. T h e E ffect o f B o rro w in g  C o n strain ts in  S tatio n ary  M od els
VPNS PNS PuN s
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
„Constant 13.059 14.233 21.574 14.174 15.967 14.681
DCabal -0.268 -1.726 not. siq. (-1.361) not. siq. (-0.886)
PPoCrRat not. siq. (-0.03) not. siq. (0.653) not. siq. (1.134)
DPriCrRat not. siq. (0.303) not. siq. (0.013) not. sifl. (-0.739)
PPrDoRat 6.308E-02 1.833 not. siq. (1.621) not. siq. (0.855)
_  ÂdLR7 0 OS0 0.000 0.000
D-W 1.071 -
C-l 1.379 1.000 1.000
The Condition index of the model with all borrowing constraints variables Is 
3 083. This indicates that the disappointing result cannot be due to multi- 
collinearity between the three domestic borrowing constraints.
Table 11.7,4. j. T h e  E ffe ct of B o rro w in g  C o n strain ts  in  N on-:
GNS 2
Coefficient T-Ratio
GNS
Coefficient T-Ratio
S tatio n ary  M o d els  
FNS
Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant 22.286 7.959 23.308
Cabal -0.384 -3.872 -0.390
8.568
-4.040
-0.115
5.233E-02
Dcabal -9.82E-03 -0.068 -1.13E-02 -0.080 -5.07E-02
Lcabal -0.263 -1.672 -0.276 -1.805 -2.68E-02
CabalL -0.140 -0.936 -0.129
DocCrRat 0.346 6.486 0.262
-0.887
5.058
-9.65E-02
0.180
-0.113
1.459
-0.965
-0.472
-1.783
9.360
PdocCrRat 0.267 1.572 0.364 2.2042.486
9.760E-02 1.589
3.047LDDocCrRat 0.258 2.230 0.279 0.127
PdocCrRatL 4.402E-02 0.523 4.219E-02 0.516 -5.23E-03
Adj. R" 0.874 0.843 0.8470.975
-0.175
D-W 0.616 0.959
C-l 7.372 7.372 7.372
Constant
Cabal
Dcabal
Lcabal
CabalL
PriDoRat
DpriDoRat
LDPriDoRat
DpriDoRatL 
Adi. R  ^
D-W 
C-l
63.552
-0.354
-0.142
-0.377
-0.309
-0,140
7.206E-02
-5.92E-02
0.102
13.765
-2.932
-0.756
-2.118
-1.648
-5.096
1.681
-1.107
3.277
0.834
0.886
11.301
55.127 12.302
-0.355
- 0.112
-0.329
-0.257
-0.107
5.570E-02
-5.45E-02
-3.031
-0.613
-1.904
■1.412
-4.025
1.339
-1.050
9.632E-02
0.796
0.784
11.301
3.188
22,057
7.312E-02
-8.98E-02
-9.07E-02
-0.157
-7.85E-02
2.658E-02
-5.61 E-02
1.802E-02
0.793
I .  044
I I .  301
13.325
1.690
-1.331
-1.422
-2.336
-7.982
1.730
-2.929
1.615
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-6 392 -2 .7 lT -1.8W
-0.694 -9.175 -6.191
-0 109 -1.956 -0.151"
-2.442 0.119 3.400
7 412E-02 0.991 5.752E-02
0.694 -3.55E-02 - U . / O D
« n o i i F . n o 0.970 2.289E-02 0.250
6.076E-02 1 .loo
.7 26F-02 -0.8761 -5.65E-02 -0.615
-Ö.JÖE-Ü2 -1.032
PriP.rR at 0 639 19.268 0.524 14.258
0.258 12.376
-0  233 -1.7941 -2.22E-02
-0.154 -0.1381 -1.690
LnPrir.rPat -0 267 -2.0591 -0.116 -0.81 Ö
-0.119 -1.466
DnriCrRatl 0 407 3.329 " 0.450"
3.320 1.946E-02 0.253
A  r i i  P z n 97 2 0.955
u . o u o
D-W 1 012 0.826
0.829
C-l 15.141
15.141 15.141
Notes'
DocCrRat model refers to 1966-1997, others t o 5-1997 . crecjjt
Contrary to the stationary models, it was not possible t effects are
variables in one equation, because once the req J rnnejition index of 
included the multicollinearity becomes very serious with a condition inde
129.
II.7.5. The Effect of the Central Provident Fund
Table II.7.5.a. The Effect of the CPF in Stationary Models
X/PNS P N S Pu N S
T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
Constant 13 167 13.899 22.346
14.081 16.960 16.259
DCPF 0 668 1.727 not sia. (1.243)
-1.092 -2.854
LDCPF not sin (-1.099) not sin. (-1.372)
not sig. 1-1:030)
DCPFL -0 971 -2.513 not sia. (-14581
not siq. (0,779)
Adi R* 0 12R 0.000
0.182
D-W 0.464 -
0.335
C-l 1.962 1.000
1.415
Constant 14.370 16.412 23.41 el 15.270
18.106 17.025
DCPFeff nrrf ftin (1.191) not sia. (0.703) -1.477
-2.420
LDCPFeff not siq. (-0.696) not siq. (-1.606)
-1.096 -1.797
DCPFeffL -1 537 -3.113 -1.732 -2.003
not sig. (0,377)
Adi R2 n 21 9 0.089
0.269
D-W 0.735 0.317
0.476
C-l 1.559 1.559
1.820
Note:
Models using CPFeff refer to 1966-97
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The dynamic effects of the CPF -  even after inclusion of lag or lead values -  appears 
weak in single-dimension models.401 Once level variables can be included in the 
stationary models the CPF's explanatory power increases substantially. However, 
low Durbin-Watson statistics again indicate a not yet fully robust model.
Table II.7.5.b. The Effect of the CPF in Non-Stationary Models
GNS 2 GNS FNS
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio
_  Constant 4.248 1.501 5.272 1.873 -21.235 -5.319
_ CPFrate 1.059 13.344 0.929 11.761 0.343 30.594
DCPF -0.458 -1.040 -0.327 -0.745 -7.82E-02 -1.257
__ l d c p f 0.240 0.583 0.392 0.955 -0.184 -3.156
__ DCPFL -0.855 -2.196 -0.599 -1.546 -4.91 E-02 -0.893
Adj. Rz 0.865 0.825 0.974
D-W 0.420 0.352 0.835
C-l 7.301 7.301 7.301
Constant 12.376 5.120 12.418 5.005 -0.161 -0.305
CPFeff 1.358 13.356 1.188 11.388 0.459 20.688
DCPFeff -0.602 -1.107 -0.399 -0.714 2.144E-02 0.180
LDCPFeff 0.175 -2.319 0.415 0.728 -0.243 0.389
DCPFeffL -1.197 0.316 -0.878 -1.657 4.388E-02 -2.005
Adi. Rz 0.882 0.836 0.948
D-W 0.422 0.349 0.495
C-l 6.818 6.818 6.818
Note:
Models using CPFeff referto 1966-97
II.7.6. The Effect of Interest Rates and Life-Expectancy
Interest rates do not prove statistically significant if regressed on saving by 
themselves. Life-Expectancy, on the other hand, proves statistically significant at 
least in the non-stationary models, which also attract high R-squareds but are highly 
affected by multi-collinearity between the dynamic and level variables resulting in a 
condition index of 72.
401 The inclusion of lag or lead variables appears opportune even within stationary models, because a 
forward looking consumer is likely to incorporate past and anticipate announced future changes of the 
compulsory saving regime in his saving behaviour. Agrawal (2001) has found the lead of the CPFrate 
to be statistically significant in his DOLS model for gross-national-savings.
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III. With all Diligence Due: Where did all the Savings go?
Investment behaviour is the essential link running from saving to growth, but 
has rarely and if at all only to a limited degree been investigated in Singapore's 
case. This has largely been due to the lack of a readily accessible data source. In 
an attempt to close this gap, a large variety of government and private sources 
have been combined into a new database, which allows a much more revealing 
investigation into Singapore's investment pattern than hitherto possible and 
leads to a number of new insights about Singapore's recent economic history.
Chapter One has shown that Singapore can be compared to a child with a good 
athletic built growing up in a family environment of sports enthusiasts. The odds 
that the child will become a successful sports person are in its favour. Chapter Two 
has shown what the child did to realise its potential. If we wanted to extend this 
metaphor further, this chapter will now finally look at the training and 
competition schedule of the child, at how much it was able to set the schedule 
itself and how much was determined by its trainers and at where it invested 
most of its energies to reap the gains it did.
Using a variety of sources, the following accounting exercise is trying to 
determine which agency controlled what portion of the total saving pool and 
where did it decide to invest it. The exercises offer insights into the literature on 
the country's saving performance and growth.
Contrary to the earlier chapters, the accounting exercise does not test any 
hypothesis in its own right. Instead by purely compiling the numbers it offers 
upper and/or lower limits for a number of common speculations about 
Singapore's economic history, The exercise is able to show that Singapore's 
government was in control of the equivalent of eighty percent of the country's 
savings. However, the analysis also shows that the government only made final
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investment decisions for two-thirds of the funds it controlled. Moreover, as a 
lower limit about one fifth of the total investment pool or fourteen percent of 
cumulative 1965-99 GNP was used as working capital, which would indicate that 
a more efficient use of the funds, i.e. less foregone consumption, could have still 
been possible without affecting the investment success. The working capital 
appears to have been accumulated solely by the public sphere, which has 
Surrendered some of it to compensate the financial limitations of the private 
sector. The exercise finds that private investment was predominantly directed 
towards the service sector and public investment largely towards overseas. 
Based on their investment decisions Singaporeans did not see an exploitable 
comparative advantage in manufacturing. Even foreign investors, who 
dominated the comparatively little manufacturing investments made, primarily 
committed their funds to the tertiary sector. The analysis also shows that 
Singapore was not a flying goose in the strict sense. Sngapore's development did 
not follow a flying geese pattern in which the country copied another country's 
earlier development success story and invested in a successive list of increasingly 
advanced industries. Instead Singaporeans decided to invest in the tertiary sector 
from the start. If at all, it was the foreigners who were the flying geese, using 
Singapore for their own industrial sequencing.
The Chapter will first review the relevant literature strings dealing with the 
degree of government control, the standard development story of labour- 
intensive manufacturing, the Flying Geese Hypothesis and the question of over­
saving. The second part will describe m some detail the sources, data constraints 
and procedures used to compile the data set. Finally, the third section will 
present the findings followed by a short conclusion.
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HI-1. Literature Review
The existing literature on this subject area is very limited. Similar attempts have 
not been made before. The only known example of something even remotely 
similar is Nehru and Dhareshwar (1993), who create time-series on capital stocks 
and Gross Domestic Fixed Investment for a number of countries, one of which is 
Singapore. Their GDFI series is very similar to the official GFCF series. However, 
they do not investigate investment patterns, nor do they try to include non-fixed 
investments, e.g. overseas assets and other financial investments, beyond those 
resulting in fixed capital stock. Some studies have focused on a certain aspect of 
Singapore's investment pattern, e.g. Low (1998), who describes Singapore's 
outward (private) direct investment for 1981-91.
On the other hand, the discussion of high or excessive government control is 
comparatively frequent, but has so far been hardly backed up with quantitative 
evidence. The literature review wffl therefore take its point of departure from the 
discussion of the degree of government control in Singapore, continue with a 
summary of the literature describing Singapore's development as one largely 
based on labour intensive manufacturing, which leads to the review of the Flying 
Geese Hypothesis o f . industrial sequencing The section will close with a 
discussion of the literature on over-saving in Singapore.402
111.1.1. The Degree of Government Control
The question of the degree of government control in Singapore and East Asia in 
general has seen a distinct evolution over time. Krueger (1978) is a prominent
402 The related issue of reasons for the country's high capital inflows has been investigated at quite some length in the literature and will thus not be 
covered here. Edwards (2000 pp. 204-5) gives a concise summary of the literature explaining international FDI capital flows. For a description of early 
FDI activity Into Singapore (especially from UK, Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, USA) see Hughes and You (1BO0). Huff (1905, pp. 1425-1429) 
also deals with FDt in Singapore and so does Ermisch and Huff (1999). Urn and Pang (1991) analyse F0I to Singapore and Malaysia.
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example for the early misconception of low government involvement in East 
Asia. Anne Krueger (1978), starting from an emphasis on trade, argues that those 
countries where government inteivention has been lower have exhibited higher 
growth rates, with influential examples being the four East Asian Tigers. This 
view has already been revised among others by Amsden (1989), Wade (1989), 
Rodrik (1994) and Lall (1996). Amsden (1989) pointed out that government 
intervention in Korea was much more extensive than has been portrayed in the 
literature up to that point Wade (1989 and 1990) showed that the governments of 
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all gave central attention to ways of augmenting 
and directing the composition of investment.™ They led rather than followed the 
markets.« He also argued that one of the lessons to be learnt from these 
countries' economic histories was that sectoral industrial policies that lead the 
market can improve upon growth outcomes of self-adjusting markets.™ From 
this point of view Wade (1989) compared the development policies employed by 
the nations of East Asia with those of Rosenstein-Rodan and Gerschenkron 
arguing for a big push in form of a sharp increase in capital formation under the 
prodding of government, allied at times with banks.« Similarly, Rodrik (1994) 
argued that the governments of South Korea and Taiwan played a crucial role in 
overcoming coordination failures in their respective economies. Lall (1996) 
argues that the initial misconception of a market driven interpretation of East 
Asian success was due to the timely coincidence with the rise of neo-liberalism in 
the USA and UK, which itself was due to the disillusionment with earlier 
development economics, which believed that markets in developing countries 
were'missing'or'inefficient'.403 5*07
Nevertheless, the World Bank's influential East Asian Miracle (1993) publication 
went to great pains to (largely) echo the low government involvement
403 Wade (1989, p.68)
404 Wade (1990,303) „
405 Wade (1989, p.89) Nevertheless, Wade alao pointed out Wat the governments gave little attenllon to ways o( increasing the efficiency ot resource 
use.
408 Wade (1989, p. 71) '
407 Lall (1998, p. 112). Lall also offers a summary of the development of the discussion about the degree of government control in feast Asia.
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hypothesis. On the one hand, it departed from the earlier World Bank approach 
by admitting that some markets actually did not function efficiently, and that 
government intervention was needed to remedy market failure. It also admitted 
the existence and pervasiveness of selective interventions in East Asia. However, 
on the other hand, it was obliged to defend the fundamental postulates of the 
World Bank's policy advice, that governments should not be selective in 
influencing resource allocation, and in particular, not mount industrial policy.« 
Similarly the financial development literature used to refer to Singapore as an 
example of the advantages of liberal internal finance in promoting rapid
economic growth,409
With particular respect to Singapore, Lim Chong-Yah (1991) had already 
concluded that the role of the government in Singapore's case had been central to 
Singapore's success based on his assessment of the role of public enterprises, 
fiscal policy, monetary policy, exchange rate policy and wage policy.4«  
However, Lim (1991) discussed the role of the government in the economy rather 
than its control over the economy. Asher (1989), on the other hand, tried to 
determine the degree of government control but had to conclude that the 
traditional measures such as tire share of government revenue in GDP or the 
share of government employees in the labour market do not adequately capture 
the degree of control in Singapore's case. Yet he is not able to calculate his own 
measure. Instead, he concludes that "the paucity of relevant and reliable 
empirical studies" necessitates a reliance on a qualitative rather than quantitative 
analysis.411 Years later Asher (2001) again comes to a similarly sceptical
conclusion:
While Singapore’s conventionally measured tax revenue to GDP ratio is 
rather low (fluctuating within a narrow range 15 to 18 percent during the
408 S o . for example Felix (1994) or Singh (1BB5) for good summaries and criticism of this and other aspects of the Wortd Bank's East Asian Miracle 
publication.
409 See for example McKinnon (1003, pp.2 and pp.12-13)
410 Lim (1991, pp. 202-214)
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1991-99 period), its total revenue to GDP ratio is not only high (reaching a 
peak of 37.2 percent of GDP in 1997), but has also shown considerable 
volatility. Even this does not fully capture the transfer of resources from the 
private sector to the public sector. This is because the budgetary figures, 
particularly for investment income and for capital receipts are incomplete 
and they do not include various off-budget accounts, preventing fiscal 
analysis on a consolidated basis. The balance sheet of the government is 
also presented in such a manner as to render rigorous analysis all but
impossible.* 412 4135
Notwithstanding these apparent data problems, Koh (1987) had already argued 
that the government had increasingly been playing "the role of an intermediary 
between savers and investors. This intermediary role of the government is 
unique among countries in the world."4«  According to Koh (1987), the public 
sector in Singapore commanded in the mid-1980s 70% of savings but only 30% of 
investment.«4 However, Koh (1987) does not give any details of his calculations 
or further support to this claim. Arguing along similar lines Ermisch and Huff 
(1999) state that although the government virtually determined Singapore's 
remarkable savings ratio, investment came mainly from private enterprise and in 
the form of direct foreign investment. Again, they make this claim without
reference or any statistical support.«5
Earlier Huff (1994) had already pointed out that in addition to government 
control of savings through the CPF, there was also a large indirect transfer of 
savings from the private sector to the government as a result of voluntary 
deposits with the Post Office Savings Bank since the POSBank was required to 
use most of the money deposited with it to buy government securities, or as
ABneroweu, p. iai)
412 Asher (2001, p. 4). His view on the usability of government budgetary statements is also shared in IMF (2000, p.3).
413 Koh (1087, p. 100)
414 Koh (1987. p. 82) „ „ .
415 Ermish and Huff (1099, p.22); Huff (1995c) at least contrasts the respective shares of the public and private sector In Gross National Saving and
GFCF, which ware published by the government until 1985,
. 247
Chapter Three Paae 248
deposits with the Monetary Authority of Singapore. Yet, he does not go on to 
quantitatively assess this 'redistribution'.416 In Ermish and Huff (1999) they 
argue, again without statistical support, that the mobilization of public savings 
relied chiefly on manipulation by the government, which used its control over 
public utilities and telecommunications (constituted as statutory boards and 
given monopoly status) to turn the internal terms of trade against workers.417 
Additionally, they argue that most of the private sector's contribution to 
Singapore's high savings rate was extracted through the government's Central 
Provident Fund.418
Alten (1995) tries to circumvent the (apparent) lack of empirical data by 
surveying the opinions of managing directors of multi-national companies in 
Singapore. Based on the answers obtained, he concluded that Singapore's 
"economic development is, above all, a political process, decided upon and 
guided by a strong government determined to overcome the country's backward 
economic status and to enter the first league of industrialised nations in the 
beginning of the next century."419 Easton and Walker (1997) use economic 
freedom indicators to address the question of government control on prices for a 
cross-section of 57 countries in 1985 and conclude not too surprisingly that 
market socialism is a continuum, i.e. there are countries with strict pricing rules 
and with less strict pricing rules even though they have similar public ownership 
structures. Overall ownership and pricing policy are positively associated, i.e. 
public ownership will influence pricing in reality.420 Chiu and Lui (1998) assess 
Singapore's policies and also come to the conclusion that Singapore's 
government was very active in shaping the country's industrialisation 
particularly through its pioneer industries policy, the taming of unions, 
provision of infrastructure and by inducing foreign investments through the
416 Huff (1994, p. 336)
417 Internal term» of trade are defined as workers wages In comparison with the prices at which they had to buy from government monopolies.
418 Ermish and Huff (1999, p. 30)
419 Alten (1995, p. 230)
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formation of alliances with foreign partners, thus reducing significantly the risk 
in such undertakings. However, they further emphasise the differences between 
Singapore and the other Tigers. Contrary to some of her neighbours, Singapore 
has kept the economy open to foreign trade and investment.
Another aspect of government control is the government's high degree of 
involvement in the private sector through its many Government-linked- 
Companies. The IMF (2000, p.9) quotes a recent study by La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes and Shleifer (1998) looking at the ownership structure of the twenty 
largest publicly traded firms in each of the 27 richest economies in the world, 
which has found that Singapore had the second-highest proportion of state- 
controlled firms (45 percent, second only to Austria), and higher than Korea and 
Japan.420 21 Control was defined as ownership of 20 percent of stocks or more. 
Another study by Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1999) using 2980 publicly traded 
corporations in nine East Asian countries reaches similar results. Within their 
sample, Singapore has the highest level of state control with 23.6% of the 221 
corporations scrutinised with state ownership of over 10%, 23.5% with 
ownership above 20% and 11.25% ownership above 30%. However, estimating 
the role of the GLCs in Singapore's economy has remained a contested issue.422 
For many years the annual review of the Singapore economy by the American 
Department of Commerce stated that GLCs produce as much as 60 per cent of 
GDP, an estimate taken form a report from the Ministry of Finance of 1993. The 
Singapore government has not commented on this estimate until very recently 
when, in answer to a question in parliament, the Minister of Trade and Industry 
stated that in addition to the government's own share of 8.9 percent of GDP the 
GLCs in fact contributed only 13 percent of GDP and foreign controlled
420 Martel socialism is defined as a system In which public ownership is pervasive but where, nevertheless, mantels are permitted to dear. In theory, 
reliance on public or private ownership is determined separately from the Issue of control of market outcomes. Easton and Walker (18S7) offer no 
direct reference to Singapore.
421 IMF (2000, p.9)
422 This section on the role of the GLCs follows Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp.13-16) See also Peebles and Wilson (2002. pp. 4449) for more details 
on the interrelationships between the different GLCs and other government bodies.
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companies 42 pet cent®  Surprisingly, the Heritage Foundation, which still 
ranks Singapore as the second most free economy in the world, states that GLCs 
dominate Singapore's economy, constituting up to 70 percent of Singapore- 
owned companies and generating up to 60 percent of GDP. Moreover, it detected 
increasing evidence of Government intervention in Singapore's economy which 
led to it being downgraded on this criterion.«* The issue is further complicated 
by the fact that some of the GLCs in defence-related areas or strategic sectors are 
exempted from having to file accounts with the Registrar of Companies, as Low
(1998) points out«» Low estimates the number of GLCs in 1990 herself at 616.“  
Peebles and Wilson (2002) report that after the 1985 recession the Public Sector 
Divestment Committee recommended in 1987 the selling of shares in many 
GLCs. Nevertheless, the government has retained significant holdings in many 
listed companies such as Singapore Telecommunications (79.7 per cent), Semb 
Corporation Industries (58.8 per cent), Singapore Airlines (53.8 per cent) and 
Singapore National Printers Corporation (49.0 per cent) and others at present.® 
The GLCs owned by Temasek Holdings alone accounted for about 10 per cent of 
GDP and about 27 per cent of the stock market capitalization in 2000 despite 
years of privatization.« Upon review of the literature, Peebles and Wilson (2002) 
summarise that it has proved very difficult to compile a complete list of GLCs.® 
They also argue that many aspects of the government's influence over the 
economy's resources are not revealed in such numbers as the proportion of GLCs 
or the public sector in output Ownership is not the main factor but rather how 
the government can mobilize resources and allocate them where it sees fit.®  
However, the desired information is not offered in their publication. 4235*7890
423 The Strait« Times, 24 February 2001, p. H8; and Sin9apore Department o» Statistics (2001)
424 The 2001 Index of Economic Freedom
425 Low (1898, p 159)
428 Low (1098, p. 201)
427 IMF (2000, p. 11)
428 Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 48)
429 Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 44)
430 Peebles and Wlson (2002, p. 24)
250
Chapter TTirep
Page 251
Approaching the question of government control from a qualitative angle 
necessarily leads to the government's own view on this issue. Yet, the picture 
which emerges appears at first ambiguous. Goh, Keng-Swce, Singapore s deputy 
prime minister at the time and former Finance Minister, wrote in 1972: "The 
government has to be the planner and the mobilizer of the economic effort” but 
“the free enterprise system, correctly nurtured and adroitly handled, can serve as 
a powerful and versatile instrument of economic growth."431 432In 1976, Goh Keng- 
Swee writes: "The laissez faire policies of the colonial era have led Singapore to a 
dead end, with little economic growth, massive unemployment, wretched 
housing and inadequate education. We had to try a more activist and 
interventionist approach."« Lee Kuan Yew is quoted in the Straits Times, 
January 6, 1982, as saying: "Those developing countries that have tried 
centralized state planning and nationalized economic activity, and put 
bureaucrats in place of entrepreneurs, they have stagnated." The ambiguity 
seems to suggest that the government was not quite sure where to strike the 
balance between a free market economy and a more centrally planned economy. 
The commitment to let the market set the prices appears to have been rather 
strong. Yet, the leaders also seemed convinced that some degree of control over 
the factors of production was necessary, particularly the control over credit.433 43
The government was also able to strongly influence the wage setting procedures 
through its National Wage Council, which Huff (1995c and 1995d) considers to 
be one of the central aspects of Singapore government control. Moreover, the 
government was convinced that the state together with foreign MNCs needed to 
compensate for a lack of entrepreneurs in Singapore.4
431 Huff (i BBS, p.33B), quoting Goh Keng-Swee In The Aslan, 20 August 1072,
432 Goh (1B78, p 84)
433 Lee (2000, p. 639) offers a very telling quote. Lee writes that when advising China on their development options in the 1980s Goh Keng-Swee 
“believed China's most Important problem was the inability of the People's Bank of China (PBGC), their central bank, to control credit.'
434 See for example Hughes (1069, p.29 and pp.32-33), Hermann (1070, p. 217), Yoshlhara (1976, p. 21 and p. 162), and Lee (2000, p. 86)
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In summary, a high degree of control by the government in Singapore has 
become the accepted view.435 However, so far the lack of data has not allowed to 
Put a figure on it. If the government's own position has been assessed it was 
mostly through general macro-economic indicators or the government's budget 
statements. The government's Financial Statements have not been used. Nor 
have the balance sheets of government banks been reassessed and consolidated 
into the government's own financial position. Potentially very informative 
sources have yet gone unused, particularly when considering the central role of 
capital accumulation and thus saving and investment for Singapore's economic 
development.
111-1.2. Labour Intensive Industrialisation
The share of manufacturing value added in GDP more than doubled in 
Singapore between 1960 and the early 1980s. The World Bank's Development 
Indicators show an increase from 16.2 percent in 1960 to a peak of 39.2 percent in 
1984. The share of the labour force employed in manufacturing rose from 14.2 
percent at the census year of 1957 to a peak of 30.4 percent in 1981.436 Based on 
this 'transformation' Singapore's development story is often interpreted in the 
literature as springing from the exploitation of a comparative advantage in cheap 
labour through labour intensive manufacturing, which was followed by a move 
«P the (manufacturing) value-chain. This understanding is founded in the
435 Huff (1995C p.1) probably capture. this view be« when he writes: -The Singapore model featured a strongly Interventionist government and
Planning, which went well beyond me Wodd BanK'a 'market-friend!/ approach to Include -market replacement-, tn Singapore, decisive departures from 
the price mechanism and a  domestically managed regime allowed capitalism to work." _ ' „ , , „ ,, . .
436 Labour tome ratio, taken from Dept, of Statistic (1982): Economic and Social Slal,sties; Tab,. S A  p. 37. A ve-V Importani .f is tic  far he newly 
independent Singapore is the shift away from rubber processing to — ctunng. <859 manufacturing output was 6 *  38 8 9  < ™ > M l e  the vatu, 
of rubber processing stood a. S* 1186.8 million; by 1963 manufacturing had overtaken rubber processing wimjote, ouftrul of 843.8 and 74M  
respectively and by 1966 manufacturing had surpassed the rubber processing output from 1959 with total manufaefurtrig ortpul of SJ; 1325.8. The 
Increase in manufacturing was able to compensate for the fall In the rubber processing industries. The EDB Annual Report 1969 (p.52) offers me 
following figures for total output:
fnWiórt "m u — "1TOJ— "TW T~ TBB2— "1U63 ~ m r ~ "TUBS - tbbb— TBB7— 1UB8 ~T9B9—
~raamn3EiOTmjr ~45B:8— ■■«BIT ' TJUtl'.'J--J "B4'X8" U27.lT "VJHb'.B-" ' IBB 77 “ Vl/b.?1 "7635T "
“TTHBB rTT95V "BUTT" hrrmnT~ TiC rB" euBrt 'TSBT.Tf r 646.5 ’ '5687.... "BT9'.'4 ~BD57
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government's own view of Singapore's development and takes further support 
from the very well publicised incentives given to "pioneer industries" by the 
Singapore government.^'7 Exemplary proponents of this (standard) view of the 
country's development are Yoshihara (1976), Peoples Action Party (1985), Meier 
(1986), Lim (1991), Chan (1993), Islam and Chodhury (1997) or Peebles and 
Wilson (2002). This notion is even more prevalent in the popular press, see for 
example The Economist (June 1st, 20002, p. 59).438
The Peoples Action Party summarised Singapore's development up to 1985 in 
four phases:439
1. 1956-65: growth of import-substitution industries
2. 1965-73: trend towards labour-intensive industries. Examples given are: 
shipbuilding and ship-repairing, assembly^ refrigerators and integrated
circuits, production of garments and wigs
3. 1973-1978: shift towards more diversified and higher value-added 
industries Examples given are: production of semi-synthetic penicillin, 
oil refinery, oilfield equipment, liquid crystal displays, colour tv-tubes
4. 1978-84: upgrading and restructuring into skill and technology intensive 
industries. Examples given are: electronic components and materials,
computer hard-drives.
T l  „ 1 —.............................— ■— , . . t.  industrialise In order to develop was the prevalent view when Singapore set out to Join the
urlhermore, the belief that a  conn ry * ou economists who set up the development plans for foe newly independent Asian
586 tor wamp,e ^  f t .  was, and it. near absence ft f t .  East ,ha, exp ired  f t .  d.spemy ln
we2 .  7 ‘2 Z T “ xpec,ad <o Introduce new teohnotogy, new soda, attitudes, raise ieveis of easting ski»,, provide employment
S T v  ' T  nUmber* 01 Unemp'0y.Bdto°r “" t r ^ r e t ^ p l ' i y 1Z 7 g T L m2 Z Zl Z  Z  separation from Malaysia, and emphasized 
4 3 8 Ku"' ° <197S' p10)' ,Or)8r r n M 9 7  and p. 202) wiles: *F«m « « « »  « «  -  # » time of independence in 1965,
. ’‘P orlenled' ,abour fntensiv« In us na z ' '  ^s ,ructuraiiy, Singapore has been transformed from a largely entrepot trade economy
i n T T  h8‘ me,8m° r  T  >Z Z Z Z Z Z Z  ¡ S l U  of Singapore, forming 71,8% of fo.al exports in 1988, whereas in 
% of fotai exports, Z  ) Export-oriented industrialisation has remained the main strategy of development. It consist, of a 
broad rang“ veloplnt activities, 2 *  as the establishment ot physical infrastructure, construction of industrial parks, manpower training and 
development creaiion of a legal and administrative framework for Industrial promotion, and fiscal Incenhves tor W l e d  Indusfoe. As 
unemployment was a serious problem, the Initial emphasis was on labour-intensive Induslrtes. And a .  there was a  dearth o toe* 
entrepreneurship th em atorelJce was on foreign investment and tha creation of an investment climate conducive to such investments, Dot focal and 
forefoTto t a l  p’ace However the orientation towards labour-intensive industrialisation has shifted towards higher skilled, higher value added 
activities since 1979 ' Chan (1993 P 48) writes: 'Stressing their comparative advantage In an abundant, cheap, and malleable work force, these 
economies (East Asia folding Singapore) found a favourable niche In foe export of light-industrial, labourcnfonsiva products, such as textile*. shoes, 
and toys,. to foe of the d e v e i Z  countries.' Islam and Chodhuty (1997, p. 199) write: -fo foe 1960s, the economc strategy focused on foe
expansion offow-.kl.led, labour Intensive manufacturing activities. The focus shifted fo foe 1970s fo foe diversification o foe °
higher skill level, end higher value added activities- For an articie explicitly describing and anaiysing Singapore .  pioneer Industry policies see Ermish
439 PAPI1(W 85, pp 170-179): See for example also Goh (1995, pp. 34-38) about foe predominant role of manufacturing fo Singapoms economic 
development between 1960-90. fo a speech given in 1986 Goh (1995, p. 32) summarises: 'Let me sum up our expenence fo economic growth between 
1060-85, In the first 20 years, foe manufacturing sector was foe main engine of growth, providing rapid employment and Income.
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Some have built on this understanding of Singapore s development history and 
draw pessimistic conclusions from it for the country s economic future. Okposin 
(1997), for example, argues that after losing her comparative advantage in cheap 
labour combined with a high reliance on FDI Singapore will face difficult times in 
the future,«! Michael Porter even suggested, among other things, that the focus 
of the Singapore economy must shift much more towards services in order to 
cope with the challenges of the future,« Young (1992) interprets the country's 
rapid industrialisation as one of the main reasons for its low return on capital 
due to the fast redundance of former capital investments.
Overall the role of services in Singapore's development history has not often
been appreciated. Peebles and Wilson (2002) even refer to it as "apart from
certain quirks arising from its history as an entrpot trading centre and island city
state bereft of natural resources, Singapore's structural change began predictably
with labour-intensive industrialization in the late 1960s and the economy has
moved steadily up the value-added ladder ever since."« They write this even
though earlier in their book they point out one of the main advantages of the
_  . L hpreft of natural resources, namely its low importservice sector for an economy Deren ui »a » « «  j  r
leakage.40 123*45
On the other hand, Gereffi (1994) offers a more differentiated understanding of 
Singapore's economy and those of the other East Asian NICs. He argues that East 
Asian NICs have managed to build successful industries beyond their initial 
comparative advantage and original factor endowments which was limited raw 
materials, unskilled but disciplined labour, and small markets. The East Asian
440 This PAP publicatiôn,"which celebrates 30^ 0 .  the p ari/, axlsianca, also —  -  no. without a cartain pdde -  .ha. .ne export, of 
rafngurator compressors to the US and Franca attracted protectionist response, in the ea y
441 Okposin (1990,p. 88)
442 Business Times, 6 August 2001
443 Young (1092. p 15 and pp 26-27)
4AS Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 135)
445 Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 74)
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NICs thus were motivated by the principle of dynamic competitive advantage 
rather than by their static comparative advantage in cheap, disciplined labour. «  
Huff (1994 and 1995c) is one of the few examples which assigns the development 
of the service sector a more central role. He argues that Are development of 
financial and business services followed a more precise planning strategy than 
manufacturing. He shows how this strategy was set out in the 1972 budget 
speech, strengthened in the 1981 economic development plan for the eighties and 
further elaborated in 1986 in The Singapore Economy: New Directions.« He 
points out that during the 1980s “every budget statement contained new 
measures aimed at financial innovation. A complementary thrust of government 
policy which aimed at attracting international financial institutions to Singapore 
was demonstrably successful. From 1981 to 1990, while there remained 13 
Singapore local banks offering a full range of banking services, the number of 
foreign banks rose from 86 to 128, and merchant banks from 39 to 68. By 1990 
there were 199 ACUs, since virtually all banks and merchant banks dealt in Asian 
dollars,"* 4748
HI.1.3. Of Product Cycles and Flying Geese
Bruce Cumings (1984) argued in his often cited analogy with flying geese that 
countries in Hast Asia followed one another in a developmental trajectory in 
which the latecomers replicate the developmental experience of the countries 
ahead of them, starting with the Japanese.449 T h e  Flying Geese hypothesis calls 
for a pattern of industrial sequencing, which moves from the import of consumer 
goods, to the production of consumer goods, to the export of consumer goods to
<46 Geroffi (1994, p. 36)
447 Huff (1994, p. 341) and Huff (1805c, pp-16-18)
uaq v f * ! ? 94' **’ ,, „ „ »i, Moan For an example of a graph visualising the flying geese pattern see tto (1992, p. 26), For a
440 This Idea was drat developed hy A k a m a t e u “ aTcent (lately) descriptive comparison of tha devaiopmen. poilcia. of Japan and me nummary of tha literature see Ohkawa and Kohama (1969), For a recent (<arg«<y> « » w p
Asian NICs see Yamada and Kuchifci (1997).
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the import of capital goods, the production of capital goods and the export of 
capital goods. In its final stage the production of earlier stage products is 
terminated. This view has found early support by Singapore's and in general 
East Asia's industrial policies but more recently has also attracted a fair share of 
criticism.
Early support stems from Singapore’s import substitution policies followed until 
the demise of the hope for a common market wiih Malaysia and later by the 
government's well publicised incentives given to pioneer industries, initially 
largely in labour intensive manufacturing.« Even local politicians have early on 
described an Asian group of newly independent states in Asia which followed 
similar development policies, e.g. Goh (1971). In one of Goh's earlier speeches 
given in 1967 he even directly refers to Japan as a leading example for 
modernization without the loss of cultural identity against the other option of a 
communist development« Meier (1986) also follows Cumings (1984) arguing 
that the East Asian NICs followed Japan and as the NICs move up the ladder of 
comparative advantage into capital-intensive and knowledge-intensive products, 
the second tier countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand) follow 
behind with exports from light industries such as food processing, textiles, 
clothing and simpler electronics.« Soon and Tan (1993) also write that 
Singapore's policy makers did look to Japan - as well as Germany - for lessons for 
their development plan. They extend this view further and argue that even more 
importantly "although Singapore did not have a role model for its bureaucracy, 
the same qualities have been significant in the economic success of Japan, 
Republic of Korea and Taiwan, China."« Ito (1996) also finds that die patterns in 
oulput and export for Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia and Thailand imply *52
_ -------------- -— T " “  „nun, international Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1955), end Legislative
See for example: Economic Davelopm _  , , .  ny Mr F J  Lyle a  Canadian Industrial expert, who delivered his suggestionsAssembly, Singapore (1959), which odors the Industrial development plan Oy Mr. t.J.uy» f
« r G ^ I S T ^ M V 'C a n ^ s i a ^ ^ m i z e  without recounts to the methods used by the communists? The Japanese have succeeded In establishing 
» modem state In awry sense of the word while preserving all that Is precious In their cultural heritage and discarding what is not consonan with 
Progress * See also Hughes (1969) for a summary of Singapore's early Industrialisation policies.
552 Meier (1988, p.1  A)
453 Soon and Tan (1993. p. 43)
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that these East Asian economies, with the exception of Hong Kong, are indeed 
repeating Japan's pattern of economic development,« However, to  (1996) also 
States that the flying geese hypothesis has not yet been rigorously tested beyond 
such observational evidence.* 455 4567
On the other hand, Bernard and Ravenhill (1995) disagree with the simplified 
flying geese analogy and the notion that other East Asian countries tried to copy 
the Japanese development trajectory. Instead, they argue for the globalisation of 
production networks, increased governmental disputes over economic 
relationships and the rapid pace of technological change as explanatory factors 
for the economic integration in East Asia. While they do not deal with Singapore 
explicitly, they find that the pattern of industrialization in Korea and Taiwan has 
been dramatically different from that pursued by the original goose, Japan. They 
point out that “although Korea and Taiwan, and more recently Malaysia and 
Thailand, may be exporting products in the same industries in which Japan 
enjoyed success a few years ago, the context in which they are doing so is 
substantially different, in terms of both industrial organisation and geopolitics. 
(...) [The] dependence on Japanese technology, coupled with the dependence of 
Japanese corporations on other locations in the region for lower-cost labour for 
assembly operations, has produced a new regional division of labour that is 
based not on national economies but on regionalized networks of production.“«  
They also do not think that ultimately the East Asian countries will be able to 
overcome this dependence due to substantial changes "in the global political 
economy and in production techniques in the last twenty years. Steeper learning 
curves, increased costs of research and development, and the necessity of 
locating within an established distribution network all exacerbate the problems 
faced by economies seeking to reduce their technological dependence."«» While 
they disagree with the idea that East-Asian countries simply tried to copy the
* 54  tto (1 69 6, p . 2 6 0 )
4 55  Ito (1 69 6, p . 2 5 0 )
456  B arn ard  a nd  R avanhill (1 8 9 5 , p . 2 0 8 )
457  B ernard  and Ravenhill (1 99 5, p  2 07 )
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Japanese trajectory, as a whole they do not oppose the notion of a process of 
economic integration in East Asia. Instead, their main criticism is that the flying 
geese analogy does not fully capture the complexity of the regional political 
economy and that product cycle theory is not in line with the industrial 
development of many East Asian countries, particularly Taiwan and Korea.
111.1.4. Over-Saving in Singapore
The question of over-saving in Singapore's case has been discussed, more or less 
directly, since the second half of the 1980s, partly initiated by the country's 
recession in 1985/86 which only Singapore experienced and was preceded by 
sustained increases in the country's saving rates peaking at 46.6 percent in 1983. 
One of the earliest examples, a study group of the National University headed by 
Prof. Um Chong-Yah, who was also the president of the tri-partite National 
Wage Council, did not necessarily address the question of over-saving directly, 
but still recommended changes to the CPF among them a reduction in 
mandatory contribution rates.® The study group argued that after provisions 
have been made for housing, for life annuity, and for Medisave, the 50% rate of 
contributions to the CPF in the early 1980s was quite in excess of the needs of an 
average worker in Singapore. Koh (1987) reads this as implying that Singapore 
had over-saved.® In fact, the government seems to have reached the same 
conclusion, because it did indeed lower the CPF contribution rates twice in 1986 
and 1 9 8 7 ,Nevertheless, the government has always emphatically disputed the 
view that Singaporeans are saving too much.® Han (1996), in a book edited by *461
♦58 Um at al (1988), This view I* reiterated In Ufn (1988a, pp. 234-235)
W  A ^ m i r a S ,  situation occurred again during the Aslan Crisis, when Singapore had reached another peak in her saving with 82.4 percent of 
GDP in 1998 TOsTme an occasional paper by Singapore's Department of Statistics (1699) on household expenditures point, out that S in w o .es  
households have reduced their expenditure mote than disposable Incomes have fallen In 1998 and that thus household savings In cased  while 
Incomes were declining. Such a situation Is hardly conducive to a recovery, although the study « a y . away from making any such value slatements. But
again the government meets by lowering the CPFTelesfrom fortyMo ieo2): Too mucfl Savings? Not true -  BG Lee'.
461 See Huff (1995b, p. 749) and Deputy Pnme Minister U e  in the Stratta rimes weewy **uyu*i '  " . _  . .
In this article Lee somewhat paradoxically argues that the country Is not suffering from oversaving because the private sector ha. access to abundant
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Lim Chong-Yah, argues that Lim's earlier position is no longer tenable and that 
statistical evidence had been "adduced to demonstrate that compulsory savings 
through the Central Provident Fund are not longer excessive. 462
Although not directly addressing the question of oversaving, Young s (1992) 
study shows that Singapore, although investing and saving significantly more 
than Hong Kong, only achieved similar growth, which can be interpreted as a 
clear sign for over-saving.463 Moreover, his study shows how the real return to 
capital has rapidly fallen in Singapore to levels well below Hong Kong's. His 
central finding that Singapore's before subsidy rate-of-return on capital was one 
of the lowest in the world is taken up by Huff (1995b). Huff argues that Young's 
results indicate that additions to output from further investment (the marginal 
efficiency of investment) may have been close to zero. If so, Singapore's share of 
investment in national income approached growth maximisation.464 This, he 
continues, is a sign that the Singapore government was not maximising utility 
but growth. If it had maximised utility the government would have targeted a 
higher return. Therefore, Huff (1995b) argues that while in terms of utility there 
might have been over-saving owing to a potentially unrewarded sacrifice of 
current consumption, in terms of growth there probably wasn't. However, he 
does not further quantify his argument, i.e. the potential degree of over-saving in 
terms of utility or growth. Moreover, the comparison with Hong Kong at similar 
growth rates still poses the question why Singapore was not able to both 
maximise utility and growth, as her city-state neighbour apparently did. If we 
accept that Hong Kong should be Singapore's benchmark, we must conclude that
u , < P ) 1 - jo nercent of Gross National Savings between 1975 and 1693. H® echoes the
<* w »  w « «  » » I » - 1“ » 4“ “  r r  ~
z air policy, in sxngapore me tf mwemment ha* wasted the Having* of Its «Utzons.* Thu executive summary of
the E «  S e S o t S  P r i n c e  Singaporean growth rates wen. no higher for all the oompulaoty Investment mqttimd of It.
citizens, it is fair to say that the government effectively dissipated all the forced savings.
464 Huff (1005b, p. 750)
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the country has clearly over-saved both in terms of utility and growth, unless we 
assume that Singapore's economy was not able out of some exogenous reason to 
increase its productivity further and thus raise its returns closer to world levels 
and consequently maximise its growth rates even m ore.« Gapinski (1999) 
reaches the same conclusion that given the much higher rate of labour and 
capital accumulation in Singapore, the country should have experienced faster 
growth of output and labour productivity than did Hong Kong.« Gapinski
(1999) explains this growth shortfall by the high degree of government 
interventionism and reduced civil liberties in Singapore, which are manifested in 
the high saving rates. He refers to his earlier work (Gapinski, 1996), which has 
argued empirically that reduced civil liberties undermine economic growth. His 
calculations also show how the marginal product of capital in Singapore falls 
from 0.103 in 1961-65 to 0.028 in 1986-90. These dramatic declines 
notwithstanding, Singapore did however manage to post marginal products 
above the real rate of interest, which Gapinski (1999) interprets as a confirmation 
Of the consonance of the country's capital acquisitions with capital optimization.
The World Bank's influential 'East Asian Miracle' publication, on the other hand, 
concluded that Singapore may have compelled its consumers to save too much. 
According to the World Bank, the country's overall low TFP performance lends 
support to the thesis that social returns of Singapore's saving were not very high, 
possibly even below the opportunity costs of foregone consumption.«
In the absence of direct evidence, which according to Koh (1987) is lacking due to 
the difficulties in calculating an optimal saving rate, he also interprets the rising 
Incremental Capital to Output Ratio (ICOR) in the 1980s as suggesting that there 
are increasing amounts of excess capacity. This in turn implies that "there is less *46
S>n9ap0m has the burden of maintaining a ^  referl w * ,  ba8|o difference that Singapore had to b aa self-
comparatively high .hare due to the amall «1» of tha W W L M  j  ?  > d housing even though I Wed to avoid the
reliant nation: *We had to be a nation or we would cease to exist. We had to »uosioize ouuuw
debilitating effect» of welfarism."
466 Gapinski (1999, pp. 154-159)
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need for Singapore to invest as much as it has done over tire last few years, and 
hence from the standpoint of the adequacy of savings, the need to save as much 
as it has done is less. Thus, there is a strong presumption that Singapore has 
over-saved." 467 68 Lim (1988a), without referring to excessive savings as directly, 
also points to a rising ICOR from 2.8 for the period 1965-73 to 4.6 for 1974-83.469 
Similarly, Hooley (1995) approaches the question from an analysis of the ICOR as 
an arguably problematic but still best available measure for investment efficiency 
for a whole economy and finds that Singapore's investment efficiency between 
1977-89 has indeed been below that of other Hast Asian economies but above that 
of South East Asian countries. Arndt (1991 and 1993) also finds Singapore's ICOR 
to be the highest, i.e. the least efficient, in his Asian sample, except for the 
Philippines. Even India's ICOR was lower in tire 1980s. However, as Peebles and 
Wilson (2002) point out the 1980s are particularly bad for an analysis of 
investment efficiency for Singapore due to the fact that the country experienced 
two recession years and much investment was in housing. Peebles and Wilson 
(2002) show that Singapore's ICOR in the 1980s was indeed higher than in tire 
two earlier and the following decade.470 Peebles and Wilson (2002) also refer to a 
discussion centering around an unpublished paper by Toh and Ng (2000), which 
most likely formed the basis for deputy prime minister Lee Hsien Loong's claim 
that Singapore's ICOR of around 5 during the 1990s compares favourably to that 
of Hong Kong with 9 and even Japan with 18.471 Han (1996) argues that 
Singapore's ICOR needs to be compared with Japan or Switzerland rather than 
its closer East Asian neighbours since these two countries share a very limited 
natural resource base with Singapore and finds that indeed Singapore does 
compare favourably to these countries between 1977-91.*72 Peebles and W ilson 
(2002) discuss Singapore's absolute capital-output ratio, finding similar results as 
for the ICOR calculation, namely a continuously rising ratio between 1978-85 and
467 World Bank (1994, p. 2 2 1 )
468 Koh (1987, p. 86) However, it must ba noted, that a rising ICOR could also mean that new technologies simply demand higher capital ratios. In 
Mher words, a rising ICOR is not necessarily a sign of excess capacity but possibly a sign of structural changes In the economy.
469 Lim (1988a, p. 232)
470 Peebles and Wltson (2002, p. 67)
471 Lee, Helen Loong: Speech at the 2000 Singapore Business Awards; as cited by Peebles and Wilson (2002, p, 67)
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constant values for 1985-96. In 1996 the capital-output ratio is tile highest 
compared to those o f Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand and about 
the same as that of the United States.®  Miles and Scott (2002) compare the 1965- 
90 average investment ratios for 27 countries and relate them to the 'Golden 
Rule' finding that Singapore together with Japan have had high investment 
ratios but still within the 'target range' of 30-35 percent of GNP, which the 
Golden Rule would approximate as the opfimal investment rate in an 
industrialised steady state economy.* 47374
Guest and McDonald (2000) built a simulation model based on maximising a 
social utility function and various assumptions about productivity growth, 
demographic change and other aspects. For Singapore, their estimate o f the 
optimal saving rate for 1996 was 30.9%, much lower than their estimate of the 
actual rate o f 45.4%. Claessens et al.(1998) approach the question on the company 
level by calculating the return on assets defined as EBIT over Total Assets less 
annual inflation for 358 Singaporean companies. Singapore's average 4.4 percent 
real return for 1988-96 is one of the lowest among the country's Asian peers. 
Only Japan and Korea have worse returns. However, it Is comparable to 
Germany's 4 .7  percent or the United States' 5.3 percent, while Singapore's new 
investments ratio (new investments as percent of existing investment) with 10.4% 
was much higher than that of the United States (3.4) or Germany (2.5) and even 
Japan (8 .0 ).®  However, the sample of companies is not necessarily 
representative o f the economy, covering mainly large firms and not taking into 
account the econom y's structural composition. H ie  sample m ight be biased, for 
example, towards utility companies with high assets and low ROA while the 
total economy m ight have a different structure.
Han (1996, pp. 27-28)
473 Peebles and Wilson (2002, p.S6> robh-nnunlas production function with a mammal nrtum io capital which 1* approximated
474 Mils« and Scott (2002, p. 104). This assumes a standard Cobb-Douglas pr ias
by tha factor share of capital in GDP, which In turo stands at 30-35% In most Industrialisad steady state economies.
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111.2. Procedures, Data Sources and Data Constraints
As discussed above investment behaviour has so far rarely and if at all only to a 
limited degree been investigated,- largely due to the lack of a readily accessible 
data source. In an attempt to close this gap, a large variety of government and 
private sources have been combined into a new database, which allows a much 
more revealing investigation into Singapore's investment pattern than hitherto 
possible and leads to a number of new insights into Singapore's recent economic
, . .. to ta l in v e stm e n t p o o l, in clu siv e  o f
T h e firs t s te p  w a s  to  d e te rm in e  th e  co u n try  s to ta l m v « u  f
appropriated foreign savings, followed by the reclassification of Gross National
S av in g s in to  p u b lic sav in g s  o n  th e  o n e  h a n d , a n d  v o lu n ta ry  an d  co m p u lso ry
private savings on the other hand.™  Subsequently, the amount of foreign and
voluntary private savings which the government managed to control through its
,  , . . .. „ „  r1f»«i<;ified in  o rd e r  to  d e riv e  a  m o re  a c c u ra teo w n  fin an cial in stitu tio n s w a s  re-classmea
estimate of the government's role in the allocation process. The exercise 
continued by classifying total investments made over time by the agency in 
Charge o f the ultimate investment decision and by the main asset categories into 
which the funds were invested. Graph III.2. summarises the procedure
g rap h ica lly .
<75 The return* calculated tor Germany and the USA relate to those companies listed on the DAX or NYSE respectively.
<76 Disaggregating the official Gras* National Saving* «arias followed the *ame methodology as described tn Chapter Two and Is therefore not 
separately discussed here. This chapter witt use the GNS series adjusted for housing withdrawals as sat out In Chapter Two.
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Graph III.2. The Accounting Exercise
111.2.1. Gross Foreign Savings
In order to derive the total investment pool available for the purposes of this 
investigation Total Gross Foreign Savings appropriated into the Singapore
economy need to be added to GNS.
Gross foreign savings appropriated into Singapore's economy are defined as the 
sum of Direct Investment Inflows, Portfolio Investment Inflows, Other 
Investment Inflows (including trade credits) as well as Errors and Omissions«* 
The data is taken from the IMF's Balance of Payments publication, which has two
Omission, are of a substantial nature In the ease of s 'n9aP°'®‘  Omlssio^ are so high In Singapore's case. One possible explanation is the
S$351 billion of appropriated foreign savings, it Is not «toanaJfB w  confrontation between the two countries during the formation
omission of trade with Indonesia in Its national accounts, stemming from the years or me conn
of the Federation of Malaya. For an early reference to this peculiarity see  Yang (1870, p. ).
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main data constraints. Firstly, some subsections are netted before 1987, since 
separation between changes in assets and liabilities was not strictly adhered to, 
e.g. other long-term capital of deposit money banks. Before 1977 direct and 
portfolio investments are only reported as net-inflows. Errors and Omissions are 
by definition netted figures. This results in a tendency in the data-set to 
underestimate the additions to the total investment pool stemming from foreign 
sources. Secondly, the data offered in the annual IMF publications appears to 
have undergone regular and retro-active alterations. Assuming that the 
alterations are correcting mistakes from the past and not adding any of their 
own, the most recent figures for each year were used to compile the series, i.e. 
the observation for year X was taken from the publication in year X+t when year 
X lay too far in the past to be reported any longer in year X+t+1. 
Notwithstanding these constraints, the data available through the IMF is much 
more detailed than any official Singaporean publication, which makes using it
inevitable.
A potential difficulty occurs because data from national income accounting is 
combined with information taken from the Balance of Payments. The basic 
national income identity, which is used to determine GNS, already incorporates 
Net-Exports and Net-Income-From-Abroad, which are both accounted for in the 
Current Account of the BoP with their counter-entry in the Capital Account and 
thus might appear to be a source for double-counting. However, the opposite is 
the case. Without the inclusion of the Capital Account the total available 
investment pool would be substantially understated. If a country experiences a 
trade deficit, for example, the resulting net-imports reduce gross national saving 
but on a financial perspective are only made possible through foreign savings 
appropriated into the economy. Therefore, the total available investment pool 
would actually be understated if only Gross-National-Savings would be 
considered.478 If the country experiences an export surplus, as Singapore has *
*78 In mathematical form the calculation Is represented as follows.
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since the mid-1980s, the economy is investing overseas by giving trade credits to 
foreign buyers. T h e  income effect of the net-exports increases gross national 
savings and is accounted for via the national accounts. The decision to allow the 
buyers to finance these purchases through trade credits or the sale of other 
investment vehicles is an allocation decision which should not affect the total 
investment pool. Therefore, only credit entries in the capital account of the BoP 
are used to determine total appropriated foreign savings and thus double-
counting is prevented.479
111.2.2. Determining the Degree of Government Control
In order to derive the degree of government control that portion of voluntary 
savings, which was held through toe government's financial institutions, needs 
to be re-classified. This in turn requires the construction of a data-series for all 
non-govemment liabilities on the balance sheets of the DBS, POSBank, MAS and 
BCCS,4») The sources and formulas used in detail are:
DBS: Total Liabilities less Government Loans both taken from DBS
annual reports.481
where
Total Investment Pool • GNS + Credit Entries in Capital Account
+ Trade Credits Received + Other Investment Inflow« + Error» andGNS« Y -C -G -N et-Im ports
Credit Entries In Capital Account « Direct and Portfolio Investment Inflows 
Omissions
R e a m in g  the formulae give. us: other Investment + Error,«Omission, ♦ (Trade Credit, Received -  Net-Imports)
Total investment Pool *  Y ~ C -  G + Direct and Portfolio Investment * Other Investment fcrrorsaumi
„„umoorts affects the total Investment pool. In other words only net-imports which have not been 
Therefore, only the balance of trade credits and net-imports whic„ were n0, UBad ,0 finance net-imports would increase the pool,
financed by trade credits would lower the investment pool an 7 covered as such when the Investments are traced.
479 Overseas trade credits are part of Sin8a^ *  0(f s aJngs Bank, MAS: Monetaty Authority of Singapore, Singapore's Central Bank;
4B0 DBS: Development Bank of Singapore; POSBank. Post-Offlce-savt g
BCCS: Board of Currency Control Singapore . (und8 payable, but not contlngencies/guarantees and
481 To,a. liabilities side of DBS balance sheet-.II deposits, share * ^ m 2 t Z 2  prior to1904. Fmm 1994 on, however, to . annuel
other off-balance sheet liabilities. Loans from the Singapore got* a|nount nas fanBn to sjMmilllon In 1983 and Is therefore negligible,
«ports do not list Singapore government loan* separately any • ■ |oan,  ^„andlng to toe DBS after toe financial year 1092/3.
The loan »chadule In the government's financial *'a“ ma"  J i||(|J  . ¡ « e  share-issues after toe banks' creation could not be separated Into 
Government share capital was not deducted from DBS tot ’ , 1008 6$1 ,65billion which Is less than 2% of total liabilities this
government and nongovernment placements. Howeireh since o P ^  ^  B0V8mm8nt.s thar9 capital Is held by government investment
omission should not alter the results substantially. Furthermo , i ® .  must ^  considered part of the private sector along with all
vehicles, such as Temasek and MND Holdings, which -  due to the lack of data 
other government-linked companies.
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POSBank: Total amounts due to depositors as reported in the MAS 
annual report.482
MAS: total balances of Commercial Banks and Finance Companies with 
the MAS taken from the MAS annual reports.8 For the years 1965-69 
before the MAS' creation this refers to balances with the Accountant 
General and Bank Negara Malaysia as reported in Singapore's Statistical 
Yearbooks.
BCCS: non-currency liabilities taken from BCCS annual reports.484
In addidon to the share of voluntary private savings captured by the 
government's financial insfituaons the share of foreign savings which was 
commanded by the government must also be re-classified. The information is 
taken from the IMF's Balance of Payments publications. However, it is 
questionable to which degree public and private spheres have truly been kept 
separate in the country's balance of payments statistics.
A further complication derives from the fact that after 1968 the government and 
the MAS operate on a financial year running until March 31«. The financial years 
were re-apportioned over the respective calendar years, for example % of the 
increase between financial years 1997/8 and 1998/9 are allocated to calendar 
year 1998 and V. to calendar year 1999, with calendar year 1998 receiving >/. of the 
increase between financial years 1996/7 and 1997/8.
482 The government uses the MAS as Its bank and thus II I* very unlikely that any of these deposit* are government funds,
483 This definition excludes any deposits from financial Institutions other than commercial banks and finance companies, such as Insurance companies 
hr merchant banks, which makes this figure a conservative estimate. However, the definition would include the DBS’s deposits with the MAS, which 
•lave already been accounted for as part of the DBS non-government liabilities. Unfortunately, neither the MAS hor the DBS specify the amount ot DBS 
reserves deposited with the MAS. Therefore, an Imputation becomes necessary. Assuming that the DBS holds a similar ratio of Its non-bank customer 
^posits with the MAS as ihe average commercial bank, we can impute a figure for the DBS' deposits will) the MAS. The reserve ratio for each year of 
911 commercial banks defined as deposits with MAS over total deposit* by non-bank customers taken from the MAS’ annual reports Is applied to the 
DBS’ non-bank customer deposits taken from the bank's annual reports. The POSBank Is not considered a commercial bank until It Is acquired by the 
DBS in 1888. Therefore, no imputation of Its likely deposits with the MAS Is necessary to avoid a potential problem of doubte-countlng.
4®4 Since these non-currency liabilities arc predominantly funds that arc to ba transferred to the Consolidated Fund, l.e. to the government, this 
treatment assumes that the government has not yet accounted for these funds as part of Total Government Revenue, otherwise (tvs would lead to 
some degree of doublecounting, e g. In 1999 the BCCS showed 132 Mil. to be transferred to Consolidated Account -  in our treatment these funds are 
^Wltional to the governments financial surplus (Tot Rev. -  Consumption) of 35.8 Bullion in 1999.
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111.2.3. Tracing Public Investments
While the establishment of the savings pool and the degree of government 
control looks at the liabilities side of the saving agencies' balance sheets, tracmg 
the corresponding investments requires an analysis of the development of their 
respective assets. The task is complicated by the fact that these agencies exchange 
funds among themselves, which if counted each tíme the same funds appear on 
one of the agencies' asset side will lead to a substantial degree of double­
counting. For example the CPF carries government bonds on its asset side and
. . „ -pcnprtive funds received from the CPF as anthe government itself shows the respecn
_  , • i, rarrv a final investment decision must beasset. Therefore, only assets which carry a u
included in the analysis. The sources used for this exercise were tíre central 
government's financial statements and the annua, reports for the indmdual 
institutions. Table III.2.3. summarises the respective asset items included and
excluded.
Even though the asset side of the balance sheets has been disentangled as well as 
the information provided permits, some degree of double-counting is still 
possible, since the individual institutions use different formats to categorise their 
assets and since the schedules to their respective accounts vary substantially m 
terms of the detaU offered -  not only between them but also over time.
Two further investment vehicles need to be considered in order to fully capture 
the government's investment pattern, namely the government's capital 
expenditures and the country's foreign reserves. The former is necessa^ because 
unlike a private enterprise the government does not capitalize its cap.tal 
expenditures onto its balance sheet in the form of fixed assets. The latter becomes
necessary, because the officially reported foreign reserves do not match the
, ,  , ,, UAC j  +Via RCCS which indicates that there are external assets held by the MAS and the wmu.
further vehicles involved in the foreign r e s e r v e  position of the country.
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Table III.2.3.: Asset Categorisation for Public Investments485
Included Assets,
i.e. with final Investment decision
Excluded Assets,
i.e. without final investment decision
Central
Government
• Loans Receivable
• Advances Receivable
• Quoted Investments
• Unquoted Investments
• Public funds administered by 
organs of state
• Other Assets
• Cash
• Government Stocks
• Deposits with investment agents
DBS • Loans Receivable
• Domestic Equity Investments
• Real Estate
• Overseas Government Securities
• Other Assets
• Loans to and Equity in other financial 
institutions
• Singapore government securities and 
T-Bills
• Cash and balances with banks and 
agents
• Amounts due from other banks
KJSBank • Loans Receivable
• Real Estate
• Listed and Unlisted Shares
• Bonds and Debentures
• Overseas Government Securities
• Other Assets
• Singapore government securities
• Time deposits and short-term 
investments
• Deposits with MAS
• Treasury Deposits/T-Bills
• Accrued Interest
• Cash and Deposits
CPF • Fixed Assets
• Staff Loans
• Portfolio Investments
• Debtors & Deposits
• Overseas Government Securities
• Singapore government securities
• Bank deposits
• Cash and bank balances
• Accrued Interest
• Foreign Reserves
• Fixed Assets
• Staff Loans
• Overseas Investments
• Other Assets
• Singapore government securities
• Cash and Cash Equivalents
BCCS •  External Assets
•  Real Estate
• Other Assets
•  Cash in hand and with agents
The Singapore government does not publish capital expenditures in its own 
publications, where it refers to development expenditures, which can include 
current expenditures for salaries, training and the like. Therefore, Capital 
Expenditure were taken from the IMF's Government Financial Statistics, which 
however only refer back to 1972/3 and also do not offer a breakdown of the 
capital expenditures apart from the years 1977/8-86/7. For the years before 1972 *
*85 Investments by the EDB are not separately listed, because they are Included In the government’s loan portfolio as loans to the EDB until the DBS 
•ekes over the Industrial finance function from the EDB In 1869. From that point on they are Included In the DBS' loan portfolio.
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the IMF's International Financial Statistics were used instead. Yet, this source 
does not directly publish capital expenditure, which meant that they had to be 
derived by subtracting government consumption from total expenditure. 
Unfortunately, the derived figures are substantially larger than those published 
in the IMF's Government Financial Statistics for the years where both are 
available. In order to be rather on tire conservative side and to have the longest 
continuous series the IMF's Government Statistics were used after 1971, This 
might underestimate government capital expenditures.486
The official foreign reserves were taken from Singapore's Statistical Yearbooks 
for the years 1965-99 and for 1963-64 from Singapore Department of Statistics 
(1982). The difference between official reserves and die sum of BCCS' external 
assets and MAS' foreign reserves was added to government overseas
investments.
As a general clarification, it is important to point out that the public investment 
measure does not fully capture the whole public sector since Government-Linked 
Companies (except for the DBS) are not reclassified due to their multitude. 
Furthermore, potentially retained earnings of statutory boards (except for 
POSBank, CPF, MAS and BCCS) are also left in the private sphere. In essence, 
therefore, the definition of public sector in this exercise is rather narrow, 
comprising the central government, its financial institutions and that part of the 
statutory boards' investments, which was financed through government loans or
took the form of profit transfers to the central government.
^  potential explanation of this discrepancybetweon the IMF'. IFS and GFS publication, could be .  differinf, tmlmn1 of dob. . « v i e .  However, 
potential explanation ot mm oiscrep 7  . 1 a the GFS does not consider debt-service (neither Interest nor repayments) as
1« turns out both oubHc««ons consWer debt service a  separate Hem, I.«. me  ^ ^
"  ... « il . ice  Hnn* rvtf irtciudfl dfibkrfiDSvrnfnU as part of either Government
If  Of capital expenditure». Instead It Is part of current expenditure. The IF8 does not inciuoe oeot repaym em . »  t » .
insumption or government expenditure.
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111.2.4. Tracing Private Investments
Private agents making investment decisions comprise commercial banks (excl. 
the DBS), finance companies, merchant banks, insurance companies, discount 
houses, foreigners and Singaporean residents investing in Singaporean equity or 
debt instruments as well as Singaporeans investing abroad. For the private 
financial institutions the same problem regarding double-counting applies as 
described above for investments by the public sector. Therefore, for the purposes 
of this exercise their assets exclude cash, investments in government securities 
and t-bills, deposits with the MAS, and amounts due from other Singaporean 
financial institutions. DBS assets were subtracted from commercial bank assets 
because they are already accounted for in the public sphere.
The information for the private financial institutions is taken from the MAS’ 
annual reports, which summarise their balance sheet positions. However, the 
data series do not extend further back than 1969 or 1970. For merchant banks or 
discount houses they do not start until 1974 and 1972 respectively. Domestic 
equity investment by foreigners and Singaporean residents is taken from the 
surveys, 'Foreign Equity Investment in Singapore', conducted by the Department 
of Statistics. Their data is drawn from the accounts of all companies incorporated 
or registered in Singapore except for partnerships and sole proprietorships. The 
publication started in 1992 with data going back to 1978 for foreigners' equity 
positions and back to 1980 for Singaporeans'. Additionally, the EDB annual 
reports offer foreigners' investments in manufacturing going as far back as 1963 
and investment by Singaporean residents in manufacturing for the years 1963 to 
1968, which at least allows for interpolation of the years 1969-79 until the 
publication by the Department of Statistics becomes available. No information is 
available for domestic investment in corporate debt instruments by foreigners or 
Singaporean residents, which however seems unlikely to having been 
substantial. A potential s o u r c e  of doublecounting can stem from the fact that the
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commercial banks have loans to non-bank financial institutions on their balance 
sheets. This can include financial holding companies and investment 
corporations but also finance companies and merchant banks, winch are 
accounted for separately. If these loans were indeed granted to finance 
companies and merchant banks and these institutions in turn used the funds to 
finance their loan portfolio then the funds will have been double-counted.
A survey of overseas investments by firms registered in Singapore is published 
by the Department of Singapore, 'Singapore's Investment Abroad', with data 
going back as far as 1976. This survey does not cover official foreign reserves or
any investments by the central government, which for ihe purposes of this
, in(nrmaHnn is already accounted for in the publicexercise is beneficial since that information y
investment analysis. However, it does include financial institutions' investments
abroad from 1994 onwards, which have already been accounted for using the
. ,  „ „ „ „„Miration does not list investments by source,MAS annual reports. Since the publication aoes nut 3
i.e. where the funds for the investments came from, but only offers information 
about the type of overseas investment held, e.g. equity, portfolio etc., the 
information included in the MAS annual report about financial institutions' 
overseas investments was deducted from 1994 onwards in order to avoid double­
counting.« There is no information about individual Singaporean residents'
personal investments overseas.
All equity measures are at cost. Domestic equity includes retained earnings. 
Investments abroad in foreign equity, however, do not include retained earnings, 
although this information is available, because retained earnings are by 
definition not repatriated. Consequently they are not part of the country's
national income and thus not part of the domestic investment pool.
*87 The subtraction of financial institutions' oversea» assets as published in the 
which means that the publication by the Department of Statistics either already
MAS report leads to a dip in the serfes in 1894 below 1883 levels, 
Included some of those Investments before 1894 or does not fully
account for them  in 1894.
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While the potential pitfall of double-counting between the different sources has 
been minimised, the lack of observations for the early parts of tire period is less 
easily dealt with. In general, there are four ways to deal with this problem. The 
first option is to disregard Hie early parts of the period and not start the exercise 
until the late 1970s. The second is to assume that the starting balances in 1965 
were equal to the first available observation, while the third option would 
assume that they were zero. The fourth would apply some form of reverse 
engineering in order to estimate observations backwards from the given data. 
This would involve fitting a trend to the available observations and extending 
that trend backwards. Different trending mechanisms were applied to the data 
after their transformation into constant 1990 S$, using the GDP-deflator as 
reported by the Department of Statistics. Linear trends often resulted in unlikely 
negative starting balances and quadratic trends in early observations far above 
the later observations. Exponential trending, on tire other hand, yielded 
consistently good fits to the existing data and reasonable estimates above zero 
hut below the later observations. Given the country's overall development, an 
exponential trend does not seem out of the question. Therefore, early 
observations for those data-series were estimated using exponential trends.488
111.2.5. Overall Evaluation of Quality of Data
The creation of this dataset had to contend with two, in their combination 
seemingly paradoxical main problems. On the one hand, there is the potential 
problem of having too m ud, data, i.e. double-counting, when at the same time 
there is also the problem of having too little data, i.e. missing observations. The 
danger of double^oundng has been removed as far as possible through a 
diligent read of the notes and schedules of the data-sources. As it turns out the
-------   --------■—  (Bxoi DBS) to Transport and Communication and Foreign
488 See appendix tor the exact formulas and description of Comma lnc,uded negative observations tor the early years. In that case
Equity in Agriculture. Mining and Quarrying could not ba trended backwa ,
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total cumulative investment pool for 1965-99 amounts to S$l,217,986 million 
while the total traced investments account for 5* 1,121,455 million or slightly over 
92 percent of the investment pool (bo* constant 1990 S $).« Given * e  fact that 
the investment pool probably is somewhat understated due to * e  netting of 
some Balance-of-Payments positions, * is  outcome seems to indicate that double­
counting has been successfully removed from * e  dataset, unless substantial gaps 
in * e  investment pattern remain unaccounted for. However, none of * e  gaps 
described above seems substantial enough to increase * e  traced investments 
significantly above * e  total investment pool. Even * e  reverse engineering of the 
starting balances for * e  missing private investment data series only amounts to 
S$ 11,385 (constant 1990 S$). In o*er words, if * is  imputation was not used and 
instead * e  worst case scenario of a zero value for th e  starting balances of *ese  
series was used, traced investments would still be below * e  cumulative 
investment pool. D *er gaps, such as investments in sole proprietorships and
. , . . , • in debt vehicles are also not likely to raisepartnerships or private investments in a e m  vauu j
* e  traced investments significantly above * e  total investment pool. Therefore,
* e  potential problem of too much data seems ra*er successfully dealt with.
The problem of missing early observations, however, is a more resilient one, 
which will never fully disappear unless potentially existent but not yet publicly 
available data is made accessible.« Until ften, it becomes paramount to analyse 
to what degree conclusions derived from this dataset are potentially affected by 
the meftods used to compensate for * e  missing observations. In * e  aggregate, 
using * e  estimations derived from exponential trending can, on * e  one hand, 
lead to understating investments by 8*11,385 if indeed the zero assumption ton s 
out to be true. On * e  o *er hand, it can result in a maximum overestimation of 
investments by S$26,930 if * e  first available observations are closer to the true
*  zero starting balance was assumed.
488 Total traced investments for the period 1865-98 refer to the increase In total stock of Investments betw een  31/12/64 and 31/12/99.
*90 Requests to the EDB for access to their data sources have been declined.
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starting balances.« In total, this estimation procednre adds a maximum error 
window of S$ 38,315 or 3.4% around the traced investments. Therefore,
, , , f;m,rPc should not be too sensitive to thisconclusions based on the aggregate figures
assumption. However, the more disaggregated fhe level of observation becomes
the more will the degree of sensitivity to the trending assumptions increase.
m £ nf an individual data series which hasTherefore, in the extreme case of looking at an maiviuiuu u
i . ' , • „ •*.„ rsctriv observations, conclusions based onbeen trended back in time to derive its early oDservau^ ,
these early years must be considered as speculative.
^TThesum  of the fir« observation» .qua). SM8.318. Sine« S$11,385 ere accounted for in the 
s i 2 6 ,9 3Q ¡t the maximum likely overstatement deriving from this method,
dataset usino exponential trending, the difference of
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III.3. The Allocation Process - An Accounting Exercise
.3.1. The Total Investment Pool
. , , „ 1 22 trillion constant 1990 Singapore dollars
In total the Singapore economy had 1.44
availabte for investment purposes, of which more than a third came from abroad 
increasing the total amount available for investment by over fifty percent above 
gross national savings. In turn this means that Singapore was able to make 
investments during 1965-99 equivalent to 70 percent of the sum of the country s 
Real GNP, while the gross national saving rate averaged 46.13 percent during
these years.
Table II1.3.1.a.: Total Real Investment Pool and Government Control
1965-99
Constant 1990 S$ - million
Government Saving 
Forced Private Saving 
Voluntary Private Savina g  
Total Gross National Saving
Percent government controlled 
Reclassify POS + DBS + MAS + 
Percent government controlled
BCCS non-gov, liabilities
360,113
181,729
284,990
826,831
65.6%
118,942
79.9%
Add Gross Foreign Saving Inflows 
of which offirial funds.
391,155
600
.—— or wmcn onicie» iumu~.
total g r o s s  investment fund
Of which government controlled 
. Percent government controlled
1,217,986
661,384
54.3%
Even more striking than this substantial amount of foreign savings is the 
extraordinarily high degree of government control. Beyond the government's 
own savings and its control over the compulsory pension scheme, it must be 
particularly noted that through its financial institutions the government was able
<92 Adjusted for investment in residential housing channelled through the CPF.
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to  a t tr a c t  th e  e q u iv a le n t o f  o v e r  fo rty  p e rce n t o f  p riv a te  v o lu n ta ry  sav in g s  in to  its  
realm  o f  i n f l u e n c e d  O v e ra ll, s lig h d y  o v e r  5 4  p e rce n t o f  Are to ta l in v e stm e n t  
p o o l w a s  co n tro lle d  b y  th e  g o v e rn m e n t w h ich  is eq u iv alen t to  e ig h ty  p e rc e n t o f  
to ta l g ro s s  n a tio n a l sav in g . T h is estim ate  o f  g o v e rn m e n t co n tro l d o e s  n o t  
reclassify  n o n -fin an cial g o v ern m en t-lin k ed  co rp o ra tio n s , n o r  d o e s  i t  tak e in to  
a c c o u n t o th e r  m e a n s  o f  c o n tro l su ch  as th e  cen tra l b an k s' p olicies a ffectin g  c re d it  
crea tio n  o r  th e  in flu en ce o v e r  foreig n  sav in g s e x e rc ise d  b y S in g a p o re 's  
in stitu tio n s d e a lin g  w ith  F o re ig n  D ire ct In v estm en t. T h erefo re , it is safe to  a rg u e  
th a t e v e n  th o u g h  this d e g re e  o f  g o v e rn m e n t co n tro l a p p e a rs  a lre a d y  v e r y  
su b stan tia l i t  is sffll a  co n se rv a tiv e  lo w e r lim it e s tim ate . O v e ra ll, the g o v e rn m e n t  
is lik ely  to  h a v e  co n tro lle d  o r  d irected  c lo se  to  th e  eq u iv alen t o f  th e  n a tio n 's  to ta l  
g ro ss  n atio n a l sa v in g s  b e tw e e n  1 9 6 5  an d  1999 .
Graph III.3.1.: T h e  Government's Expansion o
f  C o n tro l  th ro u g h  its  F in a n c ia l
«M T to main government controlled financial Institution» at* the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the Potri-Office Savtngt Bank (PQS), the 
D evelopm ent Bank of Singapore (DBS) and the Board of Currency Control of Singapore (BCCS).
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G rap h  III.3 .1 . sh o w s th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e  g o v e rn m e n t's  fin an cial in stitu tio n s  
co n so lid ated  b alan ce  sh eets. A t  in d ep en d en ce  the g o v e rn m e n t fin an cial 
in stitu tion s co n tro lle d  fu n d s eq u iv alen t to  a  m e re  15 .5  p e rc e n t o f  G N P . B y  the  
m id -1 9 8 0 s  th e ir  b alan ce  sh eets  h a d  in creased  to  a  v a lu e  a t  o r  a b o v e  2 0 0  p e rc e n t of  
G N P.
F o r a  p e rio d  o f tim e  th e  S in g ap o re  g o v e rn m e n t p u b lish ed  its o w n  e stim a te s  o f  
pub lic s e c to r  sa v in g . H u ff (19 9 5 a ) a m e n d e d  the official series b y  a d d in g  C P F  
sav in g s fo r  1 9 7 4 -8 4 . T ab le III.3 .1 .b . offers a  co m p a riso n  o f  the officially  re p o rte d  
pub lic s e c to r  sa v in g  a n d  the C P F  sav in g  as  a  p e rce n t o f  G N S , b oth  a cco rd in g  to  
H u ff (1 9 9 5 a ) a n d  th e  n e w  e stim ates  d eriv ed  h e r e .494
Table III.3.1.b : Comparison of Government Control495
Amended Official Series (Huff, 1995),
% of Public CPF Total I
GNS Sector Saving m  + (2)
1974 22.8 20.0 42.8
J975 34.2 20.6 54.6
1976 32.1 18.1 50.2
1977 39.8 17.5 57.3
1978 37.6 17.3 54.9
1979 38.4 21.0 59.4
1980 41.1 24.6 65.7
_1981 40.6 24.8 65.4
~1982 46.1 27,2 73.3
.1983 53.0 23.6 76.6
[1984 60.7 17.0 77.7
New Estimates
Gov. CPF Total I Total II
Saving Saving (Gov + CPF) (+ Fin Inst.)
42.0 22.2 64.2 70.6
47.3 23.2 70.5 88.4
39.3 22.8 62.1 92.3
36.3 23.3 59.6 76.4
33.7 23.6 57.3 78.7
34.6 25.5 60.1 80.3
42.0 29.1 71.1 73.3
43.6 29.7 73.3 97.9
46.3 31.7 78.0 110.7
42.8 28.6 71.5 88.3
33.5 27.8 61.3 71.8
Compared with the results from the current exercise even the amended official 
figures substantially underestimate the actual degree of control by the
<94 Huff (19958), pp. 1426-27 which offer, the « m e  dale a .  Huff (1994) pp.332-333. Public Sector savings are defined a .  the current .urplu. In the 
consolidated account, of the public .actor, which con.1.1. of government plu. .even major .tatutory board., namely the Hou.lnfl and Development 
Board, Jurong Town Corporation Public Utilltle. Board, Port of Singapore Authority, Telecommunication Authority of Singapore, Urban Redevelopment 
Authortly and Sentoea Development Corporation. Central Provident Fund savings are defined a .  the net addition that year to the accumulated fund due 
•o member.. Because of member.' withdrawal, of funds, thl* figure was normally less than members' contributions. A preliminary figure tor 1965 Is
also given but not reported here. After 1985 the government discontinued the reporting of public sector saving.
<95 After the addition of saving, appropriated by the government's financial Institution. It. control over the saving, pool is In some year, larger then 
“"»I GNS of that year, which mean, that the government must have attracted foreign saving. Into its sphere of influence. Huff, percentage, are 
expressed a .  percent of official GNS, while this study use. as the denominator GNS adjusted for residential housing Investments channelled through 
the CPF,
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government. Only in the two final years are the estimates of the amended series 
by Huff (1995a) above the figures (excluding government financial institutions) 
derived in this exercise. Once the government's financial institutions are added, 
gap between the two series becomes even more striking. The differences stem 
from a different definition of public sector savings and CPF savings. In our case 
government savings does not include the statutory boards due to limited data 
availability but adds in its final step savings appropriated by the government's 
financial institutions. Additionally, the current surplus used by Huff as the basis 
for government savings, does not always equal in Singapore's case the difference 
between total government revenue and total government consumption, the 
definition employed by this study. In respect to CPF savings, our series only 
deducts withdrawals for consumptive purposes in order to derive the net saving 
additions appropriated by the CPF. Other withdrawals, for example, for 
investments in government sponsored equity schemes or housing are considered 
to be merely a move between types of investment portfolios.496
Apart from a revision of earlier estimates of government control, the creation o f a 
total investment pool also points out that an analysis based merely on Gross- 
Hxed-Capital-Formation (GFCF) substantially underestimates total investments 
naade. Cumulative GFCF for 1965-99 accounts for 609.1 billion constant 1990 S$, 
which is the equivalent of 80.3 percent of total GNS or fifty percent of the total 
Gross Investment Pool. Therefore, merely considering officially reported GFCF 
will limit the analysis to only about half of the total funds available for 
investments. As the analysis by asset category below will show almost half of 
tois gap can be accounted for by overseas investments, both by the public and 
the private spheres.497
<»06 For a critical a s ss ss a m t  of different definition» of CPF »avlnfl» ***“'*'' ,ha question of oversaving and crowding out In Singapore aee 
W  For an Interpretation of the remaining gap and what It can poselbly tell M about lha gua»«on
»action 111.3,4, and 111.3.5.
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III.3.2. Investment by Investment Agents
While the total investment pool is based on annual Hows of savings, the analysis 
Of the investment patterns uses year-end stock balances for the respective agents. 
Comparing the starting balance of December 31« 1964 with the ending balance of 
December 31» 1999 yields the comparable figure to the cumulahve savmg flows 
for 1965-99. However, this comparison might no , capture important
, t • i Koh«ppn these two points in time. Therefore, adevelopments takmg place between tnesc y
measure summarising the development over the whole time period is needed. In 
order to derive such an overaU measure each portfolio position was tracked for 
each year and converted into constant 1990 S$. The sum of ah year-end balances 
is then able to describe the cumulative importance o f each respechve item and 
agent. In  other words, each portfolio position is given a •point' for each constant 
1990 S$ invested in it at each year-end. The more 'points' the portfolio positron 
collected between 1965-99, the higher was the exposure of the total portfolio to
this type of investment.
Table III.3.2. summarises Singapore's investment pattern by investment agent, 
using both tfre increase in the year-end portfolios and the overall measure. As it 
turns out, there are no major differences of the respective agencies' shares of total 
investments made between the two measures. The increase in the year-end 
portfolios as opposed to tfre overall measure seems to slightly overstate the 
government's and understate tfre banks' role in making tfre ultimate investment 
decision. In turn this means Brat the government has actually become somewhat
more important towards the end of tfre period as the main investment agent
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Table III.3.2.: Investm ent Pattern by Investment Agents498
Overall Measure
2,480,477 21.2%
918,969 7.9%
332,509 2.8%
102,428 0.9%
216,159 1,8%
9,429 0.1%
118,941 1.0%
1,983,311 17,0%
263,720 2.3%
1.337,904 11.4%
2,529,029 21.6%
609,169 5.2%
786,493 6.7%
11,107,675 100%
_ (constant 1990 S$) Incr. Year-End Portfolio
Government 283,916 23.3%
MAS 97,619 8.0%
DBS 52,087 4.3%
„POSBank (5ZL 0.0%
BCCS 16,988 1.4%
CPF 1,453 0.1%
Additional Foreian Reserves (4,266) -0.4%
-Banks (excl. DBS) 165,643 13.6%
_Non-Bank Fin, Inst 13,751 1.1%
-Foreign (In-) Direct 155,319 12.8%
Private Domestic 265,548 21.8%
-Private Overseas 73,456 6.0%
-Not-traced 96,532 7.9%
-TOTAL 1,217,986 100%
Graph III.3.2,a.: Investm ent by Agency -  Increase in Year-End Portfolio499
Investment Pattern by Agency
increase in year-end portfolio size 1964-99
(% of total increase)
Not-traced
« 8  T h e  N o t-T ra c e d  item  I* the difference between the Total Investment P ool and the sum  o f all traced Items. T h e  P O S B a n k  has a  negative figure for 
'h e  com parison  o f the starting and ending portfolios, because with the acquisition b y the D B S  In 1998 all assets have m oved to tee D B S . Additional 
fo re ig n  R eserves I e. the balance betw een official reserves and  those held at the M A S  and  B C C S , are also negative b ecause  in 1985 all foreign 
reserves are  additional to M A S  and B C C S  since these Institutions do not yet exist, while b y 1999 unlike m ost of the rest of the parted officially reported 
reserves a re  lo w e r than w hat M A S  and  B C C S  hold together. T h e  B C C S  is the C urrency B oard  of Singapore  In charge  of issuing Singapore  s national 
currency,
498 T h e  graph only displays non-negative shares, as a result percentages can differ slightly from  table III.2.
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Nevertheless, the comparatively low government involvement, given its high 
control over savings, is very striking. In total the government and its financial 
institutions accounted for 36.7 percent of the total investments made, based on 
the increase of its year-end portfolios.500 At the same time, however, it controlled 
54.3 percent of the total available investment pool as shown in Table III.3.1.a. 
Consequently, it m ust have given up control over 17.6 percent o f the investment 
Pool and re-injected this portion into the private sphere, which as a result 
accounts for 55.3 percent of total investments made.
Over the whole period 1965-99 the Singapore government and its financial 
institutions controlled savings of 661 billion constant 1990 S$, but only made final 
investment decisions amounting to 452 billion. How can this gap of 209 billion be 
explained? The government shows on its balance sheet in 1999 investments in its 
°w n government stocks, presumably bonds, with the value of 88 billion constant 
1990 S$, which at the time of issue must have increased the government's 
revenue and thus its savings. However, because the bonds have since then been 
bought back from the private sphere, the government has in essence abandoned 
control over the funds initially raised through the issue of these securities and 
thus re-injected those monies back into the non-governmental sector. Similarly, 
an additional 2 billion constant 1990 S$ was deposited with investment agents.501 
Together these items can explain forty-three percent of the gap between 
controlled savings and placed investments. The rest together with the question 
why the government felt the need to cease control over these funds remains a 
Puzzle. This seems to suggest that due to too tight a grip on the nations' savings 
the government redirected more funds into its realm of influence than it could 
handle. After all the government went to quite some lengths in establishing and 
expanding its own financial institutions which were able to re-direct alm ost 120 
billion constant 1990 S$ from  voluntary private saving into the realm of
*00 B ased  on the overall measure, the government's share In Investments m ad» w ee 3S,7 percen t
501 Additionally, the government I» holding 48.5 billion constant 1090 S$ In cash al the end of 1099. To remain conservative It was assumed that these 
funds are deposited with government Investment agents, such as the MAS or DBS. If that was not the case, the savings reflected In these funds would 
h8ve effectively been neutralised.
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government control, while at the same time the government felt the need to 
surrender control over 209 billion constant 1990 S$.
Looking at the foreign direct and indirect investments throws up another 
intriguing aspect. According to the country* s Balance of Payments Singapore was 
able to appropriate 391.2 billion 1990 constant S$ in gross foreign savings. Yet, 
equity holdings by foreigners in Singaporean firms amounted only to 156.7 
billion in 1999 or 155.3 billion above their estimated 1965 starting balance. 
Therefore, about 235 billion are either unaccounted for in the official publications 
or have been diverted to other investment agents, via such vehicles as sale of 
land leases, taxation, salaries and other running expenses. As the summary by 
investment category below shows, Singapore was able to increase her overseas 
assets by about 265 billion (constant 1990 S$) during tire same time.502 In other 
words, the Singapore economy was able to increase her own foreign holdings by 
a little more than the equivalent of what the country was able to divert from 
foreign inward investments.503
HI.3.3. Investment by Asset Category
Table III.3.3. summarises the investment pattern by target asset categoty, both in
terms of the increase of the year-end portfolios between 1964 and 1999 and the
„  . „„uefanHal difference between the two types ofoverall measure. Again, no substantial
measurement emerges.
“ n ^ T e t  ai. (1998) point out mat a substantial portion of Singapore'» oversea» asset» are owned by companies In Singapore, which themselves are 
“ "trolled by foreign Interest». For example, In 1990 50 percent of the stock of Singapore'» direct Inveslments abroad originated from foreign controlled 
firm».
S03 This gives rise to another Interesting question: why was Singapore not able or willing to invest even more overseas instead of having substantial 
domestic funds linger more or less unused as working capital? Two potential answers emerge: an aven higher role of foreign Investment might have 
undermined the policy of a controlled appreciation of the Singapore dollar, which In turn would have resulted in higher Inflation and thus less of a 
success-story based on macro-economic stability. Alternatively, the players tn the economy might not have noticed the degree of underutilised funds
In the system.
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Table III.3.3.: Investment Pattern by Asset Category
504
(constant 1990 S$) I « n r  Year-End Portfolio
Public Real Estate 89.217 7.3%_
Public Manufacturing 7.408 0.6%
Public Services 19,813 1.6%
Public Other 220,269 18.1%
Public Overseas 111,032 9.1%
Private Real Estate 100.529 8.3%
Private Manufacturing 75.677 6.2%
Private Services 322,225 26.5%
Private Overseas 154,150 12.7%
Private Other 21.135 1.7%
96,532 7.9%
TOTAL 1,149.879 100.0%
Overall Measure....
757,647 6.5%
68,143 0.6%
267,451 2.3%
1,862,053. 15.9%
1.245,018 10.7%
960,482 8.2%
927.904^ 7.9%
3.093.157 26.5%
1.365,891 11.7%
172.422 1.5%
968,371 8.3%
11.107,675 100.0%
Given the country’s standard development story as a labour-intensive 
manufacturing export base, it might be somewhat surprising to find that 
manufacturing has attracted only 6.8 percent of the total investments made, far 
behind real-estate (15.6%), overseas investments (21.8%) and the service sector 
(28.1%),505 Moreover, of the small proportion in manufacturing two-thirds came 
from foreign sources. This is of particular interest in respect to the discussion 
about the country's productivity performance, because recent studies have found 
considerable productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, while the overall 
conclusion of the TFP literature points to very limited productivity gains in the 
economy as a whole. Rao and Thangavelu (1998) found that FDI intensive 
industries as a whole experienced a signficiant improvement in TFP growth from 
-2.6% in 1974-84 to 10.9% in 1987-95. Thangavelu and Rao (1999) show very 
strong productivity growth in the almost exclusively foreign electronics sector.506
— ............................... ........rfirt oart o, the Private sector (or the purposes of this summary. Rea. Estate composes m o m en t
504 Foreign direct and indirect investment is considered pert P
in Homing, Real Estate Development a* well as the Construction n us Mtate, 22.4% oversea» and 25,8% »ervice«. It must be noted,
80S Based on the overall measure the «hare, are: 8.5% manufacturing, _ ^  ((westment pool, which could not be traced or allocated,
however, that ttiis ranking of the recipient sector» i* «omewhat sans allocated due to lacking description* add up to 27,7%. Yet
The non-traced »hare and the »urn of Other category Investmen w manufacturing sector and none to service*, would manufacturing
nevertheless, only if 73% of the non-traced and not-ellocalable fun s Improbable particularly considering the fact that the mein
have received the equivalent share of investments as the service *e ■ majn GLC,  ar8 all m the service sector. Therefore, it seem*
unallocatabla investment portion are unspecified government,nvB8"“  non.an0catablB Investments would rather widen than dose the distance 
much more likely that a sector specific treatment of the non-tra
between the investment shares received by the .entice and manufacturing sectora^■ 1687.B5 rtilnfl from 5.1% tor 1974-84, which 1» significantly
80S Thangavelu and Rao (1999) find TFP flrowth In the electronics Young (1994) finds negative TFP growth for the manufcturtng
more than Young's (1994) hypothesis of dose to sera growth for the m ^e manufactitrthg industries for me period 1983-93. Yet, m .
«ectores .  whol e. Leung (1907) find, substantially l o w e r b u t i s t t t i i ^ p e m t e l y ,  
study it criticised by Thangavelu and Rao for not treating the
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If productivity gains have been realised it appears they have been achieved in 
foreign dominated parts of the economy. However, it must be noted that even 
foreign investment preferred the service sector, with over 60 percent of foreign 
direct and indirect investment flowing into the tertiary sector accounting for 27.6 
percent of total investments made in services. Therefore, while both domestic 
and foreign investors seem to have agreed on Singapore s investment 
opportunities in the service sector and on their respective abilities to exploit 
them, they appear to have disagreed on their comparative lack of opportunities 
in the manufacturing sector.507
Graph III.3.3.a.: Investment by Asset Category
Investment Pattern by Asset Category
increase In year*end portfolio size 1964-99 
(%  oftotalincrease)
Private Other Public Ma"u
6<”  Yoshlhara (1876,p 18) explain* this different view about the respective comparative advantage, a. a response to Singapore* negative
a « » « . ,- .  , . _ H ^  . _  ,  _ «ha amort oriented Industry had to compete In the International marketassessment of her own competitiveness in manufacturing on a world market, m e export oneniou muusuy k»
against well-established Western and Japanese firm, which enjoy more advanced technology, better marketmg and management knowhow, and 
»«ler access to capital. How could these disadvantages be overcome? Singapore's answer was to invite foreign Investment,
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That this decision to invest predominantly and from the start in the service sector 
might have been a superior development strategy for a government in charge of 
a country bereft of natural resources is supported by the generally low import 
leakage of the service sector .The MAS Quarterly Bulletin March 2001 offers a 
calculation which calculates the import component of each dollar of final 
expenditure in services to be only 0.29 cents as compared to over 90 percent 
imports for Petroleum refinery for example or 0.62 cents for manufacturing. 
While this aspect might not be of importance to the private investor, whose 
economic objective is to merely maximise return-on-investment, from the 
government's point of view guiding investment towards services makes 
fundamental sense because most of the income stays within the country, not like 
manufacturing where the predominant share of revenue needs to be spent on 
imported inputs. Given Singapore's resource endowment a concentration in 
services is therefore logical, especially if one also takes into consideration that 
services usually carry a high labour content, the one resource Singapore has been 
blessed with.
Additionally, at least the Singapore government was convinced that Singapore 
With its trading background was suffering from a lack of entrepreneurs suitable 
for exploiting manufacturing opportunities. Therefore, very early on it set out to 
built Singapore into a service hub, particularly a financial centre. Lee Kuan-Yew 
writes in his autobiography:
We did not have a group of ready-made entrepreneurs such as Hong Kong 
gained in the Chinese industrialists and bankers who came fleeing from 
Shanghai, Canton, and other cities when the communists took over. Had 
we waited for our traders to learn to be industrialists we would have 
starved. It is absurd for critics to suggest In the 1990s that had we grown 
our own entrepreneurs, we would have been less at the mercy of the 
rootless MNCs. Even with the experienced talent Hong Kong received in 
Chinese refugees, its manufacturing technology level is not in the same 
class as that of the MNCs in Singapore.80 09
808 See also Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 74)
«00 Lee (2000, p. 80) See also Lee (2000, pp. 543-544). The view of a lack of entrepreneurs has also been prevalent In the secondary literature. See 
'or example Soon (1903 p 6) Rodan (1989, p. xv), Yoshlhara (1978, p. 182 and p. 21), and Hermann (1970, p. 217) and Hughes (1989, p. 29 and 
P » ) .  Lee Kuan-Yew's autobiography also describes how the decision to turn Singapore Into a financial centre ones back to 1988, when It was
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While Singaporeans apparently did not consider opportunities in manufacturing 
as promising as foreigners and while the exploitation of opportunities in the 
service sector rested substantially on the private sphere, Singaporeans have 
instead had a continuous desire for overseas investments, indulged almost 
equally by the public and the private spheres.510
In 1999 the Singapore government held (current) S$128.5 billion in official foreign 
reserves, which equalled 90 percent of that year's GDP or 70 percent of total 
money supply (M3). On first sight this might appear excessive. However, it 
should not be forgotten that at the same time the government has a substantial 
liability through the CPF, which in 1999 amounted to S$ 88.4 billion. The 
question on whether these overseas investments are indeed foreign reserves or 
rather pension funds rests fundamentally on the assessment of the government's 
(not-allocatable) other domestic investments. At the end of 1999 the central 
government listed quoted and unquoted investments of over (current) S$160 
billion. Yet, since no detail is provided on where and how these funds have been 
invested such an assessment is highly speculative, because it can only point to 
the government's shareholdings in a few large, well-known GLCs such as 
Singapore Airlines, Neptune Orient Lines, Singapore Telecom, Development 
Bank of Singapore etc. Therefore, the large public overseas investments are not 
°nly strikingly high but also strikingly difficult to assess. The most telling hint 
that these foreign reserves are actually pension funds comes from the fact that 
the Government Investment Corporation (GIC) is reported to have over 100 
billion of these funds under its management. The GIC's portfolio includes such 
assets as real estate and direct investments in overseas companies. These 
Investments are far from liquid and therefore will not be able to fulfil the
"commended that Singapore fill me lime gap In the International ttnanda) world, which .»sled between 1ft. close of trading In San Francisco and the 
opening of the banks In Zurich. Lee (2000, p.72> describe* the telephone conversation between Or. Winsemlus, Singapore's Dutch economic advisor, 
®nd Mr Van Oenen, the vice president of the Bank of America branch In Singapore, which gave rise to this Idea. Van Oenan Is quoted as saying, -If we 
M  Singapore in between, before San Francisco doses. Singapore would have taken over. And when Singapore closes, I. would have handed over to
Zurich. Than, for the first time since creation, we wHI have a 24-hour round-the-world service in money and banking '
610 The continued and substantial overseas Investment (tows by the public sphere contradicts some of the literature which points to the pnvate sector 
as Ibe driving force behind outward investment See for example Yeung (1090, p 252)
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standard role of foreign reserves, i.e. to alleviate a potential current account or 
currency crisis.511
The monetary history of Latin American countries, can potentially suggest 
another reason for these substantial overseas investments, particularly by the 
public sphere. Edwards (2000) points out that almost every one of the U ta  
nations has tried to sterilize large capital inflows in an effort to maintain greater 
control over monetary policy -  however rather unsuccessfully. He argues that 
the lack of success has been due to the fact that interest earnings on internahonal
1 the central bank has to pay a relatively highreserves are rather low, while tne cum
interest rate to persuade the public to buy its own securities. Transplanting this 
argument to Singapore's history offers very intriguing insight. Contrary to the 
Latin American countries, Singapore was able to use the Central Provident Fund 
to mop up the additional purchasing power stemming from FDI (and other 
sources) at virtually no (real) interest cost to the government. At the same tune,
the government was able to profitably invest these funds overseas through tts
u Government Investment Corporation,
financial institutions, particularly the uoverm nt
_  . , . c;«rrannrp due to the country's institutional
Therefore, sterilisation worked in Sing p
, . . behaviour -  but also at the cost of
framework and more active investment r
Singapore residents' real pension balances with the CPF. In other words, 
Singaporeans paid for low inflation with a negligible (real) return on their CPF 
balances. Whether this procedure resulted in a net social gain, however, cannot 
be assessed due to the fact that the GIC is not required to publish its annual
reports.512
— ............................................................................... . ,no ln 1990 balance sheet showed 61.6 billion constant 1900 S$ of loans
511 The Bovemment is also substantially exposed to public sector hou a  $ and apartment« bought at some point from the HOB these
outstanding from the HOB. However, since Singaporeans predominan y wer8 lndeed used to pay back the CPF liabilities, then the
loans do not have an asset value on a national level. In other words, I 0v8t to HdB in service charges etc. in order forPensioner would in essence receive a pension from the flovamment which he would na
the HDB to be able to repay these loans to the government In the first plaoh ov6re80 s Income is free of Singapore tax If not remitted
512 The income tax system also offere an institutional bias towards ovarseas in^sm » relle( agreement with the source countty. no tax
back to Singapore. Even If such Income Is remitted, so long as Singapore has a double
liability would be Incurred.
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In order to follow the annual investment flows and thus the development of the 
Investment pattern over time, the (1990 constant S$) year-end stocks of each 
portfolio item were converted into first differences. Graphs III.3.3.b-d show the 
percentage distributions, i.e. percent of total public investment flows, and the 
absolute figures.
Graphs III.3.3.b-d: Annual Public Investment Flows513
«13 The not-iraceabla portion consist» predominantly of not further specified quoted end unquoted Investments. For the sake of the flraph they were, 
however, calculated as the difference between total annual public Investment flows and fhe sum o f Ihe Bows going info overseas, »a l estate, seiv.ce. 
«*» manufactunna. Due fo the lack of a 1064 year-end observation for foreign reserves, (he 1965 figure far overseas Investments assumes that there 
been no change.
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The small role of manufacturing investments for the whole period is reinforced. 
New investments in the service sector, however, seem to have been concentrated 
^  the mid-1970s to mid-1980s. New overseas investments have always figured 
high on the government's investment agenda, apart from 1974 which shows a 
substantial divestment in that portion of foreign reserves not held by the MAS 
and BCCS m ost likely in response to the world-wide oil-crisis induced recession. 
Real estate investments figure prominently as well, with a rising importance 
from the late 1960s onwards. For a period until 1987 the share o f new 
investments in real estate can even rival tire share of new investments in overseas 
assets. Between 1986 and 1993, however, the government seems to have tried to 
reduce its portfolio's exposure to real estate. This coincides with an increasingly 
liberal policy of allowing Singaporeans to use their CPF funds to acquire their 
HDB apartments. Yet, from the mid-1990s on the government again increases the 
share of new real estate investments. The proportion of not-allocatable, new 
quoted and unquoted investments rises as well from the mid-1980s, which also 
coincided with a proliferation of the government's investment funds.
In the private sphere services have dominated for the whole period. Only for a 
very short time around 1970 does the manufacturing sector appear to have been 
^ e  dominant target for new private investments. However, this result is
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somewhat sensitive to data-Umitations in this particular sector and time-period. 
Nevertheless, the predominant role of services is supported by the fact that in 
1969 almost 50 percent of the non-government, non-cash assets of Singapore s 
commercial banks' were committed to the service sector and only about 20% to 
manufacturing. This finding casts some doubt on the standard description of 
Singapore's early development, which points to labour-intensive manufacturing 
as the driving force. Additionally, based on the analysis of the investment 
patterns a strict reading of the flying geese hypothesis must be rejected, since it 
would argue for a much later development of the tertiary sector. Instead 
Singapore 'chose' to develop its service sector from the outset and continuously 
invest overseas.
Graphs III.3.3.e-g: Annual Private Investment Flows514
• Overseas
■ Real Estate 
Sendees
•Manufacturing!
■ Not-Traceable
A n n u a l New Private Investm ents  A (%of total n e w  private Investm ent)
to  to  to  to to  to  to
3 a a 2 a ä 9 H I  -8
614 The not-traceable portion Is calculated as the difference between total annual private Investment (lows and the sum of the flows going into 
overseas, real estate, services and manufacturing. Due to the lack of early observations -  particularly tor non-manufacturing -  Investments during the
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IH.3.4. Oversaving?
, t. * v,00n cnprulation about whether and if so by Ever since the mid-1980s there has been specuiano
v , ^  ^  w  over-saved. What can the new dataset possiblyhow much Singapore might have over
. _  . .  .1,0 ctartinc position from the literature, weadd to that discussion? Taking the starting p
explore the development of Singapore's Incremental Capital to Output Raho 
(ICOR) over time. Additionally, we extend the ICOR concept by a Total
Incremental Capital to Output Ratio (TICOR), which uses the increase m the total
1 inctoaH of only considering fixed-capitalavailable investment pool instead y
investments -  Since GFCF only accounts for about half of the total available 
investment fund, this adjustment seems sensible if one wants to evaluate the 
question of whether the country has forgone unnecessary amounts o
consumption. The difference between TICOR and ICOR can only be due to three
factors: overseas investments, working capital and corporate investments m non-
t- u ^atiiHlkpd i e are shown as assets on thefixed assets, which have been capitalis ,
, 4-v.iie tint accounted for as an expense, 
company's balance sheet and are thu
•« i cc'ss\r*-r\rt\i annlvinct the Golden Rule to the Additionally, we assess the capital effic - cy pp y
............... .....— — m 1B64 mlohl be due to data Inconsistencies,
early yeans ot the period are sensitive to Imputational assumptions. Thedivestment
«nee the senes detailing Singapore'» investment abroad change» In 18 . d , ascertain consistency with the oilier parts of the
815 The (T)ICOR indices are calculated using GNP Instead of the more customary GDP 
Kapler and explicitly allow for the effect of Income on overseas investmen
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development of Singapore's capital stock and finally approach the question 
through a simple but revealing accounting exercise,516
Table III.3.4.a. shows sub-period averages for the ICOR and T1COR concepts. The 
watershed of the 1985/86 recession becomes immediately visible, confirming 
Peebles and WUson's (2002) argument that ICOR assessments of the 1980s might 
be unduely biased.» As a matter of fact, treating the two recession years 
separately and splitting the sample period around them reveals that the ICOR for 
1987-99 is actually lower than that for 1965-84, which points to rising (fixed) 
capital efficiency in the second period. On tire other hand, the T1COR continues 
to rise, indicating falling efficiency. The disparate behaviour of the two senes can 
only be explained by higher returns to fixed capital than non-fixed capital
investments in the post 1986 period.
Table lll.3.4.a„: Singapore’s ICOR and T IC O R 518
ICOR TICOR
-1965-73 2,72 4.49
1973-78 5.13 7.66
,1978-84 5,27 7.92
3985^86*^ 90.45 164.72
1987-99 4.37 9.76
,1965-84 4.55 6.92
»1987-99 4.37 9.76
-1965-99 4.69 9.38
Going beyond sub-period averages, annual WICOR calculations have the 
disadvantage of being rather volatile. However, since we are predominantly 
interested in Singapore's development since the country's independence, using 
1964 as the base year for an alternative CT)ICOR calculation, i.e. cumulative CFCF
5'8  For »n assum erti using financial coun.eriaduals see S a e ta  HI.5. 'Excuree: Financial Aseewmem of Singapore'. O verling' altiva end o. this 
chapter.
W  Pr í ri“ " . T e d PoSn7L  government1* own view tf  Singapore1,  deveiopment .tag*., tt i .  taken from PAP «
described In eection m.1.2. end extended by treating the Singapore recession of 1885/8 wpetefely end fhe remainder of the penod 1987-09 « .  one 
«uh-penod
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since 1965 over the change in real GNP since 1964, seems both historically 
sensible and analytically more revealing. As graph III.3.4.a. shows, the increasing 
distance between TICOR and ICOR is again striking. The inclusion of non-fixed 
asset investments can make a substantial difference to the evaluation of 
Singapore's investment success.
Graph III.3.4.a.: Singapore's Investment and Saving Ratios
Comparing, as is generally done, one country's ICOR with another's is not 
particularly helpful if one wants to evaluate the investment success. Since 
investing in another country's GNP and participating in that country's GNP is 
not an investment option. Instead one economy can only invest in another 
country's companies. Therefore, the appropriate benchmark with which to 
compare Singapore's T1COR would be the price-earning ratios of other countries 
Stock markets. The price-earnings ratio compares the earnings of a company with 
its stock market valuation, in essence, this allows for the same interpretation as 
ate TiCOR, namely that at a price-earnings ratio of x the company would need to 
achieve at least the same earnings for a period of x years to justify its price, i.e.
nnnuiiP tlip share In 1999 Singapore had the investment necessary to acquire me. snare. * i b  r
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accumulated investments o£ S$ 1,218 billion, gross-fixed-capital assets of S$ 609 
billion and had achieved an increase in annual GNP of 130 billion (all in constant 
1990 Sf). This equals a T1COR with base year 1964 of 9.38 and an ICOR with the 
same base year of 4.69. With a T1COR of a little over nine Singapore would need 
to stop investing for a period of a little over nine years while keeping its real 
GNP level in order to recoup her investments. From this perspective, a TICOR of 
a little over nine in the late 1990s does not look too bad, since most international 
stock markets had average Price-Earning Ratios significantly above 9 at that 
time.519 In other words, if Singapore had wanted to acquire similar earning 
streams than what it enjoyed by 1999, it would have had to pay a much higher 
price at the end of 1999 than what it actually did by investing m her own
* c «receding thirty-five years. If Singapore was toeconomy over the course of the pr cea a '
indeed withdraw the whole investment pool at the end of 1999 and invest it in 
the Financial Times 30 stock market index it wouid only gain the rights to a little 
over a third of the earnings it realised by investing in her own economy. From 
that point of view, the investment was highly successful.520
i o Giiimi pffiriencv of non-fixed assets and Beyond pointing to the relative fall ng e c y
. ... rr>mnarisons with other countries, whose economiesinterpretations of possible co p
« wr p ir ™  levels or whose stock markets offer differentoperate at different ICOR 
investment opportunities, it is difficult to draw definite conclusions from the 
mere observation of (1 )1 0 »  indices. The question of over-saving can not be
J , , , . , Mrxwpvpr macro-economic theory can further ouradequately resolved this way. Ho e er,
. .  to to Patp of Investment states that the capital stockinvestigation. The Golden Rule Rate of mvesuut-v
, , cfaifa consumption also rises or in othershould be increased so long as steady s f
words the optimal level of investment in the steady state is achieved when the 
marginal product of capital equals the depreciation rate. Under the g
--------  ---------------------------------- --------------—  ' . .  Flnancl„  Tima« 30 index stood at 22.40 on December 30tti, 1999, with aS19 For example, tha prico aamlnfls ratio of the shares com ne
hlflh of 25.41 and a low of 18.80 over the course of the whole year.  ^ _  . . Slnoapore had invested all of her savlno« in the NYSE composite
820 The Exkurse in Section III.5. calculates a  similar counterfactual by as T1C0R as8g(nes but annually over the course of the whole
Index, yet not as one lump-sum Investment In 1999 as the comparison p unfBa|jstlc, if it had nevertheless been possible, investing In the 
development period. It comes to the conclusion, that although the coun actually achieved by Singapore's own economy.
NYSE composite index would have yielded a comparable Increase in income by 1999
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assumption of diminishing returns, any additional investment beyond this level 
would result in a fall in total consumption, since the incremental cost of 
depreciation to the economy would be higher than the additional output
achieved.521
Graph III.3.4.b.: The Golden Rule522
The marginal product of capital is generally estimated as the factor share of 
capital in GDP, which empirically lies around 30 to 35 percent. Therefore, in the
521 Tt)e Golden Rule condition that the optima! level of saving Is reached when the marginal product ot capital (MPK) Is equal to the depreciation rale 
(5) can be quite simply derived at mathematically taking Its starting position from the basto consumption Identity in the steady stale, where Investment 
** ec|ual to depreciation: C ■ f(K) -  8K, where C stands tor the total consumption of the economy. K Is the total capital stock and f(K) the economy's 
total output. To find the K, which maximises C In the steady state, we need to differentiate to find dC/dK ■ f(K) - 8 and set this derivative to zero. Since 
r<K) Is nothing else than the marginal product of capital, we obtain the Golden Rule condition of MPK ■ 6 for the optimal level of investment. If Ihe 
model is extended to Include population growth (n), the Golden Rule condillon Is achieved If MPK ■ 8 + n. If the mode! is further extended to allow tor 
technological progress (g) the Golden Rule condition is given as MPK « 6 + n ♦ g Or In other words at the Golden Rule level of capital, Ihe net 
ma'f>lnal product of capital (MPK -  6) equals tha rate of growth of total output (n + g). An alternative Interpretation of the Golden Rule therefore says 
toal as long as the net marginal product of capital Is larger (hen Ihe growth rate, the economy would benefit from additional capital Investments, For an 
«»Planatton of the Golden Rule see most macroeconomics textbooks, for example Miles and Scott (2002, pp. 102-104) or Mankiw (2000, pp. 89-87). 
For an earty discussion see Phelps (1961).
522 Sources: GFCF taken from 1060-95 from Department of Statistics: Singapore System of National Accounts 1095; Singapore, 1896; pp. 86-103; 
1996-98 taken from Dept, of Statistics: Statistical Yearbook (various issues); Share of Profits: see NWage Series in Chapter One, which is based on 
various sources for total renumeration. The Profit Share appears relatively high, compared to the regularly assumed one-third of GDP. However, even 
toe Singapore Department of Statistics (1997) puts it at an average of 0.551 for 1973-96 and Young (1995, p.858), calculating his estimates using 
interpolation from Input-Output tables, finds Singapore to have the highest capital factor share within his sample of Taiwan, South Korea and Hong 
Kong, He works from an average of 0.481 for 1966-1990. The average of our series Is 0.5772. Asher (1999, p.1) argues that the Singapore 
9°vemment followed a policy to keep the wage share In national income as tow as possible and correspondingly keep the share of capital as high as 
Possible, with respect to the following analysis, If anything this high profit share gives our subsequent analysis a conservative character, since the gap
•ween profit-share and Investment-share Is lower than If we had employed other, lower estimates.
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stead y  sta te  w h e re  d e p re cia tio n  equals in v estm en t, th e  'o p tim a l' in v e s tm e n t is 
gen erally  a p p ro x im a te d  as ly in g  b etw een  3 0  an d  3 5  p ercen t. W h ile  th e  c o u n try  ts  
m o v in g  to w a rd s  a  n e w , h ig h e r s te a d y  sta te  fro m  a  co m p a ra h v e ly  lo w  lev el o
cap ita l in  the e c o n o m y  th e  in v e stm e n t ra te  ca n  be h ig h e r until th e  d e p re cia tio n
, , «_ c R ased  o n  th is c rite rio n  a n d  g iv en
ra te  m a tch e s  th e m a rg in a l p ro d u c t o f cap ita  .
th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  S in g a p o re 's  G ro ss-F ix e d -C a p ita l-F o rm a tio n  a s  sh o w n  in  
g ra p h  III.3 .4 .b . n o  c le a r  o v e r-in v e stm e n t b e co m e s v isib le, sin ce  th e  G F C F  ra
sta y s  la rg e ly  w ith in  th e  ta rg e t  ra n g e .
A n  a lte rn a tiv e  re a d in g  o f  th e  G o ld en  R u le  h a s  b een  p ro p o se d  b y  A b el e t  al. 
(1 9 8 9 ). If  a n  e c o n o m y  is ca p ita l efficient, th e y  a rg u e , th e  o p e ra tin g  p ro fits  o f  th e  
c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  sh o u ld  b e la rg e  e n o u g h  to  c o v e r  in v estm en ts . If  th e y  a re , th e  
c o rp o ra te  s e c to r  h a s  b een  a  n e t-so u rce  o f  fu n d s fo r  co n su m p tio n . B u t if 
in v e stm e n ts  e x c e e d  p ro fits , th en  th e  ca p ita l s to ck  h a s  b e e n  fin a n ce d  a t  th e  
e x p e n se  o f  co n su m p tio n . C o m p a rin g  S in g a p o re 's  g ro ss-n a tio n a l-sa v in g s  a n d  th e  
p ro fit sh a re  a s  s h o w n  in  g ra p h  III.3 .4 .a . g iv e  n o  in d ica tio n  o f  o v e rs a v in g  u n til  
p o ssib ly  th e  v e r y  e n d  o f  th e  p erio d . H o w e v e r, o n ce  w e  co n sid e r  to ta l  
in v e stm e n ts  m a d e , i.e . in clu siv e  o f  th e  su b stan tia l sa v in g s  a p p ro p ria te d  fro m  
a b ro a d , th e  a sse ssm e n t ch a n g e s  d ra m a tica lly . C o n sid e rin g  to ta l in v e stm e n ts  
rn ad e, th e  e c o n o m y  h a s  b e e n  la ck in g  ca p ita l efficien cy  f ro m  th e  e a rly  1 9 8 0 s  
o n w a rd s , w h ic h  c a n  be in te rp re te d  a s  s u p p o rt  fo r  th e  o v e rs a v in g  h y p o th esis .
Table III.3.4.b. compares the averages for sub-periods. With the investment share 
averaging at 60.7 percent and the achieved average profit share at 57.7 percent, 
Singapore appears to have over-invested three percent of cumulative GNP 
between 1965-99. Moreover, splitting the sample period around the 1985/86 
recession shows that over-investment has been concentrated in the post 1986 
period when the investment share stood at more than 14 percent of GNP above
*be p ro fit  sh a re .
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Table lll.3.4.a.: Total Investment vs. Profit Share (both as percent of real GNP)
Total Investment Profit Share
_1965-73 41.7% 54.6%
_ 1973-78 53.9% 64.5%
1978-84 65.7% 58.3%
J985-86 69.5% 54.8%
1987-99 72.3% 58.0%
J  965-84 52.3% 57.9%
J987-99 72.3% 58.0%
1965-99 60.7% 57.7%
One could argue, that based on these results Singaporeans could have potentially 
lowered their savings rate and thus have enjoyed higher consumption levels 
without affecting the economy's wellbeing. However, because foreign and 
domestic investment can not be considered disjointly due to their multiple 
interactions and feedback mechanisms, the question whether the potential over­
investment can be translated one-to-one into domestic over-saving depends on 
one's view of how much domestically financed investment was necessary in 
order to make Singapore such a successful recipient of foreign investment. The 
central question therefore turns out to be whether and to what degree lower 
domestic savings would have also lowered foreign investment in Singapore. 
While this cannot be established with an exact elasticity, looking at Singapore's 
own substantial overseas investments allows us to make a lower bound estimate. 
Even if we assume that all of the government's overseas investments were 
necessary in order to generate through its foreign reserves the required macro- 
economic stability requested by foreign investors, private overseas investments 
hy Singaporeans will have hardly attracted foreign funds to Singapore. It is safe, 
therefore, to assume that private overseas investments, which totalled (constant 
1990) S$ 154,500 millions or 11.28 percent of cumulative real 1965-99 GNP, could 
have been lowered by three percent of GNP without significantly affecting the 
country's ability to attract foreign investments. Thus, it can be argued that as a 
conservative estimate Singapore over-saved the equivalent of (at least) 3 percent 
of cumulative 1965-99 GNP and this largely in the period after 1980.
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Moving beyond macro-economic theory, the simplest but potentially most 
revealing way of addressing the question of oversaving is to look at how much of 
the saving did go unused. Table III.3.4.b. offers the respective calculation, in 
which cumulative GFCF for 1965-99 together with all overseas investment is 
deducted from the total investment pool, which was available for these years. 
The balance can only be working capital or corporate investments in non-fixed 
assets, which have been capitalized onto the companies balance sheets.523
Table lll.3.4.b.: Working Capital in Singapore
1990 constant S$ million 
Cumulative Investments 1965-99 
Less Cumulative GFCF 
Less Cumulative Overseas Investments...
1,217,986.29 
-609,117.33 
- 269.437.74
Equals Working Capital 339,431.22
The calculation shows that as an upper limit a little over 27.5 percent of the total 
investment pool were merely used as working capital, i.e. did not find a final 
investment target. If we were to assume that the 7.9 percent share of the 
investment pool, which can not be traced, was fully invested overseas, we obtain 
a lower limit bound of a little under 20 percent.524 Tins means that in a 
conservative estimate almost every fifth dollar, which Singapore had available 
for investment purposes, did not find a final investment. Twenty percent of the 
total investment pool equals about fourteen percent of the cumulative real GNP 
for 1965-99. Saving fourteen percent of GNP only for it to be used to help 'oil the 
system' appears somewhat high, although again no benchmark exists of how 
niuch working capital an economy requires. Moreover, Singaporeans and 
particularly their government but also the country's foreign direct investors 
valued stability very highly.
523 Unfortunately, there is no Information available about the amount of potential non-fixed capital Investments capitalized onto corporate balance 
•heels. However, since this can only be capitalised patents, royalties or goodwill It Is not likely to having been a substantial amount In terms of thair 
•bans in GNP,
524 The portion of the Investment pool which can be traced but not allocated, such as the unexplained quoted and unquoted Investments by the 
floverwnent or parts of Its capital expenditures, are not likely to having been overseas Investments, because foreign investments are shown as a 
•eparate item on the government's financial statements and capital expenditures do by definition not allow for overseas Investments.
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 ^ cavinas which was not put to a direct 
Nevertheless, this large proportion of s g
in v e stm e n t co m b in ed  w ith  th e  fin d in g of o v e r-in v e stm e n t b a se d  o n  th e  o  en  
R uie in d ica te s  th a t  e v e n  th o u g h  S in g a p o re 's  in v e stm e n t p e rfo rm a n ce  m u s t be 
co n sid e re d  a  su cce ss , i t  co u ld  h a v e  p o ten tia lly  b een  ach ie v e d  w rth  lo w er  
(d o m estic) sav in g s . T h e re fo re . S in g ap o rean s co u ld  h a v e  (in  re tro sp e ct) en jo y ed  a
higher level of consumption by at least three percent of cumulative GNP wtthout
, i ____co Particularly in tire second halt ot the
affectin g  th e  c o u n try 's  g ro w th  p e rfo rm
««orPQQarilv h ie h  b y  m o re  th a n  ten  p e rce n t  
p erio d  g ro ss  n atio n a l sa v in g s  w e re  u n n ecessarily  n ig  y
of GNP. The thus generated investment funds went largely unused.
H l . 3 . 5 .  C r o w d i n g  O u t ?
A related issue is the question of whether the high government involvement has 
crowded-out private enterprise. The IMF (2000), for example, argues that the 
overwhelming power of government owned companies in Singapore is "likely to 
have crowded out local private enterprise and thus prevented the development 
of a large and dynamic network of local corporations, contributing to the widely 
perceived lack of corporate dynamism in Singapore."525 On the other hand, Huff 
(1994 and 1995c) argues that public investment most likely crowded-in private 
investment. He points out that crowding-in would help explain the paradox of 
high public sector savings and yet reliance on private sector capital formation, 
"public sector savings which finances infrastructure brought even higher private 
sector investment. A possible drawback, however, was that private industry 
crowded in was largely foreign."526 At face value, our analysis so far could be 
understood as showing an even more direct form of crowding in. The
IMF (2000, pp. 10-11)®28 Huff ¡1084, pp. 338-339), In Huff (1996, p. 1431), however, he argue« (hat an “Adaptation, frequently »uggested in the mid-1960s, of a Hong Kong 
development model reliant on small Chinese manufacturing enterprise and so local entrepreneurs appears never to have been seriously considered by
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government gave up control over savings and thus allowed the private sector to 
make the investment decision. Contrary to Huff (1994 and 1995c), however, it 
was not private industry investments, which were crowded in, but largely 
service sector investments. The surrender of control by the government 
combined with the fact of considerable unused funds in the economy, therefore, 
would cast some doubt over the argument that the government's strong 
involvement in the economy has crowded out private domestic investments -  at 
least from a financial point of view.
However, a closer look reveals a significantly different picture. Until 1995 
Singapore published GFCF separated by public and private sector. Combining 
this information with our new database and applying the same calculations as in 
table III.3.4.b. shows that indeed the Singapore government kept the private 
sector at a tight financial leash.
Table 111.3.5.: Crowding Out
1990 constant S$ million 
Government controlled investment pool 1965-95 
Less Real Public GFCF 1965-95 
Less Real Public Overseas 1965-95
442,433.99
112,679,16
79.623.88
Collected Working Capital 1965-95 250,130.94
Private controlled real investment pool 1965-95 
Less Real Private GFCF 1965-95 
Less Real Private Overseas 1965-95
353,913.80
324,507.65
71.830.40
Collected Working Capital 1965-95 (42,424.25)
As table III.3.5. shows the government appears to have been responsible for the 
collection of the considerable amounts of working capital described above, while 
on the other hand the private sphere seems to have experienced a financial 
crunch. The repurchase of government bonds shows nicely how tins crunch has 
been remedied by the government by giving up control over parts of the savings
I f .  decision to rely for econom ic developm ent on M N E .  and «late -o w n ed  «n te rp ria e . a llow ed S in g a p o re ', local b u . i t « » »  elite ta.f9. 1y to 
excluded form the decisio n-m aking process,"
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appropriated into its realm of influence. At the end of the 1995/96 financial year 
the government's financial statements show (constant 1990 S$) 42,571 million in 
government bonds and deposits with investment agents, which equals almost 
exactly the underfunding of the private sector. Additionally, the government's 
other investments of almost (constant 1990 S$) 100 billion in quoted and 
unquoted investments will have further eased the private sector's financial 
tension. Yet, it must be assumed that these investments contrary to the 
repurchase of government bonds also came with a substantial degree of control 
by the government over the investment target's decision process and it is 
therefore doubtful whether they can be considered as evidence against
crowding-out.527
While we can not show whether this tight leash has actually led to unfulfilled 
investment and the neglect of other entrepreneurial opportunities in the private 
sector, the disparate financial endowment seems to nevertheless rather support 
the crowding-out than the crowding-in hypothesis. If crowding-in has taken 
place it was under strong and financially direct influence of the government.
------------------------------------ ------------------- . h m ai,ion of (constant 1990 S$) 38,793 million and outstanding loans to the
627 In addition, the government'« financial statements also show a cas po actually be considered as capital expenditure and thus
HDB Of (constant 1990 S$) 27,S90 million, which are anybody's guess on whether they should actually
GFCP, see the discussion In sections ltl.3,2. and IV.3,
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111.4. Conclusion
Essentially, tins chapter intended to determine how the substantial amounts of 
savings were transformed into investment. In combination with the by now well- 
established growth literature and the saving investigations of Chapters One and 
Two, this link will be able to close the circle of Singapore's development: saving 
based on favourable circumstances, which were very well exploited, leading to 
investment, which in turn lead to growth and thus enabled more saving.
The investigation indicates more dearly than previously tire Singapore 
government's control over investment dedsions. On a conservative estimate the 
government managed to appropriate the equivalent of eighty percent of the
, , .. cavincT«! between 1965-99 into its realm ofcountry s (real) gross national savings oerwe
influence. The Government also acted as a very active Investment Fund 
Manager, who however delegated one third of his control over the appropriated 
funds to the private sector. In this respect Singapore has been a clear case of 
government control along the lines of Amsden and Wade: a pro-active state, 
which interferes in an hands-on, practical and substantial way in the economy, 
much more so than North's notion of a strong but limited government whose 
main role is to create efficient organizational structures, and even stronger Bran 
Eichengreen's, whose state only gets involved in re-distributory negotiations 
through its guarantee of a social contract.
In terms of industrial policy, the exercise finds that private investment was 
predominantly directed towards the service sector and public investment largely 
towards overseas. Based on their investment dedsions Singaporeans did not see 
an exploitable comparative advantage in manufacturing. Even foreign investors, 
Who dominated the comparatively little manufacturing investments made, 
primarily committed their funds to the tertiary sector. The analysis also shows 
that Singapore was not a flying goose in the strict sense. Smgapore s
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development did not follow a flying geese pattern in which the co u n try  c o p ie d  
another country's earlier development su ccess  s to ry  an d  invested in a successive 
list of increasingly advanced industries. Instead Singaporeans decided to invest 
in the tertiary sector from the start. If at all, it was the foreigners who were the 
%ing geese, using Singapore for their own industrial sequencing.
Additionally, it becomes apparent that Gross Fixed Capital Formation captures 
only about half of total investments made, which casts s o m e  doubt over other 
analyses merely based on GFCF. The exercise is able to show that as a lower limit 
about one fifth of the total investment pool or fourteen percent of cumulative 
1965-99 GNP was used as working capital, which would indicate that a more 
efficient use of the funds, i.e. less foregone consumption, could have still been 
possible without affecting the investment success. Singaporeans could have (in 
retrospect) enjoyed a higher level of consumption by at least three percent of 
cumulative GNP without affecting the country's growth performance. 
Particularly in the second half of the period gross national savings were 
N ecessarily high by more than ten percent of GNP. Although not strictly 
comparable due to very different methodologies employed, it is striking how 
close this finding is to the policy impact on Singapore's savings established in 
Chapter One, which ranged from five to ten percent. The collected working 
capital appears to have been accumulated solely by the public sphere, which has 
surrendered some of it to compensate the financial limitations of the private 
sector.
Combining these findings with the results fr o m  Chapter One, it can be argued 
that while Singapore's savings in the second half of the period might not have 
been surprising, i.e. could have been expected of a country given Singapore's 
circumstances, they were nevertheless unnecessarily high. In retrospect, 
Singapore consumers could have en jo y e d  a higher standard of living, without 
affecting the country's economic development. Expanding the metaphor from
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Chapters One and Two, the exercise shows that the trainer has committed the 
child to a highly controlled and unnecessarily ambitious training and 
competition schedule. In retrospect, we can say that the child could have had a 
little bit more fun, particularly during its adolescence, without endangering its 
success.
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ll1-5- Excurse: Financial Assessment of Singapore’s Oversaving
Even though financial theory has made major advances since the 1950s, it 
remains notoriously difficult to evaluate the efficiency of investments. While 
calculating the respective return might be comparatively easy, assessing that 
return and thus finding ex-ante performance benchmarks of similar risk-levels 
remains difficult. Therefore, we try to assess the country's investment 
performance through two counterfactual analyses. The counterfactuals try to 
estimate for two alternative investment strategies that return, which would have 
been necessary in order for these alternative scenarios to have yielded the same 
increase in income as Singapore's actual investment behaviour. This makes 
Singapore's actual investment success assessable.
ft Singapore had used her savings in a purely financial manner and thus invested 
each year's addition to the investment pool as well as all cumulative investment 
revenue since 1965 in interest bearing debentures an annual real return of 6.21 
percent would have yielded additional (real) income in 1999 equal to the increase 
in GNP actually achieved since 1964.528 Therefore, the (real) internal rate of 
return of Singapore's investment over the thirty-five years since the country's 
independence was a little over six percent per year. Table III.5. shows the 
spreadsheet procedure which was used to iteratively determine this internal rate 
°f return.
Table 111.5.: Singapore’s Internal Rate of Return
Constant 1990 S$ million 1965 1966 1967 1999
Starting Balance 
Real Interest Earned 
« S a v in a  that vear
0
0
1.125.33
1,125.33
69.91
1.565.55
2,760,78 .
171.50 . 
2.861.96 .
. 2,091,440.86 
129,920.31 
102.377.S3
tnding Balance 
Jncrease in GNP since 1964
1,125.33 2,760.78 5,794.25 . . 2,323,738.70 
129,923.96
528 This calculation 
>0 8%,
assumes that the saving Is Invested at year end. On the assumption of Investment In mid-year, the real internal rate of return falls
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Considering this cakutation a 'counterfactual' anaiysis in economic terms, 
however, brings out its main caveat. Although it is financial* instructive, it »  
nevertheless historically impossible and thus not really useful for a benchmark 
analysis on which to base one's evaluation of the country's investment success. 
Investing the country's whole savings purely in financial instruments rs neither 
politically nor economically viable. The saving performance, particularly of die 
early years, would not have been possible if the increase in GNP had been 
restricted to the interest earned from earlier financial investments. For example 
by 1970 Singapore's real GNP had already increased by (constant 1990) S$6.
, . 1Q/- * tTip country also managed to add (constantbillion from its starting base in 964. The tr   6 (
, _ „i jf. vpaf Xhis would have heei\1990) S$ 8.5 billion to its investment pool m th y
impossible if the increase in incomes would have been restricted to the interest 
earned on the financial investments of the last five years, which equals on y 
(constant 1990) S$ 1 billion. As a matter of fact, the assumption of the same 
saving behaviour as if the country had invested in its own infrastructure etc.
. iQ7 n have invested the equivalent to one would require Singaporeans m 19
, „ , . • 529 Tn other words, Singaporeans would havehundred percent of their income. I
n rh  thev have without the increase in income never been able to save us muc as n y
, „^prated bv domestic investment. Given thestemming from the growth genera y _
, . r Cincranore was able to realise the country did investment performance which S gap
,  ^ a vnftim of a little over six percent. Butindeed achieve a real internal rate o
C. . .  Uave been able to follow such an investmentSingapore would never h  n
«Ur inrreased bv the equivalent of six percent on performance had her income only c y 4
past investments.
A similar outcome is obtained if one assumes that Singapore had invested the 
additions to her total investment pool since 1965 annualy in an eqmty portfoho 
tracking the performance of the NYSE composite index. Assuming
« 9  GNP in IBM .  7.5 billion. Th. additional income due to pest Investment* In financial Instrument, at real rale of return of 6 21% would have 
yielded additional Income of 1 billion In 1970, making that year's GNP B.5 billion, which Is exactly the amount which Singapore was In reality able to
Invest in 1970. All constant 1990 Si.
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counterfactualy — that the country would have still been able to realise the same 
gross national savings, attracted the same amounts of FDI and had tire foresight 
to sell its portfolio at the end of 1999, the country's total investment pool would 
bave increased to over (constant 1990) S$ 3.577 trillion, only based on the capital 
gains in the NYSE composite index.^ If reinvested in 1999 in interest bearing 
bonds with a real interest rate of 3.62 percent, this would yield (constant 1990) S$ 
130 billion income to Singaporeans, which equals the increase in (real) GNP since 
1965. Given the fact that a real interest yield of 3.62 percent at the end of 1999 is 
not unreasonable, this counterfactual would argue that had it been possible for 
Singapore to simply invest the total investment pool in US stocks, the country 
would have potentially achieved a similar increase in GNP as was achieved by
the country's actual domestic investment.
« 0  The historical NYSE composite Index data was taken from the NYSE Internet page d « l 12.08.2003) at:
httpy/www nyse.com/marketlnfa/p1020656088262.html7dl splayPage«%2Fmarketinfo%2Fmarketlnfor.html. The lack of lnclu»lon of divid6nd Pa*ment8
In the available data series can be rationalised In our case by assuming that these dividend payments would have been used to cover the expenses of 
*he fund, which have also not been Included In the counlerfactual analysis.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
Singapore's history holds many clues to understanding fast, capital-driven 
economic development. The thesis has examined some of the central, yet so far 
unresolved issues. The methodologies employed were largely quantitatively 
driven, the approach therefore predominantly investigative and not so much 
argumentative. The resulting findings are presented in a concise format in the 
Executive Summary at the beginning of the thesis. But how do these quantitative 
fadings alter our qualitative perception of Singapore's economic history beyond 
each individual figure's respective impact? The following concluding remarks 
intend to briefly highlight two such aspects crucial to understanding Singapore's 
recent economic history and then extend the findings of the thesis to point to 
some likely challenges in Singapore's future.
Favourable Starting Position
Both saving chapters point to a number of circumstances in favour of Singapore's 
saving transition and thus in favour of her capital-driven rapid development, 
such as the opportunity presented by the country's demographic transition and 
its geographic location allowing for a strong external position.
Beyond those circumstances which can be quantitatively assessed there are quite 
naturally a number of others which can not. Lucky timing is one of them. The 
country's comparatively late independence allowed Singapore to learn from tire
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^stakes of early developers.531 The economic situation right after independence 
Was furthermore helped by extraneous factors like the Vietnam war and the 
resumption of trade with the 'new order' in Indonesia. Rodrik (1996) also points 
to a relatively well educated work force, which in turn he argues made it easier 
to establish a competent bureaucracy as well as enhancing the productivity of 
tfiterventions aimed at boosting private investment.532 A comparatively equal 
utcome and wealth distribution is also regularly mentioned as a reason for a well 
functioning public administration.533 The political economy argument in essence 
maintains that societies with lower inequality will resort to less redistribution 
and grow faster, since redistribution acts as a tax on accumulation.534 Due to her 
free-trade history, Singapore did not have a problem accepting foreign economic 
influence, as Huff (1995) points out.535 Moreover, it should not be forgotten that 
Singapore was at her independence one of the richest Asian nations, which again 
ls due to the country's excellent geographic location, and had already shown a 
decent growth performance from the mid 1950s onwards.536
531 See for example Goh (1971 p.9) as he describes the lessons learnt from other countries, 
which focused on import substitution policies, or Goh (1972 Pu 43) in a 1967 radio interview or 
Qoh (1972 p 79) in a paper presented at a conference in February 1965. Lee (1998, p. 538-9) 
describes his impressions from his 1964 trip through Africa and subsequent missions in 1970 and 
1979 as an unforgettable lesson in decolonisation, the crucial role of social cohesion and a 
capable, effective government to take power from the colonial authority. He summarises his 
experiences* “When misguided policies based on half-digested theories of socialism and 
redistribution of wealth were compounded by less than competent government, societies formerly 
held together by colonial power splintered, with appalling consequences.
®32 Rodrik (1996, p. 20-21)
Huff (1995 pp 1422-23) points out for example that Singapore had for Asian standards a 
substantial middle class and less of an immigration problem. See also Rodrik (1996), Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), George Clarke (1993) and Nancy Birdsall, David 
Ross and Richard Sabot (1994) or specifically on wealth distribution Bardhan (2001)
534 Rodrik (1999) additionally argues that the economic costs of external shocks are magnified by 
the distributional conflicts that are triggered and that this diminishes the productivity with which a 
society’s resources are utilized.
335 Huff (1995, p. 1434): *|n Singapore ... development through multinationals as a substitute for 
local entrepreneurship required of the Republic no more than what historically it had always done 
— to respond to changes in the international economy and the resulting requirements of 
foreigners."
536 Huff (1995, p. 1422-23); Goh (1972, p. 37), for example, writes in a 1966 speech to the 
Malayan Society: "In Malaya and Singapore, the primary accumulation of capital on which 
subsequent growth was mounted took place during the colonial era about the turn of the century.
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r, , a W  th e im p o rta n ce  o f  a  fa v o u ra b leO u r fin d in g s re in fo rce  th e  a rg u m e n t a
startin g  p o s itio n  fo r  S in g a p o re 's  su b seq u en t d ev elo p m en t. R a th e r  th an  a g a rn st
all o d d s, a s  d re  P A F s  le g a c y  trie s  to  d escrib e S in g a p o re 's  d e v e lo p m e n t su cce ss ,
i u n w  w ell th e  fav o u rab le  o d d s  h a v e  b eenthe n a tio n 's  tru e  su cce ss  s to ry  lies m  h o
i .  artiipvement, b u t a  d iffe re n t a n d  m o re  e xp lo ited .537 T h is  is  far fro m  a  le sse r ch ie
realistic  o n e . M o re o v e r, it  is  sig n ifican t fo r th o se  n a tio n s  try in g  to  le a rn  fro m  a n d  
p ossib ly  c o p y  S in g a p o re 's  d e v e lo p m e n t policies. B efore  d o in g  so  * e y  " e e  ‘- 
assess th e ir  o w n  s ta rtin g  fm sition , h o w  it  c o m p a re s  to  S in g a p o re  s  m  th e 9 6 0 s
fnr d ifferen ces. T h e  an a ly se s  o f  th is th esisa n d  h o w  th e y  c a n  p o ssib ly  co m p e n sa t  
sh o u ld  h e lp  in  th a t  u n d ertak in g .
IV.2. The Role of an Altruistic Generation and a Sense of Crisis
P u ttin g  a  d efin itiv e  p a id  to  th e  n o tio n  o f  S in g a p o re 's  su cce ss  b ein g  d u e  to  die  
free m o v e m e n t o f  m a rk e t fo rces, th e  th esis h a s  b een  ab le  to  estab lish  (lo w e r lim it)  
e stim ates  o n  th e  d e g re e  o f  co n tro l ex e rcise d  b y  th e  g o v e rn m e n t o v e r  th e  n a tio n 's  
sav in g s  a n d  th e  re su ltin g  d e g re e  o f  u n n ecessarily  fo re g o n e  co n su m p tio n . T h e  
thesis th e re fo re  len d s su p p o rt to  th o se  in te rp re tin g  th e g ro w th  a cco u n tin g  
lite ra tu re  o n  S in g a p o re  as  a n  in d ica tio n  th a t th e  c o u n try 's  su cce ss  w a s  d u e  to  
sacrifices .538 T h e  d iesis  h a s  sh o w n  w h ich  in stru m e n ts  th e  g o v e rn m e n t u se d  a n d  
w h ich  o p p o rtu n itie s  i t  w a s  ab le  to  b en efit fro m . H o w e v e r , w h ile  it  h a s  b een  
re la tiv e ly  e a s y  to  estab lish  w h ich  in stitu tio n al to o ls  th e  S in g a p o re  g o v e rn m e n t  
e m p lo y e d  to  g a in  its  h ig h  d e g re e  o f  co n tro l, it  is m o re  d ifficu lt to  re a s o n  h o w  it
This process produced conditions as abominable as those in Western Europe, the Soviet Union 
and Japan during the first stages of their industrial revolution. v . , , , . h
537 Or as Huff (1994, p. 369) puts it: "Singapore became rich because it was already relative y r c , 
and because it had good policies." __.
638 Most forcefully Krugman (1994. p.78): “If there is a s e ^  growth, it is simply deferred
gratification, the willingness to sacrifice current satisfaction for future gam.
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P ersu ad ed  a t  le a st o n e  g e n e ra tio n  o f  S in g ap o rean s to  a llo w  su ch  a  h ig h  d e g re e  o f  
control a n d  fo re g o  su b stan tia l a m o u n ts  o f  co n su m p tio n  fo r the sak e o f  fu tu re  
gen eratio n s .539 T h e  th esis, esp ecially  th e  b rid g e  b u ilt b y  its in v e stm e n t an aly sis  to  
4116 ex istin g  g ro w th  a cco u n tin g  lite ra tu re , sh o w s th a t  this ro le  o f  a n  'a ltru is tic  
g en eratio n ' m u s t  be co n sid e re d  th e d ecisive  fa c to r in  S in g a p o re 's  e co n o m ic  
history.
° ne p ossib le  e x p la n a tio n  is offered  b y M ich ael B arr (2 0 0 0 ), w h o  p o in ts  o u t  th a t  
since th e ex p u lsio n  fro m  th e F e d e ra tio n  o f  M alay a  S in g ap o re  w a s  g o v e rn e d  
Und er a  c o n s ta n t fe a r o f  crisis. B a rr  (2 0 0 0 ) re fe rrin g  to  A rn o ld  T o y n b ee 's  
'C h allen g e  a n d  R e sp o n se ' th esis, a rg u e s  th a t L ee  K u a n -Y e w  a n d  th e P A P  h a v e  
Used th e  o p p o rtu n ity  p re se n te d  b y  th e exp u lsio n  to  face  S in g a p o re a n s w ith  the  
ch allen g e to  s u rv iv e  a n d  to  co n v in ce  th e m  to  m ak e  im m e d ia te  sacrifices. T h is h as  
led to  S in g a p o re  b ein g  g o v e rn e d  u n d e r a  co n sta n t sen se o f  crisis , in tern al an d  
extern al en em ies a n d  th e re -o cc u rrin g  n e e d  to  re sp o n d  to  so m e  n e w  crisis  w h ich  
n eed s all to  s ta n d  u p  fo r S in g ap o re  a n d  s u p p o rt th e  P A P .540 T his s tra te g y  h as  
been e m p lo y e d  to  th e  p re se n t d a y . P eeb les a n d  W ilso n  (2 0 0 2 ) a rg u e  th a t e v e n  in  
c o n te m p o ra ry  S in g a p o re  " th e  g o v e rn m e n t seem s k een  to  k eep  its p e o p le  in  fear
That the PAP government knowingly aimed for a strategy of sacrifices combined with a highly 
controlling government becomes evident in the following quote from Goh (1972, pp.34-5) taken 
from a speech given in 1966 to the Malayan Society: “In the history of advanced industrial nations 
of today, except the fortunate few well-endowed with natural resources such as the United States 
and New Zealand the first stage of economic development had been a harsh and cruel phase. It 
meant the destruction of traditional institutions and the imposition of terrible sacrifices on the vast 
majority of the population In most instances the first stage of economic growth represented a 
traumatic experience It was possible to drag the country through it only within a strong political 
framework. Such was the experience of Britain and Western Europe during the Industrial 
Revolution, and Japan too during the Meiji Restoration. (...) it is worthy of note that Western 
Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan, during the time they achieved their economic breakthrough, 
did not have universal franchise. (...) Hence it was possible to exact from the general population 
sacrifices which no popularly elected government today would dare even to contemplate. (...) I 
believe that unless democratic backward countries can create new institutions and promote new 
values which can galvanize, inspire, cajole, induce and, in the last resort, compel men into action, 
they will not be able to lift themselves out off the present state of stagnation and poverty.
540 Barr (2000, pp.80-81). He also argues that Lee Kuan-Yew also applied this strategy in order to 
minimize his personal embarrassment as he had been the one who had manipulated Singapore 
into Malaysia in the first place.
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im m in en t co lla p se  a n d  th e re tu rn  to  the lo w  q u ality  o f  life an d  s ta n d a rd  o f  
ü vin g o f  th e  co lo n ia l e r a ."*41
Ind eed , i t  is s trik in g  h o w  th e  p ic tu re  p ro p a g a te d  by th e P A P  g o v e rn m e n t b o th  a t  
the tim e a n d  to  th e  p re s e n t d a y  in  re tro sp e c t co n tra sts  sh arp ly  w ith  th e  o n e  
d ra w n  a b o v e  o f  a  fa v o u ra b le  s ta rtin g  p o sitio n  for S in g ap o re . Tire P A P  h a s  a lw a y s  
tried  to  c o n v e y  a  sen se  o f  crisis  to  th e  S in g ap o re  e le cto ra te .®42 Y e t  fa r  fro m  b ein g  
a co n tra d ic tio n , th is 'to o l ' w a s  u sed  d elib erately  an d  v e r y  effectiv ely  to  h elp  
o v e rco m e  th e  ce rta in ly  e x iste n t ch allen g es an d  to  m ak e  tire re fo rm s a n d  h a rd  
W ork m o re  p a la ta b le  w h ich  w e re  n e ce ssa ry  to  a llo w  th e co u n try  to  b en efit fro m  
the y e t-to -b e  e x p lo ite d  fa v o u ra b le  in itial s itu atio n .543 In o th e r  w o rd s , in  th e  e a rly  
1 9 6 0 s  S in g a p o re  h a d  th e  a d v a n ta g e  o f  actu ally  h a v in g  a  fa v o u ra b le  s ta rtin g  
P o sitio n  w h ich  w a s  h o w e v e r  h id d en  u n d e r a  v e r y  tro u b le so m e  p o litical  
e n v iro n m e n t. T h e  P A P  g o v e rn m e n t's  m ain  a ch ie v e m e n t w a s  to  co m b in e  b o th  
th ese a p p a re n tly  c o n tra d ic to ry  asp e cts  in to  o n e  su ccessfu l d e v e lo p m e n t s tra te g y ,  
co n v in cin g  th e  c o n te m p o ra n e o u s  g en era tio n  to  a c c e p t sacrifices  o n  b eh alf o f  la ter
Peebles and Wilson (2002, p. 7)
The problematic interpretation of Singapore' situation particularly around and after the 
separation from the Federation of Malaya and the withdrawal of the British military forces was also 
shared by a number of outside commentators, for example: Bonavia (1967), Bellows (1968), 
Emery (1968) or Buchanan (1972). It is also noteworthy that on the other hand the Singapore 
government tried to convey just about the opposite interpretation of the county's situation to the 
world outside Yoshihara Kunio (1976, p.18) quotes E.J. Mayer, the first Director of the Economic 
Development Board In January 1962: "It is completely wrong to think of Singapore as an 
underdeveloped county Yet this belief Is vey prevalent both in Singapore and abroad, It has 
probably arisen from the fact that the surrounding countries are comparatively under-developed -  
but what may apply to nearby states certainly does not apply to Singapore. In almost evey 
respect this is a highly developed county."
643 It is also noteworthy that this tool of a sense of crisis has probably only worked due to the fact 
that Singapore had indeed something to lose due to its comparatively high standard of living in 
Asia. Furthermore, the PAP government made sure that at least parts of the gains from the 
growth success were immediately shared with the population, see for example Campos and Root 
(1996) or Jaspersen (1997), Moreover, the PAP used the HDB housing programme vey 
effectively to support its legitimisation. These aspects function as the facilitating link between 
crisis and the need to make sacrifices on the one hand and a favourable situation on the other.
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gen eratio n s u s in g  th e  tro u b le d  p o litical e n v iro n m e n t to  c re a te  a  sen se o f  cris is  a s  
justification  fo r th e  sacrifices .544
Iv-3- Selected Challenges in Singapore's Future
S in gap o re  w a s  v e r y  su ccessfu l a t  exp lo itin g  a  g o v e rn m e n t co n tro lle d , cap ita l led  
d e v e lo p m e n t s tra te g y , in  w h ich  o n e  g e n era tio n  h a s  g iv e n  u p  a  su b stan tia l d e g re e  
of th eir e n title m e n ts  in  fo rm  o f  fo reg o n e  co n su m p tio n  a n d  s u rre n d e re d  co n tro l. 
■^ s p o in te d  o u t  b y  th e g ro w th  a cco u n tin g  lite ra tu re , o n ce  th is  s tra te g y  h a s  ru n  its  
co u rse  S in g a p o re  n e e d s  to  fo cu s  o n  ra isin g  the e co n o m y  s p ro d u ctiv ity  in ste a d  o f  
m erely  in cre a sin g  its  ca p ita l in p u ts. G iven  th e resu lts  o f  th e  th esis on  
g o v e rn m e n t c o n tro l, th is h o w e v e r  w o u ld  req u ire  a  c o m p le te  p o licy  tu rn  a ro u n d  
an d  a  su b stan tia l re -d e sig n  o f  th e e c o n o m y 's  o w n ersh ip  stru ctu re s . W h e th e r the  
S in g ap o re  p o litica l elite  w ill be able to  s te e r a  co u rse  w h ich  in  esse n ce  req u ires  it  
to  re tu rn  th e  c o n tro l i t  a ccu m u la te d  o v e r  d e ca d e s  b a ck  to  free  m a rk e t fo rce s  is 
q u estio n ab le . T h e  p ro g re s s  a lo n g  this p a th  h a s  so  far b een  v e r y  h esitan t. If th e  
p A P  g o v e rn m e n t is n o t  able to  re la x  its d o u b ly  firm  g rip  o v e r  b oth  th e  e co n o m y  
itself a n d  th e  p o litica l sy ste m  co n tro llin g  it, it  is n o t lik ely  th a t  a  S ch u m p e te r  
p ro ce ss  o f  c re a tiv e  d e stru ctio n  w ill be ab le to  tak e h o ld . S u ch  a  p ro c e s s  a lm o st b y  
d efin ition  is  n o t  lik ely  to  b e su ccessfu lly  in stilled  v ia  d o c tr in e  n o  m a tte r  h o w  
efficien t th e  p u b lic  ad m in istra tio n .
B ey o n d  th e  m e re  th e o re tica l a rg u m e n t fo r ch a n g e , th e  th esis  p o in ts  to  tw o  
fu rth e r so u rce s  o f  p re ssu re : th e  se co n d  s ta g e  o f  th e  d e m o g ra p h ic  tran sitio n , in  
w h ich  th e  fo rm e rly  b en eficially  in cre a se d  la b o u r fo rce  ra tio  tu rn s  in to  a  q u ick ly
This strategy is much in the Chinese tradition, where the word for Crisis combines two 
symbols: the first, wei, meaning ‘danger’ and the second, ji, opportunity.
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aging population, and potential problems with the government's balance-sheet
position.
The d e m o g ra p h ic  tra n sitio n  w h ich  th e  sav in g  an aly sis  h as sh o w n  w a s  o n e  o  *  
ce n tra l a s p e c ts  in  S in g a p o re 's  ca p ita l a ccu m u la tio n , w ill o v e r  th e  co u rse  o f  ti 
n ext d e ca d e s  t u n ,  in ti, s o m e w h a t o f  a  b u rd e n  for S in g ap o re  s  e co n o m y  an d
system . Asher (1994) already p o in ted  o u t  tha X y  .
persons is expected to be above 60, as compared to every eleven person m 
X990,« This second stage of the demographic transition has sparhe a th
• u  t  th e  a d e q u a cy  o f C P F  sav in g s , w h ich  afte r  all a re  
co n tro v e rs ia l d iscu ssio n  a b o u t th e  ad  q  y
L p v e n  th o u g h  su b stan tia l a m o u n ts  
d esig n ed  to  b e th e  fin an cial s u p p o rt  m  o ld  a g e  e v e n  m o  g
, , h o u sin g .54 46 T h e m o s t s tu d ies  p o in t to  a
w ere  d iv e rte d  fo r  th e  p u rch a se  o  8
.4 . o t  for th e  n eed s o f a n  o ld e r  g en era tio n  m  the  
co n sid erab le  u n d e r-e n d o w m e n t to r
w h ich  S in g ap o re  h a s  b e co m e . C o m b in e d  w ith  
m a tu re  in d u stria lise d  e co n o m y , w h i 8  P  ,
.. n fr) fully b en efit a t  le a st m  th eir o ld  a g e  fro m  
th e  w is h  o f  th e  'a ltru is tic  g e n e ra tio n  to  fully
.  a a ch iev ed  d u rin g  th eir a c tiv e  w o rk m g  liv es  
th e im p ro v e m e n ts  in  liv in g  s ta n d a rd s  a ch iev ed  b
.  .n H a l  p re ssu re  o n  th e e x istin g  so lu tio n  to  th e  w elfarethis situation puts substantial pressu
• • /  w  M o re o v e r  th e  p o sitiv e  effect o f  CPF sa v in g s  o n  the
q u estio n  m  S in g a p o re .547 M o re o v e  , F
c th e  c o u n try  w ill e v a p o ra te  as  w ith d ra w a ls  s ta r t  tooverall saving performance o f th e  try
. .u, D, ,Pn e x ce e d  co n trib u tio n s, m a k in g  fu rth e r  ca p ita l
eq u al o r  p o ssib ly  e v e n  e x ce e u
accumulation strategies next to impossible.
Due to the very strong connections between the government's financial situation 
and the economy, and particularly the CPF, the government's balance sheet gives
545 Asher (1994, d.34). „646 See for examole Asher (1994 pp. 78-80), Wong and Park (1997), Heller and Symansky
(1998), Asher (1999, pp. 3692-3693), Shantakumar (2002) or Peebles and Wilson (2002, pp. 91-
93) for a recent summary. , * .
647 Shantakumar (2 0 0 2  a  2 5 ) for example, recommends a minimum pension guarantee to people 
in t h e MeSt&ly, Asher (1994 p.71) refers; It> a Juge by Goh Keng. 
Swee stating that all modern societies regardless of their economic or social systems move 
towards the welfare state in their advanced stage of development.
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further rise to reservations about Singapore's economic future. While a complete 
assessment is not possible due to lacking details especially about substantial 
parts of the government's assets, one particular peril can be quite clearly 
established. In April 2000 the government carried loans granted to the HDB of S$ 
72 billion. With the exception of 1988 and 1989 the loans outstanding to the HDB 
have been continuously rising since 1960 with no sign of a substantial 
repayment. In the 1990s alone the outstanding loan arrangements increased from 
S$ 16.5 billion in April 1990 to over S$ 72 billion in April 2000. The quality of 
these loans is rather questionable. How will the HDB ever be able to repay those 
loans? After all already well over 90% of the population own their houses. Over 
the next fifty to sixty years, i.e. until the HDB regains the legal title to the 
leaseholds, these loans in essence can only be repaid through service charges, 
which is not very likely.548 If the government had to write-off these loans its 
financial position would be seriously harmed. This becomes evident if one 
considers the fact that the total loans outstanding equal in value about fifty six 
percent of the country's total officially reported foreign reserves, which as 
argued in the thesis m ust be considered to be largely pension fund assets. The 
financial and social snowball effect would be considerable. This in turn makes 
the Singapore government liable to a major moral hazard problem, similar to any 
bank which is dependent on one single debtor. It will need to continue to 
support the HDB's losses because it can neither politically nor financially afford 
to cut back its commitment to the debtor. The strong increase in outstanding 
loans in the 1990s might be an indication that this mechanism has already been at 
work. Technically, the government should consider payments to the HDB as 
capital expenditures instead of capitalising them as assets in the government's
The city of Glasgow gives a good point of reference for a city with similar problems, although at 
a much smaller scale. In 2002 the city had to write-off all of the debt outstanding to the local 
housing authority (financed with a grant from the British Treasury) and sell the remaining flats to a 
tenant organisation for £25 million, which however required a further cash-injection of £7Q0m from 
the Scottish parliament. (The Economist, March 30,h, 2 0 0 2 , p. 2 8 )
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loan portfolio. In the 1990s alone such a treatment would have reduced the 
government's reported surplus by about half.
The combination of the three challenges to Singapore's future briefly discussed 
here form  a very potent cocktail, even without the consideration of other 
domestic or international challenges to Singapore's economic foundation. This 
cocktail is likely to create quite some headaches for the country and requires a 
substantial redesign of the nation's further economic policies.
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VI. Appendix
VI.1. Data and Detailed Regression Results for Chapter One
Included in the attached CD-Rom are the following SPSS files. The numbers 
in the file name correspond with the respective section in the thesis:
Dataset_Chapterl .sav (SPSS-format)
Results 1-4-1 .spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-2.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-3.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-4.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-5-l.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-5-2.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-5-3.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-5-4.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-5-5.spo (SPSS-format)
Results I-4-6.spo (SPSS-format)
VI.2. Data and Detailed Regression Results for Chapter Two
Included in the attached CD-Rom are the following SPSS, Microsoft Word and 
Microsoft Excel files. The numbers in the file name correspond with the 
respective section in the thesis:
Dataset Chapter Two.xls (Excel-format)
Results II-5-3.doc 
Results II-5-4.spo 
Results II-5-5.spo 
Results II-5-6.spo 
Results II-5-7.spo 
Results II-5-8.spo 
Results II-5-7.spo
(Word-format)
(SPSS-format)
(SPSS-format)
(SPSS-format)
(SPSS-format)
(SPSS-format)
(SPSS-format)
The dataset is also attached in print.
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Dataset Chapter Two
C I Z L)e p e n d e r t  V a r ia b le s f In d e p e n d e n t V a ria b le s : In c o m e
G N S ratjG N S ra t2 P u N S ra t P N S ra t F N S ra t V P N S ra t R Y P C NWage RWage VPC DispY Di spYCPF Growth NWGro AvrGro
[Visual *(*> L id i .... l (V ? J ( ! ) ? J ¡ 0 ) HV? KD 1(1) 1(1) KD 1(1) KD K0) K1 )? KO)
ADF (3) -2.73 T I -2.35 T -5.22* T -3.93* T -1.73 -5.34* T -0 .13 T 1.50 T 1.54 T -0.93 T 0.13 T 1.07 T -5.73 * -3.36 * -6.91 *
Order of 1_LUÌ_ -  K1>.. »(0) KO) 1 0 ) 1(0) »(1) KD 1(1) 1(1) KD KD 1(0) • (0) 1 (0)
ADF (4) -2.35 T -2.04 T -5.14* T h3.99* T -1.86 -5.39* T -1.40 T 1.30 T 1.37 T -0.94 T 2.15 T 2.49 T -4.90* -3.35 * -6.87*
Order of 14 1 1 Kl) HO) \{°) 1 0 ) 1 (0) l+ l(°) l(°> K0) I + HO) K0) 1(0) KO)
1960 -2,39 3.642,7 280,3 7O T " i .329.6 "3.449,2
1961 -2,30 -2,30 3.830,6 279,7 768,5 1.394,3 3.626,0 3.579,8 5,16 -0,18
1962 5,78 5,78 1,36 3.989,9 288,3 785,7 1.464,3 3.771,5 3.724,3 4,16 3,07
1963 3,73 3,73 7,25 -3,52 1,49 -5,01 4.314,0 281,0 761,6 1.591,9 4.099,5 4.051,5 8,12 -2,54 200,2
1964 8,90 8,90 6,24 2,66 1,72 0,94 4.056,2 286,5 764,0 1.521,1 3.819,1 3.768,6 -5,98 1,95 (508,6)
1965 11,17 11,17 7,54 3,63 1,72 1,91 4.223,6 294,6 769,1 1.617,6 3.973,4 3.922,2 4,13 2,82 82,1
1966 15,75 15,75 7,92 7,83 1,66 6,17 4.556,8 294,7 757,6 1.772,6 4.293,4 4.242,2 7,89 0,05 244,9
1967 15,89 15,89 8,49 7,40 1,59 5,81 4.999,8 301,6 775,4 1.944,9 4.715,2 4.664,1 9,72 2,35 351,3
1968 19,66 19,80 9,27 10,53 1,56 8,97 5.595,8 307,6 786,8 2.188,0 5.258,5 5.203,1 11,92 1,99 233,7
1969 19,06 19,48 7,64 11,84 2,24 9,61 6.216,9 311,0 773,6 2.499,2 5.833,3 5.728,6 11,10 1,09 70,2
1970 19,27 19,67 10,84 8,82 2,87 5,95 6.907,8 314,2 768,1 2.825,3 6.461,2 6.303,8 11,11 1,02 12,4
1971 18,84 19,18 9,65 9,53 3,42 6,11 7.535,6 328,5 765,7 3.232,8 7.057,3 6.847,3 9,09 4,55 (158,2)
1972 24,47 24,78 10,79 13,99 4,32 9,67 8.383,7 327,6 723,2 3.797,8 7.781,4 7.475,7 11,25 -0,26 61,9
1973 27,61 28,12 10,37 17,75 5,04 12,71 8.970,6 359,2 704,4 4.575,0 8.306,2 7.920,1 7,00 9,66 (292,1)
1974 26,27 27,02 11,36 15,66 6,00 9,66 9.366,3 422,9 720,5 5.498,0 8.523,3 8.045,7 4,41 17,73 (421,9)
1975 29,38 30,37 14,35 16,02 7,05 8,97 9.960,1 481,4 799,7 5.996,0 8.970,1 8.379,5 6,34 13,83 (113,9)
1976 31,43 33,32 13,10 20,22 7,59 12,63 10.380,9 504,0 823,5 6.353,1 9.267,1 8.621,9 4,22 4,68 (168,5)
1977 32,04 34,46 12,53 21,94 8,02 13,91 10.959,9 538,6 866,0 6.817,1 9.774,1 9.086,4 5,58 6,88 60,8
1978 33,33 36,08 12,15 23,92 8,52 15,40 11.864,8 569,0 893,2 7.557,9 10.681,2 9.892,3 8,26 5,63 315,1
1979 35,71 37,85 13,09 24,76 9,65 15,11 12.802,0 618,8 923,6 8.577,3 11.539,9 10.561,5 7,90 8,76 223,1
1980 34,44 36,61 15,39 21,21 10,64 10,57 13.335,6 699,4 936,3 9.961,7 11.915,6 10.784,3 4,17 13,03 (393,8)
1981 37,40 39,86 17,39 22,47 11,82 10,65 13.885,7 797,8 1.001,0 11.066,9 12.169,6 10.854,5 4,12 14,06 (353,3)
1982 40,77 43,29 20,04 23,25 13,72 9,53 14.370,7 859,0 1.033,7 11.942,0 12.433,6 10.846,8 3,49 7,68 (264,5)
1983 44,80 47,89 20,52 27,37 13,70 13,67 15.729,2 947,0 1.097,3 13.574,3 13.691,4 12.001,0 9,45 10,24 793,9
1984 45,82 52,46 17,59 34,87 14,57 20,30 17.092,2 1.048,0 1.206,0 14.853,1 14.975,6 13.028,7 8,67 10,67 467,9
1985 41,23 48,12 13,22 34,90 17,39 17,51 17.093,0 1.131,0 1.318,2 14.665,8 15.254,7 13.018,8 0,00 7,92 (1.230,5)
1986 38,68 45,32 30,10 15,22 13,43 1,80 17.229,6 1.140,0 1.347,5 14.576,3 15.941,8 14.300,2 0,80 0,80 (895,9)
1987 37,09 43,24 15,71 27,53 10,86 16,67 18.125,0 1.176,0 1.373,8 15.515,0 16.836,4 15.338,0 5,20 3,16 351,5
1988 41,01 46,40 17,05 29,35 9,67 19,68 19.904,4 1.273,0 1.400,4 18.093,1 18.488,7 16.930,6 9,82 8,25 1.416,8
1989 43,63 47,68 16,58 31,10 10,32 20,78 21.386,6 1.398,0 1.466,9 20.381,5 19.754,7 17.933,0 7,45 9,82 433,0
1990 43,88 47,18 17,93 29,26 10,74 18.51 22.410,9 1.528,0 1.528,0 22.410,9 20.603,7 18.663,1 4,79 9,30 (576,9)
1991 45,38 49,36 19,34 30,03 11,74 18,29 23.231,3 1.669,0 1.614,1 24.021,2 21.183,0 19.061,8 3,66 9,23 (827,1)
1992 46,40 50,79 21,50 29,28 11,65 17,63 24.364,6 1.804,0 1.723,0 25.509,7 22.116,1 19.829,6 4,88 8,09 (97,7)
1993 45,26 49,01 22,35 26,66 10,99 15,67 25.566,6 1.918,0 1.738,9 28.199,9 23.258,9 20.812,1 4,93 6,32 119,5
1994 48,26 51,47 22,07 29,40 10,00 19,40 27.690,5 2.086,0 1.812,3 31.871,8 25.201,7 22.771,2 8,31 8,76 975,9
1995 51,08 54,86 24,58 30,28 11,41 18,87 30.061,2 2.219,0 1.938,0 34.420,0 27.590,6 24.685,8 8,56 6,38 698,2
1996 50,38 54,26 27,19 27,07 11,56 15,52 30.640,6 2.347,0 2.026,8 35.481,8 28.159,8 25.195,2 1,93 5,77 (1.605,3)
1997 54,25 58,11 29,28 28,83 11,08 17,76 33.842,1 2.480,0 2.125,1 39.493,7 31.147,1 28.006,4 10,45 5,67 1.281,8
1998 53,98 59,34 31,37 27,97 11,61 16,35 32.549,7 2.740,0 2.395,1 37.236,9 29.952,7 26.896,7 -3,82 10,48 (3.654,2)
1999 54,06 60,27 23,37 35,90 9,00 27,90 34.775,3 2.813,0 2.518,4 38.844,0 32.365,0 29.938,0 6,84 2,66 1.297,1
2000 51,51 56,61 20.89 35,72 8,42 27,31 37.126,1 3.063,0 2.693,9 42.212,3 34.212,2 31.608.4 6,76 8,891 789,6
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j  D e m o g ra p h y / Q u a lity  o f  F in a n c ia l In s titu tio n s i  C P F
L ab R at Dep Life C A B  al DoCrRat PriDoRat PriCrRat R C P F ra t CPFeff
Visual l ( V l(2)? 1(1) l ( V 1(1) 1(1) K D 1(0) 1(1) 1(1)
ADF (3) -2.01 T -1.59 T -2.30 T -2.5 T -1 54 T -1.78 T -1.48 T -3.48 * - 0.88 T -0.09 T
Order of 1 «(1) •0) 1(1) »(1) •(1) 1(1) 1(1) 1(0) K D 1(1)
ADF (4) -2.15 T -1.50 T -2.47 T -2.77 T -1.50 T -1.67 T -1.65 T -3.40 * -0.92 T -0.45 T
Order of 1 * d ) . I d ) 1(1) • O K , 1(1) «(1) I (0) 1(0) 1(1) 1(0)
T555 52,73 TÌTTF 10,00
1961 83,54 11,74 10,00
1962 84,36 64,5 7,76 10,00
1963 85,17 64,9 11,62 7,03 470,65 33,11 10,00
1964 27,86 85,99 65,3 5,93 11,28 328,48 37,06 10,00 2,4
1965 26,98 86,82 65,7 4,92 16,18 225,10 36,43 2,81 10,00 2,6
1966 27,09 83,84 66,1 -0,10 17,85 205,56 36,69 10,00 2,8
1967 27,91 80,95 66,5 5,44 16,33 215,92 35,25 10,00 2,8
1968 28,83 78,14 66,9 9,27 18,95 199,64 37,82 5,46 11,00 3,2
1969 29,87 75,43 67,3 11,47 18,96 219,42 41,61 3,10 13,00 4,7
1970 31,38 72,79 67,7 29,87 19,84 229,06 45,45 4,19 16,00 6,4
1971 32,70 69,73 68,1 32,29 15,96 285,32 45,53 1,06 20,00 8,2
1972 33,68 66,78 68,5 17,03 20,03 254,86 51,04 0,15 24,00 11,6
1973 35,61 63,93 69,0 12,71 25,70 238,25 61,22 -4,74 26,00 14,1
1974 36,97 61,18 69,4 20,31 21,36 261,21 55,80 -5,30 30,00 16,4
1975 36,84 58,52 69,9 10.21 22,47 252,26 56,68 3,15 30,00 18,4
1976 37,96 56,00 70,3 9,62 28,87 204,54 59,05 3,59 30,00 19,1
1977 38,87 53,57 70,8 4,54 29,26 205,11 60,01 3,83 31,00 19,1
1978 40,60 51,21 71,0 5,78 30,74 201,90 62,06 3,51 33,00 20,7
1979 42,72 48,92 71,3 7,83 34,00 196,45 66,79 2,35 37,00 23,2
1980 43,66 46,70 71,5 14,04 44,31 167,32 74,13 -0,85 38,50 23,9
1981 43,94 45,72 71.7 11,15 72,05 113,24 81,58 2.11 42,50 25,8
1982 43,09 44,76 71,8 8,64 63,88 134,86 86,15 2,70 45,00 27,3
1983 46,67 43,82 72,2 3,39 79,10 113,17 89,52 2,79 46,00 27,1
1984 46,45 42,88 72,5 1,86 81,39 107,81 87,74 6,06 48,00 28,9
1985 45,12 41,96 72,9 -0,32 75,10 118,80 89,22 6,22 50,00 31,8
1986 44,43 40,94 73,2 -2,05 76,48 113,20 86,57 4,77 40,83 27,5
1987 45,66 39,94 73,6 0,53 77,88 109,46 85,25 2,35 35,00 24,4
1988 46,79 38,94 73,8 -7,57 67,92 116,65 79,23 -2,04 35,50 23,8
1989 47,56 37,97 74,1 -9,68 61,57 132,58 81,63 -0,28 37,00 24,9
1990 48,22 37,00 74,3 -8,29 60,50 135,07 81,72 0,52 38,75 25,1
1991 48,61 37,64 74,6 -11,19 62,47 133,32 83,28 0,74 39,75 24,9
1992 48,77 38,28 74,8 -11,69 60,19 138,76 83,51 1,69 40,00 25,2
1993 48,02 38,93 75,6 -7,28 59,45 142,65 84,81 -2,43 40,00 26,1
1994 48,21 39,59 76,3 -15,97 57,50 145,75 83,81 -0,12 40,00 24,7
1995 48,28 40,25 76,4 -17,40 60,68 149,23 90,56 4,56 40,00 26,7
1996 47,63 40,47 76,7 -13,61 66,32 147,37 97,73 2,82 40,00 26,1
1997 48,25 40,69 77,0 -17,96 68,91 138,90 95,72 3,60 40,00 26,0
1998 47,67 40,91 77,4 -22,58 83,59 126,85 106,03 4,57 40,00 26,0
1999 47,73 41,12 77,6 -18,25 78,54 124,62 97,88 4,94 30,00 20,1
2000 52,94 40,35 78,0 -16,18 74,69 125,62 93,82 0.62 31,50 18,0
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Sources /  Notes:
AD F (3) 
ADF (4)
/gives the ADF test s ta tis tic  fo r Augm ented D ickey-Fuiier regressions w ith an intercept and for the optim al number o f lags out of a maximum of either three or 
[four fags. The optimal number of tags was determined by maximizing the Akaike Inform ation Criterion. *  denotes that the null hypothesis of a unit root, ie of 
non-stationarity, can be rejected at a 95%critical value. In other words * denotes that the variable has been found to be stationary. T denotes that a Dickey-Fuller 
regression with a time trend term was used in the ADF-test. The software package used for calculation o f the ADF-test was Microfit 4.1.
Order of 1
gives the order of integration of the variable, e g. I(0) = stationary variable, 1(1) = non-stationary variable integrated at order of 1; 1(2) = non-stationary variable 
integrated at order of 2. The order of integration was established by running an ADF test on the first-differences of the variable. If the first differences are stationary 
but the levels of the variable are non-stationary, the variable is considered to be 1(1) and therefore also called first-difference stationary. If, however, the 
first-differences are also non-stationary, the variable is integrated of a higher order, e.g. if the levels are non-stationary but the first differences of the first 
differences are stationary the variable is 1(2).
GNSrat Gross National Saving as percent of GNP (both current LCU). 1960-94 from Singapore Dept, of Statistics (1996) table A.8 pp. 65-67and 1995-2000 from Dept, of Statistics: Yearbook of Statistics 2001 (as available online at www.singstat gov.sg; May 2002).
GNSrat2
GNS + withdrawals from CPF for the purpose of buying housing. The adjustment becomes necessary because according to national accounts convention private 
individual's investment in housing is considered consumption and thus not included in GNS. However, given Singapore's peculiarity in respect to the interaction 
between the CPF and H D 8 withdrawals form the CPF for the purpose of purchase of HDB housing, must be considered simply a movement between government 
controlled saving portfolios. These withdrawals are therefore included in CPFsaving and in order to keep the saving aggregates consistent also need to be added 
to GNS. Withdrawals listed under Other Withdrawals are largely funds which get reinvested into equity or other forms of investment funds. No correction is 
necessary for these withdrawals because national accounting convention would not consider them consumption.
PuNSRat
Public national saving defined as Total Gov. Revenue less Gov. Consumption as % of GNP. Total revenue taken from IFS (line 81: Total Government Revenue) 
(various years), consumption until 1995 from Singapore National Accounts (1995), thereafter from IFS (various years; line 91f: National Accounts - Gov. Con.). 
Can only be found stationary if we assume a trend.
PNSRat Private Saving Rate = GNSrat2 less Public Saving as % of GNP; Can only be found stationary if we assume a trend.
FNSRat
Increase in CPF Members’ Balances +  withdrawals for Housing and Others = Contributions + Interest Earned - Withdrawals under Section 15 - Withdrawals 
for Medical; As percent of GNP; CPF members' balances 1980-2000 from CPF annual reports; 1967-1979 from MAS Annual Report; 1961-68 from Dept of Stats.: 
Yearbook of Statistiscs; all data series link, ie are consistent in those years that they overlap; CPF detailed withdrawals 1980-2000 taken from MAS annual reports; 
Section 15: 55 years of age, leaving Singapore and West Malaysia, physical incapacity, unsound mind, death and Malaysian citizien leaving Singapore. For the 
years before 1980 the only breakdown available is into housing and others. Others must be predominantely section 15 withdrawals. After 1980 Withdrawals 
recorded under Other Category are largely withdrawals for the purposes of reinvestment into equity or other forms of investment funds.
VPNSRat Voluntary Private Saving as % of GNP calculated by deducting CPF saving from Private Saving. Definition of CPFsaving see FNSRat.
RYPC
Real Per-Capita GNP using mid-year population and GNP (at current market prices) from Dept, of Statistics Online Dataresource, Iasi updated March 2002.
Total population includes residents and non-residents, only foreigners staying for less than 1 year are excluded. The series was deflated using the GDPdeflator 
at constant 1990 market prices. The GDPDefiator for 1960-94 was taken from Singapore Dept, of Statistics (1996) table A.4 pp.53-55 and for 1995-2000 Dept, of 
Statistics: Yearbook of Statistics 2001 (as available online at www.singstat.gov.sg; May 2002).
If the ADF test is conducted on four lags, the first difference is not found to be stationary unless we use the Schwarz-Baysian Criterion instead of the AIC. If the 
ADF test is conducted with three lags, we need to assume a trend of the first difference variable in order to be able to reject the Null-Hypothesis of non-stationarity.
NWage
average nominal monthly wages over ail industries and professions. 1972-81 are calculated from weekly wages reported in Singapore Department of 
Statistics (1982), table 3.7, p.39; 1982-91 are taken from Ministry of Labour Singapore Handbook of Labour Statistics 1992; table 2.2, p. 23; 1992-2000 are taken 
from Singapore Handbook of Manpower Statistics (various issues). Nwage for 1982 could have been $920 instead of $859 if weekly rate from Singapore 
Department of Statistics (1983) had been transformed into monthly wage. Since GNP and other income variables show a fall in their growth rates during 1982, 
the lower value is more likely to be correct and was thus used. However, if one assumed sticky wages one could argue for the higher value. Wages for 1960-1971 
were estimated by using the regression equation obtained from regressing Nwages on total employees' assessed income for 1972-81 from Dept, of Stats. (1983): 
Economic and Soda! Statistics. This source offers assessed income from 1960 onwards and thus allows for a statistical derivation of nominal wages.
The exact equation was: Nwages = 241.7605 + 0.00009840 Asslnc, with a R-squared=0.98 and Durbin-Watson=1.8907.
First differences can only be found stationary if we assume a trend.
RWage average real monthly waoes, using the GDPdeflator. Sources see NWaae and RYPC; First differences can only be found sfationary if we assume a trend.
YPC Nominal oer-caoita income. For sources see RYPC; First differences can only be found stationary if we assume a trend.
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OispY
Real per-capita disposable income = GNP less d irect taxes. For sources o f real GNP and population see RYPC. D irect taxes are defined as the sum of taxes 
on corporate and private income, on property, payrofl taxes and estate duties. This defin ition is  taken from Republic o f Singapore: The Budget for the Financial 
Year (1987/88) p.19. It does not deduct other compulsory payments like fees or CPF contributions. Income tax fo r years 1969-75 was only available on financial 
year basis and therefore had to be aportioned to fit calendar year series. Data is taken from Department of Statistics: Statistical Yearbook (various issues).
It must be noted however that there is also a skill development fund levy of 1.0% of payroll of those below a certain wage, though currently it is an off-budget item  
and can therefore not be included in direct tax estimate, see Asher, 2001, p.19. If the ADF test is conducted on four lags, the first difference is not found to be 
stationary unless we use the Schwarz-Baysian Criterion instead of the AIC. If the ADF test is conducted with three lags, we need to assume a trend of the 
first differences in order to be able to reject the Null-Hypothesis of non-stationarity.
DispYCPF Real per-capita disposable income after CPF contributions plus withdrawals under section 15 and for medical. For sources see DispY, VPNSRat and CPFeff. First difference can only be found stationary if we assume a trend.
Growth Annual growth rate of RYPC.
NWGro annual growth rate of NWage
AvrGro difference between the current year's income (RYPC) and the income predicted by multiplying last year's real per-capita income by the average growth rate of the three proceeding years. If the observation is negative the modelled average consumer would have predicted a higher income.
LabRat
people employed as percent of total population, both including non-residents. Total employed workforce 1974-2000 taken from Dept, of Manpower: Yearbook 
of Manpower Statists (various issues); observations for 1964-69 from Dept of Information and Arts: Singapore Annual Report (1978 and 1964 issues); 
observations for 1969-73 from Department of Statistics: Annual Key Indicators. Individual time series do not always match. In these cases always information 
from the latest publication was used.
Dep
those aged under 15 and above 65 as a percent of those aged 15-64. 1960-99 taken from WB World Development Indicators CD-Rom (2001 edition). Year 2000 
from Dept of Stats: Singapore Population 2000, based on Census 2000. Both sources refer to resident population only. A complete time-series for the age 
distribution of the total population is not available, since the Department of Statistics does not incorporate or publish the demographic breakdown of the 
non-resident population. First-differences can only be found stationary if we assume a trend.
Life Life expenctancy at birth; until 1999 from Development Indicators CD-Rom (2001 edition), some years had to be interpolated. 2000 from Dept, of Statistics: Yearbook of Statistics
CABal
The negative of Singapore's Current Account Balance. CABal for 1960-79 is taken from Dept of Stats (1983): Economic and Social Statistics; Table 4.10, p. 68-9. 
1980-2000 from Singapore Dept of Statistics internet Site: historical Dataseries, last updated 1 March 2002 
Contrary to our results Agrawal (2001) finds this variable non-stationary.
DoCrRat Total Domestic Credit (end of period, current S$) as percent of GNP. Taken from IMF's: international Financial Statistics (various issues); line 32: Monetary Survey * Domestic Credit.
PriDoRat
Total Credit to Non-Government as percent of Total Domestic Credit, both end of period. Taken from IMF's International Financial Statistics (various issues); 
line 32d: Monetary Survey - Claims on Private Sector.
PriCrRat Claims on Private Sector (end of period, current S$m) as a percent of GNP, from IFS, line 32d (Monetary Survey -  Claims on Private Sector)
R
Real interest rate, computed using 12 months time deposits and the GDPdeflator. The 12 months time deposit interest rates (end of period) for 1958-81 is taken 
from Dept of Statistics: Economic and Social Statistics (1982), for 1982-91 from Statistical Yearbooks and thereafter from the ’data-room' at MAS website at 
mas.gov.sg. The single observation for 1965 is taken from Ministry of Trade and Industry: Economic Survey of Singapore. Data before 1965 or for 1966 and 1967 
was not available. The Null-Hypothesis of non-stationarity could not have been rejected if the Schwarz-Baysian Criterion had been used instead of the AIC.
CPFrat
Employer’s and Employee's maximum contribution rates to CPF from Asher (1999a) except for year 2000, which was obtained from CPF directly. Not everybody 
pays this maximum CPF-rate. Government employees and certain age groups can have different contribution rates. In some years changes to the contribution 
rates took effect at points durinq the calendar year. The changes were then apportioned respectively.
CPFeff
Total Annual Gross Contributions to the CPF as a percent of total estimated remuneration. Contributions taken from Singapore Ministry of Information and 
Arts: Annual Report (various issues) + 1960 and 1961 from NUS: Report o f the CPF Study group. Total Renumeration paid to employees for 1980-97 from  
Department of Statistics: Trie Income Approach to Gross Domestic Product, July 1998; Table A11-12, pp.53-4. Remuneration includes employers' contribution 
to Centra! Provident Fund and any other benefits the emptyee received. It excludes the self-employed. Remuneration are recorded before the deduction 
of employees' CPF contribution. For the other years estimated as total (employed) workforce * average nominal wages (For sources see Nwage).
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VI.3. Investment Database for Chapter Three
The investment database compiled for Chapter Three is attached in print as 
well as included on the CD-Rom in Microsoft Excel format. It consists of four 
main sections:
• Investment Pool 1965-99
• Real Public Investments 1965-99
• Real Private Investmentsl965-99
• Imputed Starting Balances (only on CD-Rom)
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Real Investment Pool 1965-99
Cumulative
in S$million (constant 1990 S$) 1965-99
Gov. Saving
Forced Private Saving
Voluntary Private Saving
360.113
181.729
284.990
GNS Flows Total GNS (adjusted for housing)of which gov saving 
of which directly gov. controlled 
declassify POS+DBS+MAS+BCCS non-gov liab. 
% of GNS directly and indirectly gov. controlled
826.831
43,6%
65,5%
118.942
79,9%
For. Sav. 
Flows
Gross Foreign Saving Inflows
of which Official Funds
391.155
600
TOTAL
GROSS
FLOWS
TOTAL GROSS INVESTMENT FUND
of which gov. controlled 
in % of total inv. fund flows
1.217.986
661.384
54,3%
TOTAL
GROSS
STOCK
Cumulative Total Inv. Fund
of which gov. controlled 
in % of total inv. fund flows
11.688.537
COMPARE 
WITH GFCF
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
as % of Total Gross National Saving 
as % of Total Gross Investment Fund
609.117
73,7%
50,0%
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
465,9 601,0 698,2 839,6 1.044,0 970,4 1.553,8
128,5 136,8 146,4 157,7 175,7 284,1 411,2
70,4 152,5 543,6 574,2 1.009,5 1.219,7 853,1
664,8 890,3 1.388,2 1.571,5 2.229,2 2.474,1 2.818,1
70,1% 67,5% 50,3% 53,4% 46,8% 39,2% 55,1%
89,4% 82,9% 60,8% 63,5% 54,7% 50,7% 69,7%
(9,3) 177,1 42,8 23,8 362,5 257,7 359,7
88,0% 102,8% 63,9% 65,0% 71,0% 61,1% 82,5%
235,0 177,4 1.290,5 2.372,1 2.177,7 5.665,5
71,9 (102,3) 23,6 383,6 68,5 194,6
1.125,3 1.565,6 2.862,0 4.601,2 4.651,9 8.483,6
986,8 785,0 1.044,7 1.965,8 1.580,7 2.519,3
87,7% 50,1% 36,5% 42,7% 34,0% 29,7%
1.125,3 2.690,9 5.552,8 10.154,1 14.805,9 23.289,5
986,8 1.771,9 2.816,5 4.782,3 6.363,0 8.882,3
87,7% 65,8% 50,7% 47,1% 43,0% 38,1%
1.458,9 1.631,9 1.684,6 1.897,2 2.549,4 3.297,8 4.617,4
219,5% 183,3% 121,4% 120,7% 114,4% 133,3% 163,8%
145,0% 107,6% 66,3% 55,4% 70,9% 54,4%
!
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Real Investment Pool 1965-99
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1.536,6 1.946,6 2.039,8 2.372,4 3.234,2 3.118,5
544,5 779,7 990,8 1.253,5 1.588,0 1.808,0
972,3 1.744,8 2.500,4 2.018,1 2.021,6 3.006,9
GNS Flows 3.053,4 4.471,1 5.531,0 5.644,0 6.843,9 7.933,350,3% 43,5% 36,9% 42,0% 47,3% 39,3%
68,2% 61,0% 54,8% 64,2% 70,5% 62,1%
614,6 815,3 1.589,9 356,7 1.226,9 2.393,4
88,3% 79,2% 83,5% 70,6% 88,4% 92,3%
For. Sav. 7.434,9 5.722,8 5.340,7 6.161,0 4.701,3 4.875,5
Flows 171,0 101,0 45,7 0,0 33,5 23,3
TOTAL 10.488,3 10.193,9 10.871,7 11.804,9 11.545,1 12.808,9
GROSS 2.866,8 3.642,6 4.666,2 3.982,6 6.082,6 7.343,2
FLOWS 27,3% 35,7% 42,9% 33,7% 52,7% 57,3%
TOTAL 33.777,8 43.971,6 54.843,3 66.648,2 78.193,3 91.002,1
GROSS 11.749,1 15.391,7 20.057,9 24.040,5 30.123,1 37.466,3
STOCK 34,8% 35,0% 36,6% 36,1% 38,5% 41,2%
COMPARE 5.844,8 4.619,4 7.071,2 8.198,6 8.027,7 8.640,2
WITH GFCF 191,4% 103,3% 127,8% 145,3% 117,3% 108,9%
55,7% 45,3% 65,0% 69,5% 69,5% 67,5%
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
3.192,4 3.392,9 3.994,6 4.955,3 6.115,9 7.622,9
2.044,1 2.379,7 2.944,3 3.425,4 4.158,2 5.217,5
3.546,1 4.300,9 4.610,9 3.403,7 3.745,4 3.623 5
8.782,6 10.073,6 11.549,9 11.784,3 14.019,6 16.463,9
36,3% 33,7% 34,6% 42,0% 43,6% 46,3%
59,6% 57,3% 60,1% 71,1% 73,3% 78,0%
1.475,6 2.154,3 2.334,1 254,6 3.453,7 5.386,5
76,4% 78,7% 80,3% 73,3% 97,9% 110,7%
3.576,0 6.190,3 8.126,6 7.692,6 11.437,0 7.426,1
480,8 17,9 (54,5) (44,8) (40,6) (38,6)
12.358,7 16.263,9 19.676,4 19.476,9 25.456,6 23.890,0
7.192,9 7.944,9 9.218,5 8.590,5 13.687,2 18.188,3
58,2% 48,8% 46,9% 44,1% 53,8% 76,1%
103.360,8 119.624,8 139.301,2 158.778,1 184.234,7 208.124,8
44.659,2 52.604,1 61.822,6 70.413,0 84.100,2 102.288,5
43,2% 44,0% 44,4% 44,3% 45,6% 49,1%
8.774,4 9.992,3 11.223,3 13.658,6 16.041,0 18.659,1
99,9% 99,2% 97,2% 115,9% 114,4% 113,3%
71,0% 61,4% 57,0% 70,1% 63,0% 78,1%
Real Investment Pool 1965-99
1983 1984 1985 198S 1987 1988
9.659.1
5.476.1 
11.150,9
1989
10.390.0 
6.470,7
13.024.0
1990
12.241,3
7.337,2
12.642,2
1991
14.086,3
8.553,2
13.322,1
1992
16.932,6
9.174,3
13.886,3
1993
18.943,4 
9.317,8 
13.284 3
8.652,0
5.779,3
5.763,9
8.214.0 
6.805,5
9.479.0
6.183,6
8.134.0
8.188.1
14.174,7
6.323,8
846,2
7.898,8
5.462,7
8.384,1
GNS Flows 20.195,2
42.8%
71,5%
3.396,1
88,3%
24.498,5
33,5%
61,3%
2.580,8
71,8%
22.505,6
27,5%
63,6%
4.627,2
84,2%
21.344,8
66,4%
96,0%
4.626,7
117,7%
21.745,7
36,3%
61,4%
5.343,5
86,0%
26.286,1
36,7%
57,6%
3.498,9
70,9%
29.884.8 
34,8% 
56,4%
12.346.9 
97,7%
18.823,6
(34,8)
32.220,7
38,0%
60,8%
3.129,1
70,5%
17.938,9
(68,9)
35.961,5
39,2%
63,0%
3.750,1
73,4%
10.827,7
(25,1)
39.993,1
42,3%
65,3%
7.124,5
83,1%
544,5
(15,6)
41.545.5 
45,6% 
68,0%
6.862,2
84,5%
10.478.5 
(13,2)
For. Sav. 
Flows
7.475,6
(205,7)
10.999,9
(27,0)
8.789,8
(35,9)
12.639,6
(208,5)
9.248,2
(46,7)
8.507,9
(44,3)
TOTAL
GROSS
FLOWS
27.670,8
17.621,7
63,7%
35.498,4
17.573,3
49,5%
31.295,4
18.908,9
60,4%
33.984,4
24.916,7
73,3%
30.993,9
18.658,3
60,2%
34.794,0
18.589,8
53,4%
48.708,4
29.172,8
59,9%
451.070.1
247.730.1 
54,9%
50.159.6
22.638.7 
45,1%
501.229,6
270.368,8
53,9%
46.789,2
26.364,5
56,3%
548.018,8
296.733,2
54,1%
40.537,6
33.215,8
81,9%
588.556,5
329.949,1
56,1%
52.024,0
35.110,3
67,5%
640.580.4
365.059.4 
57,0%
TOTAL
GROSS
STOCK
235.795,6
119.910,2
50,9%
271.294,0
137.483,5
50,7%
302.589.4
156.392.4 
51,7%
336.573,8
181.309,2
53,9%
367.567,7
199.967,4
54,4%
402.361,7
218.557,2
54,3%
COMPARE 
WITH GFCF
20.236,6
100,2%
73,1%
22.004,8
89,8%
62,0%
19.143,1
85,1%
61,2%
16.704,5
78,3%
49,2%
16.828,7
77,4%
54,3%
17.235,0
65,6%
49,5%
19.838,2
66,4%
40,7%
21.577,8
67,0%
43,0%
24.265,6
67,5%
51,9%
27.548,4
68,9%
68,0%
29.880,2
71,9%
57,4%
Real Investment Pool 1965-99
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
20,907 ,8 25.340,4 29.668,2 36.219,1 39.806,3 31.566,0
9.476,7 11.758,3 12.612,8 13.703,4 14.735,6 12.161,9
18.378,2 19.454,7 16.930,8 21.964,5 20.751,4 37.691,9
GNS Flows 48.762,7 56.553,3 59.211,7 71.887,0 75.293,3 81.419,842,9% 44,8% 50,1% 50,4% 52,9% 38,8%
62,3% 65,6% 71,4% 69,4% 72,4% 53,7%
2.933,8 6.966,6 7.269,3 11.136,9 4.265,6 5.805,0
68,3% 77,9% 83,7% 84,9% 78,1% 60,8%
For. Sav. 28.716,6 21.734,7 21.964,6 28.482,1 62.422,2 20.957,7
Flows (5,3) (3,6) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
TOTAL 77.479,3 78.288,0 81.176,4 100.369,1 137.715,5 102.377,5
GROSS 33.313,0 44.061,6 49.550,2 61.059,4 58.807,5 49.533,0
FLOWS 43,0% 56,3% 61,0% 60,8% 42,7% 48,4%
TOTAL 718.059,8 796.347,8 877.524,2 977.893,2 1.115.608,8 1.217.986,3
GROSS 398.372,4 442.434,0 491.984,2 553.043,6 611.851,1 661.384,1
STOCK 55,5% 55,6% 56,1% 56,6% 54,8% 54,3%
COMPARE 
WITH GFCF
31.643,7
64,9%
33.851,3
59,9%
41.309,2
69,8%
44.799,4
62,3%
44.404,9
59,0%
41.417,1
50,9%
40,8% 43,2% 50,9% 44,6% 32,2% 40,5%
w 
z 
> 
co
Real Private Investments 1965-99
Constant 1990 S$dolIars (after GDPdeflator)
in S$miilion (Stocks, end o f period) 1972 1973 1974
Loans Agriculture 61,4 57,0 98,3
Loans Housing & Construction 147,8 1.328,0 1.450,9
Loans Manufacturing 1.920,8 2.270,7 2.776,8
Loans Transport & Communication (174,2) (180,3) 291,0
Loans General Commerce 2.163,9 2.979,8 4.274,7
Loans Non-Bank Financial Institutions 571,8 588,0 559,1
Loans Other Services 927,2 1.170,6 781,9
Loans Others 2.651,2 2.530,4 (27,6)
Fixed and Other Assets 700,1 769,7 775,1
Overseas 251,7 176,5 154,3
Non-gov Securities 393,6 570,6 563,9
TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS (Excl. DBS) 9.615,3 12.260,9 11.698,6
of which primary sector 0,6% 0,5% 0,8%
of which Housing, Construction 1,5% 10,8% 12,4%
of which Manufacturing 20,0% 18,5% 23,7%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 36,3% 37,2% 50,5%
of which overseas 2,6% 1,4% 1,3%
of which not able to allocate 38,9% 31,6% 11,2%
Total Banks as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 17,1% 24,3% -4,8%
Finance Companies’ Housing Loans 395,1 523,5 524,7
Finance Companies' Hire-Purchase/Lease Fine 375,3 482,4 448,0
Merchants' Banks' deposits with Non-Sing Bant 12,6 19,1 57,4
Finance + Insurance Companies' Domestic Ser 229,1 287,1 229,0
Fixed and Other Assets 382,8 465,3 910,2
TOTAL NON-BANK FIN INST. 1.394,9 1.777,3 2.169,3
of which Housing 28,3% 29,5% 24,2%
of which Private Consumption 26,9% 27,1% 20,7%
of which overseas 0,9% 1,1% 2.6%
of which not able to allocate 43,9% 42,3% 52,5%
Total Non-Banks as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 2,7% 3,5% 3,3%
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
76,1 115,0 70,7 72,0 110,7 16,9 76,5
1.630,7 1.696,0 1.874,3 2.009,6 1.965,6 2.268,6 3.353,1
3.099,4 3.200,9 3.239,3 3.649,9 4.783,2 4.774,2 4.880,8
285,0 327,8 385,8 333,1 558,2 814,7 991,7
4.715,4 5.395,1 6.489,8 7.871,8 9.682,0 10.273,5 10.287,6
799,8 1.110,3 1.252,4 1.417,9 2.023,5 2.253,7 3.279,6
865,9 996,7 999,2 1.126,1 1.344,5 1.901,6 2.783,9
(11,2) (20,6) 538,7 656,3 915,3 1.007,7 953,9
896,0 1.051,2 1.111,2 1.165,0 1.425,0 1.471,3 1.813,8
129,2 132,5 4.040,2 4.234,5 5.406,3 5.455,5 9.523,3
646,1 456,0 561,4 743,7 744,8 969,7 1.126,8
13.132,6 14.460,9 20.562,9 23.279,9 28.959,2 31.207,3 39.071,1
0,6% 0,8% 0,3% 0,3% 0,4% 0,1% 0,2%
12,4% 11,7% 9,1% 8,6% 6,8% 7,3% 8,6%
23,6% 22,1% 15,8% 15,7% 16,5% 15,3% 12,5%
50,8% 54,1% 44,4% 46,2% 47,0% 48,8% 44,4%
1,0% 0,9% 19,6% 18,2% 18,7% 17,5% 24,4%
11,7% 10,3% 10,8% 11,0% 10,7% 11,1% 10,0%
12,4% 10,4% 49,4% 16,7% 28,9% 11,5% 30,9%
588,0 719,0 693,6 700,8 823,3 853,0 958,1
380,4 379,1 477,2 660,3 951,0 1.208,3 1.381,8
35,9 27,6 74,8 145,8 247,9 504,1 1.008,7
296,2 380,9 437,0 514,4 523,7 535,5 582,3
930,9 1.058,7 1.117,2 1.287,9 1.520,0 1.879,0 2.878,8
2.231,4 2.565,2 2.799,7 3.309,3 4.066,0 4.979,9 6.809,7
26,4% 28,0% 24,8% 21,2% 20,2% 17,1% 14,1%
17,0% 14,8% 17,0% 20,0% 23,4% 24,3% 20,3%
1,6% 1,1% 2,7% 4,4% 6,1% 10,1% 14,8%
55,0% 56,1% 55,5% 54,5% 50,3% 48,5% 50,8%
0,5% 2,6% 1,9% 3,1% 3,8% 4,7% 7,2%
W
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Ñ 
Z
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Real Private Investments 1965-99
Constant 1990 S$dol!ars (after GDPdeflator)
in S$million (Stocks, end o f period) 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Loans Agriculture 24,2 74,5 94,9 81,0 81,2 99,1 77,1 74,9 85,6 93,7
Loans Housing & Construction 4.143,2 5.648,1 7.335,4 8.077,8 8.356,3 8.108,2 8.083,5 10.379,5 10.876,3 12.830,6
Loans Manufacturing 4.940,4 4.932,2 4.911,1 5.297,8 4.777,5 5.700,6 5.843,1 6.160,0 6.018,2 6.154,3
Loans Transport & Communication 1.161,9 858,0 670,1 687,5 671,8 555,7 531,3 728,1 1.351,3 1.408,2
Loans General Commerce 10.742,7 11.732,4 12.184,4 11.274,1 11.701,6 11.842,8 12.029,0 12.091,1 12.702,2 14.360,7
Loans Non-Bank Financial Institutions 4.040,0 4.604,9 5.296,1 5.740,3 4.796,6 4.905,9 6.039,0 7.021,2 6.880,2 6.925,2
Loans Other Services 3.106,4 3.903,0 4.356,4 4.995,2 5.189,0 5.422,3 4.727,3 6.037,8 6.220,7 6.338,2
Loans Others 1.253,0 1.157,0 1.164,1 1.375,9 1.197,6 1.437,8 2.479,8 2.992,3 3.419,0 2.888,3
Fixed and Other Assets 972,6 975,5 1.254,3 2.180,7 2.216,8 3.357,6 3.786,5 3.325,1 3.674,1 3.686,6
Overseas 7.303,7 9.440,9 14.993,9 17.826,3 25.521,9 28.968,9 32.481,9 44.394,8 37.054,2 34.690,7
Non-gov Securities 1.917,4 2.121,5 2.153,9 2.175,3 2.520,0 2.489,2 2.703,3 2.846,1 3.024,8 2.900,8
TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS (Excl. DBS) 39.605,5 45.447,8 54.414,5 59.711,8 67.030,4 72.888,2 78.781,7 96.050,7 91.306,5 92.277,3
of which primary sector 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
of which Housing, Construction 10,5% 12,4% 13,5% 13,5% 12,5% 11,1% 10,3% 10,8% 11,9% 13,9%
of which Manufacturing 12,5% 10,9% 9,0% 8,9% 7,1% 7,8% 7,4% 6,4% 6,6% 6,7%
of which Services (ind. Transp. & Comm.) 48,1% 46,4% 41,4% 38,0% 33,4% 31,2% 29,6% 26,9% 29,7% 31,5%
of which overseas 18,4% 20,8% 27,6% 29,9% 38,1% 39,7% 41,2% 46,2% 40,6% 37,6%
of which not able to allocate 10,5% 9,4% 8,4% 9,6% 8,9% 10,0% 11,4% 9,5% 11,1% 10,3%
Total Banks as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 2,2% 21,1% 25,3% 16,9% 21,5% 18,9% 16,9% 35,5% -9,5% 2,1%
Finance Companies’ Housing Loans 1.058,6 1.350,9 1.552,2 1.616,0 1.708,2 1.804,4 1.657,5 1.766,4 1.606,2 1.473,8
Finance Companies' Hire-Purchase/Lease Fine 1.322,5 1.314,3 1.211,0 878,7 642,6 804,4 1.301,3 2.001,7 2.257,7 2.456,6
Merchants' Banks' deposits with Non-Sing Banl 1.034,7 1.018,4 1.856,5 1.915,7 2.634,2 4.363,4 4.743,1 4.576,2 4.219,1 3.376,0
Finance + Insurance Companies' Domestic Se< 816,5 905,8 941,3 1.003,7 1.372,5 2.073,0 2.452,6 2.794,0 579,0 594,3
Fixed and Other Assets 3.774,7 4.580,8 5.143,6 5.696,0 5.950,4 5.199,6 5.803,2 4.886,1 2.682,5 2.663,5
TOTAL NON-BANK FIN INST. 8.007,0 9.170,1 10.704,7 11.110,1 12.307,7 14.245,0 15.957,8 16.024,4 11.344,5 10.564,2
of which Housing 13,2% 14,7% 14,5% 14,5% 13,9% 12,7% 10,4% 11,0% 14,2% 14,0%
of which Private Consumption 16,5% 14,3% 11,3% 7,9% 5,2% 5,6% 8,2% 12,5% 19,9% 23,3%
of which overseas 12,9% 11,1% 17,3% 17,2% 21,4% 30,6% 29,7% 28,6% 37,2% 32,0%
of which not able to allocate 57,3% 59,8% 56,8% 60,3% 59,5% 51,1% 51,7% 47,9% 28,7% 30,8%
Total Non-Banks as % of Tot. Gross inv. Fund 5,0% 4,2% 4,3% 1,3% 3,5% 6,3% 4,9% 0,1% -9,3% -1,7%
Real Private Investments 1965-99
Constant 1990 S$dollars (after GDPdeflator)
in SSmiilion (Stocks, end o f period) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Loans Agriculture 82,6 95,6 104,1 135,3 111,3 154,9 194,3 168,5
Loans Housing & Construction 14.024,3 17.985,8 18.762,9 22.333,4 26.139,2 29.411,7 29.525,1 28.523,4
Loans Manufacturing 6.000,0 5.207,4 4.743,4 6.167,4 6.936,4 5.558,8 4.812,1 5.011,8
Loans Transport & Communication 1.341,8 1.019,6 119,7 71,7 141,3 143,2 479,3 240,1
Loans General Commerce 15.211,4 15.136,2 15.224,8 16.473,3 18.050,9 19.272,2 15.538,5 13.931,8
Loans Non-Bank Financial Institutions 8.138,4 8.893,6 8.750,2 10.322,0 11.825,8 11.738,0 13.473,0 14.102,4
B Loans Other Services 5.561,0 5.511,0 9.543,9 11.590,0 13.827,9 15.221,7 14.505,0 13.948,1
Loans Others 2.575,6 2.583,3 2.628,3 3.242,6 3.381,9 3.630,3 1.791,0 2.197,0
A Fixed and Other Assets 3.469,9 3.188,0 3.823,1 3.903,6 3.862,2 7.339,2 7.754,6 10.860,2
N Overseas 43.779,5 41.117,9 45.023,5 42.429,9 44.684,9 58.422,9 59.452,4 76.521,5
K
Non-gov Securities 2.987,1 2.877,9 2.805,8 3.078,6 3.275,4 3.414,7 4.549,5 3.008,5
TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS (Excl. DBS) 103.171,7 103.616,5 111.529,8 119.747,7 132.237,1 154.307,6 152.074,7 168.513,3
s of which primary sector 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
of which Housing, Construction 13,6% 17,4% 16,8% 18,7% 19,8% 19,1% 19,4% 16,9%
of which Manufacturing 5,8% 5,0% 4,3% 5,2% 5,2% 3,6% 3,2% 3,0%
of which Services (ind. Transp. & Comm.) 29,3% 29,5% 30,2% 32,1% 33,2% 30,1% 28,9% 25,1%
of which overseas 42,4% 39,7% 40,4% 35,4% 33,8% 37,9% 39,1% 45,4%
of which not able to allocate 8,8% 8,3% 8,3% 8,5% 8,0% 9,3% 9,3% 9,5%
Total Banks as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 26,9% 0,9% 10,2% 10,5% 15,4% 22,0% -1,6% 16,1%
N
o
B
a
Finance Companies' Housing Loans 
Finance Companies* Hire-Purchase/Lease Fine 
Merchants' Banks' deposits with Non-Sing Banl 
Finance + Insurance Companies' Domestic Se< 
Fixed and Other Assets
1.407,4
3.018,9
3.132,3
670,8
2.227,6
1.656.3
3.925.4 
3.589,3
766,5
2.313,1
2.010,6
4.919,5
3.296,2
819,2
1.908,1
2.240.2
4.757.2
3.805.2 
925,7
1.991,5
2.698.9
4.181.9 
3.835,4
954,7
2.066,2
3.072,8
4.099.2 
4.407,0
992,1
2.057.2
3.319,9
3.765.4 
4.330,8
1.481.5
1.887.5
3.081.1
3.886.2 
4.183,1 
1.489,0 
1.560,5
n TOTAL NON-BANK FIN INST. 10.457,0 12.250,7 12.953,5 13.719,9 13.737,1 14.628,2 14.785,1 14.199,8
n tr of which Housing 13,5% 13,5% 15,5% 16,3% 19,6% 21,0% 22,5% 21,7%rv of which Private Consumption 28,9% 32,0% 38,0% 34,7% 30,4% 28,0% 25,5% 27,4%
s of which overseas 30,0% 29,3% 25,4% 27,7% 27,9% 30,1% 29,3% 29,5%
of which not able to allocate 27,7% 25,1% 21,1% 21,3% 22,0% 20,8% 22,8% 21,5%
Total Non-Banks as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund -0,3% 3,4% 0.9% 1,0% 0,0% 0,9% 0,1% -0,6%
Real Private investments 1965-99
in S$million (Stocks, end o f period) Incr. 64-99 Overall
An italics typeset means that the
num ber has been interpolated.
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 28,4 941
Construction & Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. 6.891,2 79.399
Manufacturing 53.917,3 527.237
Transport & Communication 5.430,9 40.376
General Commerce 21.188,1 185.409
Financial & Business Services 67.887,6 500.169
Other Services (24,1) 4.374
Abroa
d
TOTAL Foreign Equity 155.319,5 1.337.904,1
of which primary sector 0,0% 0,1%
of which Construction, Real Estate 4,4% 5,9%
of which Manufacturing 34,7% 39,4%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 60,8% 54,6%
of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0%
tal Foreign Equity as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 12,8%
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying (1.029,2) 13.679
Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. & Public Utilitie 62.225,3 548.678
Manufacturing 17.641,8 258.247
Transport & Communication 32.821,7 250.404
General Commerce 17.106,2 255.631
Financial & Business Services 133.664,6 1.172.750
Other Services 3.117,6 29.642
TOTAL Equity by Singaporeans 265.548,1 2.529.029,0
of which primary sector -0,4% 0,5%
of which Construction, Real Estate 23,4% 21,7%
of which Manufacturing 6,6% 10,2%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 70,3% 67,6%
of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0%
I Domestic Equity as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 21,8%
Singapore's Investment Abroad 73.456,1 609.169
l otal Anroad as 7o ot 1 o t Gross inv. Fund .......... 6,15%"
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
76,6 88,5 102,3 118,3 136,8 158,1 182,7 211 ,2
145,1 186,1 217,1 287,4 489,5 1.457,1 2.432,8 3.671,3
49 ,8 56,5 64,1 72,8 82,6 93,7 106,3 120,6
628,8 690,0 757,2 830,9 911 ,8 1.000,6 1.098,0 1.204,9
420 ,6 486,9 563,7 652,7 755,6 874,9 1.012,9 1 .172,7
67,4 69,3 71,3 73,3 75,4 77,5 79,7 82 ,0
1.388,3 1.577,4 1.775,8 2.035,4 2 .451 ,7 3 .661 ,8 4 .912 ,3 6 .462 ,7
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
5,5% 5,6% 5,8% 5,8% 5,6% 4,3% 3,7% 3,3%
10,4% 11,8% 12,2% 14,1% 20,0% 39,8% 49,5% 56,8%
84,0% 82,6% 82,0% 80,1% 74,5% 55,9% 46,8% 39,9%
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
16,8% 12,7% 9,1% 9,0% 26,0% 14,7% 14,8%
1.155,9 1.066,2 983,6 907,3 837,0 772,1 712,2 657,0
659,6 752,5 858,5 979,5 1.117,5 1.274,9 1.454,5 1.659,4
175,2 214,7 273,4 287,4 406,3 1.117,9 1.809,2 2.402,1
222,9 257,2 296,8 342,5 395,2 456,0 526,2 607,3
1.744,9 1.862,5 1.988,0 2 .121,9 2.264,9 2 .417 ,5 2 .580 ,3 2 .754 ,2
1.915,2 2.163,3 2.443,5 2 .760,0 3.117,5 3 .521,3 3 .977,4 4 .492 ,6
10,8 12,8 15,3 18,2 21,8 26 ,0 31,0 36,9
5 .884 ,5 6.329,3 6.859,1 7.416,8 8.160,1 9.585,7 11.090,9 12.609,5
19,6% 16,8% 14,3% 12,2% 10,3% 8,1% 6,4% 5,2%
11,2% 11,9% 12,5% 13,2% 13,7% 13,3% 13,1% 13,2%
3,0% 3,4% 4,0% 3,9% 5,0% 11,7% 16,3% 19,0%
66,2% 67,9% 69,2% 70,7% 71,1% 67,0% 64,2% 62,6%
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
39,5% 33,8% 19,5% 16,2% 30,6% 17,7% 14,5%
1.113,0 1.248,6 1.400,6 1.571,1 1.762,4 1.977,0 2 .217 ,8 2 .487 ,8
-------- 2 ^ %TZJJ% ¥ 7 % ■ÜJÎW 4,2% 4,6%
Real Prívate Investments 1965-99
in S$mii!ion (Stocks, end o f period) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
An italics typeset means that the
number has been interpolated.
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 29,5 35,7 34,5 101,3
Construction & Real Estate & Rea! Estate Dev. 244,1 282,2 326,2 377,1 435,9 503,8 188,5 171,6 1.194,4 1.595,0
F Manufacturing 5.039,7 5.213,7 5.202,7 5.614,6 6.109,5 6.664,0 7.161,4 8.479,3 9.274,3 10.160,4E Transport & Communication 136,8 155,2 176,0 199,7 226,6 257,1 362,8 523,3 596,7 694,9o General Commerce 1.322,2 1.450,9 1.592,1 1.747,1 1.917,2 2.103,9 2.025,9 2.326,4 2.919,7 3.384,6
r MFinancial & Business Services 1.357,7 1.571,9 1.819,9 2.107,1 2.439,5 2.824,4 3.242,1 3.539,3 3.328,5 4.915,8
U Other Services 84,3 86 ,7 89,2 91,7 94,3 97,0 64,8 59,4 58,6 78,46 i TOTAL Foreign Equity 8.184,9 8.760,6 9.206,2 10.137,3 11.223,0 12.450,2 13.075,0 15.134,9 17.406,7 20.930,2i of which primary sector 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,5%t of which Construction, Real Estate 3,0% 3,2% 3,5% 3,7% 3,9% 4,0% 1,4% 1,1% 6,9% 7,6%9 of which Manufacturing 61,6% 59,5% 56,5% 55,4% 54,4% 53,5% 54,8% 56,0% 53,3% 48,5%
n y of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 35,4% 37,3% 39,9% 40,9% 41,7% 42,4% 43,6% 42,6% 39,7% 43,4%
of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
tal Foreign Equity as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 16,9% 5,3% 3,8% 8,1% 8,5% 9,9% 3,8% 10,5% 11,7% 13,8%
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 606,1 559,1 515,7 475,8 438,9 404,8 373,5 344,5 366,1 586,7
D Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. & Public Utilitie 1.893,2 2 .159 ,9 2 .464,2 2.811,4 3 .207,5 3.659,3 4 .174 ,8 4 .763 ,0 4.675,0 6.595,4
Manufacturing 2.916,2 3 .160 ,0 3.240,4 3 .642,3 4 .057 ,5 4.459,4 4 .810 ,5 5 .007 ,2 4.880,1 5.838,8
o E Transport & Communication 700,8 808,6 933,1 1.076,8 1.242,6 1.433,9 1.654,7 1.909,4 2.004,6 3.133,1
General Commerce 2.939,7 3 .137 ,8 3 .349 ,2 3.574,8 3 .815,7 4.072,8 4 .347,2 4 .640 ,0 4.859,2 6.008,9m q Financial & Business Services 5.074,5 5 .731 ,8 6 .474 ,3 7.312,9 8.260,1 9.330,0 10.538,5 11.903,5 11.120,7 14.291,6
e u Other Services 44 ,0 52 ,5 62 ,6 74,7 89,1 106,3 126,7 151,2 217,7 268,4
s •i TOTAL Equity by Singaporeans 14.174,6 15.609,8 17.039,6 18.968,7 21.111,4 23.466,6 26 .025 ,9 28.718 ,9 28.123,3 36.722,8
of which primary sector 4,3% 3,6% 3,0% 2,5% 2,1% 1,7% 1,4% 1,2% 1,3% 1,6%
t t of which Construction, Real Estate 13,4% 13,8% 14,5% 14,8% 15,2% 15,6% 16,0% 16,6% 16,6% 18,0%
of which Manufacturing 20,6% 20,2% 19,0% 19,2% 19,2% 19,0% 18,5% 17,4% 17,4% 15,9%1 y of which Services (ind. Transp. & Comm.) 61,8% 62,3% 63,5% 63,5% 63,5% 63,7% 64,0% 64,8% 64,7% 64,5%
c of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
1 Domestic Equity as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 15,4% 13,2% 12,1% 16,7% 16,7% 19,1% 15,7% 13,7% -3,1% 33,8%
Abroa Singapore's Investment Abroad 2.790,7 3 .130 ,5 3 .511 ,7 3 .939,3 3.595,4 4.351,4 5.334,1 6.525,8 6.679,1 8.435,4
d i otai Abroad as % ot 1 ot. tiross inv. t-und 3 , U 7 o 3,1% 3 , ü % 3,/% -2 , i  % b , 1 7 o 6,U% 6,1% U,8% 6,9%
Real Prívate Investments 1965-99
in S $ m illio n  (S to c k s , e n d  o f  p e r io d ) 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
An italics typeset means that the
number has been interpolated.
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 79,8 91.1 69,2 42,2 (22,3) (5.4) (11.4) 6,4 79,8 42,8
Construction & Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. 2.114,0 1.680,0 2.228,8 2.391,8 2.502,8 2.159,1 2.396,3 3.443,9 4.118,0 4.145,4
F Manufacturing 10.889,0 12.056,9 13.136,4 13.882,9 15.551,5 18.566,2 19.548,3 20.820,7 22.657,8 22.104,4E Transport & Communication 717,7 560,4 428,3 125,5 238,5 603,3 951,5 1.599,4 1.886,6 1.866,8o General Commerce 4.153,1 4.325,4 4.333,4 4.093,6 4.129,9 4.496,1 5.052,1 5.715,9 7.541,4 9.256,2
r g Financial & Business Services 6.479,4 6.742,6 8.168,7 8.980,5 11.166,3 14.300,9 17.237,8 17.435,4 21.302,2 23.283,5
u Other Services 62,0 176,4 175,5 206,4 221,0 230,7 234,8 327,8 349,1 142,4
e •i TOTAL Foreign Equity 24.494,9 25.632,7 28.540,2 29.723,0 33.787,8 40.351,1 45.409,4 49.349,4 57.934,9 60.841,4i of which primary sector 0,3% 0,4% 0,2% 0,1% -0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1%t of which Construction, Real Estate 8,6% 6,6% 7,8% 8,0% 7,4% 5,4% 5,3% 7,0% 7,1% 6,8%g of which Manufacturing 44,5% 47,0% 46,0% 46,7% 46,0% 46,0% 43,0% 42,2% 39,1% 36,3%
n y of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 46,6% 46,1% 45,9% 45,1% 46,6% 48,7% 51,7% 50,8% 53,6% 56,8%
of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
tal Foreign Equity as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 14,9% 4,1% 8,2% 3,8% 12,0% 21,2% 14,5% 8,1% 17,1% 6,2%
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 562,0 269,2 181,7 164,5 96,5 92,8 121,9 105,1 115,4 118,6
D Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. & Public Utilitie 8.623,7 10.105,0 12.055,5 11.928,1 10.009,9 9.555,7 11.375,9 15.980,1 20.272,4 22.889,5Manufacturing 6.199,6 6.654,8 7.064,7 6.848,6 7.270,0 7.653,2 7.699,2 8.786,0 9.978,1 10.563,0
o E Transport & Communication 3.260,4 3.517,8 3.621,7 4.117,0 4.350,1 4.783,9 7.227,4 8.736,7 9.873,6 11.056,7
m General Commerce 6.637,7 7.050,6 6.760,9 6.311,1 6.176,5 6.540,2 6.998,6 8.198,5 9.559,0 10.529,9q Financial & Business Services 17.862,1 21.164,8 24.565,8 27.659,8 29.719,9 32.180,6 32.810,0 39.318,5 46.560,9 49.751,0
e u Other Services 308,5 268,1 252,9 245,9 485,8 665,2 705,3 796,3 1.454,2 1.897,2
s i TOTAL Equity by Singaporeans 43.454,0 49.030,4 54.503,2 57.274,9 58.108,6 61.471,5 66.938,3 81.921,3 97.813,6 106.805,7
of which primary sector 1,3% 0.5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0.1%
t t of which Construction, Real Estate 19,8% 20,6% 22,1% 20,8% 17,2% 15,5% 17,0% 19,5% 20,7% 21,4%
i of which Manufacturing 14,3% 13,6% 13,0% 12,0% 12,5% 12,4% 11,5% 10,7% 10,2% 9,9%y of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 64,6% 65,3% 64,6% 66,9% 70,1% 71,9% 71,3% 69,6% 69,0% 68,6%
c of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
I Domestic Equity as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 28,2% 20,2% 15,4% 8,9% 2,5% 10,9% 15,7% 30,8% 31,7% 19,2%
Abroa Singapore's Investment Abroad 9.211,0 10.140,9 11.738,3 14.804,5 15.247,6 14.066,1 14.266,6 23.834,2 29.983,1 32.838,7
d lota! Abroad as % or l ot. tiross inv. l-und 3.2% 3,47o ."4;5%" 9,8% 1,3% -3,8% U,b% ~ry¡6% ' 12,3% 6,1%
Real Private Investments 1965-99
An italics typeset means that the
in S$million (Stocks, end o f period) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
number has been interpolated.
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 126,6 40,9 41,7 28,9 33,4 31,3 36,3 28,4
Construction & Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. 4.366,9 4.049,0 3.356,7 5.395,3 6.899,0 7.586,4 7.280,7 6.967,8
F Manufacturing 20.392,5 21.669,0 25.948,7 31.331,4 35.256,3 42.047,1 49.654,9 54.062,4E Transport & Communication 2.133,9 2.408,8 2.843,4 2.551,2 3.227,6 3.882,3 4.944,6 5.480,7o General Commerce 8.370,0 9.188,5 11.018,1 11.040,1 12.147,0 13.776,0 17.671,2 21.816,9
r q Financial & Business Services 26.884,7 28.926,4 31.342,9 33.854,3 39.177,6 47.260,1 56.651,8 68.308,2
u Other Services 143,0 159,1 30,1 76,6 156,8 148,0 158,4 43,36 i TOTAL Foreign Equity 62.417,5 66.441,6 74.581,6 84.277,9 96.897,8 114.731,2 136.397,9 156.707,7i of which primary sector 0,2% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%t of which Construction, Real Estate 7,0% 6,1% 4,5% 6,4% 7,1% 6,6% 5,3% 4,4%g of which Manufacturing 32,7% 32,6% 34,8% 37,2% 36,4% 36,6% 36,4% 34,5%
n y of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 60,1% 61,2% 60,7% 56,4% 56,5% 56,7% 58,2% 61,0%
of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
tal Foreign Equity as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 3,9% 7,7% 10,5% 12,4% 15,5% 17,8% 15,7% 19,8%
Agriculture, Mining, Quarrying 145,0 111,2 164,5 106,7 138,3 296,7 155,6 126,7
n Real Estate & Real Estate Dev. & Public Utilitie 24.363,7 27.578,3 33.327,6 49.242,4 56.128,7 58.770,5 59.085,1 62.884,9
Manufacturing 12.634,8 14.345,7 15.535,8 15.513,2 16.666,4 19.067,0 19.426,2 17.817,1
o E Transport & Communication 13.673,2 14.998,5 16.605,4 18.711,2 19.949,6 22.923,5 32.173,3 33.044,5
m General Commerce 9.408,7 11.061,0 12.579,9 15.481,9 16.831,1 17.226,6 22.692,7 18.851,1q Financial & Business Services 55.901,6 63.544,3 73.210,7 82.282,8 97.202,9 109.495,3 121.425,0 135.579,8
e u Other Services 1.890,7 1.853,9 1.689,3 2.316,0 2.783,1 3.146,9 4.399,3 3.128,3
s i TOTAL Equity by Singaporeans 118.017,7 133.493,0 153.113,2 183.654,1 209.700,2 230.926,5 259.357,3 271.432,6
t
of which primary sector 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0%
t of which Construction, Real Estate 20,6% 20,7% 21,8% 26,8% 26,8% 25,4% 22,8% 23,2%
i of which Manufacturing 10,7% 10,7% 10,1% 8,4% 7,9% 8,3% 7,5% 6,6%y of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 68,5% 68,5% 68,0% 64,7% 65,2% 66,2% 69,7% 70,2%
c of which not able to allocate 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
I Domestic Equity as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 27,7% 29,7% 25,3% 39,0% 32,1% 21,1% 20,6% 11,8%
Abroa Singapore's Investment Abroad 34.118,4 37.966,5 18.270,5 26.718,9 47.214,9 54.882,4 78.338,4 74.569,1
d i otal Abroad as % of 1 ot. (¿ross inv. Fund ....... 7,-4% -¿0,47o TO, 6% 25,2% /,t>% 1/,U% -3,/7o
in S$million (Stocks, end o f period) Incr. 64-99 Overall
An italics typeset means that the  
number has been interpolated.
Total Private
of which primary sector 
of which Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
of which not able to allocate 
Total Private as % of Tot. Gross lnv. Fund
Total Private
of which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
Not-Traceabie
Real estate as % of total flow 
Manu 
Services 
Overseas 
Not-Traceabie
Real Private Investments 1965-99
S
U
M
M
A
R
Y
673.717,3
-0,1%
14,9%
11,2%
47,8%
22,9%
3,3%
55,3%
6.723.133
0,3%
14,3%
13,8%
46,0%
20,3%
5,3%
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
11.705,2 12.945,7 14.383,0 16.066,9 18.181,4 20.995,3 26.274,4 30.547,1
10,6% 8,9% 7,4% 6,2% 5,0% 4,0% 3,1% 2,4%
7,9% 8,2% 8,5% 8,7% 8,9% 8,7% 7,5% 7,4%
10,4% 10,7% 10,9% 11,0% 12,1% 16,7% 22,1% 25,0%
53,4% 53,9% 54,1% 54,2% 53,6% 51,7% 45,4% 43,7%
9,6% 9,8% 9,9% 10,0% 9,9% 9,7% 9,3% 8,9%
8,1% 8,6% 9,1% 9,9% 10,4% 9,1% 12,5% 12,5%
110,2% 91,8% 58,8% 46,0% 60,5% 62,2% 40,7%
1.240,6 1.437,2 1.683,9 2.114,5 2.813,9 5.279,1 4.272,7
135,7 156,7 181,3 210,2 206,4 163,2 293,6
170,4 188,6 193,0 440,8 1.305,4 2.305,5 1.825,2
722,6 814,9 920,0 1.039,7 1.111,2 1.078,8 1.401,0
140,3 158,9 180,5 205,8 235,6 406,2 278,6
71,7 118,1 209,0 218,1 (44,6) 1.325,5 474,3
10,9% 10,9% 10,8% 9,9% 7,3% 3,1% 6,9%
13,7% 13,1% 11,5% 20,8% 46,4% 43,7% 42,7%
58,2% 56,7% 54,6% 49,2% 39,5% 20,4% 32,8%
11,3% 11,1% 10,7% 9,7% 8,4% 7,7% 6,5%
5,8% 8,2% 12,4% 10,3% -1,6% 25,1% 11,1%
Real Private Investments 1965-99
s
u
M
M
A
R
Y
A
n
n
u
a
I
In S $ m illio n  (S to c k s , e n d  o f  p e r io d ) 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 3 1 9 7 4
A n  ita l ic s  ty p e s e t  m e a n s  t h a t  th e
n u m b e r  h a s  b e e n  in te rp o la te d .
Total Private 36.160,4 41.539,2 43.625,5
of which primary sector 1,8% 1,5% 1,4%
of which Construction, Rea! Estate 7,4% 10,3% 10,9%
of which Manufacturing 27,3% 25,6% 25,7%
of which Services 41,9% 42,3% 46,8%
of which Overseas 8,4% 8,0% 8,5%
of which not able to allocate 13,1% 12,3% 6,6%
Total Private as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 55,1% 49,5% 17,7%
Total Private 5.613,3 5.378,7 2.086,3
of which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 405,5 1.613,3 472,5
of which Manufacturing 2.233,6 767,6 575,6
of which Services 1.810,3 2.404,8 2.849,7
of which Overseas 325,8 271,1 397,4
Not-Traceable 838,2 321,9 (2.208,8)
Real estate as % of total flow 7,2% 30,0% 22,6%
Manu 39,8% 14,3% 27,6%
Services 32,3% 44,7% 136,6%
Overseas 5,8% 5,0% 19,0%
Not-Traceable 14,9% 6,0% -105,9%
1975 1976 1977 1980 1981
48.409,3
1,1%
11,2%
25,5%
47,2%
8,5%
6,5%
41,4%
4.783.8
641,1
1.136,4
2.447.8
381,0 
177,5
13,4%
23,8%
51,2%
8,0%
3,7%
52.955,9
1,0%
11,4%
25,2%
48,9%
7,1%
6,2%
35,5%
4.546.6
651,0
1.011.7
3.064,0
(348,8)
168,8
14,3%
22,3%
67,4%
-7,7%
3,7%
63.630,7
0,7%
10,6%
22,6%
46,1%
13,3%
6,7%
86,4%
10.674,9
672.7
994.8
3.437,4
4.710,8
859,1
6,3%
9,3%
32,2%
44,1%
8,0%
1978
71.024,2
0,7%
10,0%
22,0%
46,6%
13,7%
7,1%
45,5%
7.393,4
342,8
1.259,1
3.759.0
1.248.0
784,4
4,6%
17,0%
50,8%
16,9%
10,6%
1979
83.404,9
0,6%
9,3%
21,9%
46,4%
14,6%
7,3%
62,9%
12.380,7
649,8
2.647,9
5.549,3
2.465,6
1.068,2
5,2%
21,4%
44,8%
19,9%
8,6%
88.396,3
0,5%
10,2%
21,4%
45,6%
14,3%
8,0%
25,6%
4.991.4
1.267.4 
658,8
1.688,2
458,7
918,4
25,4%
13,2%
33,8%
9,2%
18,4%
111.969,2
0,7%
11,2%
18,6%
44,8%
16,9%
7,8%
92,6%
23.572,9
3.510,6
1.951.4
9.769.5
6.328.6
2.012.7
14,9%
8.3%
41,4%
26,8%
8,5%
Real Private Investments 1965-99
in S$miffion (Stocks, end of p erio d )
A n ita lics  typeset m eans th a t the  
nu m b er has been in terpo lated .
Total Private
1 9 8 2  1 9 8 3
124.772,5 139.421,9 159.900,9 172.624,4
of which primary sector 0,5% 0,3% 0,2% 0,2%
of which Construction, Real Estate 12,8% 13,5% 14,5% 13,9%
of which Manufacturing 17,7% 17,0% 15,7% 15,1%
of which Services 46,9% 46,6% 44,3% 43,1%
of which Overseas 14,1% 14,8% 17,9% 20,0%
of which not able to allocate 8,1% 7,9% 7,4% 7,7%
Total Private as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 53,6% 52,9% 57,7% 40,7%
Total Private 12.803,3 14.649,4 20.479,0 12.723,5
of which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 3.438,0 2.844,4 4.388,0 841,8
of which Manufacturing 1.149,2 1.614,7 1.468,2 917,2
of which Services 8.413,2 6.372,6 5.909,8 3.622,8
of which Overseas (1.418,1) 3.050,9 7.988,5 5.957,8
Not-Traceable 1.220,9 766,8 724,5 1.383,8
Real estate as % of total flow 26,9% 19,4% 21,4% 6,6%
Manu 9,0% 11,0% 7,2% 7,2%
Services 65,7% 43,5% 28,9% 28,5%
Overseas -11,1% 20,8% 39,0% 46,8%
Not-Traceable 9,5% 5,2% 3,5% 10,9%
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
186.482,1 203.021,8 221.353,6 267.180,1 288.382,6 303.327,2
0.1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1%
12,1% 10,7% 10,6% 11,8% 12,8% 13,6%
14,8% 15,7% 14,9% 13,4% 13,4% 12,8%
42,3% 42,6% 42,7% 40,4% 43,6% 45,1%
23,3% 23,3% 23,3% 27,2% 24,7% 23,4%
7,5% 7,6% 8,4% 7,1% 5,4% 5,0%
40,8% 53,4% 52,7% 94,1% 42,3% 31,9%
13.857,8 16.539,7 18.331,8 45.826,5 21.202,5 14.944,6
(1.436,5) (949,7) 1.885,7 8.056,6 5.303,1 4.466,3
1.569,7 4.321,0 1.170,7 2.676,0 2.887,4 167,5
4.410,0 7.680,6 8.016,4 13.462,7 17.674,7 11.134,4
8.857,2 3.994,7 4.093,1 21.313,6 (1.548,8) (350,9)
457,3 1.493,1 3.166,0 317,5 (3.113,9) (472,6)
-10,4% -5,7% 10,3% 17,6% 25,0% 29,9%
11,3% 26,1% 6,4% 5,8% 13,6% 1,1%
i 31,8% 46,4% 43,7% 29,4% 83,4% 74,5%
, 63,9% 24,2% 22,3% 46,5% -7,3% -2,3%
. 3,3% 9,0% 17,3% 0,7% -14,7% -3,2%
Reai Private investments 1965-99
in  S $ m il lio n  (S to c k s , e n d  o f  p e r io d )
A n  ita lics  typeset m eans th a t th e  
num ber has been in terpo lated .
Total Private
of which primary sector 
of which Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
of which not able to allocate
Total Private as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 
Total Private
of which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
Not-Traceable
Real estate as % of total flow 
Manu 
Services 
Overseas 
Not-Traceable
1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9
328.182,3 353.768,3 370.448,6 428.118,4 499.787,1 569.475,9 640.953,3 685.422,5
0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,0%
13,5% 14,5% 15,5% 18,5% 18,4% 17,4% 15,5% 14,8%
11,9% 11,7% 12,5% 12,4% 11,8% 11,7% 11,5% 11,2%
45,3% 46,0% 49,4% 47,8% 47,1% 46,4% 47,4% 47,9%
24,7% 23,4% 18,0% 17,0% 19,2% 20,7% 22,2% 22,7%
4,6% 4,4% 4,6% 4,2% 3,5% 3,8% 3,3% 3,4%
61,3% 49,2% 21,5% 73,7% 88,3% 69,4% 51,9% 43,4%
24.855,0 25.586,0 16.680,3 57.669,8 71.668,6 69.688,8 71.477,4 44.469,2
2.823,1 7.107,1 6.188,4 21.753,4 12.654,5 6.975,5 369,5 2.246,4
205,6 2.194,9 5.005,8 6.784,2 5.847,1 7.813,7 7.220,2 2.998,1
11.842,6 14.042,6 20.257,4 21.812,7 30.550,7 28.912,1 39.878,3 24.363,2
10124,8 1.643,6 (16.083,6) 6.363,8 22.781,3 21.977,1 24.409,2 13.152,2
(141,1) 597,9 1.312,2 955,8 (164,9) 4.010,4 (399,9) 1.709,3
11,4% 27,8% 37,1% 37,7% 17,7% 10,0% 0,5% 5,1%
0,8% 8,6% 30,0% 11,8% 8,2% 11,2% 10,1% 6,7%
47,6% 54,9% 121,4% 37,8% 42,6% 41,5% 55,8% 54,8%
40,7% 6,4% -96,4% 11,0% 31,8% 31,5% 34,1% 29,6%
-0,6% 2,3% 7,9% 1,7% -0,2% 5,8% -0,6% 3,8%
ReaI Public Investments 1965-99
Constant 1990 SSdofiars (after GDPdeflator)
in S $ m il!io n  (S to c k s , end o f period) Incr. 64-99 Overall
Loans Housing 60.937,0 504.066
Loans Manufacturing 2.231,3 12.833
Loans Transportation (28,5) 4.247
Loans Communication (29,6) 136
Loans Other Services (Tourism, Education, (0,0) 23.693
Loans Other (ind. overseas) 66,5 4.673
G Advances repayble to gov for Housing 356,9 9.787
Cap Exp. Agri + Mining + Quarrying 44,0 851
o Cap. Exp. Housing 3.103,9 58.910
Cap. Exp. Education, Health, Social Sec. 3.475,4 66.369
v Cap. Exp. Transportation & Communication 4.650,5 88.864Cap. Exp. Others 5.018,5 89.989
e Cap. Exp., which can not be allocated 61.729,9 496.750
1* ■ Q uoted Investments 116.441,4 820.166» Unquoted Investments 26.177,1 269.740
n Other Assets (691,4) 18.921Advances repay, to gov other than Housing 432,9 3.255
m Public Funds administered by Ministries etc. 0,0 7.225
TOTAL GOVERNMENT 283.915,8 2.480.477e of which primary sector 0,016% 0,034%
of which Housing 22,7% 23,1%n of which Manufacturing 0,8% 0,5%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 2,8% 7,4%
t of which not able to allocate 73,7% 69,0%
Total Gov. as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 23,3%
Additional Gov Assets without final fnv. Decision:
Cash 49.519,4 478.358
Gov stocks 87.952,7 675.026
Deposit with Investment Agents 1.641,7 21.400
1964 1965 1966 1967
841,2 987,3 1.160,4 1.273,5
14,1 66,0 287,0 0,0
28,5 26,3 24,4 22,8
29,6 15,1 12,4 8,4
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3
14,2 13,8 16,7 22,0
505,1 1.004,2 1.622,4 2.368,6
2,7 5,0 321,5 1.555,8
1.025,0 903,1 841,9 875,1
34,4 55,2 53,2 41,4
1968 1969 1970 1971
1.794,9 1.862,8 1.966,2 2.213,3
0,0 17,2 59,5 108,3
21,1 111,9 197,4 199,3
4,4 0,9 (0,0) (0,0)
116,5 144,4 255,1 317,1
0,2 0,2 0,1 0,1
28,3 39,3 45,4 45,9
3.062,9 3.538,6 4.356,2 5.688,8
2.517,8 2.996,3 3.857,1 3.537,4
1.575,8 551,3 189,7 153,5
38,9 41,1 43,4 45,8
.495,1 3.076,2 4.340,2 6.168,0 9.160,9 9.303,9 10.970,2 12.309,4
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
34,3% 32,5% 27,1% 21,0% 19,9% 20,4% 18,3% 18,4%
0,6% 2,1% 6.6% 0,0% 0,0% 0,2% 0,5% 0,9%
2,3% 1,3% 0,8% 0,5% 1,6% 2,8% 4,1% 4,2%
62,8% 64,0% 65,4% 78,5% 78,5% 76,6% 77,0% 76,6%
n/a 51,6% 80,7% 63,9% 65,0% 3,1% 19,6% 12,8%
41,7 62,4 44,6 129,5 95,1 94,9 241,1 1.162,8
476,8 427,9 362,7 124,8 392,9 1.265,7 1.536,8 2.400,8
8,0 20,5 45,5 49,3 57,3 360,3 165,1 190,3
Real Public Investments 1965-99
Constant 1990 SSdolIars (after GDPdeflat
in S$million (Stocks, end of period) 1972 1973 1974
Loans Housing 2.659,6 3.058,3 3.542,4
Loans Manufacturing 135,9 125,4 86,0
Loans Transportation 199,0 176,6 168,2
Loans Communication (0,0) 8,6 10,0
Loans Other Services (Tourism, Education, 399,1 924,0 1.032,7
Loans Other (incl. overseas) 0,0 0,0 0,0
G Advances repaybie to gov for Housing 
Cap Exp. Agri + Mining + Quarrying
54,3 51,8 46,0
o Cap. Exp. Housing
Cap. Exp. Education, Health, Social Sec.
V Cap. Exp. Transportation & Communication Cap. Exp. Others
e Cap. Exp., which can not be allocated 5.789,0 5.452,8 5.119,1
f Quoted Investments 3.605,4 4.185,1 4.605,5■ Unquoted Investments
n Other Assets 150,5 132,4 109,7Advances repay, to gov other than Housing 47,0 44,8 38,2
m Public Funds administered by Ministries etc. 89,4 134,9 138,2
TOTAL GOVERNMENT 13.129,2 14.294,7 14.896,0e of which primary sector 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
of which Housing 20,7% 21,8% 24,1%n of which Manufacturing 1,0% 0,9% 0,6%
t
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 4,6% 7,8% 8,1%
of which not able to allocate 73,7% 69,6% 67,2%
Total Gov. as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 8,0% 10,7% 5,1%
Additional Gov Assets without final Inv. Deci 
Cash 1.837,5 2.405,3 3.324,1
Gov stocks 2.692,7 2.089,2 1.370,8
Deposit with Investment Agents 185,8 51,0 20,5
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
4.691,1 5.716,5 6.341,8 6.712,2 6.992,9 6.954,8 7.600,3
90,5 113,4 126,4 68,4 54,6 85,3 130,0
165,8 151,1 378,1 424,3 384,0 326,9 291,8
9,7 9,6 9,4 8,7 7,7 6,4 5,5
1.100,0 1.025,1 925,8 768,9 991,3 1.835,9 2.605,9
0,0 0,0 0,0 294,3 373,1 83,7 0,0
47,6 51,6 55,3 59,1 65,7 65,1 56,7
1,2 2,7 7,5 13,1 18,5
226,7 536,5 842,9 1.077,6 1.329,4
119,4 330,8 514,6 709,5 1.048,0
262,9 627,2 1.049,3 1.525,4 1.925,7
129,0 282,2 471,3 663,3 1.137,7
5.517,3 6.283,4 6.417,5 6.266,4 5.957,7 5.343,6 5.008,4
3.619,3 3.250,0 3.387,6 3.214,1 4.177,0 6.316,8 10.236,3
1.408,2 2.373,9 2.559,7 3.999,3 3.960,0 3.675,2 6.272,0
72,4 59,6 56,1 54,6 67,7 160,9 298,9
28,7 21,2 23,6 27,0 45,7 57,4 69,9
137,4 144,7 156,1 162,0 189,6 194,1 215,1
16.888,1 19.200,1 21.176,7 23.838,6 26.152,5 29.095,1 38.250,1
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
28,1% 30,0% 31,3% 30,7% 30,2% 27,8% 23,5%
0,5% 0,6% 0,6% 0,3% 0,2% 0,3% 0,3%
7,6% 6.2% 8,0% 9,1% 11,3% 15,1% 15,4%
63,9% 63,2% 60,1% 60,0% 58,3% 56,7% 60,8%
17,3% 18,1% 16,0% 16,4% 11,8% 15,1% 36,0%
4.833,7 7.021,8 8.704,5 9.549,9 10.411,0 10.117,5 5.653,4
1.294,6 1.410,7 2.334,3 2.590,1 2.946,7 3.183,3 4.002,5
16,1 6,9 51,5 364,6 466,3 200,1 31,4
Real Public Investments 1965-99
G
o
V
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
Constant 1990 S$doliars (after GDPdeflat 
in S$million (Stocks, end of period)
Loans Housing
Loans Manufacturing
Loans Transportation
Loans Communication
Loans Other Services (Tourism, Education,
Loans Other (incl. overseas)
Advances repayble to gov for Housing
Cap Exp. Agri + Mining + Quarrying 
Cap. Exp. Housing
Cap. Exp. Education, Health, Social Sec. 
Cap. Exp. Transportation & Communication 
Cap. Exp. Others
Cap. Exp., which can not be allocated
Quoted Investments 
Unquoted Investments 
Other Assets
Advances repay, to gov other than Housing 
Public Funds administered by Ministries etc.
TOTAL GOVERNMENT
of which primary sector 
of which Housing 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.)
of which not able to allocate 
Total Gov. as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund
Additional Gov Assets without final Inv. Deci 
Cash
Gov stocks
Deposit with Investment Agents
1982
9.240.6
202,9
265.5 
4,8
2.823.3
0,0
136,0
27,4
1.610.7
1.506,9
2.258.4
1.632.4
4.803.5
10.871,3
5.094.8
420,2
12,0
226.5
41.137,2
0,1%
26,7%
0,5%
16,7%
56,1%
12,1%
8.005,4
6.789,6
3,5
1983
11.985.1
131,3
228,5
4,2
2.681,8
52.7
238.0
30.7
1.823.3
2.137.3
2.676,1
2.033.3
4.625.3
14.938.2
4.307.4
516.0
0,3
279,2
48.688,8
0,1%
28,8%
0,3%
15,9%
54,9%
27,3%
6.285,0
10.538,3
8,4
1984
12.434.8
111.7 
200,6
3,7
2.537.8
144.2
342.7
31,9
2.096.1
3.073.6
3.326.8
2.911.1
4.593,4
18.533.9
5.483.6
624,6
73,2
344.3
56.868,2 
0,1% 
26,2% 
0 ,2% 
16,1% 
57,5%
23,0%
4.431,6
14.156,8
31,2
1985
16.322.7
42,1
164,6
3,3
1.927.3
216,2
600,0
46,6
2.344.1
3.918.1
4.460.1
4.449,0
4.652.3
20.783.8
5.130,9
668,8
103,9
401,5
66.235,2
0 ,1%
29,1%
0,1%
15,8%
55,0%
29,9%
6.302,8
18.062,8
24,4
1986
21.495.5
15,4
63,7
2,9
806.3
262,9
805.3
57,3
3.732.6
4.539.6
5.891.3
6.286.6
4.718.3
23.399.5
5.423,7
653.7
100,6
422.8
78.678,0
0,1%
33,1%
0 ,0%
14,4%
52,5%
36,6%
6.353,2
23.988,7
53,0
1987
22.399,6
15,5
32.4 
0,7
257.6
281.7
887.0
58.4
4.119,2
4.612,1
6.171,7
6.660,0
9.525,0
23.777.3
7.677,4
626.7
90,1
422.0
87.614.4
0,1%
31,3% 
0 ,0% 
12,6%  
56,0%
28,8%
7.428,8
28.547,1
208,1
1988
20.425.0
103.0
9,9
(0,0)
123,7
269.1
844,3
55,0
3.879,0
4.343,2
5.811,9
6.271,7
13.495.0
23.592,9
10.104.1
581.1
88,3
398.2
90.395,4
0, 1%
27,8%
0,1%
11,4%
60,6%
8 ,0%
9.089,7
28.391,8
469,4
1989
17.904,5
170,0
2,8
(0,0)
61.5
256,7
770.5
52.5
3.699,9
4.142,7
5.543,5
5.982,2
17.064.7
25.137.3
13.417.8
558.5
105.6
417,4
95.288.3
0,1%
23,5% 
0,2% 
10,2%  
66,1%
10,0%
13.278,2
26.014,6
536,9
1990
16.788.6
214,8
2,4
(0 ,0)
21,2
235.2
679.5
50,0
3.526.0
3.948.0
5.283.0
5.701.0
19.808.7
28.023,4
13.953,9
523.3
112.6
472.3
99.343.7
0, 1%
21,1% 
0 ,2% 
9,3% 
69,3%
8,1%
1991
16.788,7
263,0
2,1
(0,0)
6,7
276.6
627,2
48,4
3.410.1
3.818.2
5.109.3
5.513,5
22.581,4
30.705,9
13.611,2
1.884,9
109,4
478.6
105.235,1
0,0%
19,8%
0 ,2%
8,5%
71,4%
12,6%
18.364,7 20.514,7
28.345,4 33.184,1
680,3 635,5
Real Public Investments 1965-99
Constant 1990 S$dollars (after GDPdeflat
in S$million (Stocks, end of period) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Loans Housing 17.126,2 18.142,6 21.526,8 26.248,4 32.381,1 41.802,8 53.746,7 61.778,1
Loans Manufacturing 736,9 847,5 870,3 892,4 1.129,8 1.456,0 1.831,4 2.245,4
Loans Transportation 1,8 1,5 1,2 0,9 0,2 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Loans Communication (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0.0) (0,0)
Loans Other Services (Tourism, Education, 3,6 0,8 (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
Loans Other (incl. overseas) 290,3 275,6 264,1 258,2 254,7 251,0 264,1 66,9
G Advances repaybie to gov for Housing 580,7 481,8 397,0 348,8 307,6 275,5 329,4 371,1
Cap Exp. Agri + Mining + Quarrying 47,8 45,3 43,4 42,5 41,9 41,3 43,4 44,0o Cap. Exp. Housing 3.367,7 3.196,7 3.063,4 2.995,1 2.954,3 2.911,2 3.063,4 3.103,9
Cap. Exp. Education, Health, Social Sec. 3.770,8 3.579,3 3.430,1 3.353,6 3.307,9 3.259,6 3.430,1 3.475,4
v Cap. Exp. Transportation & Communication 5.045,8 4.789,7 4.589,9 4.487,6 4.426,5 4.361,8 4.589,9 4.650,5Cap. Exp. Others 5.445,1 5.168,6 4.953,1 4.842,7 4.776,7 4.707,0 4.953,1 5.018,5
e Cap. Exp., which can not be allocated 25.775,0 27.941,9 29.427,6 32.156,0 37.679,6 43.200,2 53.670,2 62.235,0
r Quoted Investments 35.955,5 48.154,5 53.427,4 57.991,1 62.970,8 71.034,9 93.035,8 116.444,0« Unquoted Investments 13.218,4 14.843,9 15.909,3 21.501,6 22.516,0 22.374,6 24.746,2 26.177,1
n Other Assets 1.841,9 1.308,9 876,4 364,6 212,7 268,8 403,5 333,611 Advances repay, to gov other than Housing 96,1 83,9 80,2 83,5 275,5 332,3 352,0 432,9
m Public Funds administered by Ministries etc. 496,6 554,3 600,0 150,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
TOTAL GOVERNMENT 113.800,2 129.416,7 139.460,2 155.717,3 173.235,4 196.276,9 244.459,3 286.376,4e of which primary sector 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
of which Housing 18,5% 16,9% 17,9% 19,0% 20,6% 22,9% 23,4% 22,8%
n of which Manufacturing 0,6% 0,7% 0,6% 0,6% 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0,8%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 7,8% 6,5% 5,8% 5,0% 4,5% 3,9% 3,3% 2,8%
t of which not able to allocate 73,0% 76,0% 75,7% 75,4% 74,3% 72,4% 72,6% 73,6%
Total Gov. as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 21,1% 30,0% 13,0% 20,8% 21,6% 23,0% 35,0% 40,9%
Additional Gov Assets without final Inv. Deci
Cash 24.282,2 27.313,1 33.196,4 38.798,3 44.368,8 46.811,2 48.284,6 49.561,2
Gov stocks 39.620,5 37.663,1 35.808,5 38.985,8 47.692,2 58.260,0 80.120,6 88.429,4
Deposit with Investment Agents 1.043,6 1.545,6 2.795,9 2.494,7 2.357,3 2.581,1 1.998,6 1.649,7
Cl
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Real Public Investments 1965-99
in  S $ m il l io n  (S to c k s , e n d  o f  p e r io d )  In c r . 6 4 -9 9
Loans & Equity Agriculture 0,0
Loans & Equity Housing & Construction 23.059,4
Loans & Equity Manufacturing 5.177,2
Loans & Equity Transport & Communication 3.055,1 
Loans & Equity General Commerce 3.629,2
Loans & Equity Other Services 5.060,8
Loans & Equity Others 8.482,3
Real Estate 1.691,8
Overseas Gov Securities 1.037,6
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as 893,8
TOTAL DBS (Not founded until 1969) 52.087,2
of which primary sector 0,0%
Df which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 47,5%
of which Manufacturing 9,9%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 22,5%
of which overseas 2,0%
of which not able to allocate 18,0%
Total DBS as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 4,3%
Additional DBS Assets without final Inv. Decision:
Loans & Equity Financial Institutions, Invest! 4.438,8
64-99
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
(59,2) 
(0,0)
Loans (largely mortgages)
Staff Loans (largely housing)
Real Estate
Listed and unlisted shares
Bonds and Debentures
Overseas Gov Securities
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
Total POSBank (acquirred by DBS in 1998) (59,2)
of which Housing, Real Estate 0,0% 
of which overseas 100,0%
of which not able to allocate 0,0%
otal POSBank as %  of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 0,0%
Overall
826
95.719
55.309
26.475
25.617
32.049
52.169
16.684
4.969
22.693
332.509
0,2%
33,8%
16,6%
25,3%
1,5%
22,5%
51.619
69.907
74
1.948
6.702
12.567
189
11.041
102.428
70,2%
0 ,2 %
29,6%
1 9 6 4  1 9 6 5  1 9 6 6  1 9 6 7  1 9 6 8
59,2
0,00
59,2
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
57,2
0,01
57,2
0,0%
100,0%
0 ,0%
-0,2%
51,1
0,00
51,1
0,0%
100,0%
0 ,0%
-0,4%
40,5
0,2
40,7
0,0%
99,5%
0,5%
-0,4%
40,6
1,2
41,8
0,0%
97,1%
2,9%
0,0%
1 9 6 9
227,8
13,1
20,8
( 11. 1)
250,5
0 ,0%
8,3%
90,9%
0,0%
0,0%
0,8%
5,4%
0,0
0,3
0,3
0 ,0%
0,0%
100,0%
-0,9%
1970
9,4
0,2
261,4
15,4
31.8
0,0
100,3
54.8
12.8
486,2
1,9%
11,3%
53,8%
14,1%
0,0%
23,3%
2 ,8%
21,3
0,6
0.6
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
1971
9,4
24.7
408.2
49.7
30.3
0,0
138.2
73,0
11.4
744,9
1,3%
13,1%
54,8%
13,9%
0 ,0%
20,1%
2,5%
23,3
0,7
0,7
0,0%
0 ,0%
100,0%
0,0%
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Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miffion (Stocks, end o f period) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Loans & Equity Agriculture 7,9 8,5 5,8 4,9 3,8 33,4 33,5 8,8 95,0 104,5Loans & Equity Housing & Construction 52,5 96,0 89,3 87,6 178,8 130,5 186,0 209,2 253,4 460,7
Loans & Equity Manufacturing 513,1 628,0 656,0 761,3 794,3 975,8 1.076,7 908,4 1.141,9 1.533,6
Loans & Equity Transport & Communication 179,2 185,0 148,4 130,8 124,6 167,6 287,3 523,7 930,5 1.265,4
Loans & Equity General Commerce 37,1 75,5 73.7 87,4 67,4 81,0 153,6 236,9 366,7 412,7
Loans & Equity Other Services 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0.0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0Loans & Equity Others 429,2 472,6 453,7 456,3 532,4 197,4 279,1 407,6 501,8 839,8
Real Estate 141,1 182,0 219,4 245,4 297,9 337,6 336,9 259,3 223,4 255,2
Overseas Gov Securities 130,6 132,5 157,1 139,2
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as 85,0 127,2 120,9 131,1 373,2 369,9 232,8 375,7 347,1 388,8
TOTAL DBS (Not founded until 1969) 1.445,2 1.774,9 1.767,2 1.904,8 2.372,3 2.293,3 2.716,6 3.062,0 4.017,0 5.399,7
of which primary sector 0,5% 0,5% 0,3% 0,3% 0,2% 1,5% 1,2% 0,3% 2,4% 1,9%
of which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 13,4% 15,7% 17,5% 17,5% 20,1% 20,4% 19,2% 15,3% 11,9% 13,3%
of which Manufacturing 35,5% 35,4% 37,1% 40,0% 33,5% 42,6% 39,6% 29,7% 28,4% 28,4%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 19,8% 20,4% 20,1% 21,5% 16,2% 16,0% 25,1% 38,1% 48,6% 43,5%
of which overseas 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 4,8% 4,3% 3,9% 2,6%
of which not able to allocate 35,6% 33,8% 32,5% 30,8% 38,2% 24,7% 18,8% 25,6% 21,1% 22,8%
Total DBS as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 6,9% 3,0% -0,1% 1,2% 3,7% -0,6% 2,6% 1,8% 4,9% 5,4%
Additional DBS Assets without final Inv. Dec
Loans & Equity Financial Institutions, Invest! 69,8 101,5 132,8 191,5 191,5 118,9 240,8 405,2 655,2 669,8
Loans (largely mortgages) 58,8 162,7 324,3 439,2 517,0 1.318,6 1.723,5 1.958,8 1.983,9
Staff Loans (largely housing)
Real Estate 0,0 0,0 1,8 4,4 5,3 6,2 7,1 6,4 6,8
Listed and unlisted shares 4,2 5,0 6,1 10,2 18,0 27,9 52,8 81,0 90,4 63,6
Bonds and Debentures 0 0,0 0,0 3,0 77,4 224,2 252,8 199,8 132,3 279,0
Overseas Gov Securities
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as 7,1 5,3 14,1 12,7 13,4 17,3 78,0 87,4 155,9 156,7
Total POSBank (acquitted by DBS in 1998) 11.3 69,2 183,0 352,1 552,5 791,7 1.708,3 2.098,8 2.343,8 2.490,1
of which Housing, Real Estate 0,0% 85,0% 88,9% 92,6% 80,3% 66,0% 77,5% 82,5% 83,8% 79,9%
of which overseas 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
of which not able to allocate 100,0% 15,0% 11,1% 7,4% 19,7% 34,0% 22,5% 17,5% 16,2% 20,1%
otal POSBank as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 0,1% 0,5% 1,0% 1,5% 1,6% 1,9% 5,6% 2,0% 1,3% 0,6%
x 
3 
« 
oo 
w 
O 
“0 
C/) 
00 
O
in S $ m illio n  (Stocks, end o f period)
Loans & Equity Agriculture
Loans & Equity Housing & Construction
Loans & Equity Manufacturing
Loans & Equity Transport & Communication
Loans & Equity General Commerce
Loans & Equity Other Services
Loans & Equity Others
Real Estate
Overseas Gov Securities
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
TOTAL DBS (Not founded until 1969)
of which primary sector 
Df which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.)
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
Total DBS as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund
Additional DBS Assets without final Inv. Dec 
__[Loans & Equity Financial Institutions, Invest!
Loans (largely mortgages)
Staff Loans (largely housing)
Real Estate
Listed and unlisted shares
Bonds and Debentures
Overseas Gov Securities
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
Total POSBank (acquirred by DBS in 1998) 
of which Housing, Real Estate 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
otal POSBank as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund
Real Public Investments 1965-99
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
158,1 78,7 83,5 91,0 38,8
671,9 985,2 1.136,7 1.243,1 1.103,8
1.640,6 2.024,6 1.705,9 1.381,1 1.247,6
1.289,1 1.258,6 1.095,8 722,4 458,0
524,1 613,0 638,8 525,0 510,4
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1.122,5 1.009,5 1.128,7 1.544,3 1.600,3
1.085,4 1.170,2 1.621,1 821,4 861,7
180,4 229,7 128,8 378,2 88,8
413,3 535,4 563,6 721,5 677,9
7.085,4
2,2%
24,8%
23,2%
38,6%
2,5%
21,7%
7.904,7
1,0%
27,3%
25,6%
34,5%
2,9%
19,5%
8.102,9
1,0%
34,0%
21,1%
32,5%
1,6%
20,9%
7.427,8
1,2%
27,8%
18,6%
28,9%
5,1%
30,5%
6.587,3
0,6%
29,8%
18,9%
29,8%
1,3%
34,6%
7,1% 3,0% 0,6% -2,2% -2,5%
919,9 859,5 897,3 898,9 995,7
2.207,8
11,8
51,2
194,2
2.232,5
2,6
50.2
45.2 
145,3
2.228,8
3,8
71,1
52,8
111,9
2.291,0
5,3
86,9
41,4
100,4
2.673,9
6.1
93,0
41,2
60,4
201,2 899,2 1.104,4 1.559,8 1.805,0
2.666,2
83,3%
0,0%
16,7%
3.375,0
67,7%
0,0%
32,3%
3.572,8
64,5%
0,0%
35,5%
4.084,7
58,3%
0,0%
41,7%
4.679,5
59,3%
0,0%
40,7%
0,7% 2,6% 0,6% 1,6% 1,8%
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
30,8 12,5 7,8 0,0 0,0
851,0 728,7 1.061,6 1.988,0 2.235,6
1.513,9 1.526,0 1.639,2 1.470,7 1.701,2
404,1 317,6 405,9 385,4 349,0
700,5 722,5 905,5 983,9 817,9
0,0 971,6 1.287,9 1.531,6 1.679,4
1.858,2 1.170,5 1.263,0 1.368,7 1.689,6
242,8 286,8 224,5 274,6 370,7
46,8 40,4 47,1 54,7 82,9
1.017,2 1.108,8 1.482,6 979,5 1.389,0
6.665,2 6.885,3 8.325,2 9.037,0 10.315,2
0,5% 0,2% 0,1% 0,0% 0,0%
16,4% 14,7% 15,4% 25,0% 25,3%
22,7% 22,2% 19,7% 16,3% 16,5%
37,8% 49,0% 53,2% 65,8% 57,2%
0,7% 0,6% 0,6% 0,6% 0,8%
43,1% 33,1% 33,0% 26,0% 29,8%
0,3% 0,6% 3,0% 1,4% 2,7%
1.415,4 1.364,0 1.826,5 3.042,8 3.053,5
2.560,6 3.541,4 3.374,6 3.409,0 3.383,3
6,2 8,3 7,4 6,4 6,2
100,2 119,3 115,2 117,5 131,5
68,0 223,1 245,0 344,4 551,3
364,6 341,2 384,4 889,9 1.140,8
1.797,4 181,0 190,6 187,5 194,9
4.896,9 4.414,3 4.317,2 4.954,6 5.408,0
54,5% 83,1% 81,0% 71,3% 65,1%
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
45,5% 16,9% 19,0% 28,7% 34,9%
0,7% -1,4% -0,2% 1,3% 1,0%
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Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miilion (Stocks, end of period)
Loans & Equity Agriculture
Loans & Equity Housing & Construction
Loans & Equity Manufacturing
Loans & Equity Transport & Communication
Loans & Equity General Commerce
Loans & Equity Other Services
Loans & Equity Others
Real Estate
Overseas Gov Securities
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
TOTAL DBS (Not founded until 1969)
of which primary sector 
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.)
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
Total DBS as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund
Additional DBS Assets without final lnv. Dec 
Loans & Equity Financial Institutions, Invest!
Loans (largely mortgages)
Staff Loans (largely housing)
Real Estate
Listed and unlisted shares
Bonds and Debentures
Overseas Gov Securities
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
Total POSBank (acquirred by DBS in 1998) 
of which Housing, Real Estate 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
otal POSBank as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
0,0
3.065,3
2.004,2
510,9
1.205.1 
2.226,9
2.184.1
0,0
2.968.5 
2.366,0
646,6
940,5
2.968.5 
2.497,7
0,0
5.748.6
2.950.9
1.532.9 
1.667,1
2.433.6 
2.399,3
0,0
6.713.9 
3.179,1 
1.778,5
1.911.9
2.756.7
2.638.7
0,0
8.886.7
3.326.0
2.052.8 
2.000,8
3.144.1 
2.881,6
0,0
11.184,6
4.738,6
2.809.0
2.483.0 
3.582,5 
3.552,4
0,0
20.317,2
5.830.2
3.395.3
3.183.6
4.405.6 
8.955,8
0,0
23.059,4
5.177,2
3.055.1
3.629.2 
5.060,8
8.482.3
455,7
210,0
1.035,0
547,5
147,2
1.882,2
555,7
76,7
1.574,6
574,5
75,9
1.541,8
893.5
435.6 
1.821,5
903,0
232,2
1.951,6
1.456,1
917,0
538,7
1.691,8
1.037,6
893,8
12.897,2
0,0%
27,3%
15,5%
50,8%
1,6%
25,0%
14.964,6
0,0%
23,5%
15,8%
50,6%
1,0%
29,3%
18.939,5
0,0%
33,3%
15,6%
46,1%
0,4%
21,0%
21.171,0
0,0%
34,4%
15,0%
49,5%
0,4%
19,7%
25.442,6
0,0%
38,4%
13,1%
45,9%
1,7%
18,5%
31.436,8
0,0%
38,5%
15,1%
46,0%
0,7%
17,5%
48.999,5
0,0%
44,4%
11,9%
35,2%
1,9%
19,4%
52.087,2
0,0%
47,5%
9,9%
31,1%
2,0%
18,0%
6,4% 4,0% 5,1% 2,9% 5,3% 6,0% 12,8% 3,0%
2.606,8 3.012,6 3.104,2 4.023,9 4.469,4 5.598,3 6.269,9 4.438,8
3.154,0
5,9
136.5
600.6 
834,0
3.187,9
4,7
161,6
564,7
1.323,6
4.997,6
3,2
156,6
708,5
1.475,8
5.934.7 
3,3
169,0
756,8
1.289.7
6.869,0
2,8
195,1
1.030,4
1.318,9
9.373,5
2,3
194,2
1.018,1
1.423,4
277,6 318,5 335,5 452,0 477,0 508,3
5.008,5 5.561,0 7.677,3 8.605,5 9.893,2 12.519,8
65,8% 60,3% 67,2% 71,0% 71,4% 76,4%
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
34,2% 39,7% 32,8% 29,0% 28,6% 23,6%
-1,0% 1,1% 2,7% 1,2% 1,6% 2,6%
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Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miliion (Stocks, end o f period) Incr. 64-99 O v e ra ll
65-99
Fixed Assets 143,1 2.115
Staff Loans (largely housing) 3,2 63
Portfolio Investment 1.110,9 6.392
Debtors & Deposits 235,3 752
Overseas Gov Securities (39,8) 106
TOTAL CPF 1.452,7 9.429
of which Housing 0,2% 0,7%
of which overseas -2,7% 1,1%
of which not able to allocate 102,5% 98,2%
Total CPF as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 0,1%
Foreign Reserves (incl. Gold, IMF Drawing f 97.405,3 905.095
Fixed Assets 92,6 331
Overseas Investment (BIS participation) 48,1 129
Staff Loans 10,7 24
Other Assets 62,0 13.389
TOTAL MAS (not founded until 1971) 97.618,7 918.969
of which Housing 0,0% 0,0%
of which overseas 99,8% 98,5%
of which not able to allocate 0,2% 1,5%
Total MAS as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 8,0%
External Assets 16.904,2 215.588
Real Estate 53,8 465
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as 29,9 106
TOTAL BCCS (not founded until 1967) 16.988,0 216.159
of which Real Estate 0,3% 0,2%
of which overseas 99,5% 99,7%
of which not able to allocate 0,2% 0,0%
Total BCCS as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 1,4%
Official Foreign Reserves 110.043,4 1.239.623
above MAS + BCCS For Res. (4.266,1) 118.941
1964 1965 1966 1967
3,1 2,9 2,7 2,5
0,0 0 0,0 0,0
0,0 0 0,0 0,0
0,2 0,3 0,4 0,4
39,8 39,8 37,6 29,0
43,1 43,0 40,6 31,9
0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
92,3% 92,6% 92,5% 90,9%
7,7% 7,4% 7,5% 9,1%
n/a 0,0% -0,1% -0,3%
1968 1969 1970 1971
6,4
0,0
0,0
0,8
0,0
6,2
0,0
0,0
0,9
0,0
10,7
0
0
1,0
0
17,6
0,0
0,0
0,9
0
7,2
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
7,1
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
11,7
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
18,5
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
-0,5% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1%
1.473,9
69,8
1.543,7
0,0%
95,5%
4,5%
14,7%
1.090,9 1.343,5 1.605,4 1.841,3 2.048,8
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
1.090,9
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
38,1%
1.343,5
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
5,5%
1.605,4
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
5,6%
1.841,3
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
2,8%
2.048,8
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
2,0%
3.034.9
3.034.9
3.196.9
3.196.9
3.597.4
3.597.4
4.291.0
3.200.1
5.592,3
4.248,8
6.301,5
4.696,1
7.579,0
5.737,7
9.548,5
6.025,9
I
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Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miilion (Stocks, end o f period) 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
c
p
Fixed Assets
Staff Loans (largely housing) 
Portfolio Investment 
Debtors & Deposits 
Overseas Gov Securities
25,8
0
0
0,8
0
37,9
0
0
1,2
0
52,0
0,0
0,0
0,7
0,0
67,9
0
0
0,7
0
88,4
0,0
0,0
0,7
0,0
66,5
0
0
21,2
0
65,5
0
0
27,0
0
59,8
0,0
0,0
1,2
0,0
51,3
0,0
0,0
1,0
0,0
46,1
0,0
0,0
4,7
0
1
F
TOTAL CPF
of which Housing 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate 
Total CPF as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund
26,6
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,1%
39,1
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,1%
52,8
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,1%
68,5
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,1%
89,1
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,2%
87,8
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
92,6
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
61,0
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
-0,2%
52,3
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
50,8
0,0%
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
Foreign Reserves (inch Gold, IMF Drawing f 
Fixed Assets
2.782,7 3.504,2 4.276,3 6.081,1 8.726,9 11.083,8 13.114,3 13.690,0 14.346,4 10.997,6
M
Overseas Investment (BIS participation) 
Staff Loans
A
Other Assets 127,1 185,1 150,7 203,3 359,1 852,1 875,6 1.903,0 1.111,3 584,8
rV
s
TOTAL MAS (not founded until 1971)
of which Housing 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
2.909,7
0,0%
95,6%
4,4%
3.689,3
0,0%
95,0%
5,0%
4.426,9
0,0%
96,6%
3,4%
6.284,4
0,0%
96,8%
3,2%
9.086,0
0,0%
96,0%
4,0%
11.935,9
0,0%
92,9%
7,1%
13.990,0
0,0%
93,7%
6,3%
15.593,0
0,0%
87,8%
12,2%
15.457,6
0,0%
92,8%
7,2%
11.582,4
0,0%
95,0%
5,0%
Total MAS as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund 13,4% 7,2% 6,2% 16,1% 21,9% 23,1% 12,6% 8,1% -0,7% -15,2%
B
c
External Assets 
Real Estate
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
2.423,6
0,2
2.407,0
0,5
2.465,4
1,1
2.994,2
0,6
3.462,8
0,1
3.908,6
0,4
4.430,1
0,4
4.748,0
0,4
4.683,8
1,1
4.629,3
6,7
c
s
TOTAL BCCS (not founded until 1967)
of which Real Estate 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
2.423,8
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
2.407,5
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
2.466,5
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
2.994,8
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
3.462,9
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
3.909,0
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
4.430,5
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
4.748,4
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
4.684,8
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
4.636,0 
0,0% 
99 9% 
0,1%
Total BCCS as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund 3,7% -0,2% 0,5% 4,6% 3,7% 3,6% 3,2% 1,6% -0,3% -0,2%
Add. 
For Res.
Official Foreign Reserves
above MAS + BCCS For Res.
10884,99
5.678,7
11.372,9
5.461,8
11.078,2
4.336,5
12435,22
3.359,9
13499,18
1.309,5
14.506,3
(486,2)
18.012,2
467,8
18.749,9
311,9
18417,27
(612,9)
19.436,8
3.809,8
S
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in S$milIion (Stocks, end of period)
Real Public Investments 1965-99
Fixed Assets
Staff Loans (largely housing)
Portfolio Investment 
Debtors & Deposits 
Overseas Gov Securities
TOTAL CPF
of which Housing 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate 
Total CPF as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund
1982
40,8 
0,0 
0,0
7,8
0,0
48^ 6~ 
0,0% 
0,0% 
100,0%
0 ,0%
1983
38,7 
1.6 
0
5,2 
0
45,T  
3,4% 
0,0%  
96,6%
0,0%
1984
39,3
3,3
0,0
5,2
0,0
47^" 
6,9% 
0 ,0% 
93,1%
0.0%
1985
39,0
5,9
0,0
10,4
0,0
" H T
10,7%
0 ,0%
89,3%
0,0%
1 9 8 6
39,3
7,2 
0
3,4 
0
49jf  
14,4% 
0,0%  
85,6%
0,0%
1 9 8 7
37,5
7,3
0,0
4,1
0,0
4 8 ir  
14,9% 
0,0% 
85,1%
0 ,0%
1 9 8 8
39,2
4.8
81,5
3.8 
_0
129, f  
3,7% 
0 ,0% 
96,3%
1 9 8 9
35,4
5,5
138,1
6,3
0,0
185,3
3,0%
0 ,0%
97,0%
19 9 0
63,8
3,8
149,0
5,7
0,0
222,4
1,7%
0 ,0%
98,3%
1 9 9 1
70,5
3,5
221,7
5,8
0,0
301,5
1,2%
0 ,0%
98,8%
Foreign Reserves (incl. Gold, IMF Drawing f 
Fixed Assets
Overseas Investment (BIS participation) 
Staff Loans
16.187,2 15.948,4 16.041,7 20.662,9 25.159,0 30.150,5 29.504,5 28.308,5 36.466,6 41.531,4
Other Assets 544,1 633,9 561,3 602,6 483,2 397,0 599,6 419,8 366,2 315,3
IOTAL MAS (not founded until 1971)
of which Housing 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate
Total MAS as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund
16.731,2
0,0%
96,7%
3,3%
21,6%
16.582,3
0,0%
96,2%
3,8%
-0,5%
16.603,0
0,0%
96,6%
3,4%
0,1%
21.265,5
0,0%
97,2%
2,8%
14,9%
25.642,2
0,0%
98,1%
1.9%
12,9%
30.547,5
0,0%
98,7%
1,3%
15,8%
30.104,1
0,0%
98,0%
2,0%
-1,3%
28.728,3
0,0%
98,5%
1,5%
-2,8%
36.832,8
0,0%
99,0%
1,0%
16,2%
41.846,6
0,0%
99,2%
0,8%
10,7%
External Assets 
Real Estate
Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as
5.576,2
0,0
5.627,9
0,0
6.041,1
0,0
6.953,3
0,0
8.804,3
0,0
9.245,4
0,0
8.324,8
0,0
7.985,0
15,0
(15,0)
7.993,3
14.3
13.4
8.403,8
22,8
20,8
TOTAL BCCS (not founded until 1967)
of which Real Estate 
of which overseas 
of which not able to allocate 
Total BCCS as % of ToL Gross Inv. Fund
5.576,2
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
3,9%
5.627,9
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
0,2%
6.041,1
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
1,2%
6.953,3
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
2,9%
8.804,3
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
5,4%
9.245,4
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
1,4%
8.324,8
0,0%
100,0%
0,0%
-2,6%
7.985,0
0,2%
100,0%
-0,2%
-0,7%
8.021,0
0,2%
99,7%
0,2%
0,1%
8.447,5
0,3%
99.5%
0,2%
0,9%
Official Foreign Reserves
above MAS + BCCS For Res.
21.561,9
(201,5)
22.891,4
1.315,1
26.200,2
4.117,4
31.551,2
3.935,0
33.283,1
(680,2)
35562,73
(3.833,2)
36.607,9
(1221,4)
40511,23
4.217,8
48.521,3
4.061,4
53.967,9
4.032,7
S
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Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$mil!ion (Stocks, end o f period) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Fixed Assets
Staff Loans (largely housing)
103,6
3,9
126,0
2,9
138,0
2,6
131,1 
1 8
131,5 
2 0
137,9 
1 6
146,8
o ^
146,1
Portfolio Investment 
Debtors & Deposits 
Overseas Gov Securities
303,5
8,1
0,0
315,0
14,2
0,0
453,3
4,8
0,0
605,7
9,5
0
936,2
37,8
0,0
1.047,3
144,6
0
1.029,7
176,2
0,0
3 2 
1.110,9 
235,6 
0
TOTAL CPF
of which Housing
419,1 458,2 598,7 748,1 1.107,4 1.331,5 1.355,0 1 495 70,9% 0,6% 0,4% 0,2% 0,2% 0,1% 0,2% 0 2%of which overseas 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0 0% 0 0%of which not able to allocate 99,1% 99,4% 99,6% 99,8% 99,8% 99,9% 99^8% 99,8%
Total CPF as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 0,3% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,4% 0,2% 0,0% 0,1%
Foreign Reserves (incl. Gold, IMF Drawing f 
Fixed Assets
Overseas Investment (BIS participation) 
Staff Loans 
Other Assets
49.259,5
328,6
53.222,1
367,5
57.511,0 60.802,9 
410,6 326,2
69.276,7
64,3
235,5
76.706,1
84,7
33,9
5,3
182,3
90.873,6
89,9
47,5
8,5
131,8
97.405,3
92.6 
48,1
10.7 
62,0
TOTAL MAS (not founded until 1971) 49.588,1 53.589,5 57.921,6 61.129,2 69.576,5 77.012,2 91.151,3 97.618,7of which Housing 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0%of which overseas 99,3% 99,3% 99,3% 99,5% 99,6% 99,6% 99,7% 99 8%of which not able to allocate 0,7% 0,7% 0,7% 0.5% 0,4% 0,3% 0,2% 0^ 2%
Total MAS as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund 19,1% 7,7% 5,6% 4,1% 10,4% 7,4% 10,3% 6,3%
External Assets 9.542,5 10.817,1 9.805,3 11.246,2 10.671,0 12.994,8 14.568,9 16.904,2Real Estate 52,5 52,0 50,4 49,8 50,8 50 4 53 1 53 8Other Assets (sundry debtors, other fixed as 5,9 1,6 (2,4) 11,3 8,6 8,6 1T5 29^9
TOTAL BCCS (not founded until 1967) 9.600,9 10.870,7 9.853,3 11.307,4 10.730,5 13.053,8 14.633,5 16.988,0
of which Real Estate 0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 0,4% 0,5% 0,4% 0,4% 0,3%
of which overseas 99,4% 99,5% 99,5% 99,5% 99,4% 99,5% 99,6% 99,5%of which not able to allocate 0,1% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 0,2%
Total BCCS as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 2,8% 2,4% -1,3% 1,9% -0,7% 2,3% 1,1% 2,3%
Official Foreign Reserves 62.835,1 70.595,5 73.992,6 82.681,9 90.281,2 98.760,2 108.240,1 113.078,3
above MAS + BCCS For Res. 4.033,2 6.556,3 6.676,3 10.632,7 10.333,5 9.059,3 2.797,7 (1.231,2)
Real Public Investments i 965-99
in S$tni!!ion (Stocks, end o f period) incr. 64-99 O v e ra ll
Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF, MAS, BCCS 447.737,2 4.178.910,9 
of which primary sector 0,01% 0,04%
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 19,9% 18,1%
of which Manufacturing 1,7% 1,6%
of which Services 4,4% 6,4%
of which Overseas 24,8% 29,8%
of which not able to allocate 49,6% 44,5%
Total Gov ... as % of Tot. Gross inv. Fund 36,8%
Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF, MAS, BCCS 
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
Not-Traceable (incl.Agri)
Real estate as % of total flow 
Manu 
Services 
Overseas 
Not-Traceable (incl Agri.)
1964 1965 1966 1967
5.632,3 6.373,2 8.029,3 10.531,5
0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
15,2% 15,7% 14,7% 12,3%
0,3% 1,0% 3,6% 0,0%
1,0% 0,6% 0,5% 0,3%
n/a 51,7% 45,9% 41,4%
n/a 30,9% 35,4% 46,0%
n/a 65,8% 105,8% 87,4%
741,0 1.656,1 2.502,2
146 176 118
52 221 (287)
(17) (5) (6)
160 392 674
400 871 2.002
19,7% 10,6% 4,7%
7,0% 13,3% -11,5%
-2,2% -0,3% -0,2%
21,6% 23,7% 27,0%
54,0% 52,6% 80,0%
1968 1969 1970 1971
14.802,3 15.863,3 19.047,6 22.691,8
0,00% 0,00% 0,05% 0,04%
12,3% 12,1% 10,9% 10,4%
0,0% 1,5% 1,7% 2,3%
1,0% 1,6% 2,7% 2,7%
38,1% 39,7% 39,8% 42,1%
48,7% 45,0% 44,9% 42,5%
92,8% 22,8% 37,5% 34,7%
4.270,7 1.061,1 3.184,2 3.644,3
528 100 144 290
- 17 42 49
111 115 264 99
1.272 669 1.277 1.970
2.360 161 1.457 1.237
12,4% 9,4% 4,5% 8,0%
0,0% 1,6% 1,3% 1,3%
2,6% 10,8% 8,3% 2,7%
29,8% 63,0% 40,1% 54,0%
55,3% 15,1% 45,7% 33,9%
Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miilion (Stocks, end of period)
Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF. MAS, BCCS
of which primary sector 
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
of which not able to allocate
Total Gov... as % of Tot. Gross Inv. Fund
Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF, MAS, BCCS 
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 
of which Manufacturing 
of which Services 
of which Overseas 
Not-Traceable (incl.Agri)
Real estate as % of total flow 
Manu 
Services 
Overseas 
Not-Traceable (incl Agri.)
1972 1973
25.624,5 27.736,4
0,03% 0,03%
11,3% 12,4%
2,5% 2.7%
3,5% 5,3%
42,5% 41,0%
58,8% 55,3%
28,8% 19,4%
2.932,7 2.111,9
551 539
28 (11)
264 587
1.337 488
753 508
18,8% 25,5%
0,9% -0,5%
9,0% 27,8%
45,6% 23,1%
25,7% 24,0%
1974
28.128,9
0 ,02%
14,4%
2,6%
5,6%
39,4%
55,2%
3,3%
392,5
613
(39)
95
(295)
19
156,2%
-10,0%
24,1%
-75,1%
4,9%
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1
31.852,7 36.072,5 39.708,2 47.244,3 52.027,6 55.037,9 66.218,9
0,02% 0,01% 0,09% 0,08% 0,03% 0,20% 0,19%
16,9% 18,5% 19,2% 19,4% 19,4% 19,1% 17,7%
2,7% 2,5% 2,8% 2,4% 1,9% 2,2% 2,5%
5,3% 4,4% 5,2% 6,0% 7,9% 11,5% 12,4%
39,0% 37,4% 36,5% 38,4% 36,3% 33,7% 29,6%
55,9% 61,1% 64,5% 60,7% 61,9% 58,8% 53,3%
32,3% 32,9% 29,4% 46,3% 24,3% 15,5% 43,9%
3.723,8 4.219,8 3.635,8 7.536,1 4.783,2 3.010,3 11.181,1
1.338 1.291 926 1.541 945 439 1.153
4 23 13 (58) (14) 31 45
120 (116) 494 779 1.271 2.244 1.868
1.357 1.064 1.007 3.637 739 (308) 1.002
905 1.958 1.196 1.638 1.841 605 7.113
35,9% 30,6% 25,5% 20,4% 19,8% 14,6% 10,3%
0,1% 0,5% 0,4% -0,8% -0,3% 1,0% 0,4%
3,2% -2,8% 13,6% 10,3% 26,6% 74,5% 16,7%
36,4% 25,2% 27,7% 48,3% 15,5% -10,2% 9,0%
24,3% 46,4% 32,9% 21,7% 38,5% 20,1% 63,6%
Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miilion (Stocks, end o f period) 1982 1983 1984
s Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF, MAS, BCCS 73.043,3 83.539,4 95.353,1
II of which primary sector 0,25% 0,13% 0,12%
sf which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 20,5% 22,1% 20,9%Mfin of which Manufacturing 2,5% 2,6% 1,9%
M of which Services 13,1% 12,5% 12,3%
A of which Overseas 29,8% 27,7% 27,6%
R of which not able to allocate 55,4% 56,1% 57,6%
Y Total Gov... as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 28,6% 37,9% 33,3%
Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF, MAS, BCCS 6.824,3 10.496,1 11.813,8
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 3.271 3.524 1.450
of which Manufacturing 73 (72) (20)
of which Services 1.367 867 1.315
of which Overseas 2.166 1.379 3.208
Not-Traceable (inci.Agri) (54) 4.798 5.860
Real estate as % of total flow 47,9% 33,6% 12,3%
Manu 1,1% -0,7% -0,2%
Services 20,0% 8,3% 11,1%
Overseas 31,7% 13,1% 27,2%
Not-Traceable (incl Agri.) -0,8% 45,7% 49,6%
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 19911985
109.956,8
0,13%
21,6%
1,3%
11,5%
29,0%
59,5%
46,7%
14.603,6
3.782
(70)
845
5.600
4.446
25,9%
-0,5%
5,8%
38,3%
30,4%
123.761,0
0,08%
24,9%
1,0%
10,7%
27,0%
61,7%
40,6%
13.804,3
7.059
(27)
648
1.443
4.681
51,1%
-0,2%
4,7%
10,5%
33,9%
135.185,2
0,07%
23,1%
1, 1%
10,1%
26,3%
67,2%
36,9%
11.424,1
395
0
327
2.238
8.465
3,5%
0,0%
2,9%
19,6%
74,1%
139.031,8
0,05%
21,5%
1,2%
9,8%
26,4%
69,4%
11,1%
3.846,6
(1.336)
88
70
1.039
3.986
-34,7%
2,3%
1,8%
27,0%
103,6%
149.047,0
0,04%
18,2%
1,2%
9,5%
27,2%
71,7%
20,6%
10.015,2
(2.659)
67
512
3.910
8.185
-26,5%
0,7%
5,1%
39,0%
81,7%
162.472,9
0,03%
16,5%
1,0%
9,4%
29,9%
74,2%
26,8%
13.426,0
(371)
45
1.022
8.018
4.713
-2 , 8%
0,3%
7,6%
59,7%
35,1%
175.586,7
0,03%
15,4%
1,1%
8,4%
30,8%
76,9%
28,0%
13.113,8
172
48
(362)
5.475
7.781
1,3%
0,4%
-2 ,8%
41,7%
59,3%
Real Public Investments 1965-99
in S$miffion (Stocks, end o f p e r io d ) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
s Total Gov, DBS, POS, CPF, MAS, BCCS 195.347,2 221.417,0 241.126,8 269.311,1 300.319,2 340.690,4 403.396,3 453.334,9
u
M
of which primary sector 0,02% 0,02% 0,02% 0,02% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01%
af which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 14,3% 13,0% 15,1% 16,0% 17,5% 19,6% 19,6% 19,9%
of which Manufacturing 1,4% 1,5% 1,6% 1,5% 1,5% 1,8% 1,9% 1,6%
M of which Services 7,9% 7,2% 7,0% 6,8% 6,5% 6,5% 6,3% 5,4%
A of which Overseas 32,3% 31,9% 30,7% 30,7% 30,2% 29,1% 27,1% 25,2%
R of which not able to allocate 78,7% 77,8% 76,7% 76,3% 77,3% 76,3% 79,1% 79,7%
Y Total Gov ... as % of Tot Gross Inv. Fund 48,7% 50,1% 25,4% 36,0% 38,2% 40,2% 45,5% 48,8%
Total Gov, DBS, POS. CPF, MAS, BCCS 19.760,5 26.069,8 19.709,8 28.184,3 31.008,1 40.371,2 62.705,9 49.938,6
3f which Housing, Construction, Real Estate 969 798 7.756 6.537 9.504 14.162 12.272 11.095
A F of which Manufacturing 474 111 23 22 237 326 375 414rn of which Services 536 568 820 1.554 1.089 2.693 3.180 (965)i of which Overseas 8.994 7.697 3.327 8.688 7.959 8.309 10.178 4.959n o Not-Traceabie (incl.Agri) 8.788 16.896 7.785 11.382 12.219 14.882 36.700 34.435u w Real estate as % of total flow 4,9% 3,1% 39,3% 23,2% 30,6% 35,1% 19,6% 22,2%a Manu 2,4% 0,4% 0,1% 0,1% 0,8% 0,8% 0,6% 0,8%
I s Services 2,7% 2,2% 4,2% 5,5% 3,5% 6,7% 5,1% -1,9%
Overseas 45,5% 29,5% 16,9% 30,8% 25,7% 20,6% 16,2% 9,9%
Not-Traceable (incl Agri.) 44,5% 64,8% 39,5% 40,4% 39,4% 36,9% 58,5% 69,0%
Real Private investments 1965-99
C onstan t 1990 SSdollars (a fte r G DPdefla tor)
in  S $m iiiion  (S tocks, end  o f  pe riod ) , Incr. 64-99 O vera ll
Loans Agriculture * 81,2 3.164
Loans Housing & Construction 28.481,6 288.962
Loans Manufacturing 4.118,0 142.420
Loans Transport & Communication 240,1 15.755
Loans General Commerce 13.077,2 323.709
Loans Non-Bank Financial Institutions 14.035,6 158.502
B Loans Other Services 13.679,7 156.437
Loans Others; 2 .012,1 57.071
A Fixed and Other Assets 10.526,2 83.783
N
1/
Overseas 76.511,5 694.248
Non-gov Securities 2.879,7 59.260
i\ . TOTAL COMMERCIAL BANKS (Excl. DBS) 165.642,6 1.983.311,3
S o f which primary sector 0,0% 0,2%
o f which Housing, Construction 17,2% 14,6%
o f which Manufacturing 2,5% 7,2%
of which Services (incl. Transp. & Comm.) 24,8% 33,0%
o f which overseas 46,2% 35,0%
o f which not able to allocate 9,3% 10,1%
Total Banks as % o f T o t Gross Inv. Fund 13,6%
Finance Companies’ Housing Loans 2.931,3 43.444
Finance Companies’ Hire-Purchase/Lease Fine 3.749,2 54.998
B Merchants' Banks' deposits with Non-Sing Banl 4.182,6 62.474N Finance + Insurance Companies' Domestic Sec 1.412,8 26.586
ao Fixed and Other Assets 1.475,1 76.218n TOTAL NON-BANK FIN INST. 13.751,0 263.719,6
? k
o f which Housing 21,3% 16,5%
of which Private Consumption 27,3% 20,9%
s of which overseas 30,4% 23,7%
o f which not able to allocate 21 ,0% 39,0%
Total Non-Banks as %  o f T o t Gross Inv. Fund 1,1%
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
87,3 85,6 84,1 82,5 81,0 70,4 92,6 80,1
41,8 54,5 71,1 92,6 120,7 119,7 121,5 112,8
893,8 983,7 1.082,6 1.191,4 1.311,2 937,4 1.576,0 1.569,7
0,0 (14,2) (44,6)
854,7 985,4 1.136,1 1.309,8 1.510,1 1.566,4 1.658,9 1.909,1
66,8 83,5 104,3 130,3 162,7 163,4 184,1 324,5
268,5 305,5 347,6 395,5 450,0 661,4 696,8 678,3
185,0 255,2 352,0 485,6 669,8 588,7 1.963,0 2.167,9
334,0 362,0 392,3 425,2 460,9 499,5 362,7 471,7
10,0 14,5 21,0 30,4 44,1 63,8 227,4 233,1
128,8 147,4 168,6 193,0 220,8 252,7 283,0 367,6
2.870,6 3.277,2 3.759,6 4.336,2 5.031,3 4.923,4 7.151,9 7.870,4
3,0% 2,6% 2,2% 1,9% 1,6% 1,4% 1,3% 1,0%
1,5% 1,7% 1,9% 2 ,1% 2,4% 2,4% 1,7% 1,4%
31,1% 30,0% 28,8% 27,5% 26,1% 19,0% 22 ,0% 19,9%
41,5% 41,9% 42,2% 42,3% 42,2% 48,6% 35,3% 36,4%
0,3% 0,4% 0 ,6% 0,7% 0,9% 1,3% 3,2% 3,0%
22 ,6% 23,3% 24,3% 25,5% 26,9% 27,2% 36,5% 38,2%
36,1% 30,8% 20 ,1% 15,1% -2,3% 26,3% 6,9%
149,7 167,9 188,3 211,1 236,7 265,4 222,5 291,4
137,0 153,5 172,1 192,9 216,2 242,3 239,6 293,7
0,5 0 ,7 1,0 1,6 2,4 3,6 5,5 8,3
76,2 86,6 98,4 110,5 104,9 108,5 183,4 246,4
85,4 104,6 128,2 191,3 215,9 227,6 250,6 276,9
448,8 513,3 587,9 707,3 776,0 847,4 901,6 1.116,7
33,4% 32,7% 32,0% 29,8% 30,5% 31,3% 24,7% 26,1%
30,5% 29,9% 29,3% 27,3% 27,9% 28,6% 26,6% 26,3%
0,1% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,3% 0,4% 0 ,6% 0,7%
36,0% 37,2% 38,5% 42,7% 41,3% 39,7% 48,1% 46,9%
5,7% 4,8% 4,2% 1,5% 1,5% 0,6% 2 ,1%
